## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Quarterly Report</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quarterly Report</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quarterly Report</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Quarterly Report</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Quarterly Report</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Organization of American States and The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia thank the Colombian government and the people of Colombia for their invaluable contribution to peacebuilding.

Volume I

Periodic reports of the Secretary General to The Permanent Council on The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)

2004-2007

Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia 2002-2010
Sergio Caramagna, MAPP/OAS Chief 2004-2008

Photographs- MAPP/OAS

2019 Edition

Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
First Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

I. Introduction

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in keeping with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “to instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.” This document is also intended for presentation to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth regular session, to be held in Quito, Ecuador, from June 5 to 8, 2004.

II. The MAPP/OEA mission

A. The mandate

On January 23, 2004, the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the OAS signed an agreement defining a mission to monitor the peace process (MAPP/OAS). Then, on February 6, 2004, the OAS Permanent Council adopted the aforementioned resolution, “Support to the Peace Process in Colombia,” CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), authorizing the establishment of the mission and spelling out its mandate.

The MAPP/OEA was given a broad, integrated mandate consistent with the basic principles of the Organization. Here, recognition is due to the permanent representatives for the vital contributions and support they offered during the regular meeting of the Permanent Council held on February 6, 2004.
Of special note is the broad nature of the mandate, clearly aimed at comprehensive support to the peace process being carried out by the Colombian people. All actors in the conflict are included: guerrilla groups, Self-Defense Forces, and, most especially, the communities affected by the violence.

The central concerns of promoting and defending human rights and justice and of building confidence and security are fundamental to the tasks this Mission is initiating. It is not empty rhetoric to say that the Mission is inspired by these essential values. They are also a guiding principle of OAS actions in general.

B. Conduct of the Mission

During January and February, missions were formed to make contact with government institutions, representatives of cooperating countries, and international organizations. By April, the Mission had, on a temporary basis, two (2) international verification officials in Medellín and one (1) staff member at the central level.

Temporary Mission headquarters were set up in Bogotá. A move to permanent, independent headquarters is in progress. Another office has been established in Medellín to monitor the reintegration process. That office operates with assistance from Medellín City Hall, which provides the facilities, staff, and basic equipment.

The difficulty of obtaining funds with which to carry out the mandate fully has had a strong impact on the Mission’s performance and limits its potential. Accordingly, continued efforts to secure the essential funding from various countries and cooperating organizations are pursued on a priority basis. The Mission’s budget is provided in Appendix I.

C. Coordination with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)

Contact and communication with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is under way, in keeping with the decisions of the Permanent Council. Coordination has begun and staff are exploring how to work together on advisory services, communications, and action. To that end, exploratory and coordination efforts are being initiated with the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Office of the Defender of the People, and the Catholic Church, with a view to working in indigenous communities affected by the violence.

D. Activities of the Mission

During the first quarter of operations, the Mission has been in contact with the various sectors and institutions, local communities, nongovernmental human rights organizations, and other parts of the international community, introducing the Mission and raising awareness of its mandate.

In this context, and in keeping with its mandate, it has monitored the national Government’s peace policies as they pertain to irregular armed groups.
As for demobilized irregular groups, the Mission has monitored the fulfillment of commitments, following in particular the legal status of demobilized persons and their reintegration into the work force and civilian life.

Considering that the weapons turned over by demobilized groups have not yet been destroyed owing to existing legal provisions in Colombia, the Mission is making the necessary efforts with the authorities to bring about the appropriate reforms and make expeditious destruction possible during future demobilizations.

At the request of the Government of Colombia, the Mission participates in negotiating sessions between the Government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, observing the authorities but not acting as mediators. This has made it possible, on the one hand, to explain the details of the Mission’s mandate to one of the actors in the conflict and, on the other, to gain first-hand knowledge of these illegal armed groups.

At the initiative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Mission is participating in designing projects for communities affected by violence, promoting their transition to institutional rule.

With the help of private enterprise and other cooperating bodies, the Mission is preparing activities to reintegrate former combatants, their families, and persons displaced by the conflict.

III. Unfolding of the peace process in general

Since the beginning of the tasks entrusted to the Mission to monitor efforts by the Government and people of Colombia to bring about peace, the technical nature of the Mission has been emphasized. This involves recognizing, first and foremost, the expertise and skill developed by the Colombians.

Therefore, the first steps are to learn about and recognize that expertise and skill. The national institutions, intellectuals and the academic sector, men and women working in the field, the enormous commitment of the Catholic Church and its talks with all actors in the conflict, the Facilitating Commission of Antioquia, the communities that have opposed the violence in peaceful and heroic ways, the nongovernmental organizations—in all these the Mission recognizes the enormous experience gained and effort expended by Colombians in facing the armed conflict over these many years.

Witnessing that great ability on the part of Colombians is the Mission’s first function. The conviction is that the peace process will be valid and sustainable as long as it is directed and carried out by Colombians themselves.

E. Indicators of violence

The impetus of the democratic security policy and the launching of the peace process by the Colombian Government have established security conditions that a large part of the population considers positive.
The indices of violence (homicides, abductions, massacres, and forced displacements) have dropped during 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. Still, the national Government has evaluated the cessation of hostilities by the Self-Defense Forces and found it to be incomplete.

The Mission has drawn upon official information on the course of the violence and on data provided by independent organizations of recognized professionalism.

**F. Peace process with the Self-Defense Forces**

The agreement of Santafé de Ralito, signed on July 15, 2003, by the national Government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), marks the beginning of demobilization of these outlaw armed groups, which the authorities plan to complete no later than December 31, 2005.

As a first step under the agreement, on November 25, 2003, 847 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) of the AUC in the city of Medellín turned over 623 rifles, short weapons, and support weapons, in addition to ammunition. The OAS was present as a special guest for this activity.

On December 7 of that year, 156 men belonging to the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega, in Cajibío, Department of Cauca, were demobilized. The OAS was invited.

**1. Legislation**

The Penal Alternatives Bill, presented by the Executive in the middle of last year as a legal means of advancing negotiations on the disarmament and demobilization of all the illegal groups, has come under criticism. Congressional and human rights groups have taken the lead on this position. The original proposal has been the subject of public hearings, which have led to amendments. The new proposal, now entitled Justice and Reparations Act, has been received by the international community as a positive step and is now in the congressional approval process. The Self-Defense Forces have been critical of the proposal.

**2. Negotiations**

These are being held at the bilateral level with various factions, at a unified negotiating table. Continued efforts are under way to establish points of consensus leading to a timetable for their geographic centralization, a more effective cessation of hostilities, demobilization, and reintegration. This process continues with the will of the parties to keep the dialogue going and come up with a solution to the conflict.

The Self-Defense Forces are not a homogeneous entity; internal disputes exist. These struggles may had led to the chaotic events that caused the disappearance of a top AUC leader. The prosecutor’s office is working to clarify this situation.

In perspective, and in the context of the democratic security policy, the peace process agenda is linked to negotiations with the Self-Defense Forces, especially on the establishment of centralization zones where conditions will be conducive to a cessation of
hostilities. On this point, the Mission’s verification mandate can be fulfilled effectively only under these conditions.

3. Follow-up on demobilized groups

a) Reintegrated former members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (AUC-BCN)

- Murders. Two demobilized young men were murdered.
- Guillermo Echevarria Correa was shot to death on January 3 of this year while walking with his wife and son. The police and the prosecutor’s office have gotten involved, and one of the alleged culprits is under prosecution.
- Asdrúbal de Jesús Campuzano died as the result of acts of violence that took place on February 15 of this year. No one has been found responsible to date.
- The MAPP/OEA office in Medellín is following up on these cases and their investigations.
- Legal status

The demobilized individuals have been documented: 862 identification cards and 420 military service records (200 more are being processed). The Administrative Department of Security (DAS) has issued 639 certificates. The status of 215 demobilized individuals is as yet undetermined.

The latter are subject to a writ of prohibition, having been charged with conspiracy to commit an offense. According to information provided by the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, there are 254 individuals with judicial case records. Some are under prosecution with confidential case files.

To date, fourteen (14) demobilized individuals have been detained. Two cases have to do with offenses committed after the demobilization. In the others, the corresponding analysis has not been completed. Thirteen (13) of these are in the Bellavista Penitentiary and Prison Facility and one (1) is in the Itagúí Maximum Security Prison. Some of these cases are in preliminary investigations, some are at trial, and five (5) individuals are now serving sentences.
The Mission is monitoring the situation of detainees, visiting penitentiaries, and attending hearings with the Office of the Prosecutor in Medellín, to follow up on cases and obtain official information on the dates of the offenses committed and any links among them.

The reintegration process is handled by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the City Hall of Medellín, and the Democracy Corporation (Corporación Democracia), an umbrella organization of demobilized individuals. The Program provides for security, psychosocial follow-up, training in coexistence and community safety, vocational placement, education, integration into the health care system, and subsidies.

Progress has been observed in all of these areas. The situation of demobilized persons, as of April 26, was as follows:

| Staff of the Democracy Corporation and spokespersons | 6 |
| Victims of homicide | 2 |
| Detainees | 14 |
| Working | 762 |
| Receiving psychological support | 807 |
| Participating in the Peace and Reconciliation Program | 407 |
Within the Peace and Reconciliation Program, 70 demobilized individuals have been trained under the Schools of Coexistence and Citizen Safety project. Its aims are to produce community leaders and to provide follow-up and assistance to the demobilized as a whole. In addition, 18 demobilized individuals are now in primary school, 52 are in secondary school, 115 are enrolled in one-year technical courses, and 91 are enrolled in university studies.

b) Demobilized former members of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega

After demobilization, four (4) were arrested for homicide. Later, three were freed for lack of evidence. One has a pending case of another nature.

A number of state institutions and some international organizations are sponsoring projects to support community reintegration. These include building a road to link the village to the department seat, installation of an electric plant, issuing land titles in the area, and naming a professor for each of the five districts or comarcas. The Mission is negotiating a community project.

IV. Conclusions

1. The Mission continues to work for its installation according to its mandate. As yet, it lacks the basic resources for its logistical operations and the hiring of staff. This affects its ability to fully monitor the peace process and limits its deployment in the country, especially in areas where the conflict is taking place.

2. Still, the Mission has a significant presence with institutions and the public and has assumed a noted role in supporting the peace process. The Organization’s commitment to monitor peace efforts is bringing important opportunities to understand the nature of this process to which the Colombian Government and people are so devoted.

3. The reintegration of demobilized individuals from the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, despite certain delays and difficulties characteristic of this sort of process, is proceeding in an acceptable and positive manner. The judicial proceedings they have undergone, the effective vocational placement, and other such placement efforts now under way indicate a positive trend.

4. The same can be said of the fulfillment of the agreements with the demobilized and the community of Cajibio.

5. Participation in meetings between the Government and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia has provided the Mission with first-hand experience of a reality that, until now, had not been seen by the international community.

6. The Mission reaffirms its commitment to support the peace process initiated by the Government and people of Colombia. Efforts invested toward that end serve to strengthen state institutions, justice, and the great undertaking of promoting the effective exercise of human rights with greater opportunities for peace. Peace in Colombia is possible.

7. The Mission notes the urgent need to begin work in the communities affected by
the conflict. It is convinced that this task, in the medium and long terms, will serve the broader, integrated purpose of the mandate by strengthening confidence, security, human rights, and justice, especially among those hardest hit by the violence.

8. Despite the difficulties, including recent incidents, the Mission confirms the continuation of negotiations for the geographical centralization and subsequent demobilization of the Self-Defense Forces. These efforts, and those to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, are still under way.
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Second Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT
THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA),
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION CP/RES. 859 (1397/04)

I. Introduction

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) is presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) pursuant to Resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), which states: “To instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OAS and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. The MAPP/OAS Mission

A. The Mandate

On January 23, 2004, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the OAS/SG defining a mission to monitor the peace process (MAPP/OAS). Later on, on February 6, 2004, the OAS Permanent Council issued the resolution referred to in support of the peace process in Colombia, CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), which authorized the mission and established its mandate.

The mandate of MAPP/OAS was defined in a broad, integral sense, in keeping with the basic principles of the Organization. Mention should be made of the fundamental contribution and support provided by the permanent representatives and their interest in following closely the work of the mission and the Colombian peace process.
The technical nature of the mission is its key feature. In other words, MAPP/OAS does not participate in domestic political and legal affairs, nor does it get involved in disputes generated by the peace process.

The primary concerns of promoting and defending human rights and justice, and building confidence and security are the key features of the work the mission is initiating.

B. Development of the Mission

Financing

Since May, the Mission has further developed contacts with representatives of cooperating countries and international organizations to open space for understanding and support of the work mandated. In this regard, a cooperation agreement with Sweden is already ready for signing, and progress on other agreements in support of the Mission has been made with this country, through nongovernmental organizations. The Security and Democracy Foundation has agreed to support it, especially in the area of analyzing and providing information on matters pertaining to violence. The European Union has extended an invitation to a special meeting in Brussels to seek avenues for support. In this context, Holland has proposed to organize a bilateral meeting to join in cooperation efforts.

The Mission is executing the funds provided by the Colombian Government for expansion of the territory and general tasks related to fulfillment of the mandate.

A proposed budget to complete the three years of the mandate is submitted to the Permanent Council for its consideration along with this report.

Regional offices

The Mission has so far set up the following offices for its work:

- Santafe de Bogotá (Mission headquarters)
- Medellín (Antioquia)
- Montería (Córdoba)
- Volcanes (Córdoba, covering the area where the Tierralta is located)
- Santafe de Ralito (within the zone of concentration)
- Valledupar (El Cesar)
- Cúcuta (Northern Santander)
- Villavicencio (Meta)
- Barrancabermeja (Santander)

Mission staff

At the present time, the mission is made up of eight (8) international and six (6)
national officials, plus administrative and support personnel. The mission comprises 19 persons in all.

However, to meet the requirements of the mandate and handle the dynamic peace process, every regional office would need as a minimum: two international officials, three national officials, and administrative support staff and drivers, in addition to the essential communication equipment, vehicles and logistical support.

For the immediate future, in view of the possible demobilization of around 3,000 men belonging to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia] (AUC) in the Llanos Orientales [Eastern Plains], the Mission urgently needs to increase its professional staff and its logistical capacity, in order to cover on-site verification at the outset of the peace process in the Departments of Casanare and Meta.

C. Mission Activities

1. Coordination with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)

In compliance with the decisions adopted by the Permanent Council, communication with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) has continued to grow.

In July of this year, the IACHR visited Colombia and held a meeting for coordination of support to the Mission. It also agreed on an agenda in the City of Medellin with various sectors, including the demobilized members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara.

As a result of that visit, a decision was made to look into a memorandum of understanding that would more specifically define the advisory functions of the Commission to the Mission.

Humanitarian activities in favor of indigenous communities that have IACHR precautionary measures and continue to be affected by the violence are particularly important. In this regard, the Mission is in continuous communication with the indigenous group Emberá Catío, several of whose members were victims of a hostage-taking operation by the AUC, and the necessary steps for coordination of activities in that community are being taken. The regional office in Valledupar is also developing contacts with indigenous peoples in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta for the same purpose.

The IACHR has also provided the Mission with all the documents related to experiences with peace processes in the Hemisphere and to cases of human rights violations in Colombia that are being monitored by the Commission. These documents have provided the Mission with extremely important information and assistance, and are guiding the officials of MAPP/OAS in its work involving observance of human rights and the local conflict.

2. Contact with nongovernmental organizations and institutions

It is of critical importance to the mission to count on the continuous presence and assistance of Colombian civil society and especially nongovernmental organizations working for peace and reconciliation throughout the country.
In the first six months of operations, the Mission has made contact with different local communities, sectors, and institutions, nongovernmental organizations working in the area of human rights, and other members of the international community, to introduce the Mission and disseminate its mandate.

In addition, it is working with nongovernmental organizations with experience in peace efforts on two proposals to strengthen the Mission’s mandate. In the first case, in view of the fact that various NGOs have given their support for dialogue with the AUC, and for strengthening the mandate of the MAPP/OAS, and with the cooperation of Sweden, an agreement to give the Mission greater capacity for evaluation of the progress of the peace process is being worked out. In the second case, efforts are being made to implement a data base and evaluate the evolution of indices of violence. This would make it possible to strengthen the independent evaluation unit that the Mission is organizing.

The Latin-American Association of Human Rights (ALDHU), the Network for Peace and Anti-War Initiatives (REDEPAZ), the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), the ARCO IRIS Foundation, Planeta Paz, the Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz [Development and Peace Research Institute] (INDEPAZ), Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGTD); Peace Observatory, SIMON DOMICO, Derechos Humanos Resguardo Indígena EMBERA, the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC), the Human Rights Committee of the Tayrona Indigenous Confederation, the Sindicato del Agro de Arauca (SINDEAGRO), FUNDEMOS, and other civil society organizations have expressed their support for the peace process and their support for MAPP/OAS, and have given their views on the criteria that should guide dialogues with the AUC and the solution to the armed conflict in Colombia.

A group of these NGOs participated, along with the Mission, in the opening of the AUC relocation or concentration zone, and had access to a meeting with the commanders of this organization of irregulars. This opened up an important space for working out an agenda linked to the themes of truth, justice, and reparation, and the possibility of examining complaints that implicate AUC members in alleged crimes against the civilian population.

3. Monitoring the National Dialogue

In this context, and pursuant to its mandate, MAPP/OAS monitored dialogues between the government and armed paramilitary groups. The Santafé de Ralito agreement of May 15, 2004, in which it was decided to establish a relocation or concentration zone [zona de ubicación] for AUC commanders, and the decision of August 12, 2004, in which it was agreed that the AUC of the Eastern Plains would be demobilized in the short term, and in which the willingness of the most important and largest contingents of these illegal armed groups to disarm and demobilize was confirmed, are two dates of great significance in the Colombian peace process.

It is important to point out that the Mission participates in dialogues with groups from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia only at the request of the Colombian Government, without taking on the functions of a mediator.
4. **Monitoring the situation of demobilized groups**

As for demobilized groups of irregulars, the mission continues monitoring compliance with commitments made. It is focusing in particular on the legal status of demobilized fighters, and their reinsertion in the workforce and in civilian life.

5. **Work with communities affected by the violence**

As regards the work of communities affected by the violence, consciousness-raising activities are being developed and projects are being designed to strengthen these communities, by fostering their transition to institutionality, with a focus on communities located within the AUC concentration zone. A team of mission officials is maintaining continuous contact and communication with the communities located within or in the vicinity of the zone, and it is working with rural leaders who have been coping with the presence of illegal armed groups for over twenty years. This work has made it possible to begin to create an opening for institutionality in villages and areas that had not received government assistance and have been subjected to violence. These activities related to the promotion of human rights, justice, and alternative conflict settlement are coordinated by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Office of Public Defenders [Defensoría del Pueblo], and other government and civil society institutions.

The testimony of people living in these communities, and their interest in solving the problems that have prevailed for so many years, in organizing their communities on the basis of institutional principles, and in working to solve the most urgent socioeconomic problems and in gaining access to the administration of justice, all point to the real possibility that the peace process will advance and be sustained over time. The Mission listens to the communities affected by violence since they are fundamental elements in the peace process.

6. **Support for reinsertion**

With the assistance of the private business sector and other cooperating groups, a program to generate productive projects to support the reinsertion of former combatants, their families, and persons displaced by the project is being implemented. This predominantly Colombian initiative is leading to proposals and procedures designed to generate productive jobs for members of all the illegal groups that are demobilizing, thereby contributing to advance one of the most important aspects of the entire sustainable peace process, namely, the effective reincorporation of former combatants to civilian life.

The objective of the proposal is to create more than 7,000 productive jobs, especially in the agroindustrial sector, to ensure that the families of former combatants can support themselves with regular income.

In this case, the mission performs the function of technical and administrative support in management of the program, and backs it on the basis of certain criteria and principles related to its mandate, inter alia, the inclusion of all demobilized sectors, regardless of which group participating in the conflict they belonged to.
7. Establishment of the MAPP/OAS evaluation unit

The Mission’s evaluation unit is being set up to analyze, gather, systematize, and process the relevant qualitative and quantitative information to be used as technical support in producing reports and serving other needs of the Mission.

The work of this unit will also be used to obtain an independent assessment of the situation of violence in Colombia. This work will be facilitated with the opening of regional offices and the presence of verification officials in some of the regions of greatest conflict. This evaluation will be performed by using both official sources and nonofficial sources, in the form of some highly regarded Colombian NGOs.

a) General objectives:

- Produce texts and documents useful to meet the needs of the Mission on issues that need to be dealt with in greater depth.
- Build and maintain various independent data bases, for the purpose of organizing and streamlining information so that it can be used as a support for verification of a cessation of hostilities, demobilization, and reinsertion of former combatants, in addition to other issues related to the mandates.
- Disseminate information and an evaluation on various subjects of interest to the Mission, to keep its members informed.
- Principles
  - Independence: Analysis of the information will be independent and based on separate criteria.
  - Quality and relevance: The evaluation must always maintain a high academic level and be relevant to the purposes of the Mission.
  - Objective: The evaluation must endeavor to remain outside the controversy that is generating the conflict.
  - Communication: The members of the Mission must have the information they need to perform their work.
  - Confidentiality: Sensitive information obtained in the work of this Unit will be handled exclusively by the head of the Mission.

III. General course of the peace process

A. National capacity

Since the Mission began its work, it has been clear that the work in support of the efforts of the Colombian government and people to achieve peace is technical in nature. This key focus of the Mission has enabled it to begin fulfilling the mandate while respecting the decisions and activities of the Colombian people to work through this difficult time in their history.

In the first quarterly report, the Mission explained the need to know and recognize national capacity and experiences accumulated by the Colombian people over many years of coping with violence. Over the years, they have established coordination mechanisms, work proposals, and institutional and social support, which have provided
the Mission with ideas, advice, and information that have been critical to the fulfillment of its mandate.

B. **Peace process with the self-defense groups**

- The Agreement of Santafé de Ralito, signed on July 15, 2003 between the national Government and the AUC, marks the beginning of the process of demobilization of these armed groups operating outside the law, a process which the authorities plan to complete by December 31, 2005 at the latest.
- The first step under the agreement was to demobilize 874 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) of the AUC in the city of Medellin on November 25, 2003.
- On December 7 of that year, 156 men belonging to the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega [Campesino Self-Defense Forces of Ortega], in Cajibío, Department of Cauca, were demobilized.
- On May 15, 2004, the second agreement was signed in Santafé de Ralito, providing for all of the AUC commanders to be concentrated in one relocation zone. In that zone, an area guarded by government forces and governed by the rule of law, Law 782/02 was put into practice. Under this law, the leaders of the illegal armed group who are participating in negotiations may not be captured as long as they stay within the limits of the geographical area. MAPP/OAS is performing verification functions in that zone. This agreement represents an important step forward in the peace dialogues, and renews hope in the success of the process.
- In early August 2004, the government requested the immediate demobilization of AUC groups located in the Eastern Plains, departments of Meta, Casanare, Vichada, and Arauca. This decision by President Uribe was in response to repeated clashes in that region, which were in violation of the cessation of hostilities and were jeopardizing the peace process. All of this in spite of repeated moves made by the High Commissioner for Peace to reinforce the need for a cessation of hostilities.
- On August 12, after intensive, lengthy discussions in Santafé de Ralito, the self-defense forces of the Eastern Plains, including the Bloque Centauros, the Meta and Vichada Campesino Self-Defense Forces, and the Bloque Defensores del Arauca, or a total of over 6,000 men, agreed to demobilize. In addition, the AUC pledged to demobilize the majority of their forces in a short period of time, to be established in a joint agreement with the government, on the basis of a schedule.
- This last agreement in the dialogues with the AUC is extremely important. It accelerates the goals and deadlines previously established and creates an opening for peace in Colombia. Most of the armed members of the AUC are expected to be turning in their weapons and demobilizing before the end of 2004. With this, extensive areas of the country will come under the government's control.
- It is important to point out that in view of the dynamic nature of the peace process, urgent decisions need to be made to authorize the Mission to meet the requirements in the immediate future.
C. **Indicators of Violence**

The situation of violence in Colombia has shown some important positive changes in the past two years. This trend continues to be seen in the second quarter of 2004. However, this does not mean that the situation does not continue to be serious. Yet, according to official and nonofficial sources, virtually all indices of violence have dropped considerably and gradual development has been achieved in the years since the current administration took office.

According to official statistics, and based on important cumulative figures for 2003, the most notable reductions in indices of violence in the first half of 2004 have been in murders (down 10.1%), massacres (a reduction of 43.6%), and in kidnappings (down 39.8%). According to the figures of the NGOs, important reductions were recorded in cases of serious violations, including murders, kidnappings, massacres, and displacement, although they report an increase in cases of harassment, threats, and arbitrary arrests.
Indices of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PRESIDENTIAL TERM</th>
<th>JAN. TO DEC. PERIOD</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-02</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence and crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>46,783</td>
<td>28,837</td>
<td>23,013</td>
<td>-20.2%</td>
<td>13,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases of mass murders</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-33.0%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of victims in mass murders</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>-37.8%</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total kidnappings</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>-26.3%</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the President of the Republic/Office of Communications

Official statistics also indicate that since the Santafé de Ralito concentration zone has been in effect, the percentage of murders attributed to the AUC has declined significantly, as seen in the comparative table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison of murders and massacres attributed to the AUC since establishment of the concentration zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massacres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public daily bulletins, DAS.

D. Status of demobilized groups

1. Developments with regard to reinserted members of Bloque Cacique Nutibara (AUC- BCN)

The reinsertion process supported by the High Commissioner for Peace, the Medellin Mayor’s Office, and the Corporación Democracia, an organization of demobilized paramilitaries, is generally continuing on a positive course. The work of training and psychosocial care continues to proceed in a normal fashion, although cases of lack of care of demobilized paramilitaries have been on the rise. Over 70 percent have work at the present time.

Process of reinsertion of former members of Bloque Cacique Nutibara. Medellín.
The number of demobilized young people who have been victims of murder increased during this period of time. So far, seven (7) demobilized youth have lost their lives. However, following verification of each of these cases, there is no evidence that they occurred for political reasons. In addition, the number of demobilized persons arrested and tried has increased to 31.

The Office of MAPP/OAS in Medellin, as we stated earlier, is monitoring these cases to verify the progress of investigations and fact-finding.

At the same time, the mission continues to verify the status of detainees, and to make visits to the prisons and have conferences with the Medellin Public Prosecutor’s Office, to follow up on cases and obtain access to official information on the offenses committed.

### List Of Demobilized Murder Victims In Medellin Updated On August 19, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>FIRST NAMES</th>
<th>LAST NAMES</th>
<th>DATE OF EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>71 189 695</td>
<td>GUILLERMO</td>
<td>ECHAVARRIA CORREA</td>
<td>03/01/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>71.757.324</td>
<td>ASDRUBAL DE JESUS</td>
<td>CAMPUZANO ZAPATA</td>
<td>15/02/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>98.695.572</td>
<td>FRANKI ALEXANDER</td>
<td>GARCIA GALEANO</td>
<td>04/06/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>98.622.347</td>
<td>JOVANY DE JESUS</td>
<td>DURANGO QUIROZ</td>
<td>26/06/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359</td>
<td>71.220.342</td>
<td>SANDRO ALCIDES</td>
<td>HIGUITA CHAVARRIAGA</td>
<td>16/07/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>555</td>
<td>71.263.163</td>
<td>MARLON ANDRES</td>
<td>ORTIZ LONDOÑO</td>
<td>17/07/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>71.743.812</td>
<td>OCTAVIO DE JESUS</td>
<td>GALLEGU LONDOÑO</td>
<td>08/08/04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procesado: MAPP/OEA, Bogotá.

### 2. Developments regarding demobilized persons from the Ortega Campesinos Self-Defense Forces

The process of reinsertion of demobilized paramilitaries from the Ortega Campesinos Self-Defense Forces continues to proceed satisfactorily. The social and production
programs are being carried out in accordance with plans, construction of basic infrastructure is proceeding, and the presence of law enforcement forces guarantees security in the area.

Despite the fact that this is taking place in a limited area of the country, and this group is somewhat different from other self-defense forces, the process of reinsertion and institutionalization in this zone of Cauca should be given special mention, since it provides a model built on the possibility of peace, moving towards the desired objectives in this type of process.

Process de Reinsertion of former members of the Ortega Campesinos Self-Defense Unit, Cajibio (Cauca)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction of 25 km. of roadway between Ortega and Dinde (in process).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent presence of the army in the zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 persons with technical training from Sena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 new teachers to reinforce the education staff in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility studies and studies on legalization of school premises, and health and community centers, with INCODER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of 180 hectares in Popayán by INCODER, to relocate 15 families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakfasts for children and maternal and child care, covering about 250 persons - ICBF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the High Commissioner for Peace July 2004

E. Verification

Among the relevant functions making up the mandate of MAPP/OAS, verification is particularly important. The credibility of the process and its transparency are based to a large extent on the procedures implemented for verification of the peace process.

In the Tierralta relocation zone, Department of Cordoba, where most of the commanders of the AUC are concentrated, MAPP/OAS has certain, specific functions that it is performing. They include the following:

- Verification of the agreement underlying establishment of the relocation zone and operation of all the internal control mechanisms;
- An inventory of weapons of the four hundred guards accompanying the AUC commanders;
- The entry and exist of the commanders who request special permits to carry out activities related to the peace process for specific periods of time;
- Receipt of complaints and reports on possible violations of the cessation of hostilities.

Within this framework, the mission may hear complaints and reports of possible action by the AUC that affect the civilian population and decide on verification of them in evaluating the cessation of hostilities in Colombia.
We will describe the information, complaints, and reports received, as part of the process of verification by the Mission, during the period covered by this report:

1. **In Medellín**

   - The MAPP/OAS received information and complaints regarding persistent illegal activities allegedly carried out by members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara which agreed to demobilize. This situation has led it to consider the possible persistence of the illegal armed group, despite the November 2003 demobilization. Sectors of civil society, government, religious, and human rights institutions support this concern. It should be added that MAPP/OAS has not received specific reports on such action.
   - This information, which is part of the process of verification specified in the Mission’s mandate, is particularly relevant and should alert the commanders of the demobilized group and local and national authorities to the fact that the presumed persistence of such illegal action jeopardizes the process initiated in Medellin in November 2003 and is counter to the intent of the AUC as stated in the demobilization agreement.
   - In addition, reports have been received regarding the illegal holding of real property by members of Cacique Nutibara. The mission is taking informal steps to ensure that this property is returned to its legitimate owners.
   - The MAPP/OAS is required to report on these aspects of the verification process, to recommend special attention to them, and eventually to correct and/or fully clarify this information and these complaints. The process initiated in Medellin and achievement of its objectives, insomuch as they are designed to ensure the reinsertion of the armed group and its return to a legal status, constitute a precedent which will largely serve as a basis for peace activities with other AUC units.

2. **In Tierralta, Córdoba**

   - The report of the kidnapping of Ovidio Domicó, the indigenous governor of the Emberá people in the Municipality of Tierralta, Department of Córdoba, by a group belonging to the AUC, put the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) on the alert. The release of the hostage and his return safe and sound to the community was achieved through intervention by the Mission.
   - A few days following this event, a group of five members of the same Emberá ethnic group was taken from their canoes and held by AUC groups. Again, the MAPP/OAS took steps to achieve the release of these persons.
   - Two members of the guards of the AUC commanders died as victims of suicide.
   - An inhabitant of an area bordering the relocation zone was murdered, allegedly by members of the AUC, as a result of a report filed with the illegal armed organization by the next-of-kin of a minor who was the victim of sexual violation. The police and the public prosecutor’s office intervened in the event, and the relevant proceedings are being conducted.

2. **In Valledupar**

   - In Valledupar, a member of the Kankuamo Fredy Arias ethnic group was murdered. Various human rights organizations pointed to an AUC group as being responsible for this crime. The Mission officials in that city are taking all the necessary steps to
verify this act. The report was taken to the Verification Committee in Santafé de Ralito where the AUC commanders are concentrated and put to them for their consideration. A response is currently awaited. The Mission also verified the action of the judicial authorities.

- The kidnapping of a member of the Arahuaaco ethnic group in the area of Caminos de Tabacal, Sabana Crespo was reported, allegedly perpetrated by the AUC, with a death threat if a brother, belonging to the same ethnic group, is not handed over. The Mission used its good offices to contact the commanders who were meeting in Santafé de Ralito. The situation was favorably resolved.

IV. Conclusions

1. The Mission is working to fulfill the mandate in accordance with the dynamics of the Colombian peace process, within the limits imposed by the resources available for implementation.

2. In the coming weeks, it will have to take on greater responsibilities in view of the certain possibility of the demobilization of around 3,000 men belonging to the AUC in the Eastern Plains, which will require logistical resources and manpower that the Mission does not have.

3. Important progress has been made in the verification work in the relocation zone in the Department of Córdoba, where the AUC commanders are concentrated; the Mission is working daily with the civilian population affected by the violence, in coordination with government institutions.

4. The gradual installation of regional offices is helping the Mission to be present in the area of conflict, to put it in contact with the local institutional and social stakeholders, and to enable it to act with greater diligence at the site of the events.

5. In our view, the process of reinsertion of the Cacique Nutibara in Medellín is going through a credibility crisis, as a result of the alleged persistence of criminal activity on the part of that group.

6. The May 15 agreement of Santafé de Ralito, in which the zone for concentration of all the AUC commanders was established, and the August 12 meeting that same year, when the demobilization of the AUC of the Eastern Plains was decided, represent landmarks in the peace process in Colombia. The possibility of the effective demobilization of a very large number of AUC members, from 3,000 to 5,000 armed combatants, appears certain before the end of the year.

7. Coordination to ensure the advisory services of the IACHR is a key part of the Mission’s mandate. Progress is being made in this direction, both in developing institutional aspects with the Commission, and in communications and the presence of MAPP/OAS officials in the communities of Emberá Catío, Kankuamo, and Arahuaaco affected by the violence and protected by IACHR precautionary measures.

8. The initial work with communities affected by the violence, especially in the concentration zone for dialogues with the AUC, has made it possible to begin to develop programs linked to human rights, justice, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. This function, coordinated with government institutions, takes on special
importance, since the continuity and sustainability of peace activities are focused on the members of these communities.

9. The decision by the General Secretariat and the Permanent Council to give their strong support to the Colombian government and people in meeting the challenges of building peace now requires more support than ever from the international community. The Mission is continuing its efforts to open greater space for understanding in this regard.

http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2004/CP13354E.xls
CP13354E04

Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Mission to Support the Peace Process/Colombia/OAS
Third Quarterly Report

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA

December 8, 2004

1. Background

In compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04) in which the Secretary General was instructed: “… to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,” MAPP/OAS presented the first and second quarterly reports to the Council in May and August 2004, respectively.

The aforesaid reports informed the Permanent Council of the general situation and status of the peace process and the Mission’s activities.

With regard to the peace process, we highlighted the August 12 agreement reached by the parties in Santafé de Ralito, for the demobilization of a significant number of self-defense forces. The Self-Defense Forces of Colombia [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia] (AUC) agreed to demobilize the majority of their forces in the short run, with a schedule to be determined by mutual accord with the government. Achievement of this step in the dialogues was one of the most important steps forward in the process, and we will describe it in this report.

As for the activities of the Mission, in previous reports we referred to progress made with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in exploring the possibility of signing a memorandum of understanding that would determine the specific advisory functions of the Commission to the Mission. Work on preparing a specific proposal in this regard continues.
We also reported on the work being pursued with the communities affected by the violence, including awareness-raising activities and the design of projects to strengthen those communities and promote their transition to institutionalism.

As regards verification, which is one of the key roles of the Mission, we also explained in an earlier report that, despite budgetary difficulties and the complexity and dangers of this task, verification of demobilized illegal armed groups has continued in Medellin, and verification has begun in the Santafé de Ralito “placement” zone [zona de ubicación], by performing certain specific functions that are fully under way at this point. Finally, the process of verification of compliance with the cessation of hostilities has been initiated at the national level, with the start of operation of the Verification Committee, a mechanism established under the Fatima Agreement of May 15, 2004 to create a tripartite entity (OAS-Government-Self Defense Forces) to examine complaints related to hostility and the cease-fire.

In this report, MAPP/OAS relates how it has managed to overcome difficulties and move forward in its tasks of verification and rapprochement to the communities. The Mission, however, continues to deal with substantial limitations, especially budgetary ones.

2. General Status of the Peace Process with the AUC

2.1 General status of the Dialogue

During the time covered by this report, the National Dialogue has been taking place on a regular basis, and despite various moments of tension and uncertainty, on October 7, 2004, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) announced in a press release entitled “Act of Good Faith in Peace” that by December 31, 2004, over 3,000 men from the following eleven (11) bloques (units) and fronts would be demobilized:

- Bloque Catatumbo (Northern Santander)
- Bloque Bananero (Antioquia)
- Frente del Suroeste Antioqueño (Antioquia)
- Bloque Calima (Valle del Cauca)
- Bloque Pacifico (Valle del Cauca)
- Frente Alto Sinú (Córdoba)
- Frente Medio Sinú (Córdoba)
- Frente Bajo Sinú (Córdoba)
- Bloque Cundinamarca (Cundinamarca)
- Frente Mojana (Sucre)
- Self-Defense Forces of Southern Magdalena and Isla de San Fernando (Magdalena)

On November 3, 2004, the High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo, announced at a press conference in Santafé de Ralito (site of the dialogues) that the demobilization process was beginning and presented the methodology for the process, including reinsertion or reintegration. With this, the stages of identification of “concentration” zones and awareness-raising of departmental and local institutions and the communities began. One of the commitments made by the government in this process is recovery of territories for institutionalization and support for demobilized
soldiers, through affiliation with the State Subsidized Health System, humanitarian aid for 24 months through a subsidy (training programs or companies are being formed for this), psychosocial care, formal technical and administrative training (at primary, secondary, and higher education levels), and assistance in preparation for and inclusion in productive enterprises.

As a result of this, on November 25 these agreements began to be implemented, with the demobilization of the AUC’s Bloque Bananero under the command of “Hernán Hernández,” which included 50 men from the Frente del Suroeste Antioqueño [Southwestern Antioquia Front] commanded by “Jhon Santamaría.” As the process developed, cooperation was noted on the part of local and departmental officials and on the part of the leaders of the Bloque Bananero, and this contributed to making the demobilization a positive experience, which could be used in a number of ways as a model for implementing subsequent processes. The main question being raised now and the greatest challenge of this process will be reinsertion.

At the present time, preparations are under way for the concentration and demobilization processes in Northern Santander, where around 1,400 men belonging to the Bloque Catatumbo are to be demobilized, in Cordoba, for demobilization of the Cordoba (comprising the High, Middle, and Lower Sinú Fronts) and the Mojana Front, in Cundinamarca, for the Bloque Autodefensas Campesinas de Cundinamarca, in Valle del Cauca, for demobilization of the Bloque Calima and the Bloque Pacífico, and in Magdalena, for demobilization of the Self Defense Forces of Southern Magdalena and Isla de San Fernando.

2.2 Indicators of Violence

In general terms, the cessation of hostilities is perhaps the issue in the peace process that is most discussed with the self-defense units and which has generated doubts and questions, many of which are justifiable.

Given the multiplicity of factors that hamper compilation and management of violence indicators, it is inevitable that there is considerable under-recording at all the sources. This trend is usually more accentuated in the zones most affected by the conflict and the situation of violence, which is precisely where most of the violations of the cessation of hostilities occur. As a result, there are no absolutely reliable data on the cessation of hostilities.

However, statistical indicators make it possible to detect reasonable trends as to how the cessation of hostilities is or is not being respected at a given time. By reviewing currently available statistical information, the Mission has the following observations to make.

In addition to the studies and reports that are the result of the Mission’s work, other indicators that allow it to assert that there is a substantial, cumulative decline in violations of the cessation of hostilities are the ones contained in the table “Summary of Indicators of Violence” (Annex 1). These figures mostly refer to violations committed by AUC forces and are derived from cross-checking information from both government and nongovernmental sources, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General

As you can see in the table in Annex 1, all the indicators, i.e., homicides, massacres, disappearances, and abductions, which are alleged to have been perpetrated by self-defense groups, have declined significantly since the cessation of hostilities has been in effect and the Mission has been present in the zones of conflict. This reduction is seen both in official figures and in figures and statistics provided by NGOs working as human rights defenders, although it is important to emphasize that the situation continues to be serious and worrisome, and that it is essential to continue improving and perfecting the cessation of hostilities until the total demobilization of these outlaw groups is achieved.

3. Development of the Mandate

The following activities have taken place as part of the mandate of MAPP/OAS:

3.1 Activities of the Mission

The Mission currently has eleven (11) international and ten (10) national verification officers, distributed in six (6) regional offices and two (2) in the placement zone. However, in view of the needs imposed by the demobilization process, the MAPP/OAS has decided to reallocate human and logistical resources to this process, so that it can be carried out in a more timely and effective manner. To this end, the Mission will temporarily close the Barrancabermeja and Villavicencio offices and use those resources to cover the Reference Centers1 established as part of this process.

With regard to the Mission’s funding, it is important to point out that a series of contacts has been made with the embassies of member and observer countries, in addition to donor agencies, and that to date a positive response has been received only from the Embassies of Bahamas, Sweden, and Holland. Talks have been held with those embassies to expedite the financing.

3.2 Monitoring the Dialogue

In accordance with the mandate, MAPP/OAS has been monitoring the dialogue between the government and the illegal armed groups which have been taking place during the time covered.

It is important to note that the Mission is participating in the dialogues with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia solely at the request of the Colombian Government, without taking on the role of mediator.

1 The Reference Centers are information and guidance points of the National Government for complete identification (identity card, judicial certificate, and military pass), humanitarian support, guidance and advice in the area of training and productive projects, and monitoring of reinsertion of the demobilized, located in the urban areas closest to the residence of those persons.
3.3 Work with the Communities Affected by the Violence

As regards the work with the communities affected by the violence, MAPP/OAS is continuing to pursue awareness-raising and monitoring activities, and to facilitate transition to institutionalism, especially in communities that are located within the AUC location zone. This work has been expanded in the past month to include zones where concentration and demobilization of different AUC bloques and fronts are occurring.

In September in the community of Sabana Crespo, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Cesar Department, for instance, the Mission met with indigenous authorities of the Arhuaco ethnic group for the purpose of establishing a MAPP/OAS monitoring commitment in defense of the rights of the Arhuaco people, to get an idea of that ethnic group’s view of the peace process. Along similar lines, the Mission is continuously monitoring the Emberá Catío indigenous community in the municipality of Tierralta, Córdoba, which has been affected by the conflict among different armed groups.

In October, in the Community of Nabusimake, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Cesar Department, the Mission joined with the Catholic Church to monitor the return of six indigenous Arhuacos who deserted the FARC-EP to return to their community.

In November, monitoring activities were carried out in the Corregimiento of La Mesa, municipality of Valledupar, in response to reports of possible displacement in that territory, as a result of the recovery of that section by the Army. Periodic talks are being held with the community leaders in the section to monitor the situation. Moreover, on November 25, in that same Corregimiento, a meeting of the Arhuaco community was monitored to explain its territorial problems related to the expropriations by the AUC. At that meeting, the possibility of establishing a permanent mechanism for information on the situation of that ethnic group was discussed.

In addition, the Mission is monitoring and assisting the Committee on Displaced Persons of the municipality of Pailitas, Cesar Department, coordinated by the Secretary of the Municipal Government. These activities are designed to verify the situation in relation to displacement of the population located in the mountainous region of Perijá, whose receiving center is the urban center of the municipality.

3.4 Coordination with Nongovernmental Organizations and Embassies

During this period of time, the Mission participated in various forums convened by nongovernmental organizations to explain the work done under the mandate and strengthen ties of confidence and cooperation. The Mission received different sectors of society for the same purpose, and maintained a close relationship with the embassies of member and donor countries.

European Union: At the invitation of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Bogotá, which is currently serving as President of the European Union, the Mission had an opportunity to travel to Europe and make two presentations: one at the Foreign Ministry in the Hague; and, the second one at the Latin American Committee for the Council of Ministers of the European Union (COLAT) in Brussels. As a result, on December 7, 2004, the government
of Holland signed a cooperation agreement for 953,778 Euros with the General Secretariat.

Canada: The Canadian government, through its embassy in Bogotá, invited the Mission to Ottawa to discuss issues related to the mandate and the peace process.

3.5 Verification of Cessation of Hostilities

With a view to opening up a space for improving compliance with the cessation of hostilities, the Verification Committee was set up in Santa Fe de Ralito, with the OHCP, AUC, and MAPP/OAS as its members. Reports received both by MAPP/OAS and the Office of the High Commissioner are presented to it. It should be noted that not all the reports or complaints received are presented to the Committee, since the idea is to present to that Committee those reports that could serve as a deterrent or that involve situations that could be corrected, rather than reports on faits accomplis. Notwithstanding this, the Mission is fulfilling its mandate in an independent, autonomous manner.

The verification mechanism has managed to do the following, among other things:

- Withdraw troops from zones where the AUC were present (for instance, the AUC’s Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) withdrew its troops from the region lying between Risaralda and Caldas), which has led to a reduction in violence in those zones;
- Deter violent action in places where complaints have been received and where the MAPP is conducting verification operations;
- Reduce the violence in zones where the MAPP is present;
- Liberate persons abducted by members of the AUC;
- Prevent forced displacements and reduce hostilities and extortion.

The Mission believes that although the AUC have not completely ended hostilities, as mentioned in the section on violence indicators and shown by the work in the regions, in the zones under the control of self-defense groups, hostilities have diminished. This is especially true in those regions where the Mission is present. However, in those zones where fighting is still taking place, either between self-defense groups or between them and other illegal armed groups, hostilities continue and in some cases have increased.

Although complaints filed against the AUC affecting the local people constitute violations of the cessation of hostilities and are therefore subject to verification, not all of the acts of hostility are equally verifiable. In practical terms, MAPP/OAS has given priority to the most serious acts, which are in fact the easiest to verify, and to those that will help improve the cessation of hostilities. This entails the risk that abuses of the local people will continue to be perpetrated, as they are unlikely to be verified. These practices include threats against the local people, social control of armed persons, reports of corruption and infiltration of government institutions, extortion and the so-called “vacuna.” If this situation continues to persist, it can affect the credibility of the process.

In addition, it is important to point out that the shortage of personnel and resources, the fear of the citizens, and the complexity of the geographical area, in addition to the action of the self-defense groups, all hamper the verification process. However, the Mission
believes that progress has been made in generating trust and in assessing the areas of influence of the self-defense forces.

Complaints

From the time that the Mission began its verification work up to November 16, it received 56 complaints.

The Verification Committee received a total of 67 complaints, 19 of which went to MAPP/OAS and 42 to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (see table). Up to now, the self-defense forces have responded to 31 of them. The Mission has verified a total of 15 complaints. Seven of them were not verified because of a lack of evidence, and 45 are currently being verified, since they involve the phenomena of harassment, extortion, and collection of “vacunas” which, because of their nature, are part of a special study the Mission is conducting and will be reporting on in the next report.

A table summarizing the complaints received and presented to the Verification Committee follows. We should point out that of the 67 complaints presented to the Committee, 14 are still within the valid period set by the Committee for answering, and the rest are awaiting a response. The responses to them will therefore appear in the next report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONAL OFFICE</th>
<th>COMPLAINTS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION</th>
<th>COMPLAINTS PRESENTED TO THE VERIFICATION COMMITTEE</th>
<th>RESPONSSES RECEIVED FROM THE AUC</th>
<th>VERIFIED</th>
<th>NOT VERIFIED</th>
<th>IN PROCESS OF VERIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BARRANCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOGOTÁ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CÚCUTA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDELLÍN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTERÍA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALLEDUPAR</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAVICENCIO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OACP</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Verified:** These complaints include cases in which the AUC accepted responsibility for the act and those cases in which the Mission has determined that there is insufficient evidence to determine responsibility.

**Not verified:** These include complaints where there was insufficient evidence to determine responsibility.
Since one of the objectives of MAPP/OAS is to improve compliance with the cessation of hostilities, help reduce violence, and assist in efforts to safeguard the life and safety of persons and communities affected by human rights violations, the “good offices” approach has proved effective in finding a solution for certain violent acts. There follows a description of the good offices performed by the Mission in interaction with the AUC during the period covered by this report:

- In August, in response to a complaint by the Arhuaco indigenous people, prompt mediation with the AUC commanders during the dialogue in Santafé de Ralito resulted in the release of a member of that community, thereby putting an end to the threat it had perpetrated against them.

- At the end of September, through the good offices performed with AUC commanders in Santa Fe de Ralito, a minor, who had been abducted in Putumayo in August, was returned.

- In October, through a coordinated effort in Santafé de Ralito, the AUC handed over to the Valledupar MAPP/OAS, working together with the International Red Cross, two residents of Cesar Department who had allegedly been held by a commander of the ELN’s December 6 Front.

- During the same month of October, MAPP/OAS succeeded in obtaining the release of an indigenous member of the Koggi community who had been detained a week earlier by the AUC. That mission was coordinated with the Guajira Ombudsman’s Office.

- Also in October, a campesino held by the AUC, in the village of La Honda at “El mundo el Día” Ranch, allegedly for being a member of the National Liberation Army,

---

2 We have not used the names of the persons affected by these events for reasons linked to their security and preservation of the good offices mechanism.
was turned over to MAPP/OAS. The release was coordinated by the Valledupar Ombudsman’s Office.

- The Mission’s Montería Office, engaged in three acts of good offices with the AUC to obtain information on three disappeared persons. These events occurred in August, September, and October. At this point, two of the cases are still pending a response, and in one of them, the unit denied responsibility, and so the Mission will continue to verify the facts.

- As a result of a reported death threat against a priest in a community in the southern part of Bolivar Department, the Mission performed good offices with the AUC commanders in Santafé de Ralito, and managed to lift the threat.

3.6 Participation in Demobilization

As part of the demobilization process, MAPP/OAS carried out the following activities: In the Stage Prior to demobilization

*Monitoring of the self-defense groups:* MAPP monitored self-defense groups that will be demobilizing both in the concentration zones and on the way back to their places of origin.

*Awareness-raising in the communities:* In this area, MAPP has assisted the government in awareness-raising activities carried out both in the communities and with local and departmental government institutions.

*Awareness-raising in the self-defense groups:* At the request of the parties, MAPP has assisted the government in raising the awareness of self-defense groups with regard to the steps they need to take for reinsertion in civilian life.

*During the stage of concentration of self-defense groups*

*Verification of lists of persons:* Verification of lists of persons involves simply recording the names that appear on the lists handed over by the AUC and approved by the government, pursuant to Law 782, section 3, paragraph 2. This activity does not mean that the MAPP is going to record and verify the real identity of the person and his or her legal status at the time of demobilization.

*Induction:* MAPP/OAS has assisted the OHCP induction courses given to troops regarding the procedures to follow at the time of demobilization and the functions of the reference centers. MAPP explains the mandate for the information of the demobilized soldiers.

*Verification of lists of arms:* MAPP verifies that the arms actually turned in at the time of demobilization concur with the lists of arms provided by the AUC and approved by the government. As part of this work, MAPP checks the type of weapon, the model, and the general condition of the arm. MAPP does not assume any responsibility for the final destination of the equipment once it is officially received by the competent officials.
Reference Centers

MAPP will maintain a continuous present at the reference centers during the stage of presentation of demobilized soldiers (8 days). During the next 24 months when the centers remain open, its presence will be partial but continuous, to monitor reinsertion. Its work at the centers will involve verifying participation by the demobilized persons in the process and collecting information on the activities selected, so as to ensure follow-up on their effective reinsertion. At the same time, it will verify compliance with commitments assumed by the State.

At the current time, MAPP/OAS is present at the reference center located in Turbo, Antioquia, to monitor and follow up on reinsertion of members of the Bloque Bananero and the Frente del Suroeste de Antioquia.

3.7 Demobilization of the Bloque Bananero

MAPP/OAS took an active part in the demobilization of the Bloque Bananero, by awareness-raising activities in the communities and self-defense groups, and it verified the lists of persons and arms turned in by the Bloque. According to the verification work done by MAPP/OAS, 452 men and women demobilized and turned in a large number of weapons of war, consisting of 253 shotguns, 82 small arms, and other support weapons and explosives, for a total of around 650 weapons of war, including the following ones:

69 5.56 cal. AK-47s;
46 7.62 cal. AK-47s;
92 7.62 cal. AKMs
16 223 cal. Colts;
3 7.62 cal. M14s;
3 223 cal. Galil; 4 60 mm mortars; 2 M-60 Machineguns;
6 40 mm. Grenade launchers;
4 Submachine guns; 38 Pistols;
44 Revolvers;
232 Assortment of grenades;
700 gun cartridges/ ammunition xxx;
61 Communications radios;
41,000 Ammunition of different calibers;
370 camouflage gear, among other military materiel.
3.8 Monitoring Reinsertion

In the context of the demobilization process described earlier, this task represents one of the major challenges of the Mission. It is without a doubt the stage of the process that will require the utmost efforts to ensure the viability and credibility of the peace process. As it has been doing with the demobilized soldiers from the former Bloque Cacique Nutibara, MAPP/OAS will verify the actual reinsertion of the demobilized persons in all its aspects, including legal, psychosocial, and professional ones. In addition, MAPP/OAS is verifying fulfillment by the State of the commitments it assumed.

Situation of the reinserted former members of Bloque Cacique Nutibara (AUC-BCN)

The reinsertion process, supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Office of Mayor of Medellin, and the Democracy Corporation (an organization made up of demobilized persons), is generally continuing on a positive tack. Training and psychosocial care are progressing normally. At present, according to information provided by the Peace and Reconciliation Program, 819 youth are receiving income under different types of contracts, and the ones who are not working under any contractual arrangement are receiving a subsidy, provided they are involved in an academic activity of some kind. There are 836 young people pursuing academic activities, either in primary or secondary school or at university or a vocational training center, and 500 are participating in vocational guidance activities.

The number of young demobilized victims of homicide has gone down since the previous quarter when seven homicides were reported. To date, 15 demobilized soldiers have lost their life, five of them during this quarter. However, based on the verification performed in each case, there is no evidence that these deaths were politically motivated, and in two cases, there was no information on the death. As for arrests of demobilized persons, this figure has also declined slightly, as seven persons were arrested this quarter, and two of them were convicted. The Regional Office in Medellin is currently handling a total of 32 demobilized persons who are being held in different prisons. Around 250 demobilized soldiers have been prosecuted for various reasons to date.

The Medellín Office of MAPP/OAS, as mentioned earlier, is monitoring these cases to verify the course of investigations and their results and findings. At the same time, the mission is still working to verify the situation of detainees, through visits to the prisons and hearings with the Medellin Public Prosecutor, to follow up on cases and obtain official information on the crimes committed.

On another tack, MAPP/OAS has established an arrangement of periodic meetings with the Democracy Corporation for the purpose of evaluating complaints received and the reinsertion process in general.

Finally, it is important to note that on November 25, the anniversary of the demobilization of the former Bloque Cacique Nutibara was celebrated with a ceremony and the mobilization of around 30,000 persons, who marched for peace. Local and national
officials participated in the event and highlighted the significant progress made in this process.

3.9 Agreements with Institutions

Under its mandate, MAPP/OAS has been developing possible agreements with various institutions in Colombia, including the following ones:

a) Pre-Agreement between the Catholic Church (Pastoral Social working in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta) and MAPP/OAS for Recovery of the Memory of Human Rights Violations in the Sierra Nevada. The purpose of this is to seek testimony, and reports of human rights violations, exchange of information, and joint verification procedures in the case of complaints of human rights violations alleged to have been committed by the Colombian United Self-Defense Forces, among others.

b) Proposed Film Register presented by the Tayrona de Cabildos Council, for the purpose of using videos, photographs, and texts to inform the international community of the principles governing interpretation of the universe and the forms of expression found in the territory of the Tayrona Community, to guarantee their rights and integrity and the permanency of their culture in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.

c) Cooperation Agreement with the Antioquia Facilitating Committee, to establish a mechanism for mutual support and assistance for verification of the peace processes in Colombia, within the framework of the agreement in force between the OAS General Secretariat and the Government of the Republic of Colombia.

d) Cooperation Agreement with the Ombudsman’s Office, with a view to establishing a broad-based mechanism for cooperation between the two institutions for effective fulfillment of the Mission’s verification duties and the joint generation of projects in the field of human rights, justice and peace.

e) Agreement with the Office of the Mayor of Medellín. Efforts are being pursued to conclude an agreement between the Mission and the Office of the Mayor of Medellín, with a view to strengthening the information and communication capacity with the communes in that city, which has been the scene of violence for many years.

3.10 Follow-Up on the Relationship with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)

As indicated in the previous report, the Mission and the IACHR are considering a memorandum of understanding, to comply with the mandate of the Permanent Council. To this end, the Mission sent a letter to the IACHR with a few points that it deems important to bear in mind when said memorandum is prepared, for the purpose of ensuring the valuable advisory services of the Commission:

a) Training of Mission officials by the IACHR;

b) Provision of information on cases to the Mission, by the IACHR;
c) Follow-up on precautionary measures by the Mission;

d) Joint field visits;


These measures will improve the performance of the Verification Officials specifically and the Mission in general, while they will convert members of the Mission into persons well qualified to promote the inter-American human rights system. At the same time, they will provide valuable inputs to our work and a guide for observance of human rights in the local conflict. Moreover, they will enable the IACHR to have firsthand knowledge of the development of the local conflict, and to have the Mission as a permanent collaborator.

In another vein, the Mission has been invited to certain activities to assist communities where IACHR precautionary measures are in place. In this regard, and in the context of agreements reached with members of the Commission at the latest meeting, a series of visits and meetings with these communities has taken place to inform themselves of their everyday situation. These visits have included the following: 1) A visit to the Emberá Catio indigenous community, which invited the Mission to attend as an observer the Joint Commission for monitoring precautionary measures established by the IACHR to protect the fundamental rights of this ethnic group; 2) In October, the Mission met with representatives of the Cañamomo Lomaprieta reservation of the Emberá Chamí indigenous community in the municipality of Río Sucio, Department of Caldas, with a view to hearing complaints of violations committed by the self-defense groups against this ethnic group, and especially complaints that fall within the mandate of MAPP/OAS.


4.1 Challenges and prospects of the process

- Demobilize 3,000 men before January 2005.
- Begin the work of re-institutionalization in the demobilized zones.
- Adequately reinsert former combatants into civilian life.
- Establish a viable mechanism for the future demobilization of other armed groups operating outside the law.
- Guarantee security in the demobilized zones.
- Develop projects that contain demobilized persons and ensure that when the institutions return, they fulfill the expectations of the communities.

4.2 Challenges and prospects of the Mission

- Verify the reinsertion of the demobilized persons.
- Support demobilization efforts.
- Agree on and put into practice a memorandum of understanding with the IACHR.
- Work with the communities affected by violence in the areas of justice, human rights, and alternate settlement of conflicts.
- Continue improving the verification process.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations

- The OAS presence in the peace process in Colombia is contributing to the transparency and credibility of the efforts being made in that country to obtain a lasting peace. The decision to monitor the peace process has provided the Colombian government with an important political opportunity and has helped garner the support of other countries for the Colombian process.

- The peace process with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia has made great strides during this period of time, despite the issues and obstacles observed. Today we are confronted by the concrete fact that the demobilization of eleven structures, including AUC bloques and fronts, is beginning. The major challenge for Colombians, as we stated in the report, will be the reinsertion of the demobilized persons in civilian life.

- In the course of 2004, despite reduced violence on the part of the self-defense groups, there were serious complaints of violations of the cessation of hostilities, including homicides, massacres, disappearances, acts of torture, and death threats. We have also received complaints and information on continued widespread practices less serious in nature, such as extortions and, in general, pressure on communities in areas where the self-defense groups exert influence.

- The Mission is deeply concerned over the situation of violence against the indigenous communities of Colombia. It is suggested that the present monitoring activities be increased and programs developed with indigenous peoples, within the terms of the mandate.

- The cessation of hostilities is not being fully respected, as mentioned earlier.

- MAPP/OAS will monitor and verify the reinsertion of demobilized combatants through its usual procedures and educational and productive activities, to ensure that they do not return to unlawful activities.

- MAPP/OAS will verify the dismantling of the armed structure of self-defense groups and their reinsertion in civilian life.

- The shortage of both economic and human resources needed to fully comply with its mandate is a major concern.

- The complexity of the legal situation of the demobilized persons is one of the factors jeopardizing the reinsertion process. The time it could take to clarify the legal situation of each person and the fears of being detained may lead many of the demobilized persons to go back to being a member of an illegal group.

With a view to helping improve the peace process, the Mission would make the following recommendations:

- The lack of an adequate legal framework is hampering the process. The Mission is confident that the Government of Colombia, through its democratic institutions, will establish an adequate legal framework for such a massive demobilization. In any event, any peace process is essentially a dynamic, creative process in which it is impossible to expect everything to be resolved in a day.
• The Mission would emphasize its recommendation that the legal obstacles to destruction of the arms turned in by the AUC must be overcome.
• As part of the process of the return of the territories to institutionalism, it is essential that resources be found to initiate projects on community justice, human rights, and alternative means for settlement of conflicts.
## SUMMARY OF INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>27,841</td>
<td>28,837</td>
<td>12,048</td>
<td>10,965</td>
<td>10,695</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>250 (January-September)</td>
<td>-11% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides committed by self-defense groups</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>250 (January-September)</td>
<td>-11.2% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrajudicial executions by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Data Bank, CINEP Justice and Peace</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>-48.8% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of massacres</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-42% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of massacres committed by self-defense groups</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-33.3% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of massacres (incidents) committed by self-defense groups</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-31.1% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders of union members committed by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-43.1% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders of indigenous people by self-defense groups</td>
<td>Observatorio de Derechos y DIH / Office of Vice-President of the Republic</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14 (January-September)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-81.3% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings committed by self-defense groups</td>
<td>FONDELIBERTAD</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>-29.3% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced disappearances committed by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Data Bank, CINEP Justice and Peace</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-51% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons</td>
<td>Social Solidarity Network (RSS)</td>
<td>373,531</td>
<td>422,229</td>
<td>126,963</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>66,559</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-47.6% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons</td>
<td>CODHES</td>
<td>341,925</td>
<td>412,553</td>
<td>207,607</td>
<td>130,346 (9/24/04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-37.3% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of torture by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Data Bank, CINEP Justice and Peace</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-43.3% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases of threats by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Data Bank, CINEP Justice and Peace</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>-2.5% (compared with 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to union members by paramilitaries</td>
<td>Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Methodology of the Summary Table of Indicators: The data in the summary of indicators were obtained by cross-checking the sources indicated, and refer primarily to violations alleged to have been committed by the AUC. The semesters run from January-June, July-December. None of the sources systematically distinguishes between self-defense groups that are part of the cessation of hostilities and those that are not. The colors red and yellow represent the years before and after the entry into force of the AUC cessation of hostilities (1 and 8 December, 2002), except that there were no data that made it possible to take out the month of December 2002, and so the comparison “before and after the entry into force of the cessation of hostilities” has to be approximate. Some official sources provide data from January to September 2004. In the case of the Data Bank’s statistics, these figures are derived from cross-checking information in the “Noche y Niebla” Reviews, Nos. 20-29. Since the categories used in the Data Bank reflect some changes in classification from one year to the next, the figures represent all the self-defense groups registered in the “Noche y Niebla” Reviews cited.
Mission to Support the Peace Process / Colombia / OAS
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Fourth Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL
ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN
COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

March 16, 2005

1. Background

In compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04) in which the Secretariat was instructed “...to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,” MAPP/OAS presents its fourth quarterly report to the Permanent Council of the OAS.

This report addresses the development of eight demobilizations carried out since the submission of the last report from the Secretary General to the Permanent Council, which when added to earlier demobilizations has made possible the dismantling of 10 armed AUC [Audodefensas Unidas de Colombia] units, the handover of a significant number of weapons, and the first step toward civilian status for thousands of people.

Throughout the earlier reports, the Mission placed particular emphasis on the development of its verification role during the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities and demobilization and disarmament stages. This fourth report continues the discussion of the development of these functions and adds discussion of verification and monitoring of the reintegration process.

In addition, this report continues the discussion of relations between the Mission and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the evolution of the reintegration process in Medellin, as well as the challenges and prospects of the process in general and the Mission in particular.
2. Development of the Mandate

In developing its mandate, MAPP/OAS carried out the following activities:

2.1 Demobilization and Disarming of the AUCs

Between November 2004 and February 2005, pursuant to agreements reached between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), eight bloques or fronts were demobilized. These were the Bloque Bananero (Antioquia), Bloque Catatumbo (Northern Santander), Bloque Cundinamarca (Cundinamarca), Bloque Calima (Valle del Cauca), the Sinú and San Jorge Fronts of the Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba (Córdoba), the Bloque of Southwestern Antioquia (Antioquia), and the Self-Defense Forces of Southern Magdalena and Isla de San Fernando (Magdalena).

During this period, as verified by the Mission, a total of 3,793 men and women were demobilized (See Annex 1). Added to this figure are the 868 troops demobilized from the Bloque Cacique Nutibara and the 168 troops from the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Ortega, which occurred before the arrival of the Mission, for a total of 4,828 demobilized troops.

In addition, according to the verification conducted by the Mission, a significant amount of weapons, explosives, communications and service materials, as well as real estate, vehicles, tools and beasts of burden were turned over to the government (See Annex 2).

The Mission has participated in this process by assisting the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OHCP) in the work of awareness-raising in communities and transferring AUC members and demobilized troops, in adapting the areas of concentration and, essentially, in the work of verifying the lists of persons and weapons (count, transfer, storage and destruction of explosives).

It should also be emphasized that the Mission has observed the OHCP in the transfer and control visits of demobilized soldiers with serious crimes who are currently at the Santafé de Ralito placement zone [zona de ubicación] making voluntary use of the government’s offer that they remain there while awaiting a legal framework that will define their legal status.

2.2 Monitoring Reintegration

The principal tool the Mission uses to monitor reintegration is its presence at the Reference Centers (Centros de Referencia – CRO) created by the government to provide care, guidance, and follow-up for reintegrated individuals.²

---


2 In order to serve the demobilized population, taking into account its geographic distribution and the diversity of its needs, the Government of Colombia has established Reference and Opportunity Centers (CROs) in various places throughout the country. The CRO is a place provided by the national government where those who have been demobilized can obtain care and...
At these centers, the Mission has direct contact with each of the demobilized individuals to explain MAPP’s mandate to them and the reason for its presence at the CROs. In addition, it is using these personal contacts to develop a database to monitor the reintegration process from an individual as well as a general perspective.

To date, seven CROs have been put into operation. Five of them are permanent: Turbo (Urabá Antioqueño), Montería (Córdoba), Cúcuta (North Santander), Bogotá, and Medellín (Antioquia). There are also two Mobile Reference Centers in Cundinamarca and Valle to serve small groups of demobilized individuals.

Regarding the actual delivery of the service offered to the demobilized troops and the impetus for their reintegration from the Reference Centers, there is no uniform diagnosis. This is because the process is moving ahead satisfactorily at some centers, while there have been difficulties at other centers. For example, at the CRO in Turbo, Urabá, all the services offered were provided, training courses were started, two productive projects were launched, and preliminary studies were begun for another 15 projects in different areas. In contrast, the CRO in the Valle del Cauca began its operations on February 21, 2005, two months after the demobilization of that area. Despite the difficulties encountered at the beginning of the CRO work, most of the planned activities have been carried out and, generally speaking, there has been timely payment of the humanitarian assistance established in the agreements.

Against the backdrop of this difficult and complex process, during the period from December to February, 22 demobilized individuals were the victims of homicide. According to the information received by the Mission, most of these homicides involve causes unrelated to political motivations. In addition, it can be noted that during this period, 27 demobilized individuals have been arrested by the authorities, 25 of them for common crimes occurring after demobilization and 2 for open cases involving serious crimes and who did not accept the government’s offer to go to the Santafé de Ralito placement zone.

Given this panorama, the Mission emphasizes that, even in the midst of difficulties, the process of reintegrating former combatants into civilian life is developing in an acceptable manner, although it is not free of risks and some points need to be refined. In this respect, it is essential to strengthen and increase the pace of work training courses in intermediate office and technical work at the National Training Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje - SENA) as well as the start-up of productive projects with the participation of local communities. In addition, it would be desirable to involve local authorities in the reintegration process, since practice shows that this factor—

information, to which reintegrated individuals must go after completing the concentration, demobilization and verification stage. Here they can go through the procedures necessary for their full reintegration in civilian life and receive information regarding the benefits available to them. The CRO provides inter-institutional management of counseling, information and referrals to services for the demobilized population in the areas of health, education, psychosocial care, work training, economic reintegration choices, etc.
leadership of former commanders – has made the difference in the development of the reintegration process from one region to another.

The Mission is continuing its work of monitoring and verification of the reintegration process of the former Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN). The conflict in Medellín involves perpetrators of politicized violence, common violence, organized crime, and drug-traffickers. However, despite the continued presence of some AUC structures in Medellín and its surroundings and gangs, the reintegration process, under the aegis of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Office of the Mayor of Medellín and the Democracy Corporation (an umbrella organization of demobilized individuals), is generally making acceptable progress.

From 2002 to late 2004, all the indicators of violence declined dramatically in Medellín. While there were 3,721 homicides in 2002, equal to a rate of 184 per 100,000 inhabitants, by 2004 that rate had fallen by 57 per 100,000, which is equal to a 68.4% decline in two years, or in absolute terms, 2,546 fewer people killed in 2004 compared to 2002.

Furthermore, a study of the decline in homicides by community reveals an average decline of 44.24% between 2003 and 2004 in the 10 communities where the reintegrated BCN members live, compared to 22.58% in the remaining 6 communities where there are no reintegrated BCN members. In other words, the decline in the homicide rate in the communities where there are reintegrated BCN members is twice that recorded in the communities where there are none.

### 2.3 Verification of the Cessation of Hostilities

Although the AUCs have not totally fulfilled the commitment to the cessation of hostilities, in the areas where this force has territorial control there has been a marked decline in violations. On the other hand, in those zones where there are still territorial disputes among illegal armed groups, the hostilities continue and have increased in some cases, such as in the departments of Nariño, Putumayo, Arauca, and North Santander.

During this reporting period, 89 reports of violations of the cessation of hostilities were filed with the Verification Committee, an entity that has been in operation since the signing of the Fátima Agreement, the purpose of which is to verify specific violations of the cessation of hostilities. Of these reports, violation by the AUCs was confirmed in 31 cases. In five cases, the participation of the AUCs was ruled out, and in another five cases the report could not be verified due to the lack of evidence or the absence of the mission. The remaining 48 cases are in the process of being verified. This procedure is intended

---

3 Communities 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 16. This is not counting the corregimientos.

4 This information comes from a study done by MAPP on the demobilization of the BCN, which will be made public in the near future.

5 Entity in operation since the signing of the Fátima Agreement, the purpose of which is to verify specific violations of the cessation of hostilities.
not only to establish concrete cases of violations of the cessation of hostilities but also to
discourage violations and thus improve on the commitment undertaken by the AUC.

The changes in the map of violence in Colombia are dramatic (See Annex 3), particularly
in regions where the influence of the self-defense forces has been nearly exclusive in the
last 10 years. Urabá, Catatumbo, Valle, Córdoba, regions of Magdalena Medio,
Antioquia, and Cundinamarca are undergoing a process of transition where the
homicide rates have fallen dramatically. However, in nearly all regions a portion of the
population has expressed widespread fear of a possible return to guerrilla warfare and
the humanitarian consequences such a return could have. To date, there are no reports
of guerrilla raids in these zones, although there has been sustained fighting between the
Army and the FARC in some zones bordering on these territories.

The situation of violence is of great concern in the departments of Cesar, La Guajira and
Atlántico, particularly in the municipalities of Valledupar, Pueblo Bello and Pailitas in
Cesar, Dibulla in La Guajira and Baranoa in Atlántico, where there have been homicides,
disappearances, threats and displacements. In the case of Northern Santander, serious
reports of homicides, abductions, and torture are a concern.

In other areas of the country where the Mission does not have a presence, monitoring
can only be carried out through visits made by officials or by accessing the information
through secondary sources. Another monitoring tool is the reports submitted to the
Mission by the Security and Democracy Foundation. Based on these reports, the most
critical areas in December 2004 and January 2005 were Arauca, Putumayo, Cesar and
the Valle del Cauca.

2.4 Work with Communities Affected by the Violence

With respect to the communities affected by the violence, MAPP/OAS has been working
in particular with communities located in areas where demobilizations have been carried
out. The work of the Mission was basically to develop awareness activities regarding the
mandate and the process of a return to civilian life and assisting the Office of the High
Commissioner in promoting the transition to institutionalism.

In January, the Mission visited the municipality of Tame, Arauca Department, to
participate in a security meeting and a community human rights meeting to discuss issues
of security in that area. The Mission agreed to make periodic visits to the site to verify
compliance with the cessation of hostilities.

In addition, and using Dutch government funds, the Mission is now in the evaluation and
diagnosis phase for conducting community projects involving demobilized individuals
and community leaders in the areas affected by violence. For this purpose, a diagnostic
visit was made to the city of Medellín to evaluate the possibility of carrying out a project
on conflict resolution, negotiation, and citizen participation. Work will be done in the
Santafé de Ralito placement zone to develop a community justice project. These projects
will also serve to bring government and academic institutions to the communities and
contribute to institutional strengthening.
2.5 Agreements with Institutions

On January 24 of this year, the Mission signed an agreement with the Office of the Defender of the People of Colombia for the purpose of establishing a mechanism for collaboration and for receiving information on the verification of the cessation of hostilities. This agreement also makes it possible to carry out joint projects to strengthen institutionalism in the populations affected by the violence. It is also a valuable tool supporting the work of the Mission.

In addition, the Mission plans to sign two agreements in the month of March, one with the Facilitating Committee of Antioquia and the other with the Office of the Mayor of Medellín. These agreements will make it possible to broaden the institutional support for the Mission and strengthen programs on justice and the rule of law and against violence in the communities most affected by the violence.

In the context of an agreement between the Embassy of Sweden and the Security and Democracy Foundation and in order to support the Mission in verifying the cessation of hostilities at the national level, MAPP receives weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports on alleged violations of the cessation of hostilities and fighting between the AUCs and other outlaw groups as well as with the armed forces.

These analytical and informative contributions represent a valuable tool for the Mission and provide it with a broad view of the cessation of hostilities situation at the national level. In addition, the Mission uses the data provided in these reports as input along with reports and information received in the various regional offices, for better and more complete analysis as to who is responsible for violations of the cessation of hostilities.

2.6 Follow-Up on the Relationship with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)

As indicated in earlier reports, MAPP/OAS assumes its mandate based on the premise that its work is consistent with the obligations of the OAS member states with respect to the full exercise of human rights, international humanitarian rights, and the advisory services that the IACHR should provide to the Mission in this area.

Thus, the Mission has accompanied the Commission’s visits to Colombia – most recently the visit of February 17, 2005. The IACHR has been asked to sign a Memorandum of Understanding detailing the scope of advisory services and note has been made of the report prepared by the Commission regarding the peace process in Colombia.

3. Legal Aspects of the Process

According to the observation made by the Mission, the demobilizations have been carried out in accordance with current law and regulation. The Government of Colombia, through its democratic institutions, has initiated a process to improve the current legal framework in order to address these mass demobilizations. To do this, the government has held special sessions of Congress starting this past February 15. Once the new legal framework is approved, the Mission will verify its implementation, in accordance with its mandate.
4. **Capacity of MAPP/OAS**

The mass demobilizations of the AUCs and the resulting formation of territories that must be brought back under the control of the Colombian state, present the Mission with a challenge to its actual capacity to monitor such a task. As of now, the Mission does not have the operational capacity to deal with all the obligations needed to fulfill its mandate.

This topic is of crucial importance to the OAS as a whole and for the peace process that has been started. It requires urgent measures and decision-making on the immediate future of the Mission. Fulfilling a broad and comprehensive mandate to monitor a peace process requires much broader resources and support than those provided to date.

The complexity of the problem of violence, the dynamics of demobilizations, the distances and sizes of the territories involved, and the resulting obligations call for much greater capacity so as not to hinder the Mission’s ability to meet the mandate and the enormous challenges it brings. The hiring of employees, greater logistical support and greater ability to develop programs to monitor authorities and communities are essential and immediate needs and thus more resources will be required.

5. **Conclusions**

1. In the midst of criticism and mistrust among domestic and foreign sectors, the process of dialogue with the AUCs has shown significant results, taking into account not just the number of people who put down their weapons but also the territories that now can and should be occupied by the institutions of government.

2. The start of debate in Congress on the government’s bill called “Justice and Peace” is a key component that may determine the continuation of the process with the self-defense forces.

3. The reintegration into civilian society of those who have been demobilized, the workings of justice in cases where serious crimes have been committed, the reconstruction of the truth, and reparations programs for the victims of violence will be the most meaningful tasks from now on.

4. In the specific case of Medellin, the process of the transition toward peace is still ongoing. The process has made it possible to open up significant opportunities in terms of security, peaceful coexistence of citizens and the reduction of violence. However, to be consolidated, these results require more time and more collaboration.

5. The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia must be strengthened immediately, in that the dynamics created by the process require more effective monitoring. Verification and implementation of programs designed for reintegration and support for communities affected by violence are central topics in this monitoring.
## DEMOBILIZED PERSONS

**November 2004 – February 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BLOQUE</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bananero</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defense Forces of Southern Magdalena</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cundinamarca</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catatumbo</td>
<td>1435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calima</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinú and San Jorge (Córdoba)</td>
<td>924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwestern Antioquia</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mojana</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,793</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

WEAPONS SURRENDERED BY THE AUCs

Verified by MAPP-OAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ARMAMENTS</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>2093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade launchers</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine guns</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launchers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total weapons</strong></td>
<td><strong>2708</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPLOSIVES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>2407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars of dynamite</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars of Sismofex</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars of Sismigel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentonite (pounds)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Explosives</strong></td>
<td><strong>2480</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMMUNITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>484404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERVICE MATERIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camouflage shirts</td>
<td>1329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camouflage pants</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat gear</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical vests</td>
<td>2139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Material</strong></td>
<td><strong>5587</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNICATIONS MATERIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Radios</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Radios</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Comm. Material</strong></td>
<td><strong>575</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACCESSORIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines for long weapons</td>
<td>6235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines for short weapons</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle cleaning rod tips</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle cleaning rods</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonating cord (meters)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-electrical detonators</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical detonators</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field glasses</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal detector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini laser designator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mita telescope</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silencers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total accessories</strong></td>
<td><strong>7471</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: The number of weapons surrendered is less than the number of paramilitaries who have been demobilized. However, the quality and quantity of weapons surrendered has been increasing since the process began. In the Catatumbo and Southern Magdalena demobilizations, camouflage was not counted but was incinerated in the presence of the Mission.

http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2005/CPSC02661e-.ppt
CP14031E04

**Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General**
Mission to Support the Peace Process / Colombia / OAS
Fifth Quarterly Report
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL
ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN
COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

October 5, 2005

1. Background

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in keeping with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “to instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

The Secretary General notes for the record that there has been a delay in implementing the Council’s decision owing to the change in the Secretariat and to other circumstances, which will be explained below.

The Secretary General traveled to Colombia on August 29 and 30 to view the peace process at first hand, including the demobilization of paramilitary groups and the efforts of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process. The Secretary General met with the President of the Republic, Dr. Álvaro Uribe Vélez; the Vice President of the Republic, Dr. Francisco Santos; the High Commissioner for Peace, Dr. Luis Carlos Restrepo; the Attorney General, Dr. Mario Iguarán; diplomats from the Netherlands and Sweden (two of the most generous contributors to the OAS Mission in Colombia); and representatives of nongovernmental organizations devoted to protecting human rights.

During his visit, the Secretary General was able to ascertain in the field the importance attached to the OAS Mission in Colombia and the relatively broad consensus on the need to maintain and strengthen its
presence, even on the part of nongovernmental organizations which call into question some aspects of its work. He was also able to note that an important part of the difficulties still faced by the MAPP stemmed from a shortage of human and material resources, which made it difficult to conduct on-site verification of the demobilization and disarmament process. This notwithstanding, there may also be certain operational aspects that need to be corrected.

In his interviews and contacts with officials, civil society, and the media, the Secretary General expressed his full support for the ongoing demobilization process and the hope that the pacification process could be extended to other illegal armed groups operating in the country.

During the most recent period, the Colombian Congress passed the new Justice and Peace Law, designed to constitute a legal framework for the current demobilization process and any such processes that might occur in the future. The promulgation of this law gave rise to wide-ranging debate in Colombia, especially regarding the mechanisms it provides for establishing the truth about the crimes against humanity perpetrated by groups that are being disarmed and the possibility of bringing the perpetrators to justice.

However, it is not the role of this Secretariat to comment on the contents of a law passed in sovereign fashion by the Colombian state but simply to consider it as part of the context in which the verification mission is to be carried out. The Secretary General deems it positive that the context is now clearer and is of the view that, under his mandate, verification of how the Justice and Peace Law is applied in the course of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration is a new challenge to be faced by the peace mission. Nonetheless, hopefully the concerns expressed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in its pronouncements in this regard will be taken into account as a contribution to strengthening the process.

The OAS received a mandate to provide assistance in a peace process of a magnitude unprecedented in the region, one that involved the possible demobilization of more than 40,000 men. To accomplish that mandate, the Organization was given three principal tasks: (i) to verify the cessation of hostilities; (ii) to verify disarmament; and (iii) to work with the communities affected by the violence. Special note must be taken of the bilateral assistance that Colombia is receiving from its neighbors and from other countries. Yet it must be recognized that, essentially because of scarce resources, the Organization is not fulfilling all the commitments it accepted when it approved resolution 859 of the Permanent Council.

That resolution invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to provide advice to the MAPP/OEA. It has become apparent during this period that verification of the human rights considerations of demobilization must be shored up significantly. The debate resulting from the Law and the critical stance taken in this connection by Colombian and international NGOs require further attention, especially to prevent these issues from appearing to be at odds with a task as essential as cooperation in the lofty cause of peace in Colombia.
For that reason, the Secretary General, together with the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, is examining the possibility of forming an IACHR Secretariat working group in the field, so that there may be regular, active collaboration with the MAPP to ensure that the Organization’s role in Colombia is fully consistent with the obligations of its member states regarding full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

Nor has the OAS been able to offer adequate support to demobilized individuals or their host communities, which are moreover among the communities most affected by the violence. In cooperation with the Colombian Government and the international community, the OAS will have to help pursue its mandate further, with special attention to the tasks of reintegrating the demobilized population and assisting communities in the transition toward a durable peace. The time has come to redefine the Organization’s role in Colombia and to offer the help and commitment that the Colombian people clearly deserve.

This report offers a summary evaluation of the peace process between the months of May and August 2005. It describes progress with the Mission's mandate to verify the cessation of hostilities, the need to consolidate that cessation, and the impact of demobilizations on achieving that purpose. The report also reviews the process of reintegrating former combatants into civilian life during the last three months, and the initiation of projects conducted by the Mission in communities affected by the violence.

2. Introduction

Colombia is currently experiencing one of the most serious and prolonged episodes of domestic violence in the history of the Americas. This conflict has raged for nearly 50 years, characterized by a growing cruelty that has no equal in the history of the Hemisphere. It is estimated that the irregular groups operating in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), possess weapons that in their quality and quantity exceed those available to many of the armies of member states of this Organization. There are said to be more than 40,000 men under arms in Colombia.

The moderating influence that the international community can wield has been seriously undermined by the growing capacity of these groups to support themselves through unlawful activities. Those criminal activities bring in billions of dollars, and the pain and damage they inflict can be appreciated by figures estimating that there are more than 3,000 people kidnapped in Colombia and more than one million displaced people (up to two million, according to some estimates), and hundreds of terrorist acts committed every year. To these figures must be added the millions of young people around the world whose lives are permanently affected by the drugs flowing out of Colombia.

Stability in Latin America, and especially in the Andean region, requires the achievement of solid and lasting peace in Colombia. This is an extremely difficult and complex objective. Yet it must be recognized that the great majority of the members of these groups are young people who can be rehabilitated. The idea of a prolonged conflict can
point presage more cruelty and more violations of human rights. The Colombian people have made courageous efforts to achieve peace on numerous occasions. There have been many imaginative and bold attempts by intellectuals, think tanks and governments in search of peace. Colombians of all ideological persuasions have been seizing every lesson learned to try once again, successfully or not, to negotiate peace. Today we are witnesses to a new attempt.

The goal of peace is of enormous magnitude and demands a degree of solidarity of which we have not always been capable in Latin America. There is no point in measuring cruelty, but there can be no doubt that Colombia’s pain is as deep and sustained as any country in the region has suffered.

Any peace process demands courage, creativity, and decisions that must be taken primarily by the people who bear the suffering. Only they can understand the real magnitude of the challenge. The international community must offer its backing for any effort on behalf of peace, recognizing that domestic decisions deserve the highest respect when they have been adopted democratically.

The pacification program being implemented by President Uribe has rightly received support from the international community, most recently through the Rio Group. Negotiations with the so-called Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC) have led to concrete results, which for the first time in a long time have created real expectations of a cessation of violence. Of course, this is only a first step and is subject to progress and setbacks. But the hope that this negotiation and demobilization will be followed by the demobilization of other armed groups should not be abandoned. The phase that is drawing to an end is the first one, but the possibility of peace after 50 years of violence hinges on its successful outcome. Nothing should put a damper on the achievement of this main objective.

What is at stake here is not a choice between peace, truth, and impunity, nor is a selection to be made between social peace and justice. Neither truth nor justice is possible in the midst of a war that takes tens of thousands of lives every year. By the same token, it will be necessary sooner or later to ascertain the truth and mete out justice as concerns human rights violations. We are convinced that it is possible after so many years of war to fulfill our deep desire for peace, by acting realistically while clinging to the possibility of offering truth, justice, and redress to the hundreds of thousands of Colombians whose lives have been harshly affected. In many countries that have experienced a similar fate, it has become clear over time that those processes in which peace was possible were characterized by more justice, more truth, and less impunity.

We are convinced that the Colombian Government fully shares these ideas. It is admirable that Colombia has kept its democracy operating despite threats and pressures from the insurgent groups and that it has been able to resist the horrible scourge of corruption attempts by drug mafias. As a result of this high-minded stance, journalists, intellectuals, politicians, human rights defenders, social leaders, and students have given their lives.
3. Summary of developments in the peace process

Following is a summary of some of the major issues in the peace process with the Self-Defense Units of Colombia:

- 15 AUC units were demobilized in 11 departments of the country between November of last year and August of this year, representing a significant step forward in the peace process. To consolidate this achievement will require a greater public law enforcement presence in the places where the demobilizations occurred, in order to prevent incursions by other illegal armed groups.

- Strengthening the administration of justice, working with communities affected by violence, and implementing programs for reintegrating former combatants into productive civilian life constitute unavoidable issues if there is to be a sustainable peace. And this must be done within the limitations imposed by a setting of conflict where other armed groups have not been brought into the peace dialogue.

- With the surrender of weapons by 8,804 AUC members and the start that has been made at clearing territories under the control or influence of those groups, a more significant process is now under way. On one hand, it could lead to the deactivation of most of these illegal armed forces and, on the other hand, to the recovery of these territories and departments by state institutions.

- In those territories where disputes with other illegal armed groups persist, the cessation of hostilities, which is a crucial issue in the peace dialogues with the AUC, is not being fully respected.

- Urabá Antioqueño, Córdoba, Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, Cundinamarca, and the Valle del Cauca, among other areas, constitute territories where the cessation of hostilities, understood as embracing all violent acts against the civilian population perpetrated by AUC groups represented in Santafé de Ralito, has brought with it a sharp drop in crime rates.

- The cessation of hostilities is feasible if these illegal groups can be brought together to disarm and demobilize. Without demobilization, verification of the cessation of hostilities will always be only partial, and very difficult to achieve.

- The cessation of hostilities in the territories mentioned, as a result of mass demobilizations, is an important achievement but it will not last unless a series of actions and programs are launched immediately to reinforce the progress achieved.

- It is possible to move forward on territorial issues for supporting the communities affected by the violence, and on institution building. One example is the reintegration program under way in Medellín, and the steps that are being taken to strengthen the institutional presence in communities that have suffered violence. Another example is the work that the Mission is pursuing, in cooperation with the authorities, in 60 communities in the Department of Córdoba.

- The support being provided for territories, communities, municipal governments, the justice system, and social reintegration in Urabá, Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Córdoba, among others, confirms this assertion. The process could collapse if it does not receive greater backing to move beyond these initial successes, which in themselves are not sustainable.
• We are nearing demobilization of the two largest AUC groups: the Bloque Central Bolívar and the Bloque Norte. The demobilization of these groups should practically bring the major part of demobilization to an end, which makes demobilization even more critical during this period.

• There is a consensus, even among critics of the process, that the worst scenario for Colombia would be a breakdown of the current dialogue with the AUC, and the unforeseeable consequences that would entail. Despite its difficulties, support for the current effort is beginning to be seen as preferable to backsliding and failure.

4. The demobilization process

Demobilization of the AUC units has been carried out in three clearly defined stages. The year 2003 saw demobilization of a total of 1036 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) and the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega; those demobilizations were in effect a pilot experiment for the peace process. A second stage began exactly a year later with demobilization of the BCN and the Bloque Bananero on November 25, 2004. Subsequently, the Sur de Magdalena, Cundinamarca, Catatumbo, Calima, Córdoba, Suroeste Antioqueño and La Mojana units were demobilized, by February 2 of this year. In the course of the second stage a total of 3793 members of eight AUC groups or units were demobilized.

Between February and June of this year there was a pause in demobilizations because the AUC decided to await approval of the Justice and Peace Act. On May 25 there was an incident when the national government ordered the arrest of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias Don Berna, inside or beyond the Santa Fé de Ralito Concentration Zone, for his alleged involvement in the murder of Orlando Benítez, a deputy for the Department of Córdoba, as well as his wife and his driver, on the outskirts of the Concentration Zone.

Murillo Bejarano sat at the dialogue table under the name of Adolfo Paz. This decision and the subsequent operation to capture "Adolfo Paz" led to his voluntary surrender three days later (on September 30, 2005, he was moved to a high-security prison). He also committed himself to the demobilization of all units under his command. As well, the successful outcome of this crisis served to reactivate the demobilization timetables for other groups, thus launching a third and final stage of demobilizations, which is expected to end with demobilization of all the AUC military units, in compliance with the Santa Fe agreement.

As of mid-August 2005, during the third stage, five paramilitary groups had been demobilized with a total of 3,975 members, bringing to 8,804 the total number of persons demobilized, and 5,843 weapons surrendered to date in the peace process with the AUC.

While the number of structures and men demobilized to date is impressive, the MAPP estimates that, to complete the demobilization of all the self-defense groups, there are still 11 units that must be disarmed, as well as three independent self-defense groups
that have decided to join the process, bringing to 13,340 the estimated number of members still to be demobilized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOBILIZATIONS TO DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Stage 2003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Cacique Nutibara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Cundinamarca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Catatumbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Calima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Córdoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Soroeste Antioqueño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque La Mojana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal 1 stage:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal persons demobilized:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concentration of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB):

An important factor in the current situation is the announced concentration of all military units of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB), with the exception of the Bloque Vencedores de Arauca. At the present time, this is the largest self-defense organization still operating in Colombian territory, with an estimated total of 4,400 members. In a public communiqué of July 8, 2005, the BCB announced its intention to concentrate all of its political and military units in defined zones. According to the official communiqué, that decision was taken with a view to facilitating the work of the OAS in monitoring and verifying the cessation of hostilities. It should be noted that since the publication of the communiqué the BCB has already demobilized the first of its units, the 676-member Bloque Libertadores del Sur (BLS), which was operating in the Department of Nariño. Implementation of this concentration move was still the subject of negotiation between the government and the BCB at the time this report was prepared. Information available to date indicates that the idea is to demobilize the Bloque Putumayo, the Frente Vichada and possibly the Frente Sur de los Andaquíes, which is operating in the Department of Caquetá.

5. Work of the Mission

In pursuing its mandate the MAPP currently enjoys the valuable support of the Governments of The Bahamas, Ireland, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. Currently, the Mission has 44 employees and five regional offices: Medellín (four employees), Montería and the Concentration Zone (Zona de Ubicación: four employees), Valledupar (two employees), and Cúcuta (two employees). The Mission also has a special mobile team consisting of four officers, one of whom is based in Bogotá and the others in regional offices.

Following is a status report on the work of the Mission during this quarter:

5.1 Verification of the cessation of hostilities

As noted in previous reports, while the AUC have made some partial efforts to comply with the cessation of hostilities in some regions of the country, they have generally failed to fulfill this commitment. This constitutes a major stumbling block to the normal unfolding of the process.

Although the Mission verified an improvement in the security situation in departments such as Sucre, Córdoba, Norte de Santander, Cesar, La Guajira and Magdalena, which has resulted in a decline in the most common forms of violence, failure to observe the cessation of hostilities is still the most pressing concern.

The Mission’s findings have produced the following list of territories and of armed units of the AUC responsible for violating the cessation of hostilities during the last quarter:

- Northwestern Sucre and Bolívar; principally the municipios of San Onofre, Tolú, Tolú Viejo. AUC Unit: Bloque Héroes de los Montes de María.
- Eastern Antioqueño; principally the municipios of San Carlos, San Luis and San Rafael. AUC Unit: Bloque Héroes de Granada.
• Southern and Southeastern foothills of the Sierra Nevada; the municipios of Pueblo Bello Valledupar, La Paz, San Juan de Cesar, Villanueva and Fonseca. AUC Unit: Bloque Norte, Frente Mártires de Cesar.
• Southern Cesar; in the municipios of Aguachica, Pailitas, Pelaya, La Gloria, El Carmen. AUC Unit: Bloque Norte, Frente Autodefensas Campesinas Sur de Cesar.
• Barrancabermeja Zone; in the municipios of Barrancabermeja and Puerto Wilches. AUC Unit: Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB)
• Department of Arauca; principally in the municipio of Tame. AUC Unit: Bloque Vencedores de Arauca

In contrast to what has been happening in the zones mentioned above, where armed units of the AUC remain active, in those areas where the armed groups have been dismantled there has been a substantial decline in incidences of violence. This demonstrates the importance of demobilization for enforcing the cessation of hostilities, and supports the Mission’s reiterated assertion that concentration and demobilization of troops is the only way to verify that the cessation of hostilities is being respected.

• According to official figures provided by the public security forces, in the 19 municipios1/ in Norte de Santander where the AUC’s Bloque Móvil Catatumbo was operating, the average number of murders fell from 64 per month in the last quarter of 2004 to 31.75 per month in the first quarter of 2005. As other indicators of the real dismantling of the military structure of the Bloque Catatumbo we may mention: (i) municipal elections are being held in that region with various candidates representing different political organizations, something that never happened prior to demobilization; (ii) there is a gradual reconciliation between the citizens and the administration of justice. People are now unafraid to come forward in their own name to report criminal activities, something they would not have done previously for fear of reprisal from the AUC.

• With respect to the demobilized Bloque Calima, despite the difficult public safety situation in the Departamento del Valle, the murder rate in the 12 municipios2/ where this unit operated fell from 112 a month in the last quarter of 2004 to 83.4 a month in the first quarter of 2005.

• In Urabá, where the first of the mass demobilizations took place, the police and the Crime Observatory (Observatorio del Delito) both point to a substantial decline in the overall crime rate, and in the homicide rate in particular. Thus, the homicide rate fell from 12.86 murders per month in the last quarter of 2004 to 6.67 per month in the first quarter of 2005.

The Public Ombudsman’s Office, with which the MAPP has signed an understanding, observed in its last report that violations of International Humanitarian Law declined during the first quarter this year in areas of paramilitary influence where there were demobilizations. Nevertheless, that same report indicates that paramilitaries are

---

2. Buenaventura, Buga, Calima (Darien), Dagua, Florida, Pradera, Tulúa, Jamundí, Palmira, Ginebra, San Pedro, Bugalagrande.
continuing to violate the cease-fire in those zones, although complaints declined from 130 in the first half of 2004 to 80 in the first half of 2005.

### DECLINE IN HOMICIDES PER MONTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Last quarter 2004</th>
<th>First quarter 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bloque Bananero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>3.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly decline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>50.39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |                   |                     |
| Bloque Catatumbo     |                   |                     |
|                      | 12.86             | 64                  |
|                      | 112               | 31.75               |
| Average              |                   |                     |
| Monthly average      |                   |                     |
|                      | 83.4              |                     |
| Monthly decline      |                   |                     |
|                      | 28.6%             |                     |

5.2 Monitoring reintegration

Demobilizations to date have affected some 8,804 former combatants of the AUC. They are currently located for the most part in Norte de Santander, Medellín and Turbo (Antioquia), Córdoba and Valle del Cauca.

The Mission's verification in the demobilized zones and in the Referral Centers (CRO) looks at aspects such as the effective dismantling of the demobilized unit, incursions by other self-defense units or other illegal armed groups, the security situation for demobilized troops, and fulfillment of the social and economic commitments that the government gave to demobilized personnel.

The Mission can report positively on the effective dismantling of the armed units of the self-defense groups in all regions where this has occurred. Similarly, the Mission has noted the efforts of the security forces to regain control of these regions and to prevent the incursion of other armed groups.

With respect to the provision of services and activities for reintegrating former combatants, the evaluation produces mixed results. In some regions things are
proceeding in an acceptable manner, while in others a greater effort is needed on the part of the authorities.

Efforts at reintegrating demobilized personnel into civilian life have not yet benefited from international cooperation, and this makes an already complex situation even more difficult, especially in the territories where most of the demobilizations have occurred.

Following is a summary of the situation observed by the Mission in each of the zones where these processes are under way and where the Mission has a presence.

**Urabá**

The security situation for demobilized personnel to date is satisfactory. There is no information on incursions by other illegal armed groups into the cleared zone, and the public security forces have stepped up their presence.

Reintegration of demobilized troops is progressing within the expected parameters. Their participation in educational activities is high, and job opportunities are opening up with the implementation of various productive projects.

**Valle del Cauca**

The security situation for demobilized personnel is alarming. To date, 31 demobilized individuals have been killed. The general situation of public security in the area remains complicated, and the possibility that illegal armed groups are attempting to occupy areas that were cleared during the demobilization cannot be discounted.

The violence that prevails in the zone is compounded by the delay in the provision of CRO services and programs. Prompt reporting of problems in providing help to demobilized individuals could prevent them from losing faith in their transition to civilian life and thus undermining the credibility of the process. At the same time, it must be recognized that the inducements of illegal elements could tempt them to return to outlawed activities.

**Córdoba**

The security situation for demobilized personnel in Córdoba is positive. In the city of Monteria there has been no upsurge in the crime rate following demobilization. There is a concern, however, that illegal armed organizations could take advantage of the lack of job opportunities for demobilized individuals.

**Medellín**

With respect to reintegration of the former Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN), a significant percentage of its demobilized members are currently pursuing studies at the primary, secondary or technical level in the SENA or are taking courses in the Instituto Tecnológico de Medellín (ITM). It is to be hoped that they will keep up these efforts, and this in fact represents a concrete case where the MAPP should be able to cooperate more effectively in the reintegration processes noted here.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for demobilized members of the Bloque del Suroeste Antioqueño. They have not received any solid guidance, nor have all the services of the program been made available to them. The mobile CRO for the zone has yet to be created.

**Norte de Santander**

With respect to former combatants of the Bloque Catatumbo, the security situation is of concern. To date 22 of them have been killed. The authorities will have to give greater effort and attention to the issue of productive projects.

The commitment to the process on the part of demobilized personnel has improved. It may be said that they are taking part and they are prepared to continue with the social readjustment program. The government's reintegration program has yet to reach the expected level of effectiveness. It is worth repeating, however, that the program does not receive any external cooperation funds.

### 5.3 Work with the communities

The beginning of AUC demobilization opens the prospect for strengthening institutions, especially in the areas of justice and security. With funding from the Government of the Netherlands, the Mission has been working with communities and State institutions to implement a program of community-based alternative justice mechanisms.

The work now under way with 60 communities historically affected by violence in the Department of Córdoba and the free popular election of conciliators (Conciliadores en Equidad) from among the natural leaders of these rural communities represent the first experiment of this type to be organized in the areas of paramilitary influence.

The ongoing counseling work that the MAPP is conducting with more than 7,000 inhabitants of the municipios that make up the Concentration Zone has established a basic degree of communication and trust in this task.

As well, as a means of supporting these initiatives, the Mission is incorporating exercises with these communities for achieving reconciliation and subsequent reconstruction of the collective memory. This involves the search for the truth, a fundamental right of victims of the conflict, conceived as a process of social and community construction emerging from the reality of violence. The real victims of the conflict can and must be heard, but they must also participate actively in constructing the truth. The MAPP can and must facilitate this process.

### 5.4 Agreements with institutions

In April the Mission signed several agreements with the city government of Medellín and the Facilitation Commission of Antioquia to expand cooperation mechanisms with those institutions and reinforce the Mission’s work in this important part of the country.

As well, an agreement was signed with the Ministry of the Interior and Justice to facilitate execution of programs for strengthening the administration of justice and for supporting reintegration.

*Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General*
6. Conclusions

The OAS has a historic opportunity to contribute to building a solid and lasting peace in a country that has suffered one of the most violent and prolonged conflicts in the Hemisphere. The Organization is in a position to address this challenge, provided it maintains the political commitment established in Resolution 859 and that it has the means and resources necessary to achieve the planned objectives. Consistent with this mandate, Foreign Ministers of the Rio Group recently issued a statement declaring their support for the Colombian government's efforts to reestablish peace and their interest in strengthening support for the Mission so that it can fulfill the mandate given it by the OAS Permanent Council. In this respect, a recent evaluation of the Mission at the request of the governments of the Netherlands and Sweden recommends increased support from those countries to the MAPP, and also calls for greater commitment by member states of this Organization.\(^3\) It is now time for member states of the Organization to translate their frequently expressed political will into real support and concrete deeds. The difficulties encountered to date can be overcome if the Mission's work and presence are intensified.

If the Organization is in a position to pursue these tasks, it will have to increase the size of the Mission and strengthen its management so that it can respond to the new goals and directions proposed in this report. The MAPP, which today has only 44 employees, should have a permanent establishment of more than 100. To achieve such an increase would require an annual budget of more than $10 million. Considering what is at stake in Colombia, and the benefits that could be achieved by effective OAS involvement in the peace process, this amount is clearly reasonable and within the possibilities of the member states of our Organization.

Likewise, the Secretary General considers it essential for the OAS Mission in Colombia to have a human rights component and will continue working with the IACHR, with full respect for its autonomy, to reach the necessary agreements.

A fundamental component of the strategy is to obtain financing as quickly as possible for giving the IACHR a permanent presence so that it can fulfill its specific mandate of advising the MAPP. On this point, the Secretary General welcomes the highly significant step taken by the Netherlands Minister of Justice, with whom he met in Colombia on August 29, in contributing €200,000 to help the IACHR fulfill its mandate. The IACHR’s support for the work of the MAPP is critical for guaranteeing that all OAS actions in Colombia are taken in accordance with the obligations of its member states to ensure full respect for human rights and for international humanitarian law. The Secretary General also wishes to thank the President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos, who on his recent visit to Colombia promised assistance from his country to the MAPP, a commitment that was ratified by Ambassador Esteban Tomic, Permanent Representative of Chile to this Organization.

---

\(^3\) The OAS General Secretariat will publish this document separately as an information document.
With respect to the mandate, which is quite broad, and calls for verification of the cessation of hostilities, disarmament, and reintegration, the Secretary General proposes to establish priorities, in agreement with the Government of Colombia, for assuming the corresponding responsibilities and fully and effectively carrying out the objectives of the Mission, in particular, those intended to significantly reinforce verification of matters associated with respect for human rights and to follow up on application of the Justice and Peace Law in the course of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration. Also noteworthy is the importance of working with the communities most affected by violence, including indigenous peoples and communities of African descent, by supporting local initiatives in conflict zones and promoting measures to foster trust and reconciliation, to develop a culture of democracy, peace, and peaceful resolution of the violence, as well as to identify, formulate and develop social initiatives and projects in those areas.

On October 4, President Uribe presided over the installation of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation. Established by the Justice and Peace Law, the Commission is composed of distinguished Colombian personalities, including Eduardo Pizarro, Ana Teresa Bernal, Patricia Buriticá, Jaime Jaramillo Panesso, Gustavo Villegas, and Monseigneur Nel Beltran. Its Commission are deemed to be extremely important and will require national and international support. The OAS Mission will be able to play a major role as an international observer within the Commission and to provide it, through verification and community work, with extremely valuable information.

The Secretary General asks member states' support for strengthening the Mission, support that should be reflected in the provision of financial and material resources. As a first step in this direction, there is a need for more staff to carry out the mandates. Some member countries with experience in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration could contribute their expertise in these matters. This could be done by means of the direct contribution of funds or of personnel from those countries with experience in these issues.

In order to give the necessary certainty and transparency to the tasks of the Mission, it is very important to develop a manual of procedures that will make up-to-date, clear and specific information available to the General Secretariat. It would also be useful to establish mechanisms to ensure proper documentation and transparent evaluation, investigation and guarantees for complaints of cease-fire violations by members of the paramilitary units involved in the process.

Finally, the Secretary General wishes to thank the men and women of the Mission in Colombia who with woefully inadequate resources have managed, through sacrifice and dedication, to give the OAS a presence that is contributing significantly to a peace effort on which depends so heavily the stability of Latin America, and especially of the Andean region.
APPENDIX I

SPECIAL DECLARACION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE RIO GROUP ON COLOMBIA

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Rio Group, gathered at a special meeting, listened to the detailed report of the Foreign Minister of Colombia, Carolina Barco, on the peace process under way in her country. The delegations present thanked her for that presentation.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs expressed their appreciation and support for the efforts, as noted, being made out in Colombia to restore peace in that country. They welcomed the demobilization and disarmament of over 17,000 members of illegal armed groups and recognized the contribution of the Organization of American States through the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA), whose progress will be assessed in the near future by the OAS Permanent Council.

Likewise they said that the process of reintegration and of support for the communities in which demobilizations had taken place were important in ensuring a sustainable peace process with strict respect for human rights principles.

In this regard, they expressed an interest in strengthening support for the Mission so that it might fully implement the mandate assigned to it by the OAS Permanent Council.

San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentine Republic, August 26, 2005
The Presidents of the South American Nations, meeting at the First Summit of the South American Community of Nations, held in Brasilia on September 30, 2005, expressed their appreciation and support for the efforts in Colombia to establish peace. They welcomed both the collective and the individual demobilization taking place and the disarmament of over 18,600 members of illegal armed groups and recognized the contribution of the Organization of American States (OAS) through the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA).

Likewise they said that the process of reintegration and of support for the communities in which demobilizations had taken place were important in ensuring a sustainable peace process with strict respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

The Presidents recognized that, if the process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration and that of verification by the OAS Mission were to be successful, assistance from the international community was needed.

In this regard, they expressed an interest in strengthening support for the Mission so that the mandate issued by the OAS Permanent Council could be fully implemented, and invited the Secretary General of the Organization to inform the countries of the South American Community of Nations, within a month’s time, of how best this support could be demonstrated.

Brasilia, September 30, 2005
Sixth Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

I. Background

This quarterly report by the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “to instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. Introduction

MAPP/OEA

Since the previous report was submitted to the Permanent Council in October 2005, the Organization’s Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia and the peace process itself have both made significant progress. In spite of those advances, however, we must not lose sight of the complexity of any peace process and, in particular, of the one underway in Colombia, a country that has seen more than 50 years of conflict. The Secretary General’s quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on MAPP/OEA give a temporary view of a peace plan that could take years or decades to put into practice.

With specific reference to the Mission, the member states and observer countries gave a highly positive response to the request made in the Secretary General’s last report to the Permanent Council, asking them to expand their support for the Mission. The call was for the countries interested in assisting the Mission to provide financial, material, and
human resources. The Government of the Netherlands, MAPP/OEA’s main contributor since the Organization started work in Colombia, donated US$1.5 million on December 13, 2005. With that donation, the Netherlands has become the most generous contributor to the Mission and thus deserves the special recognition of the General Secretariat.

The Governments of Sweden and the Republic of Ireland also deserve a special mention. The Swedish Government renewed its commitment to the Mission by continuing to fund the participation of the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) expert who has been a part of MAPP/OEA since 2004. In a letter to the Secretary General, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Leila Freivalds noted her country’s willingness to contribute US$2 million to the Mission and, at the same time, set out a series of concerns regarding its operations. The Secretary General answered the minister’s letter and also met with Gunnar Lund, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States, and told him that MAPP/OEA was working on the concerns expressed by his government so that, consequently, the donation of funds as initially offered could proceed.

Similarly, the Republic of Ireland donated €130,000 to MAPP/OEA for 2005, and it has promised a further €260,000 to be handed over during 2006 and 2007. The first €130,000 arrived at a particularly difficult moment for the Mission, and the money allowed the Organization’s work in Colombia to continue. The Secretary General acknowledges this generous contribution.

The Secretary General would also like to thank the Government of Mexico for its decision to send personnel in support of MAPP/OEA. On December 27, 2005, the General Secretariat received a letter from Foreign Secretary Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista, reporting his government’s decision to send two Mexican experts in human rights, social affairs, the administration of justice, criminal matters, and law and order, to join the Mission in January 2006.

Similarly, the Government of Brazil, through its embassy in Bogotá and its mission to the OAS in Washington, D.C., contacted the MAPP and the Department of Crisis Prevention and Special Missions, respectively, to analyze the options available to it for contributing human resources to the Mission.

In January 2006, President of Chile Ricardo Lagos sent a letter to the Secretary General, reporting that interministerial consultations had been held with a view to sending two professional experts in law and order and local participation.

Likewise, the Government of Guatemala, through its ambassador in Colombia, relayed its intent to contribute between two and four professionals to the MAPP.

Other member states and observer countries have indicated their interest in helping. While the exact nature of their support has not been formalized, Argentina, Canada, Finland, Norway, Romania, Spain, Thailand, and Ukraine have made overtures to the Organization. The United States and the Republic of Korea have also spoken of their interest in continuing to assist MAPP/OEA. The Republic of Korea’s donation of vehicles and computer equipment last year made a substantial contribution to the Mission.
These new sources of support enabled more than 20 officers to be hired, all of whom are international experts with experience in DDR and conflict resolution. In this way, the personnel numbers for verification tasks are being doubled. Over the coming weeks, the Mission will realize its goal of having 10 regional offices and more than 100 officers. When this goal is attained, MAPP/OEA will be in a situation to meet the challenge it faces.

The OAS’s support for the peace effort in Colombia goes beyond the valuable contribution made by MAPP/OEA and includes coordinated actions by other agencies of the Organization.

Thus, during 2005, in the public information area, the Trust for the Americas implemented a program called “Workshops for Promoting Dialogue and a Culture of Peace,” which provided support for communities receiving demobilized former combatants in five regions of Colombia. The initiative worked by means of community radio programs and workshops, seeking to reduce the tensions generated by the process, build confidence, and promote a dialogue between the receiving communities and demobilized combatants of illegal groups, thus offering everyone a new option for social integration.

In 2006, in conjunction with the Department of Crisis Prevention and Special Missions of the Assistant Secretariat for Political Affairs, the Trust hopes to implement an ambitious program of support for civil society in the cities of Cúcuta and Montería. This program – which offers workshops on harmonious coexistence, economic alternatives for demobilized combatants, and public information campaigns – has already been presented to several donors.

Similarly, the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) is carrying out a series of projects intended to improve the socioeconomic conditions of displaced populations and to carry out capacity-building among them.

The PADF has been promoting, inter alia, job training among populations displaced by the violence, with projects that encourage the development of specific skills required by the market – such as dressmaking, computer services, carpentry, metalwork, cabinet making, and flower growing. The PADF’s projects have included the promotion of partnerships and the creation of Credit Funds, which support beneficiaries in developing small-scale businesses through reputable lending agencies. The PADF and MAPP/OEA will be implementing a shared working agenda to develop and implement projects for reintegrating demobilized combatants.

In the Fifth Quarterly Report, the Secretary General agreed to establish mechanisms to ensure proper documentation, transparent evaluations and investigations, and guarantees for complaints alleging cease-fire violations by members of the paramilitary units involved in the process. In connection with that, MAPP/OEA is currently improving the existing methods and manuals that clearly and exactly set the instructions to be followed by the verification experts in (1) verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, (2) verifying demobilization and disarmament, (3) verifying that the armed units have effectively been disbanded and reincorporated into civilian life, and (4) following up on the individual verification of reintegrated combatants.
Peace Process

Since the process of peace negotiations with the AUC began in November 2003, there have been 27 mass demobilization ceremonies at which more than 20,000 combatants have been demobilized. Following a unilateral suspension of the process by the AUC, it recommenced in December. The AUC had halted the demobilizations, claiming that the Government was not meeting the commitments to which it had previously agreed. Following negotiations between the Government and the AUC, it was agreed to recommence the demobilizations and, on December 12, 1,923 members from three fronts of the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) in Antioquia handed over their weapons. After that, another 1,603 members of the self-defense forces were demobilized in December, with an additional 6,000 demobilizing in 2006 to date.

Progress has also been made in the negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). On December 16, 2005, exploratory talks began between the Colombian Government and the ELN in Havana, Cuba. The governments of Norway, Switzerland, and Spain attended these initial discussions. According to the official communiqué issued at the close of the December 21 meeting, the discussions took place in a “frank and cordial atmosphere” and it was decided to hold another meeting in Cuba in 2006 to set an agenda for peace negotiations. Under Permanent Council resolution 859, the Mission’s mandate is to support all aspects of the peace process in Colombia, and the Organization is closely watching these developments.

Also noteworthy is the failure of a proposal presented by France, Switzerland, and Spain to clear an area of 180 km² in Valle del Cauca for hosting a meeting between the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the Government at which a humanitarian agreement would have been sought.

In decree 4760 of December 30, 2005, the Colombian Government enacted the regulations for the Justice and Peace Law. This decree sets the requirements to be met by demobilized combatants wishing to benefit from the law. These include giving a free statement to a prosecutor, who then has a period of 60 days to pursue an investigation and draw up charges against the former combatant. The decree also establishes the rights of victims: under the regulations, victims may “participate actively in proceedings under the Justice and Peace Law by submitting evidence to the judicial authorities, and hearing and challenging any decisions adopted therein.” The State is responsible for ensuring that victims receive payments from the Victims Compensation Fund. One important aspect of the regulations is that they enable the procedural terms set by the Law to be interpreted in such a way that prosecutors’ offices can now meet its obligation of investigating crimes and making accusations within a more reasonable timeframe.

In spite of these advances in the peace process, MAPP/OEA has identified several violations of the cease-fire and demobilizations, and it has also seen problems caused by the reintegration of former combatants. These considerations and comments are in accordance with the mandate of the Mission and, consequently, we trust that they will be taken into consideration by the Government of Colombia.
The Mission holds that the partial demobilization and dismantling of units, transfers of fighters from a demobilized unit to another group, and the territorial expansion of a non-demobilized unit into areas where demobilizations have taken place represent violations of the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement, signed by the Government and the AUC on July 15, 2003, whereunder the outlawed organization agreed to demobilize all its members and to refrain from offensive actions.

However, recidivism into criminal activities by demobilized combatants, either individually or collectively, does not constitute a breach of the agreements signed by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) – provided that there are no ties between the demobilized combatants in question and the organization or its active officers.

The General Secretariat believes that the sustainable success of the peace process depends on the attention paid to communities affected by violence and on the effective reintegration of demobilized combatants. As has been noted by High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo, the Government needs to reexamine its efforts vis-à-vis the reintegration process. According to what MAPP/OEA has seen, with the exception of some areas, the reintegration process is in crisis and is endangering the long-term viability of the peace process. This report will highlight some of those problems.

### III. Developments with the Peace Process and the AUC Demobilizations

The AUC’s mass demobilizations recommenced on December 12. Thus, there were five collective demobilizations in December: Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) Remedios (1,923 members); Frente Héroes y Mártires de Guática of the BCB (522); Bloque Vencedores de Arauca (548); Autodefensas Campesinas de Tolima (208); and the BCB’s Frente Vichada (325). In total, 3,526 self-defense members were demobilized in December.

Similarly, this year to date, three units have been demobilized: (i) some 2,700 men belonging to the Bloque Mineros, in Tarazá, Antioquia; (ii) approximately 2,500 men from the Bloque Central Bolívar en Santa Rosa, south Bolívar; and (iii) around 700 men from the Bloque del Magdalena Medio in Puerto Boyacá.

The following table summarizes the number of weapons handed over in the five December demobilizations.
### Subtotals of Surrendered Weaponry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bloque Vencedores de Arauca</th>
<th>BCB – Frente Héroes y Mártires de Guática</th>
<th>BCB – Frente Remedios</th>
<th>Autodefensas Campesinas de Tolima</th>
<th>BCB – Frente Vichada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total combatants demobilized</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons surrendered</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of men to weapons</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemade 60mm mortars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple 40mm grenade launchers</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-shot 40mm grenade launchers</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine guns</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal weapons</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm mortar grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal grenades</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore mines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal mines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In connection with this, MAPP/OEA is still concerned about the failure to destroy the weapons surrendered by the demobilized paramilitary groups. This concern has been conveyed to the competent authorities of the Colombian Government.
IV. Verifying the dismantling of AUC armed units

To carry out its verification mandate, the Mission has offices in six regions of the country and its headquarters in Bogotá. The regional offices are located in Cúcuta, Valledupar, Montería, Turbo, Medellín, and Barrancabermeja, in accordance with the presence of active or demobilized self-defense units and their spheres of influence. MAPP/OEA also has a Mobile Team, which travels to areas not covered by the regional offices, such as Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Cundinamarca, Meta, Casanare, Vichada, etc.

After a self-defense unit has been demobilized, the regional offices keep in constant contact with the civilian, military, and police authorities, as well as with the communities and with other institutions and nongovernmental organizations with a local presence. The regional offices also monitor all the sources of information available in the areas where they are based, in order to obtain data on the prevailing law-and-order situation. Verification entails monitoring the emergence of new groups, possible raids by guerrilla forces, the presence of the forces of law and order, and the personal situations of demobilized combatants. Similarly, the Mobile Team strives to perform the same task, even though the frequency of its visits is insufficient because of the large areas it has to cover.

In addition to conducting this form of verification on the ground, the Mission’s presence in different zones allows the monitoring of communities. The Mission’s aim in this regard is to identify locations where new illegal armed groups have emerged or other illegal agents have co-opted self-defense units that have demobilized and regrouped, which pose a threat to those communities.

In performing this task, to date the Mission has carried out verifications in 16 regions and subregions of the country in which AUC units have been demobilized (see attached map), namely: city of Medellín (Bloque Cacique Nutibara and Bloque Héroes de Granada), region of Urabá in Antioquia (Bloque Bananero), southern region of Magdalena (Autodefensas del Sur del Magdalena e Isla de San Fernando), Cundinamarca (Bloque Cundinamarca), region of Catatumbo, Santander (Bloque Catatumbo), Valle del Cauca (Bloque Calima), Córdoba (Bloque Sinú y San Jorge and Bloque Héroes de Tolová), La Mojana subregion in Sucre (Frente La Mojana), Antioquia (Bloque Suroeste Antioqueño, Bloque Noroccidente Antioqueño, and Bloque Héroes de Granada), Los Montes de María subregion in Sucre and Bolívar (Bloque Héroes de los Montes de María), Nariño (Bloque Libertadores del Sur), Meta and Vichada (Autodefensas Campesinas del Meta y Vichada), and Chocó (Bloque Pacífico).

The timetable of post-demobilization visits drawn up by the Mission provides for on-the-ground verification of the effective dismantling of the following armed units that have not yet been verified: Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega, Bloque Centauros, Frente Vichada–Bloque Central Bolívar, and Bloque Tolima, thus completing the first round of demobilization verification visits that have been carried out. The Mission plans to continue with verifications of this kind over the next year.
The Mission believes the verification of the dismantling of the armed units demobilized to date to be generally positive. The illegal armed units still found in various areas of the country have been dismantled, and most former combatants have returned to their places of origin.

However, certain phenomena arising subsequent to the demobilizations are a cause of concern to the Mission. These are (see enclosed map): (1) the regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs that control specific communities and illegal economic activities; (2) holdouts who have not demobilized; (3) the emergence of new armed players and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilized groups.

A. The regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs that control specific communities and illegal economic activities.

In regions where guerrilla activity is low and the entry of the forces of law and order has not been effective, conditions arise under which various armed illegal groups can assume control. In these areas, the problem arises when middle-level demobilized combatants step into the vacuum. They assume control of the criminal activities that were traditionally the preserve of the units or groups based there (extortion, levies on drug production, social cleansing, alliances with local administrations) and organize themselves into small groups, armed with side arms, remaining in urban areas and communicating by cell phones. The Mission is therefore concerned about the possible emergence of illegal players within the framework of the conflict, who could ultimately end up engaging in turf wars.

This problem exists in: (1) The municipality of Palmito, Sucre department (the former area of influence of the Héroes Montes de María group), where a group of some eight demobilized combatants controls the population and, in particular, the urban area. (2) In the Mojana subregion, specifically in the municipalities of Majagual, Guaranda, and Sucre (the former area of influence of the Frente la Mojana), a group of seven individuals – including a former Front commander – are extorting several local traders. Reports and complaints also indicate that the group is carrying out “social cleansing.” (3) In Montelíbano municipality, in the department of Córdoba (the former area of influence of the Bloque Sinú y San Jorge), a group of around 25 individuals, including some demobilized combatants, controls the illegal drugs trade and is intimidating the civilian population. (4) In the village of La Cristalina in Puerto Gaitán, Meta (the former area of influence of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada), a group of five demobilized combatants extorts money from the transportation of foodstuffs. (5) In districts of Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca (the former area of influence of the Bloque Calima), the capture of one demobilized combatant led to an outbreak of violence that ended with the death of 14 demobilized combatants. (6) In rural areas of Palmira and in Florida, Valle (also formerly controlled by Bloque Calima), a group of demobilized combatants is engaged in extortion. (7) En Tumaco, Nariño (the former area of influence of the Bloque Libertadores del Sur), there have been reports of demobilized combatants controlling a part of the drugs trade.
Identifying the interrelations between common criminals, drug traffickers, and new manifestations of the self-defense phenomenon is a task that requires attention. Other angles could also be involved, in that there could be groups and individuals attempting to establish armed units in order to benefit from the Justice and Peace Law.

B. Holdouts who have not demobilized.

The second phenomenon that has emerged in the aftermath of the demobilization process is the continued presence in certain regions of holdouts: fronts or groups that have not demobilized. These holdouts are organically parts of the armed units of the demobilized groups, and they continue to pursue the same criminal activities in their spheres of influence. MAPP/OEA calls on these groups to join in with the peace process, hand over their weapons, and cease their criminal activities.

Córdoba

Of particular concern to the Mission is the situation that has arisen in the rural districts of Crucito and Gallo in the northern regions around Urrá Dam in Tierralta municipality following the demobilization of the Bloque Héroes de Tolová (BHT). A group of between 60 and 80 non-demobilized paramilitaries continues to operate there. The group protects illegal crops and controls the coca base trade in the area. Since the BHT’s demobilization, this group no longer uses camouflage, operating instead in civilian garb. The group has organized public meetings, telling the locals of its intent to control the area. They have conducted censuses of the inhabitants and of the community’s capacity for coca base production.

Meta

In Cristalina village, Puerto Gaitán, Meta, the Mission was told of a group of self-defense members from the Frente Vichada of the Bloque Central Bolívar that did not demobilize in Cumaribo, Vichada. The group apparently plans to fight with demobilized combatants from the Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada (ACMV) for control of the extortion carried out against the local population and against the trucks that pass through the area to supply the region’s illicit crops.

The Mission has been told, by several sources, that a former ACMV commander apparently sold some of his weapons to a dissident commander from the Bloque Centauros and hid another amount in a cache for a group of some 200 non-demobilized combatants.

Sucre

Apparently there is a group of some 30 men who decided not to demobilize and who continue to operate in the foothills of the Montes de María.

Bolívar

The same situation is found in Córdoba municipality, in the department of Bolívar, where reports speak of the existence of a group of around 15 individuals who are guarding the area and have ties with the drugs trade.
C. The emergence of new armed players and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilized groups.

The emergence of new armed groups pursuing a range of different interests remains a cause of concern for the Mission. There is a risk of demobilized sectors of the population being co-opted, and of new combatants being recruited. This phenomenon has emerged primarily in areas with consolidated illegal economies.

Valle del Cauca

In Valle del Cauca, the Mission has heard of several phenomena that are apparently related to drug trafficking in northern Valle. There, two criminal gangs are passing themselves off as self-defense forces under the names Autodefensas Unidas del Valle (AUV) and Rondas Campesinas Populares (RCP). According to some reports, to achieve this aim they are arming themselves and recruiting new members from among the civilian population and demobilized combatants. The inhabitants of some municipalities in the north of Valle del Cauca department have told the Mission that they have seen men in uniforms, carrying rifles and wearing armbands with the letters “AUV.”

In the district of La Cristalina de Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, the Mission heard about the possible creation of a new self-defense group; reportedly, it is still recruiting members and has not yet begun to conduct military operations.

In that same department, the appearance of pamphlets and graffiti from groups calling themselves “Bloque Central” (Riofrío municipality) and “Frente Social Común por la Paz” (Tulúa municipality) is being monitored by the Mission. To date, no exact information has been obtained regarding the origins or actions of these groups.

Similarly noteworthy is the appearance of pamphlets signed by the “Frente Social por la Paz” that are circulating in the cities of Sincelejo, Tulúa, and Pasto. These pamphlets refer to recent attacks by the FARC-EP, urge civil society to join up to “defeat terrorism,” and are signed “It’s coming! Frente Social por la Paz.” There are similarities in the documents found in Tulúa and Pasto, and it can be concluded that they are part of the same phenomenon.

Chocó

This department reported two specific incidents in the municipalities of San José del Palmar and Istmina, which were apparently the work of the same drug-trafficking gang that calls itself the Autodefensas Campesinas Unidas del Norte del Valle (ACUN). The Bloque Pacifico used to operate in the vicinity of these two municipalities.

This group of drug traffickers has set itself up in a rural area of San José del Palmar municipality, in the southwest of Chocó where it borders with the north of Valle department. During the third week of October, it confronted a guerrilla group composed of member of the FARC’s Frente Aurelio Rodríguez, the ELN, and the Ejército Guevarista Revolucionario—ERG, resulting in numerous deaths.
It can be said that in most of the municipalities where the Frente Héroes del Chocó operated,¹ this drug-trafficking group has now begun operations. Indeed, most sources consulted support that claim;² they also report that the “replacement” took place one month before the demobilization. In addition, they suggest that money possibly changed hands between the two organizations, whereby the Bloque Pacífico “ceded” territory and the illicit economy in the area to the ACUN.

**Nariño**

There is another worrying situation in Nariño department, where the existence of a group called “Mano Negra” or “Águilas Negras” was detected. This group’s center of operations is in the village El Palmar, Leiva municipality, and its influence extends into the districts of Esmeraldas and La Sierra in El Rosario municipality, into the village of Remolino in Taminango municipality (Nariño) and, possibly, into the municipalities of Mercaderes and Balboa (Cauca). This group operates in the former area of influence of the Bloque Libertadores del Sur (BLS), attached to the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB), which was demobilized in Taminango (Nariño) on July 30 last.

This group apparently comprises between 80 and 150 men. They are recruiting new combatants, from among both demobilized fighters and the local population. According to information received by the OAS, in the aftermath of demobilization, the “Mano Negra” group is working to recuperate the coca monopoly.

**Norte de Santander**

A similar phenomenon has arisen in Norte de Santander, where there are reports of a group calling itself “Águilas Negras” or “Águilas Azules” that operates in the municipalities of Puerto Santander, Sardinata, and Tibú and is apparently pursuing a plan to expand and secure control of territory. Some reports indicate that this group might belong to the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB). However, the Mission has to secure further information before it can determine the identity of these illegal groups. It has been noted that this group brings keen pressure to bear on demobilized former combatants from the Bloque Catatumbo living in the area, with the result that some of them have been killed, others have been displaced, and others are now part of the group.

**Antioquia**

In certainly municipalities in southwestern Antioquia – particularly Amagá, Venecia, and Hispania, the former sphere of influence of the AUC’s Bloque Suroeste – there are also reports of the emergence of a group calling itself the “Águilas Negras.”

---

¹ Condoto, Istmina, Medio San Juan, Lloró, Bagadó, Novita, and Tadó. However, its center of operations was located in the municipalities of Istmina and Medio Baudó.

² Departmental and municipal authorities, and civil, military and community sources.
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General

Cundinamarca

In Guaduas municipality, adjacent to the area where the Bloque Cundinamarca formerly operated, the Mission has detected the presence of a paramilitary group comprising some 50 men. This group carries out fuel thefts, extortion, and kidnappings, and is being investigated by the National Police.

In conclusion, it is noteworthy that in three of the cases detected – southwestern Antioquia, Norte de Santander, and Nariño – the name “Águilas Negras” appears and that, in three cities from different departments of the country, pamphlets signed by the “Frente Social por la Paz” have been circulating; to date, however, the origin and nature of this phenomenon has not been identified.

V. Special verification mission to investigate incidents in Curumaní, Cesar

In Cesar, the Mission’s team from the Valledupar office conducted verification work, with support from central government officials, in which every effort was made to investigate a massacre perpetrated by the AUC. This team, accompanied by the Social Pastoral Office and the presidential office’s Social Action, recorded an armed incursion by a group of approximately 150 men belonging to the AUC’s Bloque Norte. The group clashed with members of the ELN in both Lamas Verdes and Nuevo Horizonte. According to information provided by locals who witnessed the incidents, following the fighting a number of people from the area were captured and later executed.

To date, in the aftermath of these violent and reprehensible actions, eight bodies have been recovered and one minor, 16-year-old Jesús Emiro Manzano, remains missing. The possibility of finding more bodies has not been discarded. In addition, some 18 families were displaced.

The Mission is watching how this case unfolds. These incidents represent a clear violation of the cessation of hostilities by the AUC. The OAS has published the preliminary results of the verification, and it now falls to the judicial agents of the State to cast light on the facts.

VI. Conclusion

In his last report to this Council, the Secretary General said that the OAS had been presented with a historic opportunity to contribute to building a solid and lasting peace in Colombia; he also said the Organization was in a position to address this challenge, provided it maintained the political commitment established in Resolution 859 and it had the means and resources necessary to achieve the planned objectives. Since the presentation of that Fifth Report to the Permanent Council, the member states’ political commitment to the peace effort in Colombia is stronger than ever, while the financial support sought for so long is beginning to arrive in substantial amounts.

The Mission is growing through increased contributions of human, financial, and material resources. If all the verbal commitments made by countries interested in participating in
MAPP/OEA are formalized, over the coming weeks we could attain the goal of opening 10 regional offices in the areas where demobilizations have taken place and have a total of more than 100 Mission officers. This progress would allow the Organization to carry out its tasks in Colombia effectively, discharging the commitment with the Colombian people that it assumed in January 2004.

The Secretary General holds that human rights are fundamental to the Organization’s work in Colombia. Thus, the IACHR recently conducted a visit to Bogotá and, thanks to additional resources from the Government of Sweden, it plans to make regular visits over the coming months. The IACHR has also worked with the General Secretariat, providing advice on specific issues within the verification process.

The peace process with the AUC has also made considerable progress. The AUC’s mass demobilizations recommenced, and it is hoped that the entire group will have laid down its weapons by the end of February. The task of verifying the cessation of hostilities and disarmament, as regards the peace process with the AUC, is entering its final phase.

Ahead of the OAS Mission lies the essential task of verifying that demobilization and disarmament of the illegal units actually take place and that the legal stages in the demobilization process are followed. This requires it to be present in all areas where the AUC operate, and that goal will be attained with the contributions promised by the member states, observer nations, and other friendly countries. Similarly, MAPP/OEA can and must support the reintegration process and the work being carried out with the communities most severely affected by violence.

In spite of these advances in the peace process, MAPP/OEA has identified several violations of the cease-fire and demobilizations, and it has also observed the problems caused by the reintegration of former combatants. In addition, MAPP/OEA is concerned by the destruction of the weapons surrendered by the paramilitary groups in the mass demobilizations, and it places the highest importance on this issue. It has not to date been possible to ensure that those armaments are destroyed. These considerations and comments are in accordance with the mandate of the Mission and, consequently, we trust that they will be taken into consideration by the Government of Colombia.

The challenge posed by Colombia is perhaps the greatest one that lies ahead for this Organization. The peace process in Colombia is extremely complex, and every stage of it contains both positive aspects that deserve to be highlighted as well as serious obstacles and challenges. The role of the Organization of American States is to support the efforts of the Colombian Government in seeking to ensure a lasting peace, based on respect for the principles that guide the Organization. The Secretary General is pleased that the OAS member states recognize this challenge and are willing to assist in the quest for peace.
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Self-defense groups undergoing demobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bloque Caicurá Nutibara</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Autodefensas Campesinas</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bloque Bananeros</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Autodefensas del Sur del Magdalena</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bloque Cundinamarca</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bloque Móvil Catatumbo</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bloque Calima</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bloque Córdoba</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bloque Sucreste Antioqueño</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bloque La Mojana</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bloque Héroes de Tolová</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bloque Héroes de los Montes de María</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bloque Libertadores del Sur (BLS)</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bloque Héroes de Granada (BHG)</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Autodefensas Campesinas del Meta y Vichada (ACMV)</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Bloque Pacífico y Héroes del Chocó</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Anillo de Seguridad Santa Fe de Ralito</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Bloque Centauros</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bloque Occidente Antioqueño</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Frente Héroes de Vichada</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bloque Tolima</td>
<td>SANTA FE DE RALITO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mission to Support the Peace Process / Colombia / OAS
Seventh Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

I. Background

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “[t]o instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. Introduction MAPP/OEA

Since the sixth report was submitted to the Permanent Council, the MAPP/OEA and the peace process itself have both made significant progress. It must be recalled, however, that this progress has been achieved in a context of great complexity, inherent in any peace process and particularly in the one under way in Colombia, which has been marked by conflict for more than 50 years. The Secretary General’s quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA give a snapshot of what could be the foundations of a broader structure of peace.

In this respect, mention must be made of the Secretary General’s visit to Colombia between July 11 and 15 of this year. During that visit, the Secretary General held meetings with various government authorities, including President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, to share views on the peace process in the country. Likewise, the Secretary General met with the leaders of the MAPP/OEA and with the coordinators of its regional offices, and received firsthand information on the status of their work.
At the invitation of the mayor of Medellín, the Secretary General was able to observe the social reintegration projects under way in that major city.

With specific reference to the Mission, the member states and observer countries gave a highly positive response to the Secretary General’s appeal to expand their support for the Mission. That appeal was for the countries interested in assisting the Mission to provide financial, material, and human resources. Of particular importance was the establishment of the “Friends of the OAS Peace Mission in Colombia,” a group of countries that includes Canada, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.

The Government of the Netherlands deserves special recognition as the MAPP/OEA’s main contributor since the Organization started work in Colombia.

The Swedish Government renewed its commitment to the Mission, with generous funding and the fielding of a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) expert and of a specialist in working with nongovernmental organizations. The Government of Sweden also reported that it is prepared to earmark an annual sum in support of the Mission.

The Government of Canada has become an active partner in financing the Mission since 2005, and it is hoped that this valuable support will continue.

Along the same lines, the Secretary General notes that The Bahamas made a second contribution to the Mission, in July 2006.

The Secretary General is also grateful to Ireland for its decision to support the Mission through its 2005 contribution, and its offer to renew this effort for 2006.

In June 2006, the Government of Thailand generously made a financial contribution to the Mission.

The donation of vehicles and computer equipment last year by the Republic of Korea constituted a substantial contribution to the work of the Mission.

The Secretary General also wishes to thank the Governments of Mexico and Brazil for their valuable support in financing the participation of experts in various fields, including human rights, social affairs, diplomatic relations, and public safety. In this respect, the Government of Guatemala has informed the General Secretariat that it has appointed a Guatemalan professional to be a member of the Mission. The Governments of Argentina, Chile, and Peru have contacted the Mission to explore the possibilities of contributing to it by financing experts.

The United States has announced a major contribution to funding of the Mission for this year.

The Government of Spain, through its Council of Ministers, approved a significant contribution to the Mission. In addition, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) has decided to make another major contribution to the Mission.
The Government of Norway informed the General Secretariat of its desire to make a generous financial contribution to the Mission, arrangements for which are now being worked out.

The municipal government of Medellín has provided funding under an agreement signed with the Mission to incorporate a team of six social workers to strengthen the Mission’s activities in the city’s neighborhoods. The regional office in Medellín now has a solid team more proportionate to the challenges in that region of the country.

All of this support has enabled the Mission to increase its presence, with its 34 international verifiers, 17 local professionals, and 34 individuals providing temporary assistance—for a total of 85 participants, 38 percent of whom are women.

Following a commitment given by the Secretary General, the Mission has adopted the Basic Manual for the performance of its functions. This manual contains clear and precise instructions for the Mission’s verification experts to use in relation to (i) the cessation of hostilities, (ii) concentration, disarmament, and demobilization, (iii) dismantling of illegal armed units, (iv) maintenance of public order in demobilization areas, (v) reintegration, (vi) observance of Law 975/2005 (the Justice and Peace Law), and (vii) the field work methodology for use with communities affected by violence. The Secretary General has coordinated the advisory services offered to the Mission by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Also noteworthy is the fact that, as part of its mandate, the Mission has taken a crosscutting approach in matters relating to gender, children’s rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples and communities of African descent, both for the displaced population and for the communities receiving former combatants.

THE PEACE PROCESS

In the period covered by this report, progress was made in negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN). Specifically, in February and April, representatives of the national government and of this guerrilla organization met in Havana, Cuba, in the second and third rounds of the Formal Exploratory Phase. The Governments of Cuba, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland participated in those meetings, as did various sectors of Colombian society.

In accordance with one of the agreements from the second round, on March 7 the national government recognized two leaders of this illegal armed group as representative members for a period of three months. The parties agreed that, following the third round, they would address the design of the process and preparation of the agenda, in order to seek common ground for moving forward in the search for peace.

On May 31, the national government renewed the representative member status of the ELN delegates, so that the Formal Exploratory Phase could continue.

The Colombian Government also cited the possibility of creating a zone for discussion with the FARC, as part of a cease-fire by that group. By means of a communiqué, that
A guerrilla group called upon Colombians to vote in favor of a proposal for dialogue and peace in the presidential elections held on May 28.

Since the launching of peace negotiations with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in November 2003, there have been 37 mass demobilization ceremonies in the course of which 30,915 members of this irregular armed group have begun the transition to civilian life. The month of April saw the dismantling of units that had remained outside the Santa Fe agreement, including the Héroes del Guaviare and the Los Llanos fronts and the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc (BEC). It now remains to demobilize a last holdout unit of the BEC and the Cacique Pipintá Bloc. The last holdout unit of the BEC should be demobilized by the end of August 2006. It must also be noted that, while there has been contact with the Campesinas del Casanare Self-Defense Forces, no agreement has yet be reached on their demobilization.

In this context, the Mission identified a number of violations of the demobilization commitments, and failure to dismantle illegal armed units. The Mission also found shortcomings and gaps in the reintegration of former combatants. These considerations and observations derive from the Mission’s mandate, and it is hoped that they will be taken into consideration by the Colombian Government.

The Mission has noted with concern the appearance of new groups in the area where the demobilized units were operating. They are being led by middle-ranking officers (demobilized or not), who in some cases are recruiting former paramilitary combatants. These units, as noted in the Sixth Report, are expanding and taking control of illegal economic activities.

On the other hand, the conclusions from a detailed analysis of the reintegration process show gaps in the coverage of the official offer. These gaps are particularly apparent in the fields of health, psychosocial support, and education, and many former combatants have no possibility of finding work or pursuing productive projects. It is clear that the pace of demobilization has exceeded the response capacity of the Program for Return to Civilian Life (Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil, PRVC), which was not prepared to deal with such numbers of people. On this basis, the Mission can say that, despite the positive efforts made in the last few months, the PRVC remains in critical condition, and this poses a risk to the long-term viability of the peace process.

The General Secretariat reiterates that the success and sustainability of the peace process will depend on:

- The attention paid to communities affected by violence;
- Official recovery of the territories over which illegal groups have held sway; and
- Effective reintegration of demobilized combatants.

III. Developments In The Peace Negotiations And AUC Demobilizations

In the period from February to May 2006, there were six mass demobilizations, involving overall 8,625 members of the AUC. During this time, demobilization of the Próceres del Caguán Front, the Héroes de los Andaquies and Héroes de Florencia in the
Department of Caquetá, and the Putumayo Southern Front in the Department of Putumayo completed the dismantling of the armed units of the Bolívar Central Bloc, except for the Cacique Pipintá Bloc. A three-stage demobilization has been agreed to for the Elmer Cárdenas Bloc in Urabá Antioqueño and Chocoano; to date, two phases have been completed, and demobilization of another unit in the Department of Chocó is pending.

To sum up, in the course of the peace process with the AUC, from its beginning in 2003 until the month of May 2006, 36 armed units have been demobilized. The last year has been the most intense period of demobilizations, accounting for 52.89 percent of the total, representing 16,352 combatants over a period of four months (see Annex A).

Of the 30,915 former AUC members demobilized, 94 percent (29,036) are men and 6 percent (1,879) are women.

The men-to-weapons ratio in the demobilized units is one weapon for every two combatants. Nevertheless, there are some groups that fall below this average: the Northern Bloc (Chimila), where the ratio is 0.28; the Northern Bloc (La Mesa) with 0.32; the Tolima Bloc with 0.24; and the Ortega Self-Defense Forces with 0.27.

When it comes to the type of weapon, 76 percent of the weapons turned in were long weapons, 17 percent were side arms, and 7 percent were support weapons, distributed in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Weapon</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LONG WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>12,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>13,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIDE ARMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine guns</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>1,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPORT WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade launchers m203</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-shot grenade launchers</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple grenade launchers (MGL)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar tubes</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launchers</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the basis of this balance sheet, the destruction of weapons, which has yet to begin, remains of prime concern on the Mission’s verification agenda, considering the progress made with disarmament, the quantity of weapons surrendered by the demobilized AUC, and the time they have remained in government hands.

With respect to the main areas of demobilization, 1 60 percent of demobilized persons are to be found in four departments: Antioquia (29%), Córdoba (14%), Cesar (9%), and Magdalena (8%). As to the municipalities with the greatest concentration, first come the capital cities: Medellín (3,037), Montería (1,859), Valledupar (1,548), and Santa Marta (1,228). Prominent on the list as well are towns such as Tierralta (Córdoba) with 940 demobilized persons, Caucasia (Antioquia) with 728, Turbo (Antioquia) with 646, Puerto Boyacá (Boyacá) with 600, Valencia (Córdoba) with 505, San Pedro de Urabá (Antioquia) with 467, Carepa (Antioquia) with 412, and Apartadó (Antioquia) with 439. The demobilized and returning population is heavily concentrated, then, in the following regions: Occidente de Córdoba, Urabá Antioqueño, Bajo Cauca, and Magdalena Medio. In fact, 50 municipalities account for 70% of the demobilized population (See map).

IV. Verification of the Dismantling of AUC Units

Generally speaking, the blocs and fronts that had been operating in the country’s various regions have been broken up, and most of the former combatants are now in the process of reintegration into civilian life and are returning to their home regions.

The Sixth Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA identified a series of worrisome phenomena arising subsequent to the demobilizations, including the regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs that control specific communities and illegal economic activities; holdouts who have not demobilized; and the emergence of new armed groups and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilized groups.

The Mission has continued to monitor these dynamics, focusing on certain critical areas in which it has attempted to verify that the demobilized units have been effectively dismantled.

In specific zones, there appear to be emerging situations of possible rearmament and the appearance of armed groups claiming to be the “new generation of paramilitaries.”

These new armed units are appearing in various guises: as verified by the Mission and stated by the local authorities and certain civilians, these situations represent an amalgamation of various forces and interests from different illegal sectors. There is no one interpretation that will cover them all.

The Mission has confirmed, in a series of verification visits, that these new armed groups have varying make-ups, ranging from holdout members of groups that have not

---

1 Contact departments and municipalities, to April 26, 2006.
demobilized to members of the AUC who, after being demobilized, took up arms again. The Colombian Government has in recent weeks recognized the situation and expressed its concern, but at the same time it has warned that if the members of the demobilized groups take up arms again, they will lose their entitlement to the benefits of Law 975 of 2005.

The Mission is also concerned over police reports of the discovery of secret caches of weapons that certain AUC groups failed to hand over when they were demobilized. This situation calls for stepped-up verification and for investigation by the competent authorities. The Mission is in the course of verifying these reports, and is following the matter closely.

Since the latter half of last year, the Mission has conducted post-demobilization visits, mainly in the Departments of Norte de Santander, Nariño, Córdoba, Guajira, and Bolívar. It has also been pursuing a broad agenda based on preliminary information, in follow-up to the concerns expressed in the Secretary General’s Sixth Report.

Following is a description of the main findings from verification visits in the five departments mentioned above.

**Norte de Santander**

In the Department of Norte de Santander, the Mission verified the existence of illegal armed groups operating in drug trafficking corridors. These groups are expanding and seizing control of certain territories, and have the potential to become an armed organization of greater dimensions.

The modus operandi of these armed groups coincides with that of the old self-defense units, which has led local inhabitants to link them with the demobilized fronts. Some reports suggest that middle-ranking officers who were part of the Catatumbo Bloc are involved, as well as some former members of that organization. The Mission found that these groups were using heavy-handed recruitment methods among demobilized personnel in this area, and these have involved a series of killings and individual displacements.

In geographic terms, these armed groups have been found in the municipalities of Puerto Santander, Cúcuta, Sardinata, Tibú, and El Tarra, and are reported to be expanding towards the municipalities of El Carmen and Convención, as well as Curumaní, which is located in the Department of Cesar.

**Nariño**

In the Nariño cordillera the Mission monitored an armed group that calls itself “Nueva Generación” (“New Generation”), which is led by a middle-ranking officer from a unit of the dismantled Libertadores del Sur Bloc (BLS) that did not take part in the demobilization process. Its activity focuses on controlling revenues from drug trafficking, and it operates in a strategically important area from which it has access through the mountainous section in the north of the department to the Pacific Ocean, via the Patía River.
It must be noted that the region in which the “Nueva Generación” group was detected coincides with the zone of operations of the demobilized BLS, and it holds sway over the municipalities of Leiva, El Rosario, Policarpa, Cumbitara, and Los Andes. According to some reports, this group is now expanding and has come into conflict with subversive groups operating in the area.

Córdoba

In follow-up to verification of rearmament in this department, the Mission confirmed the presence of two armed groups. The first is located between the municipalities of Puerto Libertador and Montelíbano. It includes demobilized personnel. In the wake of action by the national army, it has fallen back towards more remote villages beyond Tierradentro.

The second armed group operates in the municipalities of Valencia and Tierralta, especially in the vicinity of the Urrá Dam, which was the turf of the demobilized Córdoba Bloc and the Héroes de Tolová Bloc. After the latter group was dismantled, an armed faction that did not take part in the demobilization process was identified, and it controls the local drug traffic.

The Mission is also working with its Montería office on verification activities in the village of Tierradentro in the municipality of Montelíbano (Córdoba), where it has detected the presence of an armed group consisting of demobilized paramilitaries. In this case, the Mission has been closely monitoring the beginnings of rearmament and the official response. It is the active role of the community and its leaders that has brought each of these situations to light, in an area that was historically under the control of illegal armed groups, and where the government has begun to establish its presence.

Guajira

The Mission has received information from various sources about an armed unit operating in the area of Bahía Portete, municipality of Uribia, Alta Guajira. This faction, which consists of no more than 40 men, did not take part in the demobilization, and is being led by one of the commanders of the Wayúu counterinsurgency front, a group belonging to the Northern Bloc paramilitaries.

Bolívar

The Mission is concerned over the results of the preliminary verification in the village of Pueblito Mejía, municipality of Barranco de Loba (Bolívar), where it has identified the involvement of demobilized personnel in criminal activities, threats, kidnapping, and, generally speaking, in undermining public order. The Mission is following the situation closely, with the cooperation of various state and nongovernmental institutions.

In conclusion we may say that, as confirmed by the verifications conducted in the Departments of Norte de Santander, Nariño, Córdoba, Guajira, and Bolívar, the activity of these groups is linked to drug trafficking, and their modus operandi is highly similar to that of the paramilitary groups that formerly operated in these zones.
Information from the verification visits reveals that demobilized and non-demobilized former commanders of middle rank and former members of the paramilitary groups are involved in illegal activities. To date, there is insufficient evidence to claim that the dismantled groups or their former commanders are heading up the illegal activities detected.

It is important to mention that the Mission will be pursuing its verification work in the remaining regions, where information has been received on possible failures in the dismantling of armed groups.

V. Verification of Reintegration

The Mission has prepared an analysis of the reintegration process, starting with the official offers stipulated in the PRVC “Modelo de Atención” (Services Model), which provides a period of two years to apply for benefits. The process was observed at the national level, in the Reference and Opportunity Centers (CRO), and in the demobilized units.

The Mission found that, on the basis of the units demobilized up to June 15, 2006, the coverage ratio of the PRVC is 65 percent: of the 30,028 demobilized combatants in question, the program has served 19,752. In other words, 35 percent of former combatants have not accepted the official offer. On the other hand, of the total of former AUC members, 66 percent have been located by the program. The units with the lowest coverage rate are those that were demobilized during 2006, reflecting the fact that they were only recently dismantled and that there is no CRO established to serve this population.

The pace of demobilization has exceeded the response capacity of the PRVC, which was not prepared to cope with such numbers of people. To this must be added other factors, such as the fact that, in some cases, former combatants are unaware of the benefits, requirements, and responsibilities involved; the lack of trust in government agencies; misunderstanding of the interests and capacities of former combatants; the lack of institutional infrastructure; and the tenuous presence of the state in some parts of the country.

---

2 The CROs are information and assistance centers for demobilized ex-combatants, set up by the national government. Former members of irregular armed groups are supposed to apply to these centers at the end of the concentration, demobilization, and disarmament phase. There, they can complete the necessary formalities for their full return to civilian life and can receive information on the benefits to which they are entitled.

3 This analysis is found in the document Desmovilización y Reincorporación: Panorama General (“Demobilization and Reincorporation: An Overview”), prepared on the basis of information provided by the Ministry of Interior and Justice, to June 2006.

4 This number does not include persons served by the Peace and Reconciliation Program of the Medellín Municipal Government, who are excluded from this analysis, nor does it include the Ortega Self-Defense Forces and the Héroes de Granada Bloc. The Municipal Government of Medellín is taking care of all demobilized personnel of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, and around 75 percent of those of the Héroes de Granada Bloc.
With respect to the identification and documentation process, the Mission concludes that 26 percent of former AUC members did not give versión libre\(^5\) during the mass demobilization, and that only 36 percent have a pasado judicial.\(^6\)

On the health front, places had been arranged in the health system as of April 2006 for 32,777 PRVC beneficiaries. This would be enough to provide coverage for all demobilized AUC members, but is inadequate to serve their immediate family members. Moreover, that figure includes spaces for individual demobilized persons, numbering 10,117. Consequently, it can be said that there is not enough capacity to bring demobilized personnel and their families into the subsidized health system.

Moreover, looking at former combatants who have been in the reintegration process for more than six months, it has been found that only 47 percent have joined the Social Security System, and this figure does not include either the Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) or the Ortega Self-Defense Forces (AO).

In terms of psychosocial care, this continues to be one of the weakest points of the PRVC. According to the PRVC, service was provided in May and June, through psychosocial workshops conducted under contract with local and national operators, for 3,678 persons, equivalent to 12 percent of the demobilized corps, without considering the BCN and the AO. Despite the progress and initiatives of the last few months, much remains to be done to deal with post-traumatic stress and individual suffering, prevent the health risks of drug addiction and family violence, and re-socialize former combatants.

Education coverage is also poor. Bearing in mind that 10,039 former combatants have been in the reintegration process for more than six months (without counting the BCN and the AO), only

48 percent have taken the “initial module.” According to PRVC records to June 2006, total enrollment in this module is 9,836, i.e., 32 percent of the demobilized corps: in the case of vocational training, the figure is 17.5 percent, and in academic training, 8.2 percent, reflecting low rates of coverage (again, without counting the BCN and the AO).

The dropout rate in formal education is high, much higher than for vocational training, which may be explained by the fact that demobilized persons have an incentive to learn a trade that will provide short-term income. Programs that offer immediate remuneration, such as the “civic auxiliaries” and “manual eradicators,” while they constitute alternatives to short-term work, have increased the dropout rate in some regions, because people prefer to earn income rather than complete the education process.

Nevertheless, temporary jobs such as those under the “Civic Auxiliaries” program being implemented with the national police can be a positive experience. The goal is to bring

\(^5\) In this procedure, the demobilized person gives his own “free version” of the events in which he was involved. He may confess, but he is not obliged to do so.

\(^6\) The pasado judicial is a judicial certificate given only to persons with a clean criminal record.
3,700 demobilized persons into traffic control training programs under the supervision of professional police officers.

The manual eradication of illegal coca crops, which is being verified in Urabá and Córdoba, with the participation of more than 1,500 demobilized AUC members, is a fact to take into consideration. To the extent that these (admittedly incipient) efforts, supervised by government and international institutions, can help to eliminate such crops and restore those lands to legality, this will contribute to building peace.

It was found that only 263 demobilized persons were involved in income-earning projects. According to surveys taken in the Temporary Relocation Zone, demobilized personnel are more attracted to urban trades than to rural activities.

The Peace and Reconciliation Program of Medellín is showing positive results through its “Return to Legality” model. From its evaluation and monitoring of this program, the Mission can say that it constitutes a model to bear in mind. It demonstrates the basic steps that the government can take successfully to provide guidance and support for individuals and groups in the most complex period of reinsertion, which runs from the handover of weapons to the necessary shift from a “violence mindset” to a “legality mindset.” Greater stress is now being placed on preparing former combatants before they enter the labor market. It is interesting to note that, recognizing the need to continue this process, the city government has extended the program from 18 to 24 months.

VI. Monitoring Law 975/2005 (The Justice And Peace Law)

The Mission has been conducting special monitoring and observation of progress in implementing Law 975/2005 (the Justice and Peace Law). This quarter was marked by two important events: the Constitutional Court ruled on a challenge to this Law, and the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR) was established.

In its judgment C-370/06, the Court recognized the constitutionality of the alternative penalties, but quashed certain articles in order to bring the proposed law into line with the principles of the Colombian constitution and international treaties.

In its verification work, the Mission is monitoring the establishment and inauguration of the CNRR. The Commission presented a proposed “roadmap” in January 2006, thereby launching a participatory process that has included hearings, forums, and debates, intended to define the model of reparations that will be applied in the country, and the Mission has been following the process. It is very important to note that the Commission is receiving support from the United Nations (OCHA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as from countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Spain.

In order to gather information on application of the Justice and Peace Law, the IACHR has conducted three visits to meet with authorities, victims, and civil society organizations, and to observe the judicial proceedings prior to demobilization. On August 1, the IACHR issued a statement on the application and scope of the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia.
VII. PARTICIPATORY COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

One of the main components of the Mission’s work is to support local initiatives in conflict zones, by promoting measures to encourage trust and reconciliation in a culture of democracy, peace, and peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the identification, formulation, and management of socially oriented initiatives and projects in those areas.

In those places where the Mission has a permanent presence, it has followed a number of participatory initiatives targeted at communities that have been the victims of violence, and at those that are hosting demobilized combatants in their return to civilian life. This involves work on the following topics, among others: Alternative Dispute Settlement Methods, Confidence-Building Measures, Reconciliation and Reconstruction of the Social Fabric; Coexistence, Reacquaintance, and Historical Memory (Convivencia, Reencuentro y Memoria Histórica); and Psychosocial Support. The most notable progress has been made in Tierralta (Córdoba), and work is beginning in Medellín (Antioquia).

In Medellín, with the strengthening of the regional office, the Mission is now monitoring the Peace and Reconciliation Program for demobilized ex-combatants. It has also reinforced its presence in the communes.

The Conciliemos Community Justice Program in Tierralta (Córdoba)

In those parts of Colombia that have experienced armed confrontation, communities have suffered from the lack of government services such as the administration of justice, and this has led the local people to resort to “methods” borrowed from the illegal armed groups themselves. The Mission is trying to help fill the existing vacuum in this area, until the state and its institutions can extend their presence to those zones.

In implementing the Conciliemos Community Justice Project in Tierralta, the Mission has conducted assessments in the communities, put forward the concept of conciliator, and selected 55 community leaders for training as conciliadores en equidad (conciliators). The leaders represent approximately 60 communities, with a total population of some 7,000.

VIII. Special Monitoring Activities

As part of its verification work, the Mission is following specific cases and situations that involve apparent violations of human rights.

In the Sixth Report, the Mission referred to the disappearance of the youth Jesús Emiro Manzano, during the events in Lamas Verdes and Nuevo Horizonte, in the municipality of Curumaní (Cesar). The Secretary General reports that, thanks to the Mission’s monitoring, the young man was found alive.

The Secretary General also reports the murder of the Arhuaco man Miguel Niño, and the forced disappearance of his son, Filadelfo Niño, which occurred in the rural area of the municipality of Pueblo Bello (Cesar) on August 11, 2004. Under its mandate, the Mission will continue to follow this case closely.
Another case that the Mission is monitoring involves the murder of the Kankuamo indigenous leader Freddy Arias on August 4, 2004, in the municipality of Valledupar (Cesar).

The Secretary General also calls attention to complaints by nongovernmental organizations that have approached the Mission to express their concern over threats from groups that, with new names, refer to themselves as autodefensas or paramilitaries.

On June 16, 2006, the IACHR issued a press release expressing concern over threats against human rights defenders in Colombia.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The demobilization of more than 30,000 AUC members during the current peace process constitutes a significant step forward in consolidating peace in Colombia. During this stage, while some holdouts still refuse to demobilize, it is of vital importance to continue supporting the reintegration efforts in the country.

The Secretary General notes progress in the process of demobilizing and disarming the AUC, but warns that specific situations arising in some regions will have to be closely monitored.

Timely attention to events following demobilization of the AUC, such as violations of the agreements, the appearance of new illegal groups, and holdouts that refuse to demobilize, should allow the Colombian authorities to correct these irregularities in time. In this context, the Secretary General considers that, if the peace process is to be consolidated, the institutions of the Colombian state will have to give priority to the recovery of those territories, villages, and districts where demobilization has occurred.

The Secretary General is also concerned over the discovery of weapons caches following demobilization of some AUC blocs. The Mission will take care to verify these facts and urges the authorities to conduct the necessary investigations.

Similarly, the Secretary General insists on the need to destroy the weapons surrendered during demobilization, in light of the time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Colombian state.

Generally speaking, the Program for Return to Civilian Life has not succeeded in providing coverage for the majority of those demobilized. The Secretary General reiterates the need to broaden the coverage to all demobilized ex-combatants, and to increase efforts in this direction.

Finally, attending to the communities affected by violence is a central concern of the Secretary General. In this regard, the Conciliadores en Equidad Program, which is having an impact in 60 communities in the municipality of Tierralta (Córdoba), represents a model that should be pursued.
In order to contribute further to the consolidation of a lasting and stable peace in the country, the Secretary General considers it essential that the Mission continue its activities under the mandate conferred upon it.


**ANNEX A**

Numbers demobilized, by sex, number of weapons surrendered and men/weapons ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL DEMOB.</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CACIQUE NUTIBARA BLOC</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORTEGA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>BANANERO BLOC</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHERN MAGDALENA AND ISLA DE SAN FERNANDO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUNDINAMARCA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CATATUMBO BLOC</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CALIMA BLOC</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CORDOBA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHWESTERN ANTIOQUEÑO BLOC</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOJANA FRONT</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES DE TOLOVA FRONT</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONTES DE MARIA BLOC</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIBERTADORES DEL SUR BLOC</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES DE GRANADA BLOC</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.120</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>META AND VICHADA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACIFICO - HEROES DE CHOCO BLOC</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECURITY RING7</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CENTAUROS BLOC</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHWESTERN ANTIOQUEÑO BLOC</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VICACHA DEL BCB FRONT</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOLIMA BLOC</td>
<td>1,922</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHEASTERN ANTIOQUEÑO - BAJO CAUCA AND MAGDALENA MEDIO FRONTS (BCB)</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES Y MARTIRES DEL GUATICA FRONT (BCB)</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>MINEROS BLOC</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1.432</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAMPESINAS DE PUERTO BOYACA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

7 The Security Ring (Anillo de Seguridad) de Santa Fe de Ralito was formed by men from the Centauros Bloc, the Libertadores del Sur, the Pacifico Bloc, and the Vencedores de Arauca Front. They were demobilized in the Department of Córdoba but their weapons were included in data on their original units.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL BOLIVAR - SOUTH BOLIVAR BLOC</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESISTENCIA TAYRONA BLOC</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPESINAS DEL MAGDALENA MEDIO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCERES DEL CAGUAN - HEROES DE LOS ANDAQUIES AND HEROES DE FLORENCIA FRONTS (BCB)</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN PUTUMAYO FRONT (BCB)</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULIO PEINADO BECERRA FRONT</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN BLOC (CHIMILA)</td>
<td>2,215</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN BLOC (LA MESA)</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEROES DEL GUAVIARE FRONT AND HEROES DE LOS LLANOS FRONT</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSTANERO FRONT - ELMER CARDENAS BLOC</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMER CARDENAS BLOC – SECOND PHASE</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,915</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,036</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,879</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,540</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
50 municipalities accounting for more than 70% of the demobilized population

Processed by the MAPP/OAS Analysis Unit, Cartographic Base of the Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institute
Verification of the dismantling of AUC armed units

1. Puerto Santander, Cúcuta
   Sardinata, Tibu and El Tarra
2. Leiva, El Rosario, Policarpa,
   Cumibamba and Los Andes.
3. Puerto Libertador and Montelíbano
4. Valencia and Tierreta
5. Bahía Portete, municipality of Uribe
6. Corregimiento Pueblo Mejía
   municipality of Barranco de Loba (Bolivar)

Processed by the MAPP/OAS Analysis Unit,
Cartographic Base of the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute
Mission to Support the Peace Process / Colombia / OAS
Eighth Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL
ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN
COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

I. Background

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “[t]o instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. Introduction MAPP/OEA

Since the Seventh Report to the Permanent Council was submitted, MAPP/OEA has made considerable progress in its post-demobilization verification tasks (verification of the dismantling of military units and their reintegration, as well as follow-up with respect to public order), of support for the communities, and of monitoring and follow-up regarding the enforcement of the Ley de Justicia y Paz [Justice and Peace Law]. The strengthening of the Mission and the consolidation of its tasks have been obtained thanks to the very positive response of the Member and Observer States to the request made by the Secretary General to increase support for MAPP/OEA.

The support of the Friends of the OAS Peace Mission in Colombia, which includes Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States, has been of particular importance.

The significant contribution of financial resources provided by the Government of Spain (through its Council of Ministers and the Spanish
Agency for International Cooperation, AECI), over the quarter covered by this report, is particularly noteworthy, as well as the important donation by the Government of the United States and the contribution of the Government of Norway.

The commitment of the Government of Holland, principal donor of resources to MAPP/OEA since the Organization began its work in Colombia, should be noted.

The Government of Sweden has maintained its commitment to the Mission, through generous funding and by providing an expert in Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration and a specialist in working with nongovernmental organizations. The Government of Sweden also reported that it is prepared to earmark an annual sum in support of the Mission.

The Government of Canada has also been an active partner in financing the Mission since 2005, and it is hoped that this valuable support will continue.

Along the same lines, the Secretary General highlights the generous contributions, of great value to the Mission, made by The Bahamas, Ireland and Thailand.

The donation of vehicles and computer equipment last year by the Republic of Korea constituted a substantial contribution to the work of MAPP/OEA.

The Secretary General also wishes to thank the Governments of Mexico and Brazil for their valuable support in financing the participation of experts in various fields, including human rights, social affairs, diplomatic relations, and public safety. In this respect, the Government of Guatemala has informed the General Secretariat that it has appointed a Guatemalan professional to be a member of the Mission. The Government of Chile has decided to support the Mission by providing an official who is an expert in verification.

The municipal government of Medellín, under an agreement signed with the Mission, has provided the funds to incorporate a team of six social workers to strengthen the Mission’s activities in the city’s neighborhoods. The regional office in Medellín now has a solid team more proportionate to the challenges in that region of the country.

All of this support has enabled the Mission to increase its presence, with its 34 international verifiers from 16 countries, 17 local professionals, and 43 individuals providing temporary assistance and 9 social workers, comprising in total 103 participants in Colombia, 42 percent of them women.

Following a commitment to this effect of the Secretary General, MAPP/OEA carried out the first printing and distribution of the Basic Manual for the Performance of the Functions of the Mission. The first Seminar on Methods of Verification was held in October, with the participation of all the coordinators, verifying officials and national support personnel. This constituted a necessary and favorable setting to gain greater depth regarding the different policies contained in the Mandate, as well as to review and unify

---

1 MAPP/OEA has international verifiers from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.
the Mission’s work methods. It is important to add that this meeting was attended by an official of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), who explained the inter-American system of human rights’ operation to the Mission’s officials.

In addition to the above, the Government of Colombia has expressed its wish to extend the Mission’s mandate, provided for in the January 23, 2004 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on Monitoring the Peace Process in Colombia.

On November 28, in Bogotá, Colombia, MAPP/OEA presented to donor and other friendly countries the Mission’s plan of action for the next three years. This plan of action, prepared by the Mission’s team, was approved by the Secretary General and submitted to the Colombian authorities.

It should be mentioned that the Mission, pursuant to its Mandate, has included in its work a cross-cutting approach with respect to gender, children’s rights, respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities, both regarding displaced populations and communities that have received former combatants. Within this framework, the IACHR has undertaken the coordination of the training program for MAPP/OEA officials, which is scheduled to begin on March 19, 2007.

**THE PEACE PROCESS**

Within the period covered by this report, significant progress has been made in the process of rapprochement between the ELN and the National Government. The fourth formal exploratory round took place in October in Havana, Cuba. Canada, Italy, Holland, Japan, and Sweden participated as observers; Norway, Spain and Switzerland participated as monitors; Cuba and Venezuela participated as supporting countries.

In a joint communication, the parties found a positive balance to the process thus far for the continuation of the process and approach towards a “basic agreement” to close the formal exploratory dialogues. Subsequently, the ELN unilaterally announced before a civil society facilitating National Commission to actively participate in demining activities.

After a period in which the Government and the FARC came closer together regarding humanitarian exchange, a series of incidents changed the dynamics of the negotiation, distancing the parties. In this new context, the Government revoked the authorization granted to the Peace Commissioner to meet with the FARC in a meeting zone.

In the quarter covered by this report, the demobilization process of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) [United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] was declared to have concluded, following 38 ceremonies in which 31,689 troops of this irregular armed force participated. The last demobilization took place on August 15, 2006, with the Frente Norte Medio Salaquí [Salaquí Middle Northern Front] or Frente Chocó [Chocó Front], an integral element of the Bloque Élmer Cárdenas (BEC) [Elmer Cárdenas Front]. The only group that participated in the Ralito peace dialogue and did not demobilize was the Frente Cacique Pipinta [Chief Pipinta Front], and it remains active.
In its verification work, MAPP&OEA has found violations to demobilization commitments as well as regarding the dismantling of units. The Mission notes with concern that rearming may be possible, the existence of non-demobilized holdouts and the appearance of other armed groups, especially within the zone of influence of the demobilized Bloque Norte [Northern Bloc], which was then under the command of “Jorge 40" and in some departments [provinces] where the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) [Bolívar Central Bloc] was carrying out operations. MAPP-OEA has identified 22 units, with the participation of middle-ranking officers—demobilized or not—the recruitment of former combatants of the self-defense forces, and the control over illicit economic activity. Despite the efforts on the part of the Colombian government, the Mission also notes that most of the groups reported on in the Sixth and Seventh reports continue to operate and some of them are, in fact, expanding.

In addition, a detailed analysis of institutional coverage of reintegration continues to show, in general, difficulties to serve the entire demobilized population. This is particularly true for the areas of psycho-social support, in education, and in links to jobs. Because of this, it can be said that, despite efforts made over the past months, the Program for Return to Civilian Life [Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil] has not managed to fulfill its promise, which in turn risks the long term viability of the peace process.

The Mission views the creation of the Alta Consejería para la Reintegración Social y Económica de Personas y Grupos Alzados en Armas [Office of the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups] as highly positive: it creates a space to articulate institutional efforts and to promote effective solutions for the reintegration of former combatants. However, the urgent need to initiate operations in those areas with the highest number of demobilized people should be also stressed.

In November 2006, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice began a formal investigation of a group of members of Congress suspected of aggravated criminal conspiracy to promote and finance paramilitary groups.

In addition, at the beginning of December 2006, former commanders of the AUC held in the penitentiary of La Ceja were moved to the maximum security prison of Itagüí, in Antioquia. After a period of alienation between the former commanders and the National Government caused by this move, both parties reinitiated talks on January 3, 2007. On this date, in the Itagüí prison, the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups, Frank Pearl, met with the former commanders. MAPP/OEA expressed at this time its concern over this alienation, and expressed its wish to continue to facilitate dialogue and a bringing together of the parties in order to consolidate efforts towards a lasting peace in the country.

The General Secretariat reiterates that the success and sustainability of the peace process will depend on:

- The attention paid to communities affected by violence;
- Official recovery of the territories over which illegal groups have held sway;
• Effective reintegration of demobilized combatants; and
• The pursuit of truth, justice, and reparations.

III. The Demobilizations of the AUC and their Disarmament

The process of concentration, disarmament, and demobilization of the military units of the self-defense forces was declared to be concluded on August 15, 2006, with the demobilization, in the Unguía (Chocó) Municipality, of the Salaquí Middle Northern Front, or Chocó Front, which belonged to the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc. Altogether, in its three phases, the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc demobilized 1,538 members of the self-defense forces, 45 of which were women.

During the entire process that began on November 25, 2003, with the demobilization of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, and that ended on August 15, 2006, there were 38 demobilization ceremonies in which 31,689 members of this irregular armed group participated (see Annex A). The greatest number of members came from the Bolívar Central Bloc, with 6,348; the Northern Bloc with 4,760; the Mineros Bloc with 2,780; the Héroes de Granada Bloc with 2,033, and the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc with 1,538. It should be highlighted that 22,962 members belonged to nine units, or 72.4% of the total number of those demobilized.

The MAPP/OEA participated actively and visibly in 36 demobilization ceremonies, including the security unit of the Temporary Relocation Zone [Zona de Ubicación Temporal, ZUT] in Santa Fe de Ralito, also known as the “Security Ring.” It should be highlighted that the Mission participated as a special guest in the demobilizations of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc on November 25, 2003 and of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega [Ortega Farmers’Self-Defense Forces] on December 7, 2003, before the signing of the “Agreement” between the Colombian Government and the General Secretariat of the OAS on January 23, 2004.

The participation of women in the self-defense forces was decreased, as was their number in positions of relative importance and responsibility. The percentage of women referred to is in the order of 6.03%, or 1,913 women demobilized.

The Cacique Pipinta Front, FCP, which was part of the Bolívar Central Bloc, participated in the process but did not complete the stage of concentration, disarmament, and demobilization. The dismantling of this unit was programmed for December 15, 2005, along with the Héroes y Mártires de Guatica Front; however, the members of this group did not arrive to the temporary relocation zone provided by the Government.  

---

2 In this instance several units of the self-defense forces participated, guaranteeing the first level of security for the Ralito Dialogue, established by the parties on July 1, 2004.

3 On May 22, 2006, the Government, by executive decrees Nos. 118 and 119 established a Temporary Relocation Zone in the vereda of El Tambor, in the Municipality of La Merced, Department of Caldas. In addition, Pablo Hernán García Sierra was recognized as representative for the demobilization. However, for the second time the demobilization was not carried out. This unit, under the command of the Bloque Central Bolívar [Bolívar Central Bloc], exercised its influence in the area limiting the departments of the coffee-growing axis (Risaralda, Caldas, and Antioquia).
An account of the weapons handed over by the different demobilized units shows that 31,689 men surrendered 18,024 weapons, a ratio of one weapon per two combatants (see Annexes A and B).

**Destruction of weapons**

The MAPP/OEA finds that the directives given by the National Government to initiate the process of inspection and registration of the war materiel surrendered by the self-defense forces in the peace process, as a first step towards its destruction, is a positive development. The month of December 2006 has been established as the time period for the registration of all the weapons surrendered into custody. The Mission has monitored this procedure and the technical work of the different institutions involved,\(^4\) in the same way it did in Montería (Córdoba), Medellín (Antioquia) and Urabá (Antioquia).

The General Secretariat received a note from the Colombian Government requesting technical and financial support for the destruction of the weapons. To this end, the Humanitarian Demining Section of the Department of Public Security made its first visit to the country to begin its support of MAPP/OEA and the Colombian authorities in the destruction of more than 18,000 weapons. Following this preliminary contact, a team from the Humanitarian Demining Section traveled to Bogotá from December 4 to 8 to assist in the development of a national plan and to identify specific requirements regarding technical and financial assistance from the OAS and the international community. It is expected that these activities will begin in January of 2007.

**IV. Verification of the Dismantling of AUC units.**

In its work on verification, the Mission has identified 22 new units with approximately three thousand members, part of whom had belonged to the self-defense forces. There are indications of possible rearmament in the case of 8 of these units, placing their cases on alert status. The remaining 14 cases have been fully verified by the Mission. It is noteworthy that the MAPP/OEA has observed that the groups that appeared after the AUC demobilizations and also stemmed from the holdouts that were not dismantled, have recruited individuals who were in the process of reintegration; however, only part of their members are demobilized combatants.

In the Seventh report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA, six cases of rearmament were identified, the majority of which remain active, except for the holdouts found in Córdoba; these have fallen back following operations of the Security Forces. The Mission has followed up on these processes, concentrating its work in some critical zones, in compliance with its task of verifying the real dismantling of the demobilized armed units.

\(^4\) Office of the General Prosecutor of the Nation, with its Technical Investigation Corps (CTI), General Command of the Armed Forces (National Army and Navy), Office of the Attorney General, National Police, Inter-Institutional Group of Anti-terrorist Analysis (GIAT), Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP).
In specific zones there have been situations arising of possible rearmament and the appearance of other armed groups claiming to be the “new generation of paramilitaries.” During the quarter covered by this report, the Mission has observed the development of these units, and has verified their appearance and growth, particularly in the zone of influence of the demobilized Northern Bloc, which was under the command of “Jorge 40.” The MAPP/OEA has encountered a worrisome situation in the south of César and in adjacent territories. The Mission has received information regarding one concrete instance of rearmament, which has allowed the persistence of a command structure with middle-ranking officers. In places such as Magdalena, Guajira, Atlántico, and César, the MAPP/OEA does not find that there has been a true disarmament; the self-defense forces maintain their influence, and there is the serious suspicion that some public institutions are permeable to it.

It is important to reiterate that the appearance of these new armed units is not a homogenous phenomenon since, according to what the Mission has verified and to statements by local authorities and sectors of the civilian population, these cases are characterized by the mixing of diverse forces and interests stemming from different sectors operating illegally. Hence, a single explanation cannot be used to account for them.

The Colombian Government has recognized this new phenomenon, giving it the name of “newly emerging gangs,” and has declared a head-on struggle against them. This has been evidenced by a series of Security Forces operations causing damage to some of these units. Despite the government’s efforts, the situation of the zones where now demobilized self-defense forces used to operate continues to be a complicated one. The populations of zones such as Putumayo, Arauca, Nariño, Urabá in El Choco, Norte de Santander, the Pacific coast of Valle del Cauca and southern César, do not perceive an improvement in security conditions, and the presence of state institutions continues to be weak. This makes incursions by illegal armed groups possible, as well as the existence of illegal units and the persistence of illicit economic activities.

Within this context, the discovery by the security forces of caches of arms not surrendered by some demobilized AUC blocs is a matter that alarms and concerns the Mission. In this respect, both verification and the necessary investigations by the competent authorities must be strengthened. The Mission has received information from the Security Forces on the finding of arms belonging to the demobilized Self-Defense Forces, involving the seizure of arms and the finding of caches, in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Caldas, Casanare, Cesar, Chocó, Magdalena, Meta, Santander, Tolima and Valle del Cauca. Although these findings are not voluminous, the caches found in the zone of influence of the Northern Bloc—especially César and Magdalena—are noteworthy for their ammunition and weapons, as well as for the number of support weapons, all of which coincides with the fact of it being one of the zones with more rearmed units and non-demobilized holdouts.

Regarding the findings of the Mission’s verification work, the Mission has identified instances of rearming in ten departments: Guajira, Cesar, Atlántico, Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Córdoba, Tolima, Casanare, Caquetá and Nariño. The MAPP/OEA also sounds
the alert on possible instances of rearming in César, Magdalena, Sucre, Antioquia, Meta, Nariño, and Putumayo.

**Verified Cases of Rearmament**

**Guajira**

In the follow-up to verification of rearmament in this department, the existence of a presumably non-demobilized holdout group in Alta Guajira has been confirmed, specifically in the rural area of the Municipality of Uribia. This unit is composed of around 70 members; they wear camouflage uniforms and carry side arms, and long and support weapons. Their actions have been oriented to displace the indigenous communities that inhabit the region, in order to solidify their dominance in the zone, which in turn is linked to control over illicit economic activities.

The Mission received information in the municipalities of Riohacha and Maicao about a unit of approximately 30 men, made up of demobilized members of the AUC, non-demobilized paramilitaries, gangs of hired assassins, and common criminals. They control social dynamics using selective violence, extortion, threats, forced displacement, and homicide. Some of its members have been captured by the security forces.

The Mission has also verified the existence of an armed unit of about 60 men, including demobilized middle-ranking officers of the Frente Contrainsurgenza Wayuu [Wayuu Counterinsurgency Front] of the Northern Bloc in the Municipality of Dibulla. This zone has access to the sea and borders the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. They operate with long weapons in the foothills of the Sierra, while in corregimientos [a territorial subdivision] such as Río Ancho, Migueo, and Palomino, they wear civilian clothing and, carrying side arms, patrol the streets in vehicles, thus maintaining their control over the zone.

**César**

The Mission was able to verify that a unit of approximately 50 demobilized men of the former Mártires de Valledupar Front of the Northern Bloc has managed to keep the modus operandi of the AUC in the Municipality of Valledupar. According to information received, moreover, the command structure of the front has remained the same, even after demobilization. This group controls social dynamics using threats, extortion and homicide with side arms.

Likewise, in the municipalities of Jagua de Ibirico, Becerril, and Codazzi, there is a unit comprised mainly of demobilized combatants of the Resistencia Motilona Front of the Northern bloc, led by a middle-ranking officer of the front. This unit, whose members wear civilian clothes and carry out their patrols using side arms, obtains its resources blackmailing the civil population. It has between 100 and 150 men.

In the south of César, in the municipalities of Pelaya, Tamalameque, Pailitas, Curumaní and Chiriguana, the existence of illegal armed units, located in strategic corridors linked to illicit economic activities, was verified. This unit is made up of approximately 200 men, including demobilized combatants and non-demobilized paramilitaries, led by middle-
ranking officers of the Resistencia Motilona Front of the Northern Block. In the city center they operate carrying side arms, and in the rural area they wear camouflage uniforms and use long weapons. The unit has also written graffiti and distributed pamphlets referring to actions of social cleansing.

**Atlántico**

In the department of Atlántico different illegal sectors have come together: demobilized persons of the AUC, non-demobilized combatants, gangs of hired assassins and common criminals. They have formed an illegal unit that exerts its influence over the population. They control social dynamics using threats and homicides carried out with side arms. It has an estimated 60 members. Their territory of operation is the areas crossed by the highways leading from Barranquilla to Puerto Colombia, Suan, and Luruaco. Their operations are concentrated in the municipalities of Soledad, Malambo, Luruaco, Sabanalarga, and Baranoa.

**Norte de Santander**

The MAPP/OEA has confirmed the growth of an armed unit in the Department of Norte de Santander, as was related in the VI and VII reports of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council, in several corregimientos of Cúcuta, Tibú, Villa de Rosario, Puerto Santander, Sardinata, Los Patios, Ocaña, El Carmen, La Esperanza, Convención, and Abrego. The Mission is concerned that the unit has solidified, growing to approximately 300 to 400 men. It includes demobilized combatants of the Catatumbo Bloc, non-demobilized paramilitaries, and other illegal groups. Although the security forces have carried out operations against the unit, capturing some of its members and destroying laboratories for narcotics processing that were under its protection, this unit remains active.

**Bolívar**

The Mission has also confirmed the persistence of an armed unit, made up of demobilized and non-demobilized combatants of the Defensores de San Lucas Front, of the Bolívar Central Bloc, in the municipalities of Barranco de Loba – with influence over Hatillo de Loba. This unit, wearing civilian clothes and carrying side arms, has increased its number by recruiting demobilized combatants. According to estimates, it could have as many as 50 men. The unit’s objective is to exercise a monopoly over illicit economic activities; to achieve this, it threatens, displaces, and kidnaps members of the population.

**Córdoba**

The Mission has ascertained that the armed units operating in the southern part of the Department of Córdoba, in the municipalities of Tierralta and Montelibano, have reduced their number to approximately 50 men, and the coercive actions against the population have also diminished. Joint operations carried out by state security organs have been positive in that they have managed to thwart the growth of these groups. However, their *modus operandi* has gone back to being low-profile, using civilian dress and side arms, radio communication, and motorcycle transportation.
**Tolima**

In the Department of Tolima, after the demobilization of the Tolima Bloc, a new unit appeared, made up of demobilized combatants and non-demobilized paramilitaries, calling itself the “Pijao Bloc.” They operate in small groups of no more than 10 people, carry out extortions, use light weapons, and have been accused of kidnapping and homicide. In the Municipality of Ibagué, security forces have arrested and charged several members of this organization.

**Casanare**

The case of rearmament in the Municipality of Paz de Ariporo constitutes a matter of special attention for the Mission, considering that the unit has approximately 200 men, a large part of who are demobilized combatants of the Centauros Bloc. The members of this group wear camouflage uniforms, carry long weapons, threaten, and blackmail the region’s cattle ranchers. It should be noted that army operations against this unit in the Department of Casanare have caused it to move to Casanare’s border with the Department of Vichada.

**Caquetá**

In the Municipality of Milán, corregimiento of San Antonio de Getuchá, the Mission has verified the existence of a military unit led by a middle-ranking demobilized officer of the Sur de los Anaquíes Front of the BCB. They control some illegal economic activities in the zone, blackmail merchants, carry long weapons and also use side arms; they wear camouflage uniforms. Made up of approximately 50 men, they maintain social control over the community. On October 21, in the Municipality of Valparaíso, army units engaged in combat with the irregular unit, killing two of its members, one of whom was the main commander.

**Nariño**

The MAPP/OEA has confirmed the growth of an illegal armed unit named “Nueva Generación” (ONG) [New Generation], as was described in the VI and VII reports of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council. This unit has solidified its control over the communities formerly under the influence of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc (BLS) of the BCB, in municipalities such as Andes-Sotomayor, Cumbitara, Policarpo, Leyva and El Rosario. Information received indicates that the group could have around 300 men operating in the region.

The unit is made up of non-demobilized middle-ranking officers of the BLS, demobilized combatants, and recruits. In urban centers they have informants dressed as civilians. They control the population’s movements using check points on highways, at which they charge money to carriers, threatening them with side arms and long weapons. In rural areas they wear camouflage uniforms, bracelets with an ONG insignia, and they patrol carrying long weapons.

This unit has carried out operations against the population, such as extortion, selective murders, rape, and threats. It is important to note that during the months of September
and October they have engaged in combat against Front 29 of the FARC. These combats have caused massive displacement of the inhabitants of the corregimientos of San Roque, Remolino Baja Patía and Naranjo, in the Municipality of Policarpa, and in the vereda [rural subdivision of a municipality] of Llana Sara, which belongs to the Municipality of cumbitara. These village areas have been depopulated for fear of crossfire.

Rearmament Alerts

César

The Mission has received information describing an armed unit mostly comprised of demobilized combatants from the Northern Bloc, who are operating in the Municipality of Pueblo Bello. The unit has approximately 70 men, dresses in camouflage uniforms, and is recruiting new members. They are suspects of extortion and homicide against the civilian population and other demobilized combatants.

Magdalena

There have been reports of a unit of approximately 150 men carrying long weapons, many of them demobilized combatants of the Northern Bloc, in the municipalities of Ariguani, Sabanas de San Angel, Plato, Pivijay, and Chivolo. This unit is reportedly achieving social control in the zone using threats and extortion. Moreover, some displaced persons who, after the demobilization, tried to return on their own to their lands have been intimidated and forced to leave once more.

Sucre

The MAPP/OEA has received information on a unit in the Department of Atlántico whose objective is presumably to achieve the economic and political control that was exercised by the demobilized Montes de María Bloc. This organization has apparently contacted persons who managed the bloc’s finances in the zone as well as persons and institutions that had been the victims of extortion, in order to seize these resources. This in turn presumably had caused a dispute among demobilized combatants, resulting in several homicides. It is important to note that inhabitants of the Municipality of San Onofre held a march and a public ceremony expressing their repudiation of any actions and attempts to achieve control on the part of any paramilitary group in their region.

Santander

The Mission received information in the municipalities of San Vicente de Chucuri and El Carmen on a unit of approximately 15 members, including demobilized combatants of the Ramón Dávila Front of the Puerto Boyacá Bloc, and Hernando Rodríguez Zárate, a.k.a. “Volunto,” a known paramilitary who has not demobilized as the unit’s commander. This unit apparently operates in civilian dress and has carried out criminal acts such as extortion and robbery, using long weapons. Security forces captured “Volunto” on September 29, along with whom was presumably his bodyguard.
**Antioquia**

In the municipalities of Caucasia and el Bagre, Bajo Cauca region, verification tasks have been carried out by the Mission with worrisome results. It is believed that a unit of approximately 60 BCB demobilized combatants is operating in the zone. They apparently hold sway over the population in urban centers, dressing as civilians and using side arms. In rural areas they are apparently patrolling in camouflage uniforms, carrying out temporary detentions and requisitioning households. Social control over the communities allows them, so it seems, to monopolize control over illicit economic activities.

**Meta**

A matter of special attention for the Mission is the case in the corregimiento La Cooperativa, Municipality of Mapiripán, from which information was received of a non-demobilized group of approximately 200 members of the Héroes del Guaviare Bloc. The unit is apparently increasing its numbers by recruiting demobilized combatants and threatening those who do not wish to join.

**Nariño**

In its follow-up to the verification of rearmament in this department, the Mission received information regarding an armed unit of approximately 100 men that presumably controlled illicit economic activities in the municipalities of Mosquera and Pizarro. This unit apparently is made up of with a variety of individuals, including demobilized combatants of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc, BCB, and members of narcotrafficking organizations from Valle del Cauca.

**Putumayo**

A holdout group of non-demobilized combatants of the Sur del Putumayo Front (BCB) is apparently operating in the municipalities of Mocoa and Puerto Asís, along with narcotrafficking organizations from Valle del Cauca. This unit is accused of selective homicide as part of its actions against the civilian population in order to achieve control over illicit economic activities. This unit has an estimated 350 men.

**Institutional Response**

The Vice-president of the Republic and the Minister of Defense called the High Commissioner for Peace, the Attorney General, and high-ranking officers of the police and the armed forces, to a meeting so that the Mission could share its concerns regarding verification of the possible rearmament of the AUC. As a result, there was a proposal for the creation of a permanent follow-up mechanism, with representatives from the highest level of government, state institutions, and the Mission. It is expected that in this way it will be possible to provide an effective response to all those former AUC groups that, following their demobilization, attempt to once again begin armed action, illegal activities, or both.
V. Verification Of Reintegration

In the process of verifying reintegration, the Mission found that the Program for Return to Civilian Life [Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil, PRVC] has made progress in its coverage of the demobilized population. Existing information indicates that 79.6% of the individuals in the process have been relocated and 77.1% are being served. An additional effort is necessary, however, to reach the 23% whose needs have yet to be addressed by the Government Program.

In this context it is important to note that although important progress has been made, the Program still faces problems in reaching all the demobilized combatants, in coordinating institutional efforts, monitoring the former combatants and their families, and offering basic services in the most critical period of reintegration.

According to reports, less than half of the beneficiaries (41.4%) have been linked to the Social Security System. This can be explained by the lack of coordination between territorial entities charged with this area at the municipal level, as well as by the lack of need on the part of former combatants to access this service. It is important to note that, although the spots for these demobilized combatants and their families to become affiliated to the service have been obtained, they have not yet been fully utilized.

Psychosocial services continue to one of the weak spots of the PRVC. In some cases they are limited to the intake of the demobilized combatants in the temporary relocation zones, or the assistance given to them by the personnel working in the Centros de Referencia y Oportunidades (CRO) [Reference and Opportunity Centers]. During this period, the coordination between this support and the contracting of organizations specialized in this area was begun; in this way 5,189 beneficiaries have been served, a small number if it is compared with the entire demobilized population.

There is low coverage in education, despite the fact that over the last period complementary and co-management policies and strategies had been implemented jointly with territorial entities, in order to guarantee the quality of education and its full coverage. Only half of the demobilized combatants have graduated from the “Initial Module,” that all demobilized combatants must take during the first six months of their reintegration. Another matter of concern is the low attendance of demobilized individuals to training and academic courses (22.8% and 17.6% respectively), as well as the high numbers of drop-outs.

According to the MAPP/OEA’s observations, low educational coverage and high drop-out rates are related to the following: 1) long periods of time transpired between registration and course initiation; 2) in the case of the “Initial Module,” the courses are designed to begin with a minimum enrollment of 35 persons; in some municipalities the number of demobilized combatants is lower than that, and they must travel to other municipalities to take the module; 3) there is a lack of coordination with other CRO

---

5 This figure was provided by the quarterly technical report, Program for Reintegration into Civilian Life, Ministry of the Interior and Justice, updated to August 2006.
activities, and there is occasional schedule overlap; 4) there is a lack of CRO management to standardize and publicize the “Formal Education” offerings, and 5) lack of information on the part of local and departmental institutions.

Regarding economic reintegration, there has been a lack of correspondence between the training offered and the labor supply, as well as of an adequate adjustment of the demobilized combatants’ profiles to allow them to find jobs. Up until the month of August, 86.7% of the demobilized individuals had been receiving humanitarian aid, which compensated for the poor results obtained in the generation of jobs. According to information received from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, over these last few months an extension of assistance was granted to 1,904 beneficiaries whose 18-month period had run out. It should be underscored that during the first months of reintegration, humanitarian assistance is the main economic alternative; however, it is transitory. By December 2006 most units had gone beyond 18 months of demobilization, and if the Colombian Government does not adjust and reinforce the job placement component, the reinsertion of this population and its social context/surroundings may be affected – in no more than five months, 10,879 members of 19 units will have gone beyond 18 months of demobilization. The MAPP/OEA especially points to the cases of Norte de Santander, Barrancabermeja and Córdoba.

Only an estimated 24% of the demobilized combatants have some type of job placement, including the 1,350 who are carrying out servicio social reparatorio [community service as reparations]. Fifty-six per cent (56%) of those who are employed do so in the informal sector; those who are productive comprise a small number of former combatants (898). It is noteworthy that among the jobs held, most are in security services. According to information received by the MAPP/OEA, many security cooperatives and training schools have been created with former combatant participation, in cities such as Medellín and Cúcuta, as well as in zones such as Sur de Bolívar and Magdalena Medio.

In this context, the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups, by Decree 3043 of 2006, should be highlighted. The mission of this office is to design, execute and evaluate reintegration policy. One of the most important functions the decree establishes is that of harmonizing and evaluating the National Plan of Action, so that state entities can develop required programs and strategies, joining the initiatives of territorial and local entities.

It is necessary to note that the processes of reintegration and the experience obtained from them have proven that there is no single formula applicable to all cases. It is a given that there are tasks that cannot be delegated, and which the state must carry out in the

---

6 Quarterly technical report, Program for Reintegration into Civilian Life, August 2006.
7 Approvals of extensions have been granted to those who have effectively made use of the benefits institutionally provided.
8 The Community Service as Reparations constitutes an initiative to place reintegrated AUC combatants in social service work for the community, under the orientation of the National Police. After a 400 hour training period, the beneficiary shall be compensated for 6 months. The National Police (PONAL) made the program official by Executive Decision 031196 of September 1, 2005.
most critical stage of demobilization, from the surrendering of weapons to the next two or three years. The strengthening of the role of institutions at the departmental and municipal levels, as well as of the private sector is a high priority.

Adequate inter-institutional coordination among entities dealing with reintegration does not currently exist. However, there are efforts that should be highlighted: in Bogotá with the *Programa de Atención Complementaria a la Población Reincorporada* [Program of Supplementary Services for the Reintegrated Population] and in Medellín with the *Programa de Paz y Reconciliación* [Program for Peace and Reconciliation]. These two programs have been executed as supplements to the institutional services offered by the national government, providing direct services with the private sector, thus guaranteeing more training and better job placement conditions for the beneficiaries. Likewise, these administrative efforts have supported the extension of humanitarian assistance beyond the 24 months established by the program at the national level.

There is no doubt that during the process, both for the demobilized combatants and for the community itself, the mindset of violence and of its environment change. Consequently, necessary training and education should be provided, in order that demobilized combatants may enjoy conditions similar to any Colombian youth in his or her community or job market. Every effort is necessary to strengthen this stage, because there is the risk that the peace process in its entirety may fail.

In addition, progress made in the restructuring of reintegration policy should have a differentiated focus. Treatment of the demobilized population should tend to respond to the particular circumstances of the beneficiaries, considering the role these persons have played within their armed units, and adjusting institutional services offered case by case. Likewise, it is necessary that this policy restructuring especially serve women, minors, and ethnic groups.

**VI. Monitoring Law 975/2005 (Justice And Peace Law)**

During this report’s quarter, the government issued Decree 3391 of 2006 that, along with Decree 4760, provide regulations for the Justice and Peace Law. This law establishes that there must be compliance with some requirements for all those aspiring to become beneficiaries, including the return of any property illegally obtained, the liberation of all persons kidnapped, and the handing over of all minors in their ranks. The law also establishes that those whose principal activity has been narcotrafficking or other activities related to illegal enrichment. It should be noted that the law, complemented by the decrees, establishes procedures for providing reparations to the victims and the clarification of the truth.

The law creates the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation (CNRR), with the task, *inter alia*, of establishing and coordinating regional committees for

---

9 Commanders, middle-ranking officers, patrolmen and support networks require differential treatment, responding to the needs and particular circumstances of each one of these levels.
restitution of property and of designing the road map for a Colombian model of reparations and reconciliation. The Commission has decided to submit its Action Plan to a process of national deliberation. To this end, it has called for a Social Consultation with the participation of civil society in discussions on different public policy alternatives to carry out its mandate effectively.

Within this normative framework, and in application of the provisions of the decree, the Office of the Attorney General has issued citations by publication calling all persons who believe are entitled to truth, justice, and reparations, and who have been victims of criminal conduct by the paramilitaries (those who have opted for the application of the benefits of Law 975). The citation was made with the purpose of obtaining, from the persons responding, information regarding the facts of their victimization, their personal information and address so that they could participate in the process and claim their rights.

The IACHR has expressed its concern regarding the deficiencies of the way in which the citations were issued, since they have only been done so in the zones where illegal armed groups are operating, without stating the aliases by which they were identified. A great number of victims have moved to other departments of the country, and therefore there is an urgent need to issue citations at the national level. As the IACHR pointed out, the participation of victims is crucial in judicial proceedings.

In addition, it is important to note that currently, at the government’s request, 57 former commanders and middle-ranking officers have been temporarily gathered in one place, waiting for the initiation of the process of investigation and trial pursuant to the Justice and Peace Law.

It is also necessary to note that other demobilized commanders have not heeded the government’s petition to temporarily relocate to certain places, including José Vicente Castaño Gil, representative and member of the General Staff of the Self-Defense Forces; Ever Veloza García (alias Hernán Hernández, Commander of the Bananero Bloc; Pedro Oliverio Guerrero Castillo (alias Cuchillo), commander of the Héroes del Guaviare Front; Luis Arnulfo Tuberquia (alias Memín), commander of the Noroccidente de Antioquia Front; Eder Pedraza Peña (alias Ramón Mojana), commander of the Mojana Front, and Miguel Ángel Mejía Munera (alias El Mellizo), commander of the Vencedores de Arauca front. The National Government revoked the suspension of the arrest warrants against these officers of the demobilized self defense forces and called upon the Security Forces to apprehend them.

Another noteworthy event – part of the work of the CNRR – that took place during the quarter covered by this report, was the opening of the first Regional Office of the CNRR in Medellín and the initiation of the work of the Comisión histórica para esclarecer la verdad del conflicto en Colombia [Historic Commission to Clarify the Truth Regarding the Colombian Conflict]. The MAPP/OEA has been following the Commission’s progress in fulfillment of its mandate; the Commission also receives support from the United Nations, through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as from countries such as Holland, Sweden, Canada, and Spain.

It should be highlighted that the Mission, through the legal team in its Analysis Unit, and with the IACHR as an advisor, will obtain information from the different organs responsible for its application and, especially, on the tasks of verification of dismantling, cease-fire, ceasing of illicit activities, and return of property, related to the application of the individual and collective benefits provided for by the law. In August 2006, the IACHR identified the challenges faced by the application of the Justice and Peace Law, and will continue to follow up in this respect.

The MAPP/OEA expects that the effective implementation of the Justice and Peace Law will contribute to the clarification of the investigations regarding the existence of alleged links between politicians and the self-defense forces, as well as other matters related to the negative influence of these irregular groups over Colombian political and institutional life.

VII. Participatory Community Processes

During this quarter, the Mission has solidified the Unidad de Iniciativas con las Comunidades [Unit of Community Initiatives], whose main task is to plan and manage support for local initiatives in conflict zones. As part of its work, and after the definition of its adopted methodologies, a selection was made of initiatives to implement in the different areas where the Mission has regional offices; more than 20 initiatives were selected for implementation over the course of a year.

In those places where the Mission has a permanent presence, different participatory processes have been followed. These processes are geared toward supporting communities that have been victims of violence, as well as those communities that have received the demobilized population that is being reintegrated into civilian life. The greatest progress in this respect has taken place, inter alia, in Medellín (Antioquia), Tierralta (Córdoba), Barrancabermeja (Santander), and Valledupar (César).

In Medellín, the inter-administrative contract signed with Metroseguridad has allowed the Mission to carry out broad community work in the city’s metropolitan area. Within this framework, several initiatives have been carried forward, from the generation of alternative teaching models to the establishment of an inter-institutional dialogue on reintegration, thus making a contribution to the coordination of activities and the supporting this process in the city of Medellín in an integral fashion.

The construction of the process of reintegration and support in the Medellín neighborhoods is of great importance. One of the greatest cycles of violence ever known in Colombia originated in these neighborhoods in the 1980s. In these same places, the mayor’s Program for Peace and Reconciliation has carried out effective actions that have visibly lowered the rates of violence.

In Tierralta, in carrying out the Proyecto de Justicia Comunitaria “Conciliemos” [Community Justice Project “Let’s Reconcile”], the Mission has supported the community,
offering technical assistance to social workers, and finalizing the strategy of dissemination of the “conciliador en equidad” [conciliator in equity] in the communities that will use this service.

In Urabá, work has been done to locally strengthen the Personerías,\textsuperscript{10} by creating spaces for dialogue. In a first meeting which took place on August 30 and 31, attended by 9 personeros and other institutions, the necessary inputs were obtained to learn about the situation of the demobilized combatants in the municipalities, and to have an exchange on the demands of the demobilized combatants, made to the personeros, and the corresponding institutional offerings.

There has also been important work carried out in Urabá with demobilized women, in order to support this population and share their concerns and problems encountered during the process of reintegration. In a series of workshops with the demobilized women of the region, the situation of these women was analyzed in the light of the benefits conferred on them by the law. The main result was the identification of the needs of demobilized women by the local institutions and organizations present, the recognition of their needs, and the presentation of institutional offerings as well as the assistance options that the women have in the municipalities. Finally, a long term commitment towards work in this area was made, with the support of the MAPP/OEA.

\textbf{VIII. Conclusions}

1. The Mission is optimistic regarding the efforts towards the construction of a peace dialog between the Colombian Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) [National Liberation Army], as well as regarding the possibility of resuming actions leading to a humanitarian agreement with the FARC.

2. The General Secretariat reiterates the importance of the demobilization and reintegration of the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia, essential components of the peace process in the country, and reaffirms its commitment to continue solidifying its work in this respect, as well as to support Colombia’s people and institutions in all peace initiatives they decide to move forward.

3. The disarmament and demobilization of the AUC and their attempt to become reintegrated into civilian life, although imperfect and with foreseeable and considerable difficulty constitute the possibility of building, step by step, new peace scenarios for Colombia; central and unavoidable issues exist in processes of this nature, especially reparations for the victims, truth and justice. Colombians face these challenges today and also have the tools that they built themselves to make progress meeting them.

\textsuperscript{10} The personería [government representation] is a position belonging to the Office of the Attorney General that has as some of its, protection of the public interest, as well as the monitoring the behavior of other public officials. At the municipal level, personeros [government representatives] are among the different offices and persons directly involved in municipal dynamics; they are aware of the problems of the corregimientos and veredas in which they work, and continuously hear the complaints and concerns of their inhabitants regarding the process of reintegration.
4. The decision to destroy each and every weapon surrendered in the AUC demobilizations is an important step, as the Mission has reiterated. To this end, the Organization’s technical support and resources have been advanced, as well as full verification of the procedure employed.

5. The Mission expresses its concern regarding the results of the verification of the dismantling of some armed units of the AUC and the danger entailed. Said verification has established a serious presumption regarding the intention of maintaining armed units linked to extortion, threats, and social control in some territories that were supposed to have been freed of the influence of AUC blocs.

6. The Government’s decision to thwart these attempts to rearm has been verified especially in Córdoba, Caquetá, Casanare, and Alta Guajira. However, it is expected that similar effective actions be carried out in other points of the territory where the potential danger is significant.

7. The greatest possible support for communities affected by violence, the strengthening of state institutions in demobilized territories and the need to take urgent measures related to reintegration, are all central themes in this stage of the Colombian process.

8. The Mission is pleased to note the naming of the High Commissioner for Reintegration and reiterates its full disposition to support him in the present and future of the peace process. However, it also notes the need to make progress with urgent measures in territories where the concentration of demobilized combatants is high. The success of reintegration of the irregular groups to civilian life is crucial to guarantee the sustainability of the peace process as a whole.

9. With respect to the Justice and Peace Law, the Mission is readying itself to follow up and monitor its effective enforcement. This is a substantial phase of the process towards compliance with justice, reparations, and the truth.
## Annex A

Numbers demobilized, by sex, number of weapons surrendered and men/weapons ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL DEMOB</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CACIQUE NUTIBARA BLOC</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORTEGA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>BANANERO BLOC</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHERN MAGDALENA AND ISLA DE SAN FERNANDO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUNDINAMARCA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CATATUMBO BLOC</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CALIMA BLOC</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CORDOBA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHWESTERN ANTOQUEÑO BLOC</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOJANA FRONT</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES DE TOLOVA FRONT</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONTES DE MARIA BLOC</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIBERTADORES DEL SUR BLOC</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES DE GRANADA BLOC</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>META AND VICHADA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACIFICO - HEROES DE CHOCO BLOC</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECURITY RINGS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CENTAUROS BLOC</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHWESTERN ANTOQUEÑO BLOC</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VICHADA DEL BCB FRONT</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOLIMA BLOC</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHEASTERN ANTOQUEÑO – BAJO CAUCA AND MAGDALENA MEDIO FRONTS (BCB)</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1799</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEROES Y MARTIRES DEL GUATICA FRONT (BCB)</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VENCEDORES DE ARAUCA BLOC</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>MINEROS BLOC</td>
<td>2790</td>
<td>2576</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAMPESINAS DE PUERTO BOYACA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CENTRAL BOLIVAR - SOUTH BOLIVAR BLOC</td>
<td>2523</td>
<td>2168</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RESISTENCIA TAYRONA BLOC</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAMPESINAS DEL MAGDALENA MEDIO SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROCERES DEL CAGUAN - HEROES DE LOS ANDAQUIES AND HEROES DE FLORENCIA FRONTS (BCB)</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHERN PUTUMAYO FRONT (BCB)</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JULIO PEINADO BECERRA FRONT</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHERN BLOC (CHIMILA)</td>
<td>2215</td>
<td>2043</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHERN BLOC (LA MESA)</td>
<td>2545</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEROES DEL GUAVIARE FRONT AND</td>
<td>1765</td>
<td>1718</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEROES DE LOS LLANOS FRONT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMER CARDENAS BLOC - FIRST</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMER CARDENAS BLOC – SECOND</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMER CARDENAS BLOC – THIRD</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31,651</td>
<td>29,740</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>18,002</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex B

### Number of Weapons Surrendered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LONG WEAPONS</th>
<th>SUPPORT WEAPONS</th>
<th>SIDE ARMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RIFLES</strong></td>
<td>12,862</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHOTGUNS</strong></td>
<td>706</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARBINES</strong></td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,734</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,022</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MACHINE GUNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>226</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRENADE LAUNCHERS M203</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SINGLE SHOT GRENADE LAUNCHERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>458</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MULTIPLE GRENADE LAUNCHERS (M.G.L.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MORTAR TUBES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>423</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROCKET LAUNCHERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,246</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBMACHINE GUNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PISTOLS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVOLVERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Verification of the dismantling of AUC armed units

1. Alta Quindío - Uribe
2. Meta Quindío - Guaviare
3. Riquehío y María
4. Soledad, Molambo, Luruaco, Sabana Larga y Saravena
5. Villedupar
6. Palay, Tamalameque, Paillitas, Curumani y Chiviriano
7. Jaga de Jimeno, Bucaramanga y Codazzi
8. Villa del Rosario, Puerto Santander, Sardinal, Oso, Albergue, El Carmen, Cerro san Pablo, La Esperanza, El Carmen y Cúcuta.
9. Baranoa de Losa
10. Tierralta y Montebello
11. Ibagué
12. Par de Arriero
13. Milán
14. Palmarca, Léka, Los Andes, Cumbias y Botumayo

Processed by the MAP/IOEA Analysis Unit
Cartographic Base of the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute
I. Background

1. This quarterly report by the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia is presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in accordance with Resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), which “instructs the Secretary General to provide a quarterly report to the Permanent Council on the work of MAPP/OAS and its continuing ability to contribute to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. Introduction

2. As part of its verification work, OAS/MAPP has identified a complex situation in the regions, which must be dealt with decisively to prevent it from jeopardizing the process for the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the members of the Self-Defense Forces. Given this scenario, it is important to recognize and value the positive aspects of what has been accomplished so far, i.e.: the direct impact on reducing violence in large areas of the country; the beginnings of Government presence in the territories; the return of the communities that were expelled by the paramilitaries; and, reconstruction of the social fabric in villages and communities that were under the domination of irregular armed groups.

3. For OAS/MAPP, the post-demobilization phase is a critical time. The current dynamics could trigger a truth and justice process that would put an end to paramilitary groups in the regions, and lead to reconstruction of the State. Or, on the other hand, it could
accentuate the influence of paramilitary groups linked to drug trafficking. To avoid this eventuality, it is critical to strengthen institutionality and the process of reintegration of former combatants, and to ensure that the Government responds decisively to the emergence and expansion of illegal armed groups.

4. The presence and activities of various illegal groups in different regions of the country continue to present one of the main risks to consolidating the peace process. Some of these groups are led by commanders of the United Self-Defense Forces [AUC] who did not heed the government’s call to participate in the process, while others reflect an alliance between former paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Moreover, it has been noted that mid-level AUC commanders are heading new illegal armed units. The operations of these groups continue to gravely affect the civilian population, and primarily vulnerable groups, such as women, children, Afro-descendants, and indigenous peoples.

5. At the same time, the status of the reintegration process is a source of serious concern on the part of OAS/MAPP. Delays in strengthening the institutions in charge of this process together with the limited operational capacity and coverage of the program at present are some of the factors that are hindering the socio-economic reintegration of demobilized combatants. A weak reintegration process in turn poses serious threats to the peace process as a whole, since it does nothing to prevent the recruitment of the demobilized fighters by new illegal units, which are being seen in different regions of the country.

6. On the other hand, there have been positive steps forward in the peace process. For instance, some of the truth has begun to emerge, revealing the paramilitary influence on the political, economic, and social life in the regions. Despite fear and threats, over 40,000 victims have taken up the struggle to reclaim their rights, and civil society organizations and institutions have started to respond.

7. Colombia is working on a process to delegitimze the self-defense groups. Their relationships with politicians and officials of government institutions are being discovered. These groups have even jeopardized national and international economic sectors, as exemplified in the case of the multinational “Chiquita Brands.”

8. It is also important to note that this situation has arisen in the wake of the demobilization of an illegal armed group with more than 30,000 members and 18,000 weapons. Consequently, institutions are just beginning to be reinstated and communities are slowly starting to regain trust and to reassess their past and try to change their future.

III. The Trend To Rearm And Security In The Zones Occupied By Demobilized Self-Defense Forces

9. Seven months after the end of the disarmament and demobilization process, OAS/MAPP has identified a complex scenario in certain regions of Colombia,
including Nariño, Chocó, and Putumayo, through its operations to verify the dismantling of the AUC’s military structure and to monitor public order. In these territories, the local people do not seem to notice a substantial change in security conditions, due to the emergence and continuance of illegal armed units linked to illicit economic activities, with the arms’ capability to intimidate and control.

10. The newly formed units and the remaining reductos [hold-outs],¹ can be described as on a continuum between a splintered, dispersed state and an interest in monopolizing the illegal activities. On the one hand, the units are independent with loose partnerships, casual and fluid associations, and no concrete, lasting alliances. On the other hand, there is a hierarchical organization that controls and regulates all of the illicit economic activities and operations in the different territories.

11. The Mission is troubled by information it received on an alleged attempt by some former commanders to maintain control over the illicit economic activities in the regions where they were operating. This allegation is based on a large number of interviews and statements given by former AUC members, ranging from members who operated on patrols to bloc commanders. However, from what the OAS/MAPP has found in the regions so far, there does not appear to be just one single structure.

12. After the Eighth Report was written, the Mission began to notice fundamental changes in the dynamics of the so-called emerging bands. These changes have been identified on the basis of the field work of the Regional Offices and the Mobile Team, and they can be summed up as follows:

A. **Upsurge in alliances and associations under specific leaders**

13. At both regional and local levels, the presence of articuladores [“coordinators”] (mid-level officers and a few former commanders who did not respond to the government’s call to comply with the Justice and Peace Law) in regions and communities, has become much more apparent. In various zones, we have begun to receive information on the influence of commanders who did not respond to the government’s appeal, especially Vicente Castaño and Ever Veloza² (“Hernán Hernández” or “H.H”).

14. This trend is seen most clearly in Meta Department and the eastern plains. Groups such as the one headed by “Cuchillo,” former commander of the Heroes of Guaviare Front, and “Don Mario,” former ally of Vicente Castaño, are examples of the dynamic conflict the region is currently undergoing/experiencing. There are also other groups operating there, such as the one known as “Martín Llanos”, the commander of the Casanare AUC which has not demobilized, and the one known

---

¹ The term “reductos” refers to factions of the AUC that did not participate in the demobilization process.
² Captured by the government forces in Antioquia Department in April 2007.
15. In other regions, the situation is attributed to an alliance between former paramilitaries, especially the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) and drug traffickers in the northern part of the valley [Norte del Valle]. This situation has been observed in the South of the country, in departments such as Nariño and Putumayo. Groups such as the “Rastrojos,” “Mano Negra,” and “Organización Nueva Generación Colombia,” in Nariño Department, south of Cauca and Putumayo, are the ones that best describe this situation. Drug traffickers plays a key role, allowing these structures to expand and to be reinforced militarily, for the purpose of obtaining and maintaining social and economic control.

16. The influence of the demobilized North Bloc continues, as mentioned by the Mission in its Eighth Report. Following the capture of “Salomón” -- Miguel Villarreal Archiva -- by the police, the fate of the powerful organization he headed is somewhat uncertain. The organization combined various criminal factions in the Atlantic coastal area, and especially in the areas of Cesar, Magdalena, Atlántico y la Guajira.

B. Clandestine command structures

17. In the current situation, active participation on the part of some mid-level commanders of demobilized Self-Defense Forces, who continue to head illegal structures, has been observed. It has been difficult to identify them so far, since some of them were not part of the demobilization process, or if they were, they appeared with different ranks.³

18. The best-known mid-ranking commanders were part of the former Bloque Norte. Men known by aliases such as “Alejandro or 101”, “Tolemaida”, “Codazzi,” who continue to engage in clandestine armed activities, and the assassinated “Omega”, “Jimmy”, and “Rambo” are clear evidence of the fact that former mid-ranking combatants continue to head illegal armed structures.

19. To the North of Cesar, despite the demobilization of paramilitary structures, it is assumed that various mid-ranking commanders are still present and responsible for the continued intelligence and surveillance networks and the illicit business, specifically in Valledupar. The trend is towards a reorganization of certain AUC demobilized troops, and especially of the Motilona Resistance Front, in the Jagua de Ibirico, which are using new more forceful methods of operating and attacking economic and social sectors.

20. Following the demobilization of the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc of the Urabá Self-Defense Forces, information trickled in on reductos who remained in the zone, and on the

³ AUC estimates of the number of mid-level commanders exceed 3,000 persons. Of these, there is no information pertaining to 10%, according to information provided by some ex-commanders.

Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
appearance of armed units, headed by former AUC commanders, with the participation of demobilized combatants. This situation put pressure on former AUC members to join up again, and was at the root of the assassination of several of them.

C. **Recruitment and high mobility of the demobilized persons**

21. In the zones regions to which the demobilized AUC combatants returned, we observed pressure exerted on them to participate in illegal groups. A mid-level commander who was rearmed or who headed a group of reductos would call on the members of his unit to join up. This recruitment was accompanied by death threats. As a result, some former combatants went back to their illegal activities, displacements, and murders, with a high degree of mobility among regions. The territories most affected by this practice are Cesar, and especially Valledupar, Norte de Santander – Cúcuta -, and the Urabá region.

22. The recruitment activities have also generated a high degree of mobility among the regions. The Mission received information and testimony about buses transporting demobilized persons to different parts of the country: from Córdoba to the Sierra Nevada; from Bogotá for training in Tolima; from Urabá to Norte del Valle and the Sur del Chocó; the movement of coastal people to the Eastern Plains; the movement of “paísas” to Putumayo; and, transfers of former members of the BCB in Bajo Cauca to the South of Córdoba. There were also reports of intra-urban displacements in cities such as Medellín, which were also part of this dynamic.

D. **Adaptability and flexibility of the modus operandi of the emerging illegal structures**

23. The illegal armed structures that have emerged are extremely adaptable and flexible. Their self-organization capability allows them to conform to their surrounding environment. It is important to bear in mind that the leaders of these structures are highly volatile and the opportunities to advance are very flexible, usually achieved by the use of violence. With the assassination or capture of a rapidly rising commander, a new one emerges, who follows the same pattern and operating methods. A change in command may even be instigated from within, by the next in line who wants to advance and gain control of the armed structure.

24. Thus, acts of betrayal and vengeance are common. Evidence of this is seen in the murders of mid-level commands that, like “Omego,” continue to control illegal operations in a region. It is also relevant to mention commander known as “Pedro,” who headed the structure known as “Nueva Generación” in Nariño, who was murdered by the members of that organization.

25. This creates a complex scenario for the government forces, since their operations have an effect on the illegal structures but have not managed to dismantle them. According to what the OAS/MAPP observed in the regions, the following cycle is repeated:
[Key:] Operation by government forces against the illegal structure – Withdrawal – Reorganization – Strengthening -- Expansion

26. This is what happened in Southern Córdoba. In February 2006, after the Mission reported verification of a rearmed structure in the district [corregimiento] of Tierradentro in the municipality of Montelíbano – called “Vencedores de San Jorge,” a security council meeting was held with the Defense Minister and the top military officers. Five days after that meeting, the Army engaged in combat with the illegal faction in the village of el Tambo, district of Puerto Anchica – which resulted in the death of three alleged paramilitaries, two of whom were reported as N.N. After this single operation, all the persons who were members of the re-armed self-defense group withdrew from the area and kept a low profile. Ten months later, during the second part of 2006, OAS/MAPP received a report that a group now called the “Águilas Negras” [“Black Eagles”]—but which was actually the very same “Vencedores de San Jorge” --had reappeared. Recruitment in the areas was highly visible, and there was reference to the influence of men who came from Caucasia (former members of the Bloque Central Bolívar).

27. Despite the assassinations of the persons known as “Andrés,” demobilized from the Bloque Córdoba, “Omega” from Bloque Norte, “JJ” from Bloque Central Bolívar, “Camilo” from Bloque Catatumbo, and “Monje” from Frente Héroes de los Andaquies, in addition to the alleged disappearance of “Danielito” from the Frente Héroes de Granada, it can be inferred that new commanders immediately took over the leadership of these emerging structures.

E. Impact on vulnerable communities and population groups: children, women, Afro-descendants, and indigenous peoples

28. The regional dynamics linked to the surge, strengthening, and expansion of new illegal structures have affected the most vulnerable communities and population sectors. The violence against women continues to be used as a battle strategy by the armed participants in the conflict in their struggle to control territory. In areas where the rearmed groups and reductos are operating, the adverse effect on families is evident. Boys and girls in these zones which have rearmed or where the reductos have stayed have been affected mostly by forced recruitment on the part of different illegal armed groups. This practice continues in the regions, but we do not know just how many children have been recruited into their ranks.

29. It is important to mention that women have emerged as protagonists in organizing victims and demanding their rights. Organizations such as IMP (Iniciativas de Mujeres por la Paz) – an alliance comprising 22 women’s organizations—and las...
Madres de la Candelaria, among others, play a major role in enforcing the Justice and Peace Law. Leaders such as Yolanda Izquierdo, assassinated by unknown assailants in Córdoba, have become symbols of persons seeking justice and reparations.

30. Indigenous communities have also been affected. In Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the population groups most likely to have their rights violated are the indigenous peoples. The highest incidence is found among the Kankuamos, the Kogui, and the Wiwa. North of Chocó, the Embera-Katios people have been subjected to food embargoes and threats, as have the Waumnaan, to the South. In Tolima, the activities of illegal armed groups have primarily affected the Pijao people and their protected areas, Totarco Dinde and Zaragoza Tamarindo, in Coyaima Municipality.

31. The territories where Afro-Colombians live have also become conflict zones where some of the illegal armed organizations have located. This is true along the Pacific, in Chocó, Cauca, and Nariño Departments, and in the Caribbean Departments of Guajira, Magdalena, Córdoba, Cesar, and Sucre. Perhaps the most critical situation is in the northern part of Chocó, and the coastal area of Nariño Department, where the collective territories of the Afro-Colombian communities have been transgressed. In these areas, where these communities have received legal rights to their lands, many inhabitants have been displaced in the face of threats from illegal armed groups.

F. Take-over of the areas abandoned by the AUC by drug traffickers

32. According to some post-demobilization forecasts, guerrillas would take control of the demobilized AUC territories. However, the situation in the regions shows that offensives by the insurgents have been weak, and that, on the contrary, other structures in the service of drug traffickers have begun to exercise control over the regions that used to be occupied by the AUC.4

33. Reports have started to trickle in regarding the growing presence of drug traffickers in the Norte del Valle, and especially along the Pacific Coast, and in Putumayo and Caquetá. Alliances are also being formed to occupy territories and corridors for growing, processing, and transporting illicit drugs. This has been the case in the Eastern Plains, where former AUC commanders who rejected participation in the peace process have joined forces. To the south of Cesar, a conflict between rearmed groups is being waged for control of the routes to the Venezuelan border and the Atlantic Coast.

34. The relationship between the drug traffickers and each of the illegal armed groups or former AUCs who never demobilized is increasingly apparent. One salient point is the fact that there is very little confrontation between these structures and the

4 Drug traffickers are able to penetrate an area much more rapidly than the guerrillas, especially when they have people with experience in managing the illicit economy of the region.
guerrillas. With the exception of a few confrontations in Nariño and Meta, there
does not appear to be any real conflict between the illegal organizations for the
time being. On the contrary, in some regions alliances that are not based on
ideological or political grounds have begun to be forged.

35. The Departments of Nariño, Putumayo, Cauca, Caquetá, and southern Chocó⁵ are -
the ones where this situation is most prevalent. In the Guajira, drug trafficking units
continue to gain strength over the economy and the tendency of illegal armed
groups to form strategic alliances around drug trafficking is clearly seen.⁶

IV. The State’s Response

36. The Mission has participated actively in the follow-up mechanism created by the
government, by attending two meetings in February and March with the Vice-
President, the Defense Minister, the Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law Program in the Office of Vice-President, the Public Prosecutor’s Office
[Fiscalía], the Administrative Department of Security Department (DAS), and high-
ranking officers of the Police and the Armed Forces. At these meetings, OAS/MAPP
expressed its concern over the rearmament trend. It is important to point out that
with the implementation of this mechanism, the government has responded
effectively to the emergence and continuance of armed structures operating outside
the law, and it is a key instrument for monitoring the process.

37. In the second half of 2006, increased operations and results were seen, as
government forces moved against illegal groups and reductos. According to the
most recent National Police Report on Control and Monitoring of Demobilized
Combatants, between 2006 and 2007, 1,095 members of “newly emerging
bands” were captured, and 193 of them, or 17% of the total captured, were
demobilized. This means that the make-up of these new groups includes a large
component of new recruits, in addition to the AUC members who did not
participate in the demobilization process.

38. Among the most important operations were the ones carried out against the illegal
groups operating in the Departments of Caquetá, Norte de Santander,
Magdalena, and Antioquia, where persons who were part of the command
structure of these organizations were either captured or killed in battle. In October
2006 in Caquetá, the Army fought the unit that calls itself the “Bloque Antisubversivo del Sur” (“Anti-Subversive Southern Bloc”), and killed the leader of
that group, Juan Carlos Monje.

⁵ In southern Chocó, in the municipalities of Istmina, San José del Palmar, and Puerto Meluk, it is very clear that the “franchise”
of the Bloque Pacifico has been transferred from the AUC to the “Machos” group headed by the drug trafficker Diego Montoya.
Similarly, in the municipality of Sipi and the San Juan River basin and towards the Pacific coast, the “Rastrojos” group under
the command of Wilber Varela has gained control of these areas, and has even engaged in direct armed conflict with the FARC,
which had the same intentions.

⁶ Each armed structure has a service to offer (warehousing, road security, transportation, drug shipments, or hired guns, among
others).
39. In Norte de Santander, the authorities formed an elite search party made up of 120 men from the Army, Police, Public Prosecutor’s Office, DAS, and CTI, to stop the rise of the “Águilas Negras.” In December 2006 Máximo Cuesta Valencia, alias “Sinaí,” was apprehended. The illegal armed groups operating in Magdalena Department were most affected by the capture of mid-level commanders. Of the four factions operating and living in the area, the heads of three of them were captured.\(^7\)

40. The most significant capture so far is the April 2007 apprehension of Ever Veloza, alias HH, who demobilized as a member representing the Bloque Bananero. After evading the government’s call to report to Itagüí Prison along with the other AUC commanders, Veloza formed a new illegal armed unit that operated in Urabá Antioqueño and Meta Department. According to statements by the Defense Minister, “HH” would not receive any of the benefits under the Justice and Peace Law, and would be tried in the regular courts.

41. It is important to point out that the National Police established its presence in 107 districts and villages in the national territory during the period covered by this report. The purpose of these rural outposts is to counter the activities of illegal groups in these areas.

42. Following the OAS/MAPP’s Eighth Report which referred to the alleged permeability of public institutions to illegal armed structures, information to this effect is still being received, and has been passed on to the national government at the follow-up meetings.

43. The Mission has told the highest government authorities of its concern over including demobilized AUC combatants in the network of collaborators. The participation of former combatants in this mechanism has generated some confusion and created the image of possible collusion with the government forces in certain communities. Concerns with regard to the demobilization and disarmament process have been manifested especially in those cases where the local people are able to identify former paramilitaries and currently operating rearmed groups.

V. Reintegration Of Former Combatants

44. The transfer of the PRVC (Program for Reintegration into Civilian Life) from the Ministry of the Interior to the Office of the High Commissioner for Reintegration has affected the process to reinsert over 30,000 former combatants. The major difficulties in implementing the program revolve around delays in strengthening the responsible institutions, the lack of definition and certainty regarding how the

---

\(^7\) a) Centro del Magdalena Faction: Dec/06 Saul Severini and Dairo Alberto Laino Scopetta; b) Águilas Negras: Jan./07 Juan Hipólito Mejía aka. “Caucasia or 7.7” and March/07 the capture of Edgar Ariel Cordoba aka. “5-7”, Norberto Quiroga Poveda aka. “5-5”, and Jose Daniel Mora aka. “101”; c) Familia Rojas: Jan./07 Adan Fairuth Rojas aka. “Adancito” and March/07 capture of Adan Rojas aka. “Negro Rojas” (son and father, respectively).
program will be reorganized, and the lack of coordination between the national structure on the one hand, and municipal governments and the private sector on the other.

45. One of the most important advances was issuance of Decree 395 regulating Law 418 of 1997. This has a significant impact on the process, since these new regulations include provisions aimed at responding to the needs of the demobilized population and at securing their social and economic reintegration, with no time limits.

46. The purpose of this Decree is to strengthen the regions institutionally through the Reference and Opportunity Centers (CROs) and the competent entities in the area, and to work with the communities. The creation of new reference centers and moves to strengthen already existing ones are a response to the need to have technical personnel with good management skills. However, to date, the Mission has noted that the operation of the CROs, the opening of new ones, and the work of the Brigadas de Cierre de Brecha de Servicios\(^8\) have encountered some obstacles that have affected the anticipated results.

47. The Brigades have been affected by the situation involving threats by illegal armed structures to the reintegrated combatants and the transfer of some demobilized combatants to other departments. Moreover, in some cases OAS/MAPP has observed that the beneficiaries do not have information on changes in the program, and do not even know the schedule of the upcoming meetings with the Brigades.

48. The still limited operational and coverage capacity of the Program is compounded by the difficulty in establishing clear statistics. In general, there is a problem that has to do with the discrepancy between the number of demobilized combatants reported by the Government and the number located by the Police. The information provided by some local officials is far removed from reality. There is no clarity regarding the number of beneficiaries, or their location or mobility.

49. The two most worrisome issues are the productive or work projects and humanitarian aid, which are key benefits for the demobilized combatants. In the first case, OAS/MAPP has verified that, as a rule, people in the communities continue to have the impression that the program does not provide for the socio-economic reintegration of the beneficiaries, and this in turn could be the reason why they tend to go back to illegal activities.

\(^8\) The Office of the High Commissioner for Reintegration works in cooperation with various government agencies and the IMO in organizing sessions with the demobilized population to gather information on the current status of their benefits, particularly in relation to documentation, although they also check on their situation in terms of health, education, psycho-social support, humanitarian aid, and productive projects. These brigades work with demobilized individuals or groups, regardless of whether they have left or are still part of the process, and, without exception, they all sign a document of commitment that enables them to continue with the reintegration process.
50. The associations that have been established to develop these projects have not been adequately trained to make sustainable or viable proposals in each region. There appears to be a lack of opportunities that has caused the migration of demobilized persons and contributed to abandonment of the program and even to the death or detention of demobilized combatants, because either they have joined illegal groups or they have become involved in criminal activities.

51. In the second instance, the expectations generated by the extension of humanitarian aid, based on Decree 395, have had a negative impact on certain regions due to nonpayment. Payment of humanitarian aid has been suspended already in the case of around 1,096 demobilized combatants from the Catatumbo, Bananero, Calima, Mojana, and Córdoba Blocs, and they have still not received disbursements.

52. The education and health benefits offered by the program have over 60% coverage. However, this is an area of concern, since many of the beneficiaries have not yet received these benefits, despite the fact that they have been in the program for around two years.

53. In view of this situation, the Office of High Commissioner is not only faced with serious challenges, but it also has at hand the opportunity to offer a different life to more than 30,000 former combatants. This institution should act immediately to extend to all of the beneficiaries and their families coverage of basic services, such as health, education, documentation, and psycho-social care. In the medium- and long-term, it should guarantee them alternatives for earning income, through sustainable productive projects, for instance. Failure to do so could leave the market of violence, which is still active, as their only option.

VI. Application Of The Justice And Peace Law

54. During the period covered by this report, progress has been made in implementing the Justice and Peace Law. This development is reflected in the opening of court trials against some of the demobilized combatants targeted by Law 975, the decentralized operations of the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission, the organization of the Public Prosecutors and Public Defenders Offices [Procuraduría y Defensoría Pública], and institutional initiatives. Although these initiatives are not very well coordinated, they do help disseminate the law and information on the mechanisms for participation of victims in the judicial process.

55. Bringing demobilized combatants before the courts is the concrete expression of the government’s plan for “judicialization” of the former combatants, which has generated divergent reactions in Colombian society.

56. During this recent period, implementation of the Justice and Peace Law has gone through difficult times, such as when the leaders of former self-defense forces were concentrated in the high-security prison in Itagüí. However, these difficulties in the process of implementing the Law were resolved in various meetings between
government officials and the affected and involved parties, where the OAS/MAPP played the role of coordinator and mediator.

57. The process of implementation of the Justice and Peace Law has also gone through regrettable times, such as the assassination of the representatives of the victims Yolanda Izquierdo and Carmen Santana, and the murder of Judith Vergara, a human rights defender who was working for the peace and truth process in the city of Medellín. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights denounced these assassinations and published a report, along with recommendations to the Colombian Government, regarding the right of victims of the conflict to participate in the process in conditions of security.

A. Fiscalía General de la Nación [Office of the National Attorney General]

58. In the past six months, the Fiscalía General de la Nación has focused on moving criminal proceedings forward, primarily by convening the victims of criminal acts committed by demobilized persons, and then calling on these former combatants to come forward with the truth.

59. The Fiscalía has been using the regional and local press and the radio, in addition to its web page, to publicize the summons to appear in court for each of the persons sought under the law who have already made their voluntary declarations or intend to do so in the next few months. At the same time, some prosecutors in the Justice and Peace Unit have been conducting briefing sessions for victims to make them aware of their rights under the Justice and Peace Law, so that they will participate in the proceedings.

60. As for the proceedings involving the voluntary declarations, to date various demobilized combatants have begun to offer their statements. They include Salvatore Mancuso, José Baldomero Linares (aka. “Guillermo Torres”), Juan Francisco Prada (aka. “Juancho Prada”), Wilson Salazar Carrascal (aka. “Loro”), Iván Roberto Duque Gaviria (aka. “Ernesto Báez”), Jhon Mario Salazar (aka. “El Pecoso”), and Carlos Mario Montoya Pamplona (aka. “Arbolito”).

61. With regard to these judicial proceedings, to which the Fiscalía has devoted all its efforts, we should point out the commitment observed on the part of the prosecutors in the Justice and Peace Unit, and of their work teams and the Unit Coordinator, in performing their responsibilities. Their strategy for division of labor, by AUC blocs or groups, appears so far to be adequate for this stage of judicial hearings and evidence gathering.

62. In any event, based on the declarations, and in the case of gaps or contradictions, in the coming months the Fiscalía will be facing the major challenge of verifying the information obtained and supplementing it with other pieces of evidence. In this context, the Mission feels the need to warn of the importance of strengthening the systems for protection of prosecutors and their teams of investigators, and the human and logistical resources of that institution. They are also worried about the
limits on processing the huge volume of denunciations of victims and requests for legal benefits under Law 782 of 2002 by demobilized combatants.

63. To date, in order to better organize its work, the Fiscalía has issued two resolutions to regulate the proceedings for voluntary statements. The first, Resolution 3998 issued in December 2006, established the guidelines for the procedure of receiving the statements; and, the second, Resolution 387 of February 2007, issued guidelines for the procedure for transmission of the voluntary statement hearings.

64. The Prosecutor’s Office has been exhuming the bodies located in various common burial pits discovered as a result of the information received under the Justice and Peace Law. The discovery of numerous common graves⁹ is posing one of the most important challenges in the search for truth and reparations for victims.

B. Justice and Peace Tribunals

65. The Supreme Court of Justice selected eight persons to serve the two Justice and Peace Tribunals in Barranquilla and Bogota, which, however, have still not begun functioning. The High Council of the Judicature has issued various decisions setting out the structure of these tribunals. The President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court has explained that a shortage of resources and logistical elements has prevented the Court from hearing these cases. The President of the Court took the initiative of contacting the Interior Minister to advise him that he would appoint a committee to make proposals to resolve the Chamber’s structural problems.

C. New regulations governing the process

66. Various decrees regulating Law 975 were issued during this period. In the last six months, Decree 4417 of December 2006 was issued to amend Decree 2898 of August 2006. It establishes that prior confirmation of the ex-combatant’s decision to comply with the law is not required, but that it is enough that he be questioned in that regard during the voluntary statement proceeding and indicate his decision to act accordingly. This Decree in turn amends Decree 4760 of December 2005, by replacing the 6-month term stipulated for completion of proceedings preliminary to the voluntary statement proceeding, by a reasonable period of time. This provision gives the prosecutors greater flexibility in terms of the time available for gathering relevant information prior to summoning the ex-combatant to make his voluntary statement of the truth.

67. In addition, Decree 3391 was issued in September 2006 regulating various aspects of Law 975 of 2005 and amending certain measures stipulated in Decree 4760 of December 2005. Among regulated aspects, with reference to the purpose and scope of the law, the clause in Decree 4470 of December 2005, where it established that it would cover criminal acts committed during and on the occasion

---

⁹ According to the information from the Prosecutor’s Office, the process of exhumation took place between March 20, 2006 and May 5, 2007, under the authority of the Justice and Peace Unit, with the following results: 704 bodies found, 188 preliminarily identified, 42 fully identified.
of the person’s membership in the group prior to July 25, 2005, was excluded. The circumstances in which the benefit of the alternative sentence would be revoked were also regulated, and the persons who have the obligation to provide reparations to victims and the mechanism for claiming that right were also identified, among other provisions. This Decree also allows the time in which the demobilized combatants remain in the concentration zones to be counted as part of the period of effective deprivation of freedom, when it comes time for them to serve their alternative sentences.

68. Finally, by Decree 315 of February 2007, the Ministry regulated the participation of victims during the investigative stage of the Justice and Peace proceedings. This Decree establishes that victims may participate in all procedural stages, either directly or through their representative, and that in the event they do not have the services of a private attorney, they may request the Office of Public Defenders to assign a public defendant, after presenting written evidence of need. Moreover, it establishes in detail all the rights of victims and the means they may use to demonstrate the damages suffered.

D. Victims in the Justice and Peace Process

69. The institutions responsible for implementing the Justice and Peace Law have acted to promote the participation of victims in the judicial process established by Law 975 of 2005 and to guarantee their rights to truth, justice, and reparations in the framework of those rights.

70. The Fiscalía General de la Nación, the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission, and the municipal agencies [Personerías] have played an active role in receiving the forms for reporting criminal acts and in conducting the briefing or information sessions for the general populace on the rights of victims and alternative procedures provided for by the law.

71. We have learned that a considerable number of victims has decided not to participate in the Justice and Peace process, on the assumption that they do not have adequate ways to protect themselves. This fact not only serves as a warning regarding the situation of these victims, but it should also serve to generate specific action aimed at helping and protecting these people. The adoption of appropriate measures to this end would provide the victims with a real opportunity to have their rights to truth, justice, and reparations satisfied, and it would provide the authorities with critical information to pursue their investigations.

72. Following initial enthusiasm, and mostly for the reasons just given, the participation of victims in the voluntary statement proceedings has diminished. This works against the ongoing investigations, since if the victims are not present at the time of the confession, they miss the opportunity to ask questions, obtain clarification and make comments on what the demobilized ex-combatant has said, and thereby supplement information on the crimes committed.
73. It has been verified that some victims are being advised by unscrupulous attorneys who charge fees for providing them the form which is free of charge. They make them sign powers of attorney with broad powers, including the powers to act in their place, and to receive and settle, and they demand large percentages of the reparations as fees for their services.

74. Despite efforts to inform victims of their rights, there are still various groups of persons and regions in the country where the people need to receive more information and the Public Defenders’ Office needs to have a greater presence. A greater presence of the Public Defenders’ Office would guarantee the possibility of technical advisory services during proceedings for those victims who do not have a private attorney.

E. National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission [CNRR]

75. In the time covered by this report, we have observed that the CNRR has acted dynamically, especially in organizing national activities. It has carried out various activities with social organizations to sensitize and motivate the organization of victims, assist with the visibility of their problems, and make proposals for the public agenda in favor of these victims.

76. The CNRR has fostered regional meetings to encourage the participation of victims in the judicial processes. It organized a Regional Session for Victims in the Municipality of Corozal, and it conducted the first session for attention to victims in Medellín. For this, the CNRR formed an inter-institutional brigade of attention to victims comprising the Fiscalía, the Public Defenders’ Office, the Public Prosecutors’ Office, and Personerías, among others. Likewise, it has fostered meetings with victims, so that they can hand over their denunciations directly to the Fiscalía, and the CNRR has been present at a local level in neighborhoods with victims of the violence. It has also held meetings with victims from indigenous groups, such as the Kankuama, Wallu, and Wiwa, among others, where they could hear proposed reparations, and draw up a future agenda to include treatment of this issue from an indigenous perspective.

77. In an attempt to decentralize its activities, the CNRR has opened a regional office in Bogotá to attend to victims from Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Meta, and Tolima. It has set up an office in Sincelejo, Sucre to begin the process of investigating the cases of collective reparations in the region of San Onofre and el Salado, and another one in Bucaramanga, which will attend to the victims from the Departments of Norte de Santander, Santander, and Arauca, and the subregions of southern Bolívar, Magdalena Medio, and northern Boyacá.

---

10 In other activities, the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR), has organized events for consciousness-raising and socialization events in places such as Pasto and Ipiales. In addition, as was done in Guajira Department, the CNRR supported the invitation to victims to participate in the Information Brigade organized by the National Justice and Peace Unit of the Fiscalía in Riohacha, Maicao, and Urbilla.
78. As a result of its institutional activities, the Commission has conducted six social consultations in Sincelejo (Sucre), Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, Cali, Medellín, and Paipa (Boyacá). Delegates of victims’ organizations, local and regional officials, government agencies, and international organizations participate in these consultations, which are a key tool for evaluating the perception of the law held by the different sectors of society and the government, while at the same time they provide a space to inform the people of the functions of the CNRR and to explain the legal process under Law 975 and access of the victims to justice.

79. With a view to evaluating the security conditions prevailing for the victims of the armed conflict in Córdoba Department, the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR) met with regional and national officials in Montería. On repeated occasions, the CNRR has voiced its concern over the lack of guarantees preventing victims from coming forward without fear to claim their rights to truth, justice, and reparations.

F. Procuraduría General de la Nación (PGN) [Office of the National Attorney General]

80. By Resolution 171, the Procuraduría established a working group within the Procuraduría for Criminal Matters. Its primary function is to work with the judicial and administrative authorities responsible for developing public policies in the area of justice and peace referred to in Law 975. The attorneys also process requests for pardon of demobilized persons pursuant to Law 782 of 2002.

81. The Procuraduría presented the report on the activities developed in 2006. The following were included among the most important achievements: training of 216 officers of the PGN, magistrates, and assistants for the Superior Tribunal for Justice and Peace; and, implementation of the project entitled “The Role of peace judges in the reinsertion process and the rights of victims,” as a mechanism designed to prevent, monitor, and resolve social conflicts resulting from the reinsertion and displacement process.

82. As one of the most important accomplishments of the Procuraduría: The National Attorney General, Edgardo José Maya Villazón, sent a letter to the Public Defender, Wolmar Pérez Ortiz, noting that in the voluntary statement proceedings taking place in Medellín and Barranquilla, the Ministerio Público became aware that many victims of these armed groups appeared before the Prosecutor without any legal representative. The Attorney General further noted that on repeated occasions he had reported this situation to the Public Defender or Ombudsman and he demanded that a working group be set up to represent victims and to advise and guide them in claiming their rights.

G. Public Defenders’ Office

83. The Public Defenders’ Office began to attend the voluntary statement proceedings, in compliance with Resolution 1113. This institution established a special unit to deal with issues related to the Justice and Peace Process.
84. The Defenders’ Office indicated that only seven demobilized combatants requested the assistance of a public defender. In those seven cases, the defenders were appointed. It is important to note that the Office of Public Defenders moved to select and train twenty (20) public defenders.

85. The Public Defenders’ Office has been advising individual victims through the sectionals and regionals. Through advisory services, it provides them with legal guidance in restitution of their property. Moreover, two victims’ assistance programs have been implemented, one in Oriente Antioqueño and the other in Montes de María, together with the “Territorial Networks” program, to make contact with the victims. One of the key functions was to explain the concept of full reparations and provide information on human rights and international humanitarian rights.

86. The Public Defenders’ Office has stated in official communications that the recruitment of minors is a crime against humanity that the paramilitaries should confess during their freely offered declarations, and that as there is no clear policy for handling the ex-combatant minors as victims, justice needs to be wrought in those cases. It also presented the National Plan to Search for Disappeared Persons to the public.

VII. Initiatives To Support The Communities As Part Of The Verification Process

87. The Mission has given priority in the regions to support for initiatives to assist the communities victimized by violence. These communities organized primarily on the basis of their natural leaders can and should play an important role in the reconstruction of the territories affected by violence.

88. In this context, support and training for the demobilized population in its reintegration into civilian life takes on special importance. Studies are being developed on issues related to international humanitarian rights, such as intra-urban displacement in communes. Along the same lines, the record of peaceful resistance of Arhuaca indigenous communities in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is being compiled to systematize among that indigenous group one of the most valuable experiences in this regard. Gender mainstreaming, consolidation and systematization of the experience of leaders using peaceful methods to resolve conflicts, and the strengthening of Colombian institutions all represent tasks to be done and fundamental challenges of the mandate.

89. These initiatives have helped bring the institutions closer to the communities. The natural potential of the communities should be valued and used to advantage, including their culture, history, and their memory. Thus, the communities and their leaders should be assisted and supported in any activities they are willing to undertake. In this way, their identity and their values are not violated, but rather based on them, their own capacity to solve problems, gradually linked to institutions, is strengthened.
90. Through support for local initiatives, the communities’ conflict resolution skills are being strengthened. The local people are beginning to take on greater responsibility for managing their situation and are making highly significant contributions to the peace process. Awareness and practice of human rights are a key part of this strengthening.

91. With regard to the experience of the Programa de Conciliadores en Equidad, it has become a space where citizen participation has become a reality. This is a valuable experience, which can serve as a basic for improving the justice system at a grassroots level in rural areas of Colombia. This program is one of the best examples confirming that it is possible and necessary to support the communities affected by violence. From this joint work of the Mission, the institutions, and the natural leaders of these territories, it is possible to build paths to peace, based on justice and reconciliation.

92. Building confidence in communities that were devoid of government support and the necessary institutions is one of the most important tasks of the Mission. In the period following demobilization and disarmament, marked by distrust and fear, international support plays an important role.

VIII. Conclusions

93. The spaces, opportunities, and challenges open to Colombian society and institutions following disarmament and demobilization of the AUC are enormous.

94. The drop in violence rates, the organization of victims seeking their rights to reparations, the incipient truth procedures, and the return of displaced communities are only a few of the major themes stemming from disarmament and demobilization.

95. Colombia is in a critical period. Either the State gradually consolidates its position in vast areas of the territory and thus in the struggle against illegality, or the violence is recycled in new forms and modalities.

96. The reintegration of the demobilized combatants, strengthening of the institutions, and support for the communities are responsibilities that must be acted on and supported by international assistance.

97. The phenomena of the regrouping and rearming of demobilized combatants should serve as a warning. Although it is true that the government forces have shown signs of determination to act against these illegal structures, greater and more forceful efforts are required.

98. The Colombian State is deploying considerable efforts to restore institutionality in the territories affected by violence. This progress must be supplemented with other basic institutions that gradually ensure the greater exercise of the rights of the communities.
99. The incipient application of the Justice and Peace Law opens up possibilities that are not exempt from dangers. The voluntary statements of the demobilized combatants generate expectations and open the way for progress in the judicial and social process of determining the truth. Over 40,000 victims throughout Colombia are ready to claim their rights. The judicial institutions are faced with a critical challenge.

100. The voluntary statements, especially by the demobilized leaders, have recently begun, and are expected to continue and be completed, overcoming the obstacles and difficulties that have delayed them. The victims have greater support and security to enable them to exercise their rights without threats and violence. The judicial institutions responsible for implementing the Justice and Peace Law are frequently working in precarious conditions, that jeopardize their work.

101. The dialogue that the Government is pursuing with the ELN, which has generated hope throughout Colombian society and in the international community, must be regarded as a substantive part of the process, involving the will of the Colombians to build the paths leading to justice, truth, and reconciliation.

102. The General Secretariat confirms its support for the peace initiatives of the Colombian government and people, and urges countries and international organizations to redouble their efforts to consolidate the goals achieved so far and the challenges stemming from them, especially support for judicial institutions, victims, the communities affected by the violence, and the efforts to engage in peace dialogues with other armed organizations operating outside the law.
Tenth Quarterly Report

OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)

October 29, 2007

Excellency:

I have the honor to address Your Excellency to forward the attached report, in accordance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397-04), whereby the Permanent Council resolved to “instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,” so that it may be presented orally at the next meeting of the Permanent Council.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency

Ambassador Rodolfo Hugo Gil Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Organization of American States
and Chair of the Permanent Council Washington, D.C.
I. Background

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “[t]o instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. Introduction

1. The demobilization and disarmament of self-defense groups have created a new scenario in Colombia, in which institutions face three fundamental challenges: a) the reconstruction of the State in certain regions and the weakening of illegal activity; b) the reintegration of former combatants, using a community approach that includes the towns were affected by the presence of paramilitaries; c) implementation of the Justice and Peace Law, which involves gradually uncovering the truth, seeking justice, reparations for victims, and opening up channels for reconciliation.

2. The Mission, within the framework of its work to verify the dismantling of the armed unit and monitor law and order, acknowledges the national government’s determination to combat emerging and lingering illegal groups, and the achievements of the government’s enforcement agencies in taking concrete action and strengthening their presence. However, the Mission is concerned with the increasingly noticeable presence of drug traffickers, their ability to reinvent themselves, and the persistent pall of illegality, which has a negative impact on the regions.

3. According to the verification work done by the MAPP/OEA former paramilitary commanders who did not respond to the government’s appeal continue to exert their influence and mid-level officers remain in hiding. The Mission is concerned about reports of the continued existence of chains of command whose goal is to continue to control illegal activities in their areas of operation. Worthy of note in this connection is the national government’s decision to transfer Carlos Mario Jiménez, a.k.a. “Macaco” or “Javier Montañes” to the maximum security prison in Cómbita and to take him off the list of candidates under the Justice and Peace Law, given his continued participation in illegal activities after his demobilization. To date, the facts and evidence that led to this decision have not been made public. The Mission awaits the outcome of the court case.

4. MAPP/OEA recognizes the government’s efforts to increase the visibility of law enforcement in the different areas of the country. However, in some parts of the spheres of influence of the demobilized self-defense forces, there is not much of a
law enforcement presence. In these regions, the guerillas are more visible and are carrying out concrete activities.

5. Reintegration has begun to take a new turn with the policy changes implemented by the Department for Reintegration (ACR). The Mission is heartened by the proposed intervention strategy but realizes that, in the medium term, they will have to overcome such hurdles as the lack of interest on the part of some local governments and poor institutional coordination; stigmatization of the demobilized population, which has an impact on social reintegration; the lack of motivation of former combatants as a result of the delayed implementation of the policy; scarce opportunities to find stable employment in regions where there is a large informal sector; inoperative productive projects; as well as as difficulties in ensuring the safety of demobilized individuals, who become victims of homicide and threats in a number of areas of the country.

6. Implementation of the Justice and Peace Law is at a crucial juncture. It requires a major commitment, coordinated participation of all the institutions involved, and the support of the international community. Within this framework, the 68,064 victims who have filed reports at the time of this writing, have legitimized the process and given it substantial social backing.

7. Two years since the start of implementation of the Justice and Peace Law, with the resulting institutional efforts to take the voluntary statements of demobilized forces, investigations, actions to compensate and follow-up with the victims, situations have arisen that cause uncertainty and could possibly compromise the gains made to date.

III. Rearmament Transactions: A Complex Framework Of Action For The Colombian Government

8. Drug traffickers saw the demobilization of the self defense groups as an opportunity to take control of the illegal crop zones and corridors. After the dismantling of the paramilitary units, organizations began to emerge that sought to maintain illegal influence over certain areas in which the government has not yet been able to fully re-establish its presence.

9. There is a clear relationship between illicit crop zones and corridors and the presence of rearmed remnants of units (see attached map). The emerging factions control the illegal crops planted in areas such as Sierra Nevada, Bajo Cauca, Alto Sinú and San Jorge (in Córdoba), in the south of Bolívar, near the Gulf of Urabá, in Vichada and Meta – Mapiripán; in the foothills of Caquetá, in Bajo and Alto Putumayo; as well as in the mountain zone and the Pacific coast of Nariño. They also control corridors linking the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as border areas.

10. These dynamics are driven by an adaptation process whereby some members of the dismantled United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) have joined private
armies that serve drug traffickers and are clearly mafioso in nature. A number of shifts are taking place that will move the phenomenon beyond the scope of MAPP/OEA, namely the dismantling of the armed unit of the self defense groups.

11. In the midst of the demobilization, there were often rumors about the arrival of the cartels in some regions. Based on a variety of information, while some units were dismantled, others took over areas formerly dominated by the self defense groups. This dynamic was called paramilitary “recycling” and raised serious doubts about the transparency of the process and effectiveness of demobilization and disarmament. The units split up and small armies underpinned by deadly structures emerged. MAPP/OEA observed this phenomenon, identifying more than 22 illegal units.

12. Politically, progress has been made in deligitimizing paramilitarism. To that end, although it is true that the mafiosi have gained ground with the consolidation of these illegal groups by maintaining some of the modus operandi of the self defense groups, one of the results of the process has been to deprive them of their political reason for being.

13. The temporary surge in violent actions in some regions has been related to disputes and vendettas within these new organizations, which have resulted in the assassination of the mid-level commanders and the death and displacement of the demobilized combatants. This happens in times of transition and ends when one of the rival gangs takes over the zone. The complex thing about this scenario is that although there are no permanent drastic changes in the level of violence, a tense calm can be perceived in the regions, with the active influence of the unlawful units, which continue to intimidate. The major combat zones include the cities of Santa Marta, Barranquilla and Cartagena (Bazurto market), with the neighboring municipalities of Turbana, Turbaco and Arjona, as well as in the department of Sucre, mainly in Sincelejo.

14. The Mission is worried about what is happening on the Atlantic coast, where there is growing influence of the “Twins” (the Mejía Múnera brothers were part of the demobilization process, but have since been excluded from the Justice and Peace Law). According to a number of sources, men and women have arrived from other parts of the country to take control of the territory. In the case of some towns in Santa Marta (Magdalena), the Mission has received reports of people coming in from Urabá and southern Bolívar, who are providing reinforcements for the unit created by the “Twins” that is in active conflict with the criminal gang the “Black Eagles.” In the capital Magdalena, in July, 29 persons were assassinated, 12 more than in the same month of 2006. In one of the most notorious incidents, a criminal gang using long-range rifles murdered five men and wounded five others.

15. In Bajo Cauca, after the demobilization of the self defense groups, the Mission observed the continued existence of an illegal armed unit led by members of the demobilized Central Bolívar Unit, whose activities centered on selling inputs and collecting coca base. In the first half of 2007, MAPP/OEA observed a critical
situation in the municipalities of El Bagre, Zaragoza, Cáceres and Caucasia, places where the practice of dismembering bodies and throwing them into the river has been recurrent. In July 2007, the Mission noted the disappearance of three people in Puerto Clavel in the El Bagre municipality; these people were later found dismembered on the bank of the river Nechi. Since this incident, law enforcement agencies have stepped up their presence in the area and have made progress with respect to law and order. The criminal gang now has a lower profile and merely marginal influence in urban helmets, where they pressure the population.

16. In Medellín, the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the self defense groups has had a very positive impact on the town. With prominent participation by the mayor’s office, the homicide rate was reduced from 98.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 to 29.4 per 100,000 in 2006. The homicide rate was even lower in the first half of 2007. However, the Mission has received reports of the emergence and persistence of criminal units with membership from among the demobilized and non-demobilized self defense forces and this has had a negative impact on some communities, in particular communes 1 and 8. A complex network involving gangs and combos continues to bring pressure to bear on some districts, controlling the illegal economy.  

1 The Mission is concerned about the reports regarding the influence of drug trafficking on this criminal network and its intention to increase its visibility in that town, as well as the impact that such a phenomenon could have on the spaces for community participation. MAPP/OEA acknowledges the efforts that the local government, police and public prosecutors are making to respond to this dynamic.

17. This scenario complicates the framework of action for government institutions. In the majority of areas of influence of the self defense groups, the Mission has noted the government’s efforts to gain ground, initially with law enforcement—the army, navy, and national police. However, despite stepping up its operations and strikes against the rearmed remnants of self defense forces, the capacity for reinvention and recruitment of these units, funded with resources from drug trafficking makes it possible for them to continue to exist.

1 This relates to the control of “vice spots,” confiscation and illegal sale of land, extortion of carriers and merchants, and illegal surveillance services.

2 A striking number of mid-level commanders were assassinated in Medellín and its environs in the past year.

3 Among the most significant persons captured by law enforcement was Jesús Ramos Alcázar, alias “44” or “Alfonso”, who was captured in May and seems to have been replacing the character known as “Rambo” in the Cesar department. Alcides de Jesús Durango, alias “René”, a fugitive from justice who appears to have been creating new armed groups in Urabá in Antioquia and Luis Carlos Rodríguez Rendón, alias “La Pizca”, former member of the Southeastern unit. Also detained in July was Puentes García Nólido Antonio alias “Pedro”, presumed head of “Los Rastrojos” in Nariño. Similarly, in the department of El Tolima, the police captured Antonio Mendoza Castillo, alias “Arturo”, who had apparently created a group of “Black Eagles” in the department. On the other hand, law enforcement has been conducting major operations in the municipalities in the south of Cesar, such as La Gloria, Aguachica and San Martín, where weapons from the new groups active in the region have been captured and seized. Finally, in the department of Nariño, particularly in the municipality of Cumbitara, different operations have been conducted, notably the clash in July between law enforcement officers and members of the “New Generation” gang.
18. Starting with key captures by law enforcement and the homicide of important mid-level commanders, and what the MAPP/OEA has verified, one can affirm that the lines of command of this type of organization are easily replaced. For this reason, although the army and the police have concentrated on operations against these factions, the results continue to be relative since the criminal organizations continue to be represented, albeit splintered, and still have the ability to rally around the drug trafficking economy.

19. Against this backdrop, law enforcement and the government’s security agencies propose to implement mechanisms for more appropriate action, which offer better responses to this complex scenario. The measures implemented include in particular greater coordination between the various institutions, different forms of intervention depending on the type of illegal force, strengthening of the police system with specialized squadrons, prevention of replanting crops in eradication areas, constant monitoring of illegal factions, and the security situation in regions where these factions are present. The MAPP/OEA stresses implementation of a permanent mechanism to follow up the issue by holding periodic meetings, which the Mission supports, with high-level representatives of government and state institutions. The Ministry of Defense, Attorney General’s Office, Office of the Department for Reintegration, the national police, army, Administrative Department for Security (DAS), the President’s Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Program participate in this mechanism, which is coordinated by the Office of the Vice President of the Republic.

20. In that connection, the MAPP/OEA later expressed to the highest government authorities its concern that the inclusion of former combatants in the network of cooperative forces might compromise the reintegration process. On June 25, 2007, the Minister of Defense issued a directive that supplements Directive No. 10 of 2006 giving instructions on the operation of the “Cooperative Network” program. This document states that “under no circumstances will demobilized persons be used as part of Cooperative Networks.” For the Mission, this decision constitutes a very important advance in delinking the former combatants from the government’s preventive security schemes and providing a more transparent process of reintegration into the communities.

21. Based on law enforcement monitoring, the Mission warns that the guerillas have become more visible in some regions that are part of the sphere of influence of the demobilized self defense groups, by strengthening militias and carrying out certain actions. In these areas, the incursion of these unlawful armed groups is happening gradually, with the collection of intelligence and construction of networks preceding a direct military offensive. This situation compromises the security of different communities that are afraid of the possibility of retaliation by guerilla groups. The areas most affected by this dynamic are:

- Southern Córdoba, on the outskirts of the Nudo de Paramillo area and Urabá in Antioquia; particularly the towns of Tierradentro and Juan José in the Montelibano
municipality, in the town of El Guadual de Valencia and in the town of Saiza in Tierralta.
- In the corridor leading from Tierradentro (Córdoba) to Caucana and Guaimaro, in the Tarazá municipality (Antioquia).
- Along the Dabeiba – Mutatá – Chigorodó route; and recently in the municipalities of Turbo and Apartadó.
- In Urabá in Chocó, the Ríosucio municipality and the border with Panama.
- In east Antioquia, the municipalities of San Carlos, San Luís, San Francisco, San Rafael, Cocorná, Granada, Sonsón, Argelia and Nariño.
- In the department of north Santander, the epicenters of the spread and armed conflicts are concentrated in the Catatumbo region in particular, and the routes linking Tibú with Convención and Sardinata with Ocaña.
- In the north of the Tolima department, in the municipalities of Anzoátegui, Venadillo, Santa Isabel and Libano. Similarly, in the municipalities closest to the route from Honda (Tolima) to Manizales (Caldas). The current warning is reflected in the possibility of a guerilla takeover of the municipalities of Villa Hermosa, Casablanca, Palocabildo and Herveo.
- The Túquerres-Tumaco axis in the Nariño department, and the municipalities of Mallama (Piedrancha), Ricaurte and Barbacoas.

The MAPP/OEA is also worried about the frequent reports related to civilian and military victims of antipersonnel mines.

22. In the second half of 2007, an event that merits special consideration in terms of law and order, namely the election of mayors, assemblies, councils, and administrative boards, took place on October 28. The Mission is concerned about the pressure that may be brought to bear on some of the candidates in those areas where the guerrillas and criminal gangs have a strong presence. In mid-July, the Human Rights Defender reported in a document prepared by the Early Warning System the existence of a group of more than 270 politicians and their families at risk. According to the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, of the 1,110 mayors, about 200 have been threatened. The government, for its part, has recognized that elections in 25% of the municipalities are at great risk in terms of law and order and that this percentage includes areas on the Caribbean coast and in the southeastern part of the country, in particular. Another 7% of the municipalities are at high election risk (fraud and other crimes against voting).

IV. New Horizons For Reintegration And Key Challenges

23. Reintegration has begun to have a new direction with the policy changes implemented by the Department for Reintegration (ACR), which has developed a national strategy that is slowly yielding results. Using a decentralized approach, the ACR has provided a National Network for Services of the Demobilized, made up of 37 Service Centers for the purpose of catering to demobilized individuals and their families. This approach is used to coordinate the delivery of different benefits
The Mission welcomes the fact that the Department is using a regional approach, which allows close cooperation and coordination with the local authorities and civil society organizations that have the capacity and can contribute to the reintegration of former combatants and to the construction of local reintegration plans. The Regional Monitoring Committees have been established using this approach.

The MAPP/OEA notes as an important advance the ACR’s intention to consider servicing the demobilized from different profiles, taking into account social and vocational conditions, and the demographic characteristics linking them to ethnic, age and gender-specific groups. The MAPP/OEA also stresses enhanced individual support, moving from one psychologist per 2,000 demobilized persons to one tutor per 120.

Humanitarian aid, currently called reintegration support, represents a fundamental change in reintegration. Demobilized forces used to receive a monthly payment without having to make a commitment. The framework for implementing the new policy generates a system of incentives, which establishes that the former combatants would receive support from the government as long as there are results and that they participate in the activities offered by the ACR.

After applying the different components of the strategy, as reported by the High Council, 99% of the population contacted obtained their proof of citizenship, 80% their criminal record, and 58% the military ID. In health, 78% of the beneficiaries are affiliated with the ARS. In terms of employment, 61% are working—mostly in the informal sector (63%). With respect to education, 35% of the population are engaged in studies and in job training, 65% of the demobilized have not yet started the training process.

The Mission considers the Department’s proposals to be sound. They should help overcome the challenging realities of the different regions, which are growing, after delays in the implementation of concrete measures. More than three and a half years after the start of the process of reintegrating the first self defense group, institutions face the huge challenge of restoring the confidence of communities that have been victims of violence and the confidence of the demobilized forces who took the decision to re-enter civilian life. Although reintegration should, in the long term, be viewed and positioned as a government policy, immediate issues require attention, in the context of open illegality, which creates incentives for recriminalization and seriously compromises the process.

In the majority of municipalities, the reintegration process started without regional or municipal participation. This explains the scant interest of the local governments, which saw the demobilized people as just another problem. This situation resulted in a lack of institutional coordination and the dearth of government and society stakeholders taking ownership of the process. This has been one of the fundamental obstacles, requiring measures that go beyond subcontracting.
government supply to involving civil society organizations and municipal and departmental authorities as key players. Only the experience of the Medellín Mayoral Peace and Reconciliation Program views the reintegration issue as one of the important items on the agenda of the authorities that will be elected in October.

30. The stigmatization of the demobilized population is one of the main obstacles to the reintegration process. Despite the fact that the vast majority of former combatants have returned to their communities and taken on the challenge of returning to civilian life, the participation of a minority in criminal activities has created a negative image, which has had an impact on their inclusion in the core of society, the family and the neighborhood. Based on this analysis, for the MAPP/OEA, the High Council’s community reintegration approach could help to change this situation and create an environment that is more conducive to returning former combatants to civilian life. To that end, the Mission considers it necessary to have more involvement of the business sector, which can offer job options to contribute to the inclusion of the demobilized persons.

31. The lack of motivation of the demobilized population is one of the strongest barriers to the implementation of reintegration policy. The shift of the Reintegration Program from the Ministry of the Interior to the Department created a lack of clarity and uncertainty that had a negative impact on the expectations of the demobilized and the communities themselves regarding the process. This situation is reflected in the initial resistance to participating in activities that do not yield a direct economic benefit, such as workshops on civic and psychosocial issues. The same happens with academic activities, which often have a low level of attendance. Against this backdrop, restoring the confidence of the participants is one of the key challenges for the ACR.

32. The creation of productive projects to date has proven not to be the best response to finding alternative jobs. This is the result of a lack of training and guidance about the formation of associations; the absence of agreements between the national government and the banks that facilitate the acquisition of credit; the lack of awareness of the agreements between the IOM and the Department; the uncertainty and delay of feasibility studies for such projects; the delay in procedures with responsible entities; as well as the legal problems that arise in accessing land. In addition, the framework of productive projects continues to have, with few exceptions, a rural approach that does not correspond to the urban nature of a large percentage of the demobilized self defense groups.

33. The security of the demobilized forces continues to be critical in several areas of the country, with the continued deaths of former combatants. According to the figures handled by the national police in 2007, 180 demobilized self defense group members were assassinated, the most critical months being January and June, with 31 deaths respectively. The situation is tenuous in areas where illegal units exist and emerging gangs clash, which include cities on the Atlantic coast, such as Barranquilla and Santa Marta, as well as the municipality of Aguachica in the south of Cesar.
34. Regarding the reintegration programs being implemented in the two main cities, the Medellín Mayoral Peace and Reconciliation Program has made substantial advances in the area of psychosocial support and academic training. However, there are still concerns about the connection of a segment of demobilized forces with criminal activities. This situation has been acknowledged by the local government; the Mayor Sergio Fajardo declared in July that "we are concerned that some of the reintegrated individuals are cheating the system. The trick is not that they have left the program to participate in illegal activities. The issue is that they have remained in the program and decided to continue living illegally and we cannot allow that." According to the mayor, approximately 10% of the individuals from Cacique Nutibara and Héroes de Granada gangs that were demobilized in this urban area decided to continue their unlawful activities.

35. In Bogotá there have been advances in the Mayoral and Department Program of Complementary Services for the Reintegrated Population. It is hoped that the ACR will link its actions with the work being executed by the local government, as well as available institutional offerings. The MAPP/OEA is concerned that an undetermined number of demobilized individuals are arriving in the metropolitan area and its surroundings without the proper follow-up and monitoring by the authorities. In Soacha in particular there is a “floating” population that moves to the city to receive services but is administratively a part of Bogotá, which is a problem for the Program.

V. Application Of The Justice And Peace Law: An Opportunity To Make The Change

36. The Justice and Peace Law emerged within the framework of the peace process for self defense groups, as a legal tool that provides a transitional justice system. In that regard, the law must be understood as the result of a political decision to opt for the establishment of special judicial mechanisms.

37. The Justice and Peace Law must represent for the Colombian government and public institutions an opportunity to advance towards new scenarios that make reconciliation and peace possible. To that end, it must be viewed as a transitional legal framework.

38. In a judgment of July 11, 2007, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice found that the activities carried out by former members of the self defense groups, described as conspiracy to commit a crime, could not be included in the “political crime of sedition.” Therefore the government submitted a bill to the Congress to include the Penal Code article describing the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime. The bill established that conspiracy to commit a crime would cover activities carried out by illegal armed groups to usurp the functions of law enforcement, to resist or confront organized armed groups operating outside the law and engaged in conduct that constitutes rebellion. It also states that the provision would not be applicable to persons who benefit from such acts to rise to public office or who are employed as civil servants while engaging in such activities.
39. A considerable number of demobilized persons are currently in legal limbo as the result of a process that has no stable normative framework. Government institutions are still discussing the nature of the crimes committed by these persons when they were members of the illegal units. Colombian government institutions must define the legal status of these people in order to prevent the risk of the AUC process having a negative impact on the achievements made to date.

A. The institutional response capacity of the entities involved in the peace and justice process

40. The MAPP/OEA points out the institutional response capacity of the entities involved in the peace and justice process has been inadequate. Given their characteristics, it was difficult to determine beforehand the possible number of beneficiaries in the different stages and components. This situation has meant that the entities repeatedly state that their main needs result from: a) insufficient human resources; b) the absence of effective schemes to protect victims and public officials; c) consolidation of the information system; d) the need to strengthen training programs, especially in practical subjects and in legal and psychosocial advice for victims; and e) scarce technical and logistical resources for the conduct of investigative work and the processing of evidence.

41. The National Justice and Peace Unit of the Attorney General’s Office has 23 prosecutors and 150 investigators. But, in order to function properly, the Attorney General stated that an additional 1,235 positions were required to process the large number of cases entrusted to it. To try these cases, the Ministry of Finance has provisionally assigned 80 billion pesos to the Attorney General’s Office until the Budget Law for 2008 is approved.

42. With respect to the human rights defender, one of the key aspects is the lack of resources. Although execution of the budget of the defender’s office for all of its activities and functions in 2007 is about 118 billion pesos, in the divisions, where most of the victims are, there are not sufficient funds budgeted for the defenders assigned exclusively to represent and advise victims. Regarding the Attorney General’s office, which requires approximately 20 additional positions for criminal prosecutors to assist the attorneys with the voluntary statement hearings. It is also necessary to preserve and take custody of the files.

The National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR) has increased its presence in the territories. To date, with five regional offices and plans to open others in territories, such as the departments of Bolívar, Valle del Cauca and Cesar. The Commission, as part of its outreach to the populations subject to violence, has held a large number of meetings with victims in the territories, has participated in the campaign to provide them with services, and has published a series of reports, documents, and recommendations.

The Ministry of the Interior and Justice chairs the Inter-institutional Coordination Committee, whose members include representatives or delegates from the various institutions involved in implementing the Justice and Peace Law. This Committee’s
function is to coordinate the activities inherent in the execution of the Justice and Peace Process with state-level entities engaged in that process.

43. Great strides have been made in the design and implementation of the inter-institutional information system on Justice and Peace. With the coordination of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), progress has been made in systematizing and consolidating the content of a single format for reporting criminal events. It is important to note that once the process of constructing the system is over, the Attorney General’s office will manage the system.

44. To date, four groups demobilized under the law have effectively surrendered their assets to the Victim Reparations Fund. However, only in one case have the acts of surrender been officially recognized. In that regard, the Fund’s Director has said that greater participation by the candidates is needed to process the asset forms. In addition, the majority of these assets are bogged down in embargoes, utility debts and taxes, which in many cases exceed the real value of the asset. Furthermore, the location of some of these assets, in areas that are difficult to access, makes their viability as reparation instruments doubtful.

45. In recent months judgments have been handed down from the higher courts on the issue of justice and peace. The Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the hearing bringing charges against Wilson Salazar Carrascal alias “El Loro” and ruled that the conspiracy to commit a and aggravated crime committed by the former members of the self defense groups should not be considered as a political crime of sedition.

B. Voluntary statements in the justice and peace process

46. To date, from a total of 2,914 demobilized individuals candidates for the Justice and Peace Law an initial 63 voluntary statements have been received. Based on these statements, other judicial processes have been initiated that could involve public officials and national and foreign private and public enterprises for suspected links with paramilitaries. Information has also been disclosed on extortion, drug trafficking, and on the regrouping of forces, while details have been provided on homicides, disappearances, kidnappings, and the location of mass graves. According to the Attorney General, between March 29, 2006 and May 5, 2007, 836 corpses were found in 698 graves, 298 of which have preliminary identification and 57 have been fully identified. In addition, some facts are being clarified about journalists, trade unionists, and indigenous people that were victims. Despite this, there are still concerns about the confession of the “whole” truth about the incidents and the persons involved.

47. The Attorney General’s office has examined 240,000 cases nationwide that are related to the investigations they are carrying out against the candidates under the

---

Law. To date, of the 2,914 candidates who appeared to give their voluntary statements, 2,183 have not yet had a preliminary investigation—25 of whom are members representing the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), of which 21 have been deprived of their freedom.

48. Regarding the participation of victims in the voluntary statement hearings, despite the regulations issued, some problems have arisen in their enforcement. These relate to: victims’ misinformation about the process; threats and intimidation; as well as some homicides; poor coordination between agencies responsible for guaranteeing the participation of the victims in the hearings; and insufficient economic resources for the victims to travel to the cities where the hearings are being held.

49. As presented at the hearings, the statements of the former commanders have been markedly political in nature. The Mission’s monitoring, attending over half of the voluntary statement hearings, shows that very few of the persons making statements directly face their responsibility for specific events, yet others prefer not to disclose names or institutions involved, and others claim they have forgotten.

50. A problem that consistently arises with respect to the voluntary statement hearings is the lack of security for the victims, perpetrators and justice officers—judges, prosecutors, investigators, and auxiliary personnel. In that regard, the victims are definitely the weaker and more exposed side of the equation. Several cases of intimidation, threats, and deaths have resulted in a marked scarcity of voluntary statements.

51. This insecurity is also affecting demobilized persons subject to the Law since fear prevents them from revealing more information that could compromise people, officials, institutions, members of the armed forces, and politicians from various areas of national public life. Some former commanders held at Itaguí have expressed concerns about the security of their families and themselves. There is concern about transfers to other detention centers and travel to the voluntary statement hearings. In that context, some persons have requested that the Mission accompany them to make their statements.

52. Similarly, the insecurity also affects agents of the justice system, who act in very difficult and complicated situations, without guarantees that provide them with sufficient calm to properly perform their functions.

53. The Mission has observed that the advertisement of the hearings is limited to the simultaneous broadcasting of the event in the adjacent chambers to a small number of victims, their representatives, members of the CNRR, government institutions, some NGOs, and the odd attendee from an international organization. This does not guarantee sufficient dissemination in terms of the right of victims to know the outcome. For that reason, the Mission has been amenable to broadcasting the voluntary statements in the remote municipalities of the three Justice and Peace cities—Bogotá, Medellín and Barranquilla. This initiative makes it possible for people, who do not have the resources to travel to the major cities...
where these proceedings are taking place, to hear the content of the voluntary statements.

C. The victims: context, organization, and expectations

54. Beyond the legal concepts and the formal definition of a victim used in the current rules, in the Mission’s opinion a number of factors influence the full understanding of the concept of a victim in Colombia. Irrespective of the meaning adopted, it is very important to understand that victims cannot be defined as a monolithic block. However, in some cases it is necessary to take their specificities into account with respect to three main points: context, organization, and expectations from the process.

55. A series of factors determine the context of the victims and therefore their decision and ability to participate in the process. In that regard, the threat and risk to the victim is an important but not the only element that influences the situation in the interval before it is submitted to the justice system. Institutional limitations are also part of the context, the attitude of officers of the law, and the degree of control the illegal armed group has managed to gain over the various entities.

56. It should be noted that Colombia is a country that is trying to negotiate a transition to a post-conflict situation in the midst of a conflict, which means that various protagonists continue to fight and take actions detrimental to the civilian population. The Mission has been able to verify the existence of over 22 rearmed remnants of units that still have a presence in the areas where the paramilitary groups operate. In these regions, the populations continue to be victims, thereby compromising their participation in the process.

57. The assassination of Yolanda Izquierdo, a top leader of the victims in the department of Córdoba, on January 31, 2007, showed that victims have no assurances of being able to participate actively in the process or claiming their rights. This had immediate negative repercussions since it intensified their fears and showed the limited capacity of the government to offer protection in certain areas. However, the MAPP/OEA noted that the organizations in the regions continued to claim their rights and even established new groups.

58. Despite the atmosphere of insecurity, it is admirable how the victims in certain areas have started to control their fears, become more visible and play an active role in implementing the Justice and Peace Law. This is reflected in their social consultations and victim services: more than 400 victims attended in Bajo Cauca, 500 in Necocli (Antioquia), in excess of 400 in Putumayo, 200 in Neiva (Huila), about 250 in La Dorada (Caldas), and 800 in Rionegro (Antioquia). In these

---

5 The Social Consultations and Victims' Days are activities organized by the CNRR to publicize the functions of this body within the framework of the justice and peace process, and to disseminate the rights of victims to truth, justice, and reparations. In addition, the Victims' Brigades are an activity organized by the National Unit of the Attorney General's Office for Justice and Peace, in a number of areas in the national territory, so that the victims can process the criminal acts report form and join the Justice and Peace Process.
territories, just a few years ago when the AUCs had a presence, such a high level of participation in a judicial process was inconceivable.

59. However, the threats to the victims continue. The MAPP/OEA has come to learn of these situations in Bajo Putumayo, in the municipalities of San Martín and San Alberto (Cesar); Valencia and Tierralta (Córdoba); Puerto Triunfo and Puerto Nare (Antioquia); in the urban sectors of Cúcuta (North of Santander), and in Tumaco (Nariño), among other municipalities.

60. The Mission is concerned about the case of Mrs. Maritza Salabarria, who is part of a family of 28 that turned to the government institutions after the paramilitary demobilization to claim a 110-hectare farm from which her family was displaced in 1992, when armed men made her husband disappear. The human rights defender and the MAPP/OEA accompanied the family on its return to the rural area of the Montería municipality in June 2006. It was again subject to threats, harassment, and the assumed forced disappearance of her brother, which led to their displacement and relocation once again. In mid-August, Mrs. Salabarria again received death threats close to her home. Under these dire circumstances, the decision was taken to provide her with police protection and organize her transfer to another region of the country.

61. To date, the issue of victim protection has been addressed by presenting a proposed map of risk and measures to protect victims and witnesses under the Justice and Peace Law. This initiative was coordinated by the National Planning Department (DNP), Directorate of Justice and Security (DJS), with the support of the Presidential Human Rights and International Humanitarian law Program, and discussed with the assistance of the entities responsible for and involved in the matter. The entity that will take responsibility for defining the different protection measures is still to be determined. The diagnostic study being carried out by the Attorney General’s Office on the situation of victims will be helpful here.

In that connection, it should be noted that on August 15, 2007, the Cundinamarca Administrative Tribunal ruled to protect the fundamental rights to life and personal integrity of the victims and witnesses under the Justice and Peace Law. The same ruling orders the Minister of the Interior and Justice and the Attorney General to design and execute, within the scope of their constitutional and legal authority, a victim and witness protection program under the Justice and Peace Law within 30 days of receipt of the order.

62. Regarding expectations, the process has opened a realm of possibilities in terms of truth, justice, and reparations, which is not always commensurate with institutional

---

6 Work was initially carried out with the Attorney General’s Office (FGN), in particular the Justice and Peace Unit and the Protection Program for Victims, Witnesses, and Judicial Officers; the Ministry of the Interior and Justice (MIJ); National Police (PONAL); and the Administrative Department for Security (DAS). The preliminary version of the proposal was then submitted and discussed with the Interinstitutional Coordination Committee for Justice and Peace and the National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR).
VI. Community Support Initiatives Within The Framework Of Verification

63. The Mission has prioritized six broad areas of work with the communities, within the framework of monitoring and strengthening local initiatives: a) Alternative Dispute Settlement Methods (ADSMs); b) seeking and generating confidence-building measures; c) reconciliation and construction of the social fabric; d) coexistence, re-encounters and historical memory; e) psychosocial support; f) cross cutting—human rights and international humanitarian law—and gender-specific issues. The implementation of the initiatives has built trust in the communities, strengthened institutions and brought the government closer to those areas where the State was not well represented—usually remote areas; establishment of spaces for reflection between victims and perpetrators; effective passing on of tools for identifying local problems, and for making significant contributions to restoring the historical memory of communities.

64. In the process of building closer ties with the communities, the Mission has learned important lessons through the testimonies of thousands of Colombians who face violence on a daily basis, sometimes alone, using their own tools, experiences and traditions. The Mission learned from the men and women who returned to La Gabarra (Tibú, Northern Santander) about their desire to return to their land and start over; from the Kankuamas women from the Sierra Nevada in Santa Marta, some of whose sons were dead or disappeared, yet they were firmly convinced that things could change; from the residents of Tierradentro (in Córdoba), which, despite the strong influence of illegal armed protagonists, embrace the possibility of moving forward, replacing the illegal crops, and reconstructing the social fabric; the Mothers of La Candelaria (communes in Medellín), who see in the justice and peace process a ray of hope.

65. The Mission has developed Alternative Dispute Settlement Method training activities with community leaders in the regions of Apartadó, Cúcuta and Montería. It has made it possible for municipal spokespersons to disseminate the ADSMs and analyze specific cases in the Bucaramanga region, and has promoted the role of conciliators, targeting conflict prevention and dispute settlement.

66. The creation of safe spaces from and institutional/community perspective has led to a series of activities to get closer to communities where the State’s presence has been weak, namely Las Mercedes, North Santander; promotion of institutional
representation in the districts of the Medellín Communes (e.g., Santo Domingo Sabio); strengthening of community leadership through training actions (e.g., the initiative to train leaders in Apartadó (Urabá in Antioquia); creation of an “Inter-institutional victim desk” in Medellín; joint work between communities in the districts and institutions (e.g., the mutual coexistence agreements in Medellín); and the promotion of the inter-institutional coordination desk in the context of implementing the Justice and Peace Law (meetings with municipal representatives in Bucaramanga and Cúcuta).

67. Reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric has created spaces where natural and demobilized leaders could emerge in Urabá in Antioquia; identifying experiences with contributions to reconciliation through the daily activities of women (the “Todas Somos Mujeres” imitative in Valledupar); work on reintegrating youth who have served prison sentences by training them in peace issues and making them “leaders for peace“(“Crime does not pay” initiative in Medellín); work with vulnerable youth from schools in the communes of Medellín; promotion of a culture of peace in the towns affected by the conflict (communities in San Pablo and La Gabarra in El Catatumbo).

68. In respect of historical memory, the Mission is working on a project with the Arhuaca indigenous community documenting their peaceful resistance for dissemination; in the Aranjuez district and areas adjacent to Commune 4 in Medellín; work on the urban conflict taking place since the 80s; as well as the processes coming out of the barrios of Medellín aimed at creating a meeting space, peace dialogues for mutual coexistence (monitoring of the “Mutual coexistence Table” from Commune 4 in Medellín).

69. It is important to note that the MAPP/OEA is developing activities in communities with victims of violence, monitoring victims’ associations, such as Mothers of La Candelaria and State institutions with responsibility for implementing the law as legal representatives, the Attorney General’s Office, and the CNRR.

70. The Mission is paying special attention to the demobilized forces being reintegrated into civilian life, the processes for establishing leaders, and the tracking and monitoring of community processes. The MAPP/OEA has worked on training 60 demobilized leaders (leader training initiative in Apartadó), and has participated in awareness raising activities and coordination with institutions in the city of Medellín.

VII. Conclusions

1. The Follow-up Committee that advises the Vice President of the Republic is a highly important body for analysis and decision-making regarding the major issues addressed in the Mission’s reports.

2. The participation in this Committee of the Ministry of Defense, the Attorney General’s Office, the Department for Reintegration, the National Police, the army,
the Administrative Department for Security Services (DAS), and the President’s Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Program makes it the most representative body of the Colombian Government and State for monitoring and dealing with key issues following the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

3. In the most recent reports, the Mission has argued the need to focus on three fundamental issues in particular: (a) reintegration of former combatants into society; (b) recovery by the State of those parts of its territory under the influence of illegal groups; and (c) the Justice and Peace Law.

4. The announcement of the implementation of the new policy toward the demobilized former combatants and the first actions taken in accordance with that policy are encouraging developments, which deserve the utmost support. Their success will, to a large extent, repair the social fabric and deprive criminal gangs of most of their manpower.

5. Resolute actions against the gangs emerging since the demobilization of the AUC, the greater presence of State institutions, and the confidence they generate in the civilian population are vital. They, in turn, depend on institutions, which need to be vigorously promoted.

6. Also encouraging is the news about the strengthening of the Justice and Peace Unit in the Attorney General’s Office, in terms of the number of both prosecutors and investigators. It comes at a crucial time in the implementation of this law and should boost the conviction that Colombia cannot afford to fail in this area.

7. The communities beset by violence, social organizations, the Justice and Peace institutions, and much of the international community are calling for protection, support, and active solidarity with the victims. This, still pending, task is particularly important and urgent. The nearly 70,000 victims clamoring today for truth, justice, and reparation represent one of the most important commitments facing institutions today. The mandate of the CNNR (National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission) is, in this respect, sufficiently broad and its implementation deserves the utmost support.

8. Dealings with the AUC have also been marred by a degree of legal insecurity. The recurrent crises undergone by the process testify to that fact. That is a core concern of the Mission. The importance of the disarmament and demobilization of the AUC for peace in Colombia and the possibilities and opportunities they have triggered are obvious. The solidarity of the Hemisphere and increasing support for the Mission from European countries are a reflection of that potential.

9. Only Colombian institutions are competent to determine the nature and contents of the legal framework for dealing with the AUC. Nevertheless, by virtue of its mandate, this Mission is responsible for pointing out the importance of the security of the legal framework determined by Colombians for those highly complex
processes. On that legal security depend, to a large extent, the viability and success of the process.

10. The commitment of the OAS to Colombia is more evident and resolute than ever. The dialogues with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the exhortation to return the bodies of the Del Valle legislators and members of the security forces who died in captivity to their families merit the support and solidarity of this Mission. The peace agenda of the Colombians – especially at these crucial times – calls for much more robust efforts by all of us.
Volume I. Periodic Reports of the Secretary General
Volume I

(2004-2007)

The MAPP/OAS was created in 2004 to support the peace process and monitor the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, demobilization and disarmament, and reinsertion initiatives of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

The beginning of the Mission's operations, its approach to different institutional sectors and communities, as well as the dissemination of its mandate, occurred at the same time the peace process of that moment was taking place and the experiences of the communities to overcome the effects of the internal armed conflict were being described.

Through these tasks, the MAPP/OAS began to accumulate knowledge and understanding of the actors and realities in the regions and also to build confidence, experiences and portray itself as a mission oriented to the territories.

The first 10 periodic reports of the Secretary General of the OAS to the Permanent Council described the progress and challenges that the AUC demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process represented for the country between 2004 and 2007. They also discussed the Mission's contribution to creating safe environments in the territories and developing key strategies to preserve the life of the communities it accompanied through dialogue and good offices.

The permanent accompaniment until the demobilization of the last block of the AUC in 2006, allowed making statements in 2007 about the progress made at the time and warning of the reconfiguration of the illegal dynamics, which posed great challenges for the achievements earned around the construction of peace.