


PERMANENT COUNCIL



OEA/Ser.G  
CP/doc.4148/06  
30 August 2006  
Original: Spanish

SEVENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT  
COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA  
(MAPP/OEA)



**MAPP/OEA**

This document is being distributed to the permanent missions  
and will be presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization.

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I. BACKGROUND

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “[t]o instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. INTRODUCTION

MAPP/OEA

Since the sixth report was submitted to the Permanent Council, the MAPP/OEA and the peace process itself have both made significant progress. It must be recalled, however, that this progress has been achieved in a context of great complexity, inherent in any peace process and particularly in the one under way in Colombia, which has been marked by conflict for more than 50 years. The Secretary General’s quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA give a snapshot of what could be the foundations of a broader structure of peace.

In this respect, mention must be made of the Secretary General’s visit to Colombia between July 11 and 15 of this year. During that visit, the Secretary General held meetings with various government authorities, including President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, to share views on the peace process in the country. Likewise, the Secretary General met with the leaders of the MAPP/OEA and with the coordinators of its regional offices, and received firsthand information on the status of their work.

At the invitation of the mayor of Medellín, the Secretary General was able to observe the social reintegration projects under way in that major city.

With specific reference to the Mission, the member states and observer countries gave a highly positive response to the Secretary General’s appeal to expand their support for the Mission. That appeal was for the countries interested in assisting the Mission to provide financial, material, and human resources. Of particular importance was the establishment of the “Friends of the OAS Peace Mission in Colombia,” a group of countries that includes Canada, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.

The Government of the Netherlands deserves special recognition as the MAPP/OEA’s main contributor since the Organization started work in Colombia.

The Swedish Government renewed its commitment to the Mission, with generous funding and the fielding of a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) expert and of a specialist in working with nongovernmental organizations. The Government of Sweden also reported that it is prepared to earmark an annual sum in support of the Mission.

The Government of Canada has become an active partner in financing the Mission since 2005, and it is hoped that this valuable support will continue.

Along the same lines, the Secretary General notes that The Bahamas made a second contribution to the Mission, in July 2006.

The Secretary General is also grateful to Ireland for its decision to support the Mission through its 2005 contribution, and its offer to renew this effort for 2006.

In June 2006, the Government of Thailand generously made a financial contribution to the Mission.

The donation of vehicles and computer equipment last year by the Republic of Korea constituted a substantial contribution to the work of the Mission.

The Secretary General also wishes to thank the Governments of Mexico and Brazil for their valuable support in financing the participation of experts in various fields, including human rights, social affairs, diplomatic relations, and public safety. In this respect, the Government of Guatemala has informed the General Secretariat that it has appointed a Guatemalan professional to be a member of the Mission. The Governments of Argentina, Chile, and Peru have contacted the Mission to explore the possibilities of contributing to it by financing experts.

The United States has announced a major contribution to funding of the Mission for this year.

The Government of Spain, through its Council of Ministers, approved a significant contribution to the Mission. In addition, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) has decided to make another major contribution to the Mission.

The Government of Norway informed the General Secretariat of its desire to make a generous financial contribution to the Mission, arrangements for which are now being worked out.

The municipal government of Medellín has provided funding under an agreement signed with the Mission to incorporate a team of six social workers to strengthen the Mission's activities in the city's neighborhoods. The regional office in Medellín now has a solid team more proportionate to the challenges in that region of the country.

All of this support has enabled the Mission to increase its presence, with its 34 international verifiers, 17 local professionals, and 34 individuals providing temporary assistance—for a total of 85 participants, 38 percent of whom are women.

Following a commitment given by the Secretary General, the Mission has adopted the Basic Manual for the performance of its functions. This manual contains clear and precise instructions for

the Mission's verification experts to use in relation to (i) the cessation of hostilities, (ii) concentration, disarmament, and demobilization, (iii) dismantling of illegal armed units, (iv) maintenance of public order in demobilization areas, (v) reintegration, (vi) observance of Law 975/2005 (the Justice and Peace Law), and (vii) the field work methodology for use with communities affected by violence. The Secretary General has coordinated the advisory services offered to the Mission by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Also noteworthy is the fact that, as part of its mandate, the Mission has taken a crosscutting approach in matters relating to gender, children's rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples and communities of African descent, both for the displaced population and for the communities receiving former combatants.

### THE PEACE PROCESS

In the period covered by this report, progress was made in negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). Specifically, in February and April, representatives of the national government and of this guerrilla organization met in Havana, Cuba, in the second and third rounds of the Formal Exploratory Phase. The Governments of Cuba, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland participated in those meetings, as did various sectors of Colombian society.

In accordance with one of the agreements from the second round, on March 7 the national government recognized two leaders of this illegal armed group as representative members for a period of three months. The parties agreed that, following the third round, they would address the design of the process and preparation of the agenda, in order to seek common ground for moving forward in the search for peace.

On May 31, the national government renewed the representative member status of the ELN delegates, so that the Formal Exploratory Phase could continue.

The Colombian Government also cited the possibility of creating a zone for discussion with the FARC, as part of a cease-fire by that group. By means of a communiqué, that guerrilla group called upon Colombians to vote in favor of a proposal for dialogue and peace in the presidential elections held on May 28.

Since the launching of peace negotiations with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in November 2003, there have been 37 mass demobilization ceremonies in the course of which 30,915 members of this irregular armed group have begun the transition to civilian life. The month of April saw the dismantling of units that had remained outside the Santa Fe agreement, including the Héroes del Guaviare and the Los Llanos fronts and the Élder Cárdenas Bloc (BEC). It now remains to demobilize a last holdout unit of the BEC and the Cacique Pipintá Bloc. The last holdout unit of the BEC should be demobilized by the end of August 2006. It must also be noted that, while there has been contact with the Campesinas del Casanare Self-Defense Forces, no agreement has yet been reached on their demobilization.

In this context, the Mission identified a number of violations of the demobilization commitments, and failure to dismantle illegal armed units. The Mission also found shortcomings and gaps in the reintegration of former combatants. These considerations and observations derive from

the Mission's mandate, and it is hoped that they will be taken into consideration by the Colombian Government.

The Mission has noted with concern the appearance of new groups in the area where the demobilized units were operating. They are being led by middle-ranking officers (demobilized or not), who in some cases are recruiting former paramilitary combatants. These units, as noted in the Sixth Report, are expanding and taking control of illegal economic activities.

On the other hand, the conclusions from a detailed analysis of the reintegration process show gaps in the coverage of the official offer. These gaps are particularly apparent in the fields of health, psychosocial support, and education, and many former combatants have no possibility of finding work or pursuing productive projects. It is clear that the pace of demobilization has exceeded the response capacity of the Program for Return to Civilian Life (*Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil*, PRVC), which was not prepared to deal with such numbers of people. On this basis, the Mission can say that, despite the positive efforts made in the last few months, the PRVC remains in critical condition, and this poses a risk to the long-term viability of the peace process.

The General Secretariat reiterates that the success and sustainability of the peace process will depend on:

1. The attention paid to communities affected by violence;
2. Official recovery of the territories over which illegal groups have held sway; and
3. Effective reintegration of demobilized combatants.

### III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND AUC DEMOBILIZATIONS

In the period from February to May 2006, there were six mass demobilizations, involving overall 8,625 members of the AUC. During this time, demobilization of the Próceres del Caguán Front, the Héroes de los Andaquíes and Héroes de Florencia in the Department of Caquetá, and the Putumayo Southern Front in the Department of Putumayo completed the dismantling of the armed units of the Bolívar Central Bloc, except for the Cacique Pipintá Bloc. A three-stage demobilization has been agreed to for the Elmer Cárdenas Bloc in Urabá Antioqueño and Chocoano; to date, two phases have been completed, and demobilization of another unit in the Department of Chocó is pending.

To sum up, in the course of the peace process with the AUC, from its beginning in 2003 until the month of May 2006, 36 armed units have been demobilized. The last year has been the most intense period of demobilizations, accounting for 52.89 percent of the total, representing 16,352 combatants over a period of four months (see Annex A).

Of the 30,915 former AUC members demobilized, 94 percent (29,036) are men and 6 percent (1,879) are women.

The men-to-weapons ratio in the demobilized units is one weapon for every two combatants. Nevertheless, there are some groups that fall below this average: the Northern Bloc (Chimila), where the ratio is 0.28; the Northern Bloc (La Mesa) with 0.32; the Tolima Bloc with 0.24; and the Ortega Self-Defense Forces with 0.27.

When it comes to the type of weapon, 76 percent of the weapons turned in were long weapons, 17 percent were side arms, and 7 percent were support weapons, distributed in the following manner:

LONG WEAPONS	
RIFLES	12,412
SHOTGUNS	706
CARBINES	166
TOTAL	13,284
SIDE ARMS	
SUBMACHINE GUNS	245
PISTOLS	1,519
REVOLVERS	1,256
TOTAL	3,020
SUPPORT WEAPONS	
MACHINE GUNS	216
GRENADE LAUNCHERS m203	6
SINGLE-SHOT GRENADE LAUNCHERS	458
MULTIPLE GRENADE LAUNCHERS (MGL)	89
MORTAR TUBES	423
ROCKET LAUNCHERS	44
TOTAL	1,236

On the basis of this balance sheet, the destruction of weapons, which has yet to begin, remains of prime concern on the Mission's verification agenda, considering the progress made with disarmament, the quantity of weapons surrendered by the demobilized AUC, and the time they have remained in government hands.

With respect to the main areas of demobilization<sup>1/</sup>, 60 percent of demobilized persons are to be found in four departments: Antioquia (29%), Córdoba (14%), Cesar (9%), and Magdalena (8%). As to the municipalities with the greatest concentration, first come the capital cities: Medellín (3,037), Montería (1,859), Valledupar (1,548), and Santa Marta (1,228). Prominent on the list as well are towns such as Tierralta (Córdoba) with 940 demobilized persons, Caucasia (Antioquia) with 728, Turbo (Antioquia) with 646, Puerto Boyacá (Boyacá) with 600, Valencia (Córdoba) with 505, San Pedro de Urabá (Antioquia) with 467, Carepa (Antioquia) with 412, and Apartadó (Antioquia) with 439. The demobilized and returning population is heavily concentrated, then, in the following

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1. Contact departments and municipalities, to April 26, 2006.

regions: Occidente de Córdoba, Urabá Antioqueño, Bajo Cauca, and Magdalena Medio. In fact, 50 municipalities account for 70% of the demobilized population (See map).

#### IV. VERIFICATION OF THE DISMANTLING OF AUC UNITS

Generally speaking, the blocs and fronts that had been operating in the country's various regions have been broken up, and most of the former combatants are now in the process of reintegration into civilian life and are returning to their home regions.

The Sixth Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA identified a series of worrisome phenomena arising subsequent to the demobilizations, including the regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs that control specific communities and illegal economic activities; holdouts who have not demobilized; and the emergence of new armed groups and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilized groups.

The Mission has continued to monitor these dynamics, focusing on certain critical areas in which it has attempted to verify that the demobilized units have been effectively dismantled.

In specific zones, there appear to be emerging situations of possible rearmament and the appearance of armed groups claiming to be the "new generation of paramilitaries."

These new armed units are appearing in various guises: as verified by the Mission and stated by the local authorities and certain civilians, these situations represent an amalgamation of various forces and interests from different illegal sectors. There is no one interpretation that will cover them all.

The Mission has confirmed, in a series of verification visits, that these new armed groups have varying make-ups, ranging from holdout members of groups that have not demobilized to members of the AUC who, after being demobilized, took up arms again. The Colombian Government has in recent weeks recognized the situation and expressed its concern, but at the same time it has warned that if the members of the demobilized groups take up arms again, they will lose their entitlement to the benefits of Law 975 of 2005.

The Mission is also concerned over police reports of the discovery of secret caches of weapons that certain AUC groups failed to hand over when they were demobilized. This situation calls for stepped-up verification and for investigation by the competent authorities. The Mission is in the course of verifying these reports, and is following the matter closely.

Since the latter half of last year, the Mission has conducted post-demobilization visits, mainly in the Departments of Norte de Santander, Nariño, Córdoba, Guajira, and Bolívar. It has also been pursuing a broad agenda based on preliminary information, in follow-up to the concerns expressed in the Secretary General's Sixth Report.

Following is a description of the main findings from verification visits in the five departments mentioned above.

### *Norte de Santander*

In the Department of Norte de Santander, the Mission verified the existence of illegal armed groups operating in drug trafficking corridors. These groups are expanding and seizing control of certain territories, and have the potential to become an armed organization of greater dimensions.

The modus operandi of these armed groups coincides with that of the old self-defense units, which has led local inhabitants to link them with the demobilized fronts. Some reports suggest that middle-ranking officers who were part of the Catatumbo Bloc are involved, as well as some former members of that organization. The Mission found that these groups were using heavy-handed recruitment methods among demobilized personnel in this area, and these have involved a series of killings and individual displacements.

In geographic terms, these armed groups have been found in the municipalities of Puerto Santander, Cúcuta, Sardinata, Tibú, and El Tarra, and are reported to be expanding towards the municipalities of El Carmen and Convención, as well as Curumaní, which is located in the Department of Cesar.

### *Nariño*

In the Nariño cordillera the Mission monitored an armed group that calls itself “Nueva Generación” (“New Generation”), which is led by a middle-ranking officer from a unit of the dismantled Libertadores del Sur Bloc (BLS) that did not take part in the demobilization process. Its activity focuses on controlling revenues from drug trafficking, and it operates in a strategically important area from which it has access through the mountainous section in the north of the department to the Pacific Ocean, via the Patía River.

It must be noted that the region in which the “Nueva Generación” group was detected coincides with the zone of operations of the demobilized BLS, and it holds sway over the municipalities of Leiva, El Rosario, Policarpa, Cumbitara, and Los Andes. According to some reports, this group is now expanding and has come into conflict with subversive groups operating in the area.

### *Córdoba*

In follow-up to verification of rearmament in this department, the Mission confirmed the presence of two armed groups. The first is located between the municipalities of Puerto Libertador and Montelíbano. It includes demobilized personnel. In the wake of action by the national army, it has fallen back towards more remote villages beyond Tierradentro.

The second armed group operates in the municipalities of Valencia and Tierralta, especially in the vicinity of the Urrá Dam, which was the turf of the demobilized Córdoba Bloc and the Héroes de Tolová Bloc. After the latter group was dismantled, an armed faction that did not take part in the demobilization process was identified, and it controls the local drug traffic.

The Mission is also working with its Montería office on verification activities in the village of Tierradentro in the municipality of Montelíbano (Córdoba), where it has detected the presence of an



armed group consisting of demobilized paramilitaries. In this case, the Mission has been closely monitoring the beginnings of rearmament and the official response. It is the active role of the community and its leaders that has brought each of these situations to light, in an area that was historically under the control of illegal armed groups, and where the government has begun to establish its presence.

### *Guajira*

The Mission has received information from various sources about an armed unit operating in the area of Bahía Portete, municipality of Uribia, Alta Guajira. This faction, which consists of no more than 40 men, did not take part in the demobilization, and is being led by one of the commanders of the Wayuú counterinsurgency front, a group belonging to the Northern Bloc paramilitaries.

### *Bolívar*

The Mission is concerned over the results of the preliminary verification in the village of Pueblito Mejía, municipality of Barranco de Loba (Bolívar), where it has identified the involvement of demobilized personnel in criminal activities, threats, kidnapping, and, generally speaking, in undermining public order. The Mission is following the situation closely, with the cooperation of various state and nongovernmental institutions.

In conclusion we may say that, as confirmed by the verifications conducted in the Departments of Norte de Santander, Nariño, Córdoba, Guajira, and Bolívar, the activity of these groups is linked to drug trafficking, and their *modus operandi* is highly similar to that of the paramilitary groups that formerly operated in these zones.

Information from the verification visits reveals that demobilized and non-demobilized former commanders of middle rank and former members of the paramilitary groups are involved in illegal activities. To date, there is insufficient evidence to claim that the dismantled groups or their former commanders are heading up the illegal activities detected.

It is important to mention that the Mission will be pursuing its verification work in the remaining regions, where information has been received on possible failures in the dismantling of armed groups.

## V. VERIFICATION OF REINTEGRATION

The Mission has prepared an analysis of the reintegration process, starting with the official offers stipulated in the PRVC “*Modelo de Atención*” (Services Model), which provides a period of two years to apply for benefits. The process was observed at the national level, in the Reference and Opportunity Centers (CRO)<sup>2/</sup>, and in the demobilized units.<sup>3/</sup>

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2. The CROs are information and assistance centers for demobilized ex-combatants, set up by the national government. Former members of irregular armed groups are supposed to apply to these centers at the end of the concentration, demobilization, and disarmament phase. There, they can complete the necessary formalities for their full return to civilian life and can receive information on the benefits to which they are entitled.

The Mission found that, on the basis of the units demobilized up to June 15, 2006, the coverage ratio of the PRVC is 65 percent: of the 30,028 demobilized combatants in question, the program has served 19,752.<sup>4/</sup> In other words, 35 percent of former combatants have not accepted the official offer. On the other hand, of the total of former AUC members, 66 percent have been located by the program. The units with the lowest coverage rate are those that were demobilized during 2006, reflecting the fact that they were only recently dismantled and that there is no CRO established to serve this population.

The pace of demobilization has exceeded the response capacity of the PRVC, which was not prepared to cope with such numbers of people. To this must be added other factors, such as the fact that, in some cases, former combatants are unaware of the benefits, requirements, and responsibilities involved; the lack of trust in government agencies; misunderstanding of the interests and capacities of former combatants; the lack of institutional infrastructure; and the tenuous presence of the state in some parts of the country.

With respect to the identification and documentation process, the Mission concludes that 26 percent of former AUC members did not give *versión libre*<sup>5/</sup> during the mass demobilization, and that only 36 percent have a *pasado judicial*.<sup>6/</sup>

On the health front, places had been arranged in the health system as of April 2006 for 32,777 PRVC beneficiaries. This would be enough to provide coverage for all demobilized AUC members, but is inadequate to serve their immediate family members. Moreover, that figure includes spaces for individual demobilized persons, numbering 10,117. Consequently, it can be said that there is not enough capacity to bring demobilized personnel and their families into the subsidized health system.

Moreover, looking at former combatants who have been in the reintegration process for more than six months, it has been found that only 47 percent have joined the Social Security System, and this figure does not include either the Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) or the Ortega Self-Defense Forces (AO).

In terms of psychosocial care, this continues to be one of the weakest points of the PRVC. According to the PRVC, service was provided in May and June, through psychosocial workshops conducted under contract with local and national operators, for 3,678 persons, equivalent to 12 percent of the demobilized corps, without considering the BCN and the AO. Despite the progress and initiatives of the last few months, much remains to be done to deal with post-traumatic stress and

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3. This analysis is found in the document *Desmovilización y Reincorporación: Panorama General* (“Demobilization and Reincorporation: An Overview”), prepared on the basis of information provided by the Ministry of Interior and Justice, to June 2006.

4. This number does not include persons served by the Peace and Reconciliation Program of the Medellín Municipal Government, who are excluded from this analysis, nor does it include the Ortega Self-Defense Forces and the Héroes de Granada Bloc. The Municipal Government of Medellín is taking care of all demobilized personnel of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, and around 75 percent of those of the Héroes de Granada Bloc.

5. In this procedure, the demobilized person gives his own “free version” of the events in which he was involved. He may confess, but he is not obliged to do so.

6. The *pasado judicial* is a judicial certificate given only to persons with a clean criminal record.

individual suffering, prevent the health risks of drug addiction and family violence, and re-socialize former combatants.

Education coverage is also poor. Bearing in mind that 10,039 former combatants have been in the reintegration process for more than six months (without counting the BCN and the AO), only 48 percent have taken the “initial module.” According to PRVC records to June 2006, total enrollment in this module is 9,836, i.e., 32 percent of the demobilized corps: in the case of vocational training, the figure is 17.5 percent, and in academic training, 8.2 percent, reflecting low rates of coverage (again, without counting the BCN and the AO).

The dropout rate in formal education is high, much higher than for vocational training, which may be explained by the fact that demobilized persons have an incentive to learn a trade that will provide short-term income. Programs that offer immediate remuneration, such as the “civic auxiliaries” and “manual eradicators,” while they constitute alternatives to short-term work, have increased the dropout rate in some regions, because people prefer to earn income rather than complete the education process.

Nevertheless, temporary jobs such as those under the “Civic Auxiliaries” program being implemented with the national police can be a positive experience. The goal is to bring 3,700 demobilized persons into traffic control training programs under the supervision of professional police officers.

The manual eradication of illegal coca crops, which is being verified in Urabá and Córdoba, with the participation of more than 1,500 demobilized AUC members, is a fact to take into consideration. To the extent that these (admittedly incipient) efforts, supervised by government and international institutions, can help to eliminate such crops and restore those lands to legality, this will contribute to building peace.

It was found that only 263 demobilized persons were involved in income-earning projects. According to surveys taken in the Temporary Relocation Zone, demobilized personnel are more attracted to urban trades than to rural activities.

The Peace and Reconciliation Program of Medellín is showing positive results through its “Return to Legality” model. From its evaluation and monitoring of this program, the Mission can say that it constitutes a model to bear in mind. It demonstrates the basic steps that the government can take successfully to provide guidance and support for individuals and groups in the most complex period of reinsertion, which runs from the handover of weapons to the necessary shift from a “violence mindset” to a “legality mindset.” Greater stress is now being placed on preparing former combatants before they enter the labor market. It is interesting to note that, recognizing the need to continue this process, the city government has extended the program from 18 to 24 months.

## VI. MONITORING LAW 975/2005 (THE JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW)

The Mission has been conducting special monitoring and observation of progress in implementing Law 975/2005 (the Justice and Peace Law). This quarter was marked by two important

events: the Constitutional Court ruled on a challenge to this Law, and the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR) was established.

In its judgment C-370/06, the Court recognized the constitutionality of the alternative penalties, but quashed certain articles in order to bring the proposed law into line with the principles of the Colombian constitution and international treaties.

In its verification work, the Mission is monitoring the establishment and inauguration of the CNRR. The Commission presented a proposed “roadmap” in January 2006, thereby launching a participatory process that has included hearings, forums, and debates, intended to define the model of reparations that will be applied in the country, and the Mission has been following the process. It is very important to note that the Commission is receiving support from the United Nations (OCHA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as from countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Spain.

In order to gather information on application of the Justice and Peace Law, the IACHR has conducted three visits to meet with authorities, victims, and civil society organizations, and to observe the judicial proceedings prior to demobilization. On August 1, the IACHR issued a statement on the application and scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia.

## VII. PARTICIPATORY COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

One of the main components of the Mission’s work is to support local initiatives in conflict zones, by promoting measures to encourage trust and reconciliation in a culture of democracy, peace, and peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the identification, formulation, and management of socially oriented initiatives and projects in those areas.

In those places where the Mission has a permanent presence, it has followed a number of participatory initiatives targeted at communities that have been the victims of violence, and at those that are hosting demobilized combatants in their return to civilian life. This involves work on the following topics, among others: Alternative Dispute Settlement Methods, Confidence-Building Measures, Reconciliation and Reconstruction of the Social Fabric; Coexistence, Reacquaintance, and Historical Memory (*Convivencia, Reencuentro y Memoria Histórica*); and Psychosocial Support. The most notable progress has been made in Tierralta (Córdoba), and work is beginning in Medellín (Antioquia).

In Medellín, with the strengthening of the regional office, the Mission is now monitoring the Peace and Reconciliation Program for demobilized ex-combatants. It has also reinforced its presence in the communes.

The *Conciliemos* Community Justice Program in Tierralta (Córdoba)

In those parts of Colombia that have experienced armed confrontation, communities have suffered from the lack of government services such as the administration of justice, and this has led the local people to resort to “methods” borrowed from the illegal armed groups themselves. The

Mission is trying to help fill the existing vacuum in this area, until the state and its institutions can extend their presence to those zones.

In implementing the *Conciliemos* Community Justice Project in Tierralta, the Mission has conducted assessments in the communities, put forward the concept of conciliator, and selected 55 community leaders for training as *conciliadores en equidad* (conciliators). The leaders represent approximately 60 communities, with a total population of some 7,000.

#### VIII. SPECIAL MONITORING ACTIVITIES

As part of its verification work, the Mission is following specific cases and situations that involve apparent violations of human rights.

In the Sixth Report, the Mission referred to the disappearance of the youth Jesús Emiro Manzano, during the events in Lamas Verdes and Nuevo Horizonte, in the municipality of Curumaní (Cesar). The Secretary General reports that, thanks to the Mission's monitoring, the young man was found alive.

The Secretary General also reports the murder of the Arhuaco man Miguel Niño, and the forced disappearance of his son, Filadelfo Niño, which occurred in the rural area of the municipality of Pueblo Bello (Cesar) on August 11, 2004. Under its mandate, the Mission will continue to follow this case closely.

Another case that the Mission is monitoring involves the murder of the Kankuamo indigenous leader Freddy Arias on August 4, 2004, in the municipality of Valledupar (Cesar).

The Secretary General also calls attention to complaints by nongovernmental organizations that have approached the Mission to express their concern over threats from groups that, with new names, refer to themselves as *autodefensas* or paramilitaries.

On June 16, 2006, the IACHR issued a press release expressing concern over threats against human rights defenders in Colombia.

#### IX. CONCLUSIONS

The demobilization of more than 30,000 AUC members during the current peace process constitutes a significant step forward in consolidating peace in Colombia. During this stage, while some holdouts still refuse to demobilize, it is of vital importance to continue supporting the reintegration efforts in the country.

The Secretary General notes progress in the process of demobilizing and disarming the AUC, but warns that specific situations arising in some regions will have to be closely monitored.

Timely attention to events following demobilization of the AUC, such as violations of the agreements, the appearance of new illegal groups, and holdouts that refuse to demobilize, should

allow the Colombian authorities to correct these irregularities in time. In this context, the Secretary General considers that, if the peace process is to be consolidated, the institutions of the Colombian state will have to give priority to the recovery of those territories, villages, and districts where demobilization has occurred.

The Secretary General is also concerned over the discovery of weapons caches following demobilization of some AUC blocs. The Mission will take care to verify these facts and urges the authorities to conduct the necessary investigations.

Similarly, the Secretary General insists on the need to destroy the weapons surrendered during demobilization, in light of the time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Colombian state.

Generally speaking, the Program for Return to Civilian Life has not succeeded in providing coverage for the majority of those demobilized. The Secretary General reiterates the need to broaden the coverage to all demobilized ex-combatants, and to increase efforts in this direction.

Finally, attending to the communities affected by violence is a central concern of the Secretary General. In this regard, the *Conciliadores en Equidad* Program, which is having an impact in 60 communities in the municipality of Tierralta (Córdoba), represents a model that should be pursued.

In order to contribute further to the consolidation of a lasting and stable peace in the country, the Secretary General considers it essential that the Mission continue its activities under the mandate conferred upon it.



**MAPP/IOEA**



ANNEX A


Numbers demobilized, by sex, number of weapons surrendered and men/weapons ratio

YEAR	UNIT	TOTAL DEMOB.	MEN	WOMEN	WEAPONS	RATIO
2003	CACIQUE NUTIBARA BLOC	868	860	8	497	0.57
	ORTEGA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	168	168	0	47	0.27
2004	BANANERO BLOC	447	431	16	351	0.78
	SOUTHERN MAGDALENA AND ISLA DE SAN FERNANDO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	47	47	0	38	0.81
	CUNDINAMARCA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	148	146	2	156	1.05
	CATATUMBO BLOC	1,425	1,399	26	1,115	0.78
	CALIMA BLOC	557	536	21	451	0.8
2005	CORDOBA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	925	897	28	393	0.42
	SOUTHWESTERN ANTIOQUEÑO BLOC	125	121	4	103	0.82
	MOJANA FRONT	110	106	4	103	0.93
	HEROES DE TOLOVA FRONT	465	446	19	256	0.55
	MONTES DE MARIA BLOC	594	580	14	364	0.61
	LIBERTADORES DEL SUR BLOC	689	632	57	596	0.86
	HEROES DE GRANADA BLOC	2,033	1,998	3	1,120	0.55
	META AND VICHADA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	209	197	12	231	1.11
	PACIFICO - HEROES DE CHOCO BLOC	358	314	44	279	0.77
	SECURITY RING <sup>7</sup>					
	CENTAURUS BLOC	1,135	1,090	45	754	0.66
	NORTHWESTERN ANTIOQUEÑO BLOC	222	221	1	153	0.68
	VICHADA DEL BCB FRONT	325	299	26	282	0.86
	TOLIMA BLOC	207	190	17	51	0.24
	NORTHEASTERN ANTIOQUEÑO - BAJO CAUCA AND MAGDALENA MEDIO FRONTS (BCB)	1,922	1,799	123	1,390	0.72
HEROES Y MARTIRES DEL GUATICA FRONT (BCB)	552	524	28	351	0.63	
VENCEDORES DE ARAUCA BLOC	548	506	42	409	0.74	
2006	MINEROS BLOC	2,790	2,576	214	1,432	0.51
	CAMPESINAS DE PUERTO BOYACA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	742	704	38	316	0.42
	CENTRAL BOLIVAR - SOUTH BOLIVAR BLOC	2,523	2,168	355	1,094	0.43
	RESISTENCIA TAYRONA BLOC	1,166	1,135	31	597	0.51

7. The Security Ring (*Anillo de Seguridad*) de Santa Fe de Ralito was formed by men from the Centauros Bloc, the Libertadores del Sur, the Pacífico Bloc, and the Vencedores de Arauca Front. They were demobilized in the Department of Córdoba but their weapons were included in data on their original units.




CAMPESINAS DEL MAGDALENA MEDIO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES	990	961	29	757	0.76
PROCERES DEL CAGUAN - HEROES DE LOS ANDAQUIES AND HEROES DE FLORENCIA FRONTS (BCB)	552	486	66	341	0.61
SOUTHERN PUTUMAYO FRONT (BCB)	504	487	17	292	0.57
JULIO PEINADO BECERRA FRONT	251	240	11	179	0.71
NORTHERN BLOC (CHIMILA)	2,215	2,043	172	625	0.28
NORTHERN BLOC (LA MESA)	2,545	2,230	315	833	0.32
HEROES DEL GUAVIARE FRONT AND HEROES DE LOS LLANOS FRONT	1,765	1,718	47	1,006	0.56
COSTANERO FRONT - ELMER CARDENAS BLOC	309	297	12	218	0.71
ELMER CARDENAS BLOC – SECOND PHASE	484	484	0	360	0.74
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>30,915</b>	<b>29,036</b>	<b>1,879</b>	<b>17,540</b>	<b>0.56</b>




**MAPPIOEA**

**50 municipalities  
accounting for  
more than 70% of  
the demobilized  
population**



Processed by the MAPP/OAS Analysis Unit,  
Cartographic Base of the Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institute

## Verification of the dismantling of AUC armed units



1. Puerto Santander, Cúcuta Sardinata, Tibu and El Tarra
2. Leiva, El Rosario, Policarpa, Cumbitara and Los Andes.
3. Puerto Libertador and Montelíbano
4. Valencia and Tierralta.
5. Bahía Portete, municipality of Uribia
6. Corregimiento Pueblito Mejía municipality of Barranco de Loba (Bolívar)

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