EIGHTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OEA)
I. BACKGROUND

This quarterly report of the Secretary General on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) is submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in compliance with resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Council resolved “[t]o instruct the Secretary General to provide quarterly reports to the Permanent Council on the work of the MAPP/OEA and its continued ability to contribute, through its work in Colombia, to the fulfillment of the values and principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

II. INTRODUCTION

MAPP/OEA

Since the Seventh Report to the Permanent Council was submitted, MAPP/OEA has made considerable progress in its post-demobilization verification tasks (verification of the dismantling of military units and their reintegration, as well as follow-up with respect to public order), of support for the communities, and of monitoring and follow-up regarding the enforcement of the Ley de Justicia y Paz [Justice and Peace Law]. The strengthening of the Mission and the consolidation of its tasks have been obtained thanks to the very positive response of the Member and Observer States to the request made by the Secretary General to increase support for MAPP/OEA.

The support of the Friends of the OAS Peace Mission in Colombia, which includes Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States, has been of particular importance.

The significant contribution of financial resources provided by the Government of Spain (through its Council of Ministers and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, AECI), over the quarter covered by this report, is particularly noteworthy, as well as the important donation by the Government of the United States and the contribution of the Government of Norway.

The commitment of the Government of Holland, principal donor of resources to MAPP/OEA since the Organization began its work in Colombia, should be noted.

The Government of Sweden has maintained its commitment to the Mission, through generous funding and by providing an expert in Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration and a specialist in working with nongovernmental organizations. The Government of Sweden also reported that it is prepared to earmark an annual sum in support of the Mission.

The Government of Canada has also been an active partner in financing the Mission since 2005, and it is hoped that this valuable support will continue.
Along the same lines, the Secretary General highlights the generous contributions, of great value to the Mission, made by The Bahamas, Ireland and Thailand.

The donation of vehicles and computer equipment last year by the Republic of Korea constituted a substantial contribution to the work of MAPP/OEA.

The Secretary General also wishes to thank the Governments of Mexico and Brazil for their valuable support in financing the participation of experts in various fields, including human rights, social affairs, diplomatic relations, and public safety. In this respect, the Government of Guatemala has informed the General Secretariat that it has appointed a Guatemalan professional to be a member of the Mission. The Government of Chile has decided to support the Mission by providing an official who is an expert in verification.

The municipal government of Medellín, under an agreement signed with the Mission, has provided the funds to incorporate a team of six social workers to strengthen the Mission’s activities in the city’s neighborhoods. The regional office in Medellín now has a solid team more proportionate to the challenges in that region of the country.

All of this support has enabled the Mission to increase its presence, with its 34 international verifiers from 16 countries, 17 local professionals, and 43 individuals providing temporary assistance and 9 social workers, comprising in total 103 participants in Colombia, 42 percent of them women.

Following a commitment to this effect of the Secretary General, MAPP/OEA carried out the first printing and distribution of the *Basic Manual for the Performance of the Functions of the Mission*. The first Seminar on Methods of Verification was held in October, with the participation of all the coordinators, verifying officials and national support personnel. This constituted a necessary and favorable setting to gain greater depth regarding the different policies contained in the Mandate, as well as to review and unify the Mission’s work methods. It is important to add that this meeting was attended by an official of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), who explained the inter-American system of human rights’ operation to the Mission’s officials.

In addition to the above, the Government of Colombia has expressed its wish to extend the Mission’s mandate, provided for in the January 23, 2004 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on Monitoring the Peace Process in Colombia.

On November 28, in Bogotá, Colombia, MAPP/OEA presented to donor and other friendly countries the Mission’s plan of action for the next three years. This plan of action, prepared by the Mission’s team, was approved by the Secretary General and submitted to the Colombian authorities.

It should be mentioned that the Mission, pursuant to its Mandate, has included in its work a cross-cutting approach with respect to gender, children’s rights, respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities, both regarding displaced populations and communities that have received former combatants. Within this framework, the IACHR has undertaken the

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1. MAPP/OEA has international verifiers from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.
coordination of the training program for MAPP/OEA officials, which is scheduled to begin on March 19, 2007.

THE PEACE PROCESS

Within the period covered by this report, significant progress has been made in the process of rapprochement between the ELN and the National Government. The fourth formal exploratory round took place in October in Havana, Cuba. Canada, Italy, Holland, Japan, and Sweden participated as observers; Norway, Spain and Switzerland participated as monitors; Cuba and Venezuela participated as supporting countries.

In a joint communication, the parties found a positive balance to the process thus far for the continuation of the process and approach towards a “basic agreement” to close the formal exploratory dialogues. Subsequently, the ELN unilaterally announced before a civil society facilitating National Commission to actively participate in demining activities.

After a period in which the Government and the FARC came closer together regarding humanitarian exchange, a series of incidents changed the dynamics of the negotiation, distancing the parties. In this new context, the Government revoked the authorization granted to the Peace Commissioner to meet with the FARC in a meeting zone.

In the quarter covered by this report, the demobilization process of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) [United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] was declared to have concluded, following 38 ceremonies in which 31,689 troops of this irregular armed force participated. The last demobilization took place on August 15, 2006, with the Frente Norte Medio Salaquí [Salaquí Middle Northern Front] or Frente Chocó [Chocó Front], an integral element of the Bloque Élmer Cárdenas (BEC) [Élmer Cárdenas Front]. The only group that participated in the Ralito peace dialogue and did not demobilize was the Frente Cacique Pipinta [Chief Pipinta Front], and it remains active.

In its verification work, MAPP&OEA has found violations to demobilization commitments as well as regarding the dismantling of units. The Mission notes with concern that rearming may be possible, the existence of non-demobilized holdouts and the appearance of other armed groups, especially within the zone of influence of the demobilized Bloque Norte [Northern Bloc], which was then under the command of “Jorge 40” and in some departments [provinces] where the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) [Bolívar Central Bloc] was carrying out operations. MAPP-OEA has identified 22 units, with the participation of middle-ranking officers–demobilized or not–the recruitment of former combatants of the self-defense forces, and the control over illicit economic activity. Despite the efforts on the part of the Colombian government, the Mission also notes that most of the groups reported on in the Sixth and Seventh reports continue to operate and some of them are, in fact, expanding.

In addition, a detailed analysis of institutional coverage of reintegration continues to show, in general, difficulties to serve the entire demobilized population. This is particularly true for the areas of psycho-social support, in education, and in links to jobs. Because of this, it can be said that, despite efforts made over the past months, the Program for Return to Civilian Life (Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil) has not managed to fulfill its promise, which in turn risks the long term viability of the peace process.
The Mission views the creation of the *Alta Consejería para la Reintegración Social y Económica de Personas y Grupos Alzados en Armas* [Office of the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups] as highly positive: it creates a space to articulate institutional efforts and to promote effective solutions for the reintegration of former combatants. However, the urgent need to initiate operations in those areas with the highest number of demobilized people should be also stressed.

In November 2006, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice began a formal investigation of a group of members of Congress suspected of aggravated criminal conspiracy to promote and finance paramilitary groups.

In addition, at the beginning of December 2006, former commanders of the AUC held in the penitentiary of La Ceja were moved to the maximum security prison of Itagüí, in Antioquia. After a period of alienation between the former commanders and the National Government caused by this move, both parties reinitiated talks on January 3, 2007. On this date, in the Itagüí prison, the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups, Frank Pearl, met with the former commanders. MAPP/OEA expressed at this time its concern over this alienation, and expressed its wish to continue to facilitate dialogue and a bringing together of the parties in order to consolidate efforts towards a lasting peace in the country.

The General Secretariat reiterates that the success and sustainability of the peace process will depend on:

1. The attention paid to communities affected by violence;
2. Official recovery of the territories over which illegal groups have held sway;
3. Effective reintegration of demobilized combatants; and
4. The pursuit of truth, justice, and reparations.

III. THE DEMOBILIZATIONS OF THE AUC AND THEIR DISARMAMENT

The process of concentration, disarmament, and demobilization of the military units of the self-defense forces was declared to be concluded on August 15, 2006, with the demobilization, in the Unguía (Chocó) Municipality, of the Salaquí Middle Northern Front, or Chocó Front, which belonged to the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc. Altogether, in its three phases, the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc demobilized 1,538 members of the self-defense forces, 45 of which were women.

During the entire process that began on November 25, 2003, with the demobilization of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, and that ended on August 15, 2006, there were 38 demobilization ceremonies in which 31,689 members of this irregular armed group participated (see Annex A). The greatest number of members came from the Bolívar Central Bloc, with 6,348; the Northern Bloc with 4,760; the Mineros Bloc with 2,780; the Héroes de Granada Bloc with 2,033, and the Élmer Cárdenas Bloc with 1,538. It should be highlighted that 22,962 members belonged to nine units, or 72.4% of the total number of those demobilized.
The MAPP/OEA participated actively and visibly in 36 demobilization ceremonies, including the security unit of the Temporary Relocation Zone [Zona de Ubicación Temporal, ZUT] in Santa Fe de Ralito, also known as the “Security Ring.”


The participation of women in the self-defense forces was decreased, as was their number in positions of relative importance and responsibility. The percentage of women referred to is in the order of 6.03%, or 1,913 women demobilized.

The Cacique Pipinta Front, FCP, which was part of the Bolívar Central Bloc, participated in the process but did not complete the stage of concentration, disarmament, and demobilization. The dismantling of this unit was programmed for December 15, 2005, along with the Héroes y Mártires de Guatica Front; however, the members of this group did not arrive to the temporary relocation zone provided by the Government.

An account of the weapons handed over by the different demobilized units shows that 31,689 men surrendered 18,024 weapons, a ratio of one weapon per two combatants (see Annexes A and B).

**Destruction of weapons**

The MAPP/OEA finds that the directives given by the National Government to initiate the process of inspection and registration of the war materiel surrendered by the self-defense forces in the peace process, as a first step towards its destruction, is a positive development. The month of December 2006 has been established as the time period for the registration of all the weapons surrendered into custody. The Mission has monitored this procedure and the technical work of the different institutions involved, in the same way it did in Montería (Córdoba), Medellín (Antioquia) and Urabá (Antioquia).

The General Secretariat received a note from the Colombian Government requesting technical and financial support for the destruction of the weapons. To this end, the Humanitarian Demining Section of the Department of Public Security made its first visit to the country to begin its support of MAPP/OEA and the Colombian authorities in the destruction of more than 18,000 weapons. Following this preliminary contact, a team from the Humanitarian Demining Section

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2. In this instance several units of the self-defense forces participated, guaranteeing the first level of security for the Ralito Dialogue, established by the parties on July 1, 2004.

3. On May 22, 2006, the Government, by executive decrees Nos. 118 and 119 established a Temporary Relocation Zone in the vereda of El Tambor, in the Municipality of La Merced, Department of Caldas. In addition, Pablo Hernán García Sierra was recognized as representative for the demobilization. However, for the second time the demobilization was not carried out. This unit, under the command of the Bloque Central Bolívar [Bolívar Central Bloc], exercised its influence in the area limiting the departments of the coffee-growing axis (Risaralda, Caldas, and Antioquia).

4. Office of the General Prosecutor of the Nation, with its Technical Investigation Corps (CTI), General Command of the Armed Forces (National Army and Navy), Office of the Attorney General, National Police, Inter-Institutional Group of Anti-terrorist Analysis (GIAT), Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP).
traveled to Bogotá from December 4 to 8 to assist in the development of a national plan and to identify specific requirements regarding technical and financial assistance from the OAS and the international community. It is expected that these activities will begin in January of 2007.

IV. VERIFICATION OF THE DISMANTLING OF AUC UNITS.

In its work on verification, the Mission has identified 22 new units with approximately three thousand members, part of whom had belonged to the self-defense forces. There are indications of possible rearmament in the case of 8 of these units, placing their cases on alert status. The remaining 14 cases have been fully verified by the Mission. It is noteworthy that the MAPP/OEA has observed that the groups that appeared after the AUC demobilizations and also stemmed from the holdouts that were not dismantled, have recruited individuals who were in the process of reintegration; however, only part of their members are demobilized combatants.

In the Seventh report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the MAPP/OEA, six cases of rearmament were identified, the majority of which remain active, except for the holdouts found in Córdoba; these have fallen back following operations of the Security Forces. The Mission has followed up on these processes, concentrating its work in some critical zones, in compliance with its task of verifying the real dismantling of the demobilized armed units.

In specific zones there have been situations arising of possible rearmament and the appearance of other armed groups claiming to be the “new generation of paramilitaries.” During the quarter covered by this report, the Mission has observed the development of these units, and has verified their appearance and growth, particularly in the zone of influence of the demobilized Northern Bloc, which was under the command of “Jorge 40.” The MAPP/OEA has encountered a worrisome situation in the south of César and in adjacent territories. The Mission has received information regarding one concrete instance of rearmament, which has allowed the persistence of a command structure with middle-ranking officers. In places such as Magdalena, Guajira, Atlántico, and César, the MAPP/OEA does not find that there has been a true disarmament; the self-defense forces maintain their influence, and there is the serious suspicion that some public institutions are permeable to it.

It is important to reiterate that the appearance of these new armed units is not a homogenous phenomenon since, according to what the Mission has verified and to statements by local authorities and sectors of the civilian population, these cases are characterized by the mixing of diverse forces and interests stemming from different sectors operating illegally. Hence, a single explanation cannot be used to account for them.

The Colombian Government has recognized this new phenomenon, giving it the name of “newly emerging gangs,” and has declared a head-on struggle against them. This has been evidenced by a series of Security Forces operations causing damage to some of these units. Despite the government’s efforts, the situation of the zones where now demobilized self-defense forces used to operate continues to be a complicated one. The populations of zones such as Putumayo, Arauca, Nariño, Urabá in El Choco, Norte de Santander, the Pacific coast of Valle del Cauca and southern César, do not perceive an improvement in security conditions, and the presence of state institutions continues to be weak. This makes incursions by illegal armed groups possible, as well as the existence of illegal units and the persistence of illicit economic activities.
Within this context, the discovery by the security forces of caches of arms not surrendered by some demobilized AUC blocs is a matter that alarms and concerns the Mission. In this respect, both verification and the necessary investigations by the competent authorities must be strengthened. The Mission has received information from the Security Forces on the finding of arms belonging to the demobilized Self-Defense Forces, involving the seizure of arms and the finding of caches, in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Caldas, Casanare, Cesar, Chocó, Magdalena, Meta, Santander, Tolima and Valle del Cauca. Although these findings are not voluminous, the caches found in the zone of influence of the Northern Bloc—especially César and Magdalena—are noteworthy for their ammunition and weapons, as well as for the number of support weapons, all of which coincides with the fact of it being one of the zones with more rearmed units and non-demobilized holdouts.

Regarding the findings of the Mission’s verification work, the Mission has identified instances of rearming in ten departments: Guajira, Cesar, Atlántico, Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Córdoba, Tolima, Casanare, Caquetá and Nariño. The MAPP/OEA also sounds the alert on possible instances of rearming in César, Magdalena, Sucre, Antioquia, Meta, Nariño, and Putumayo.

**Verified Cases of Rearmament**

**Guajira**

In the follow-up to verification of rearmament in this department, the existence of a presumably non-demobilized holdout group in Alta Guajira has been confirmed, specifically in the rural area of the Municipality of Uribia. This unit is composed of around 70 members; they wear camouflage uniforms and carry side arms, and long and support weapons. Their actions have been oriented to displace the indigenous communities that inhabit the region, in order to solidify their dominance in the zone, which in turn is linked to control over illicit economic activities.

The Mission received information in the municipalities of Riohacha and Maicao about a unit of approximately 30 men, made up of demobilized members of the AUC, non-demobilized paramilitaries, gangs of hired assassins, and common criminals. They control social dynamics using selective violence, extortion, threats, forced displacement, and homicide. Some of its members have been captured by the security forces.

The Mission has also verified the existence of an armed unit of about 60 men, including demobilized middle-ranking officers of the *Frente Contrainsurgencia Wayuu* [Wayuu Counterinsurgency Front] of the Northern Bloc in the Municipality of Dibulla. This zone has access to the sea and borders the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. They operate with long weapons in the foothills of the Sierra, while in *corregimientos* [a territorial subdivision] such as Río Ancho, Migueo, and Palomino, they wear civilian clothing and, carrying side arms, patrol the streets in vehicles, thus maintaining their control over the zone.

**César**

The Mission was able to verify that a unit of approximately 50 demobilized men of the former Mártires de Valledupar Front of the Northern Bloc has managed to keep the *modus operandi* of the AUC in the Municipality of Valledupar. According to information received, moreover, the command structure of the front has remained the same, even after demobilization. This group controls social dynamics using threats, extortion and homicide with side arms.
Likewise, in the municipalities of Jagua de Ibirico, Becerril, and Codazzi, there is a unit comprised mainly of demobilized combatants of the Resistencia Motilona Front of the Northern bloc, led by a middle-ranking officer of the front. This unit, whose members wear civilian clothes and carry out their patrols using side arms, obtains its resources blackmailing the civil population. It has between 100 and 150 men.

In the south of César, in the municipalities of Pelaya, Tamalameque, Pailitas, Curumani and Chiriguana, the existence of illegal armed units, located in strategic corridors linked to illicit economic activities, was verified. This unit is made up of approximately 200 men, including demobilized combatants and non-demobilized paramilitaries, led by middle-ranking officers of the Resistencia Motilona Front of the Northern Block. In the city center they operate carrying side arms, and in the rural area they wear camouflage uniforms and use long weapons. The unit has also written graffiti and distributed pamphlets referring to actions of social cleansing.

**Atlántico**

In the department of Atlántico different illegal sectors have come together: demobilized persons of the AUC, non-demobilized combatants, gangs of hired assassins and common criminals. They have formed an illegal unit that exerts its influence over the population. They control social dynamics using threats and homicides carried out with side arms. It has an estimated 60 members. Their territory of operation is the areas crossed by the highways leading from Barranquilla to Puerto Colombia, Suan, and Luruaco. Their operations are concentrated in the municipalities of Soledad, Malambo, Luruaco, Sabanalarga, and Baranoa.

**Norte de Santander**

The MAPP/OEA has confirmed the growth of an armed unit in the Department of Norte de Santander, as was related in the VI and VII reports of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council, in several *corregimientos* of Cúcuta, Tibú, Villa de Rosario, Puerto Santander, Sardinata, Los Patios, Ocaña, El Carmen, La Esperanza, Convención, and Abrego. The Mission is concerned that the unit has solidified, growing to approximately 300 to 400 men. It includes demobilized combatants of the Catatumbo Bloc, non-demobilized paramilitaries, and other illegal groups. Although the security forces have carried out operations against the unit, capturing some of its members and destroying laboratories for narcotics processing that were under its protection, this unit remains active.

**Bolívar**

The Mission has also confirmed the persistence of an armed unit, made up of demobilized and non-demobilized combatants of the Defensores de San Lucas Front, of the Bolívar Central Bloc, in the municipalities of Barranco de Loba – with influence over Hatillo de Loba. This unit, wearing civilian clothes and carrying side arms, has increased its number by recruiting demobilized combatants. According to estimates, it could have as many as 50 men. The unit’s objective is to exercise a monopoly over illicit economic activities; to achieve this, it threatens, displaces, and kidnaps members of the population.
Córdoba

The Mission has ascertained that the armed units operating in the southern part of the Department of Córdoba, in the municipalities of Tierralta and Montelíbano, have reduced their number to approximately 50 men, and the coercive actions against the population have also diminished. Joint operations carried out by state security organs have been positive in that they have managed to thwart the growth of these groups. However, their *modus operandi* has gone back to being low-profile, using civilian dress and side arms, radio communication, and motorcycle transportation.

Tolima

In the Department of Tolima, after the demobilization of the Tolima Bloc, a new unit appeared, made up of demobilized combatants and non-demobilized paramilitaries, calling itself the “Pijao Bloc.” They operate in small groups of no more than 10 people, carry out extortions, use light weapons, and have been accused of kidnapping and homicide. In the Municipality of Ibagué, security forces have arrested and charged several members of this organization.

Casanare

The case of rearmament in the Municipality of Paz de Ariporo constitutes a matter of special attention for the Mission, considering that the unit has approximately 200 men, a large part of who are demobilized combatants of the Centauros Bloc. The members of this group wear camouflage uniforms, carry long weapons, threaten, and blackmail the region’s cattle ranchers. It should be noted that army operations against this unit in the Department of Casanare have caused it to move to Casanare’s border with the Department of Vichada.

Caquetá

In the Municipality of Milán, *corregimiento* of San Antonio de Getuchá, the Mission has verified the existence of a military unit led by a middle-ranking demobilized officer of the Sur de los Anaquies Front of the BCB. They control some illegal economic activities in the zone, blackmail merchants, carry long weapons and also use side arms; they wear camouflage uniforms. Made up of approximately 50 men, they maintain social control over the community. On October 21, in the Municipality of Valparaíso, army units engaged in combat with the irregular unit, killing two of its members, one of whom was the main commander.

Nariño

The MAPP/OEA has confirmed the growth of an illegal armed unit named “Nueva Generación” (ONG) [New Generation], as was described in the VI and VII reports of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council. This unit has solidified its control over the communities formerly under the influence of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc (BLS) of the BCB, in municipalities such as Andes-Sotomayor, Cumbitara, Policarpo, Leyva and El Rosario. Information received indicates that the group could have around 300 men operating in the region.
The unit is made up of non-demobilized middle-ranking officers of the BLS, demobilized combatants, and recruits. In urban centers they have informants dressed as civilians. They control the population’s movements using check points on highways, at which they charge money to carriers, threatening them with side arms and long weapons. In rural areas they wear camouflage uniforms, bracelets with an ONG insignia, and they patrol carrying long weapons.

This unit has carried out operations against the population, such as extortion, selective murders, rape, and threats. It is important to note that during the months of September and October they have engaged in combat against Front 29 of the FARC. These combats have caused massive displacement of the inhabitants of the corregimientos of San Roque, Remolino Baja Patía and Naranjo, in the Municipality of Policarpa, and in the vereda [rural subdivision of a municipality] of Llana Sara, which belongs to the Municipality of cumbitara. These village areas have been depopulated for fear of crossfire.

**Rearmament Alerts**

**César**

The Mission has received information describing an armed unit mostly comprised of demobilized combatants from the Northern Bloc, who are operating in the Municipality of Pueblo Bello. The unit has approximately 70 men, dresses in camouflage uniforms, and is recruiting new members. They are suspects of extortion and homicide against the civilian population and other demobilized combatants.

**Magdalena**

There have been reports of a unit of approximately 150 men carrying long weapons, many of them demobilized combatants of the Northern Bloc, in the municipalities of Ariguani, Sabanas de San Angel, Plato, Pivijay, and Chivolo. This unit is reportedly achieving social control in the zone using threats and extortion. Moreover, some displaced persons who, after the demobilization, tried to return on their own to their lands have been intimidated and forced to leave once more.

**Sucre**

The MAPP/OEA has received information on a unit in the Department of Atlántico whose objective is presumably to achieve the economic and political control that was exercised by the demobilized Montes de María Bloc. This organization has apparently contacted persons who managed the bloc’s finances in the zone as well as persons and institutions that had been the victims of extortion, in order to seize these resources. This in turn presumably had caused a dispute among demobilized combatants, resulting in several homicides. It is important to note that inhabitants of the Municipality of San Onofre held a march and a public ceremony expressing their repudiation of any actions and attempts to achieve control on the part of any paramilitary group in their region.

**Santander**

The Mission received information in the municipalities of San Vicente de Chucuri and El Carmen on a unit of approximately 15 members, including demobilized combatants of the Ramón Dávila Front of the Puerto Boyacá Bloc, and Hernando Rodriguez Zárate, a.k.a. “Volunto,” a known
paramilitary who has not demobilized as the unit’s commander. This unit apparently operates in civilian dress and has carried out criminal acts such as extortion and robbery, using long weapons. Security forces captured “Volunto” on September 29, along with whom was presumably his bodyguard.

**Antioquia**

In the municipalities of Caucasia and el Bagre, Bajo Cauca region, verification tasks have been carried out by the Mission with worrisome results. It is believed that a unit of approximately 60 BCB demobilized combatants is operating in the zone. They apparently hold sway over the population in urban centers, dressing as civilians and using side arms. In rural areas they are apparently patrolling in camouflage uniforms, carrying out temporary detentions and requisitioning households. Social control over the communities allows them, so it seems, to monopolize control over illicit economic activities.

**Meta**

A matter of special attention for the Mission is the case in the *corregimiento* La Cooperativa, Municipality of Mapiripán, from which information was received of a non-demobilized group of approximately 200 members of the Héroes del Guaviare Bloc. The unit is apparently increasing its numbers by recruiting demobilized combatants and threatening those who do not wish to join.

**Nariño**

In its follow-up to the verification of rearmament in this department, the Mission received information regarding an armed unit of approximately 100 men that presumably controlled illicit economic activities in the municipalities of Mosquera and Pizarro. This unit apparently is made up of with a variety of individuals, including demobilized combatants of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc, BCB, and members of narcotrafficking organizations from Valle del Cauca.

**Putumayo**

A holdout group of non-demobilized combatants of the Sur del Putumayo Front (BCB) is apparently operating in the municipalities of Mocoa and Puerto Asís, along with narcotrafficking organizations from Valle del Cauca. This unit is accused of selective homicide as part of its actions against the civilian population in order to achieve control over illicit economic activities. This unit has an estimated 350 men.

**Institutional Response**

The Vice-president of the Republic and the Minister of Defense called the High Commissioner for Peace, the Attorney General, and high-ranking officers of the police and the armed forces, to a meeting so that the Mission could share its concerns regarding verification of the possible rearmament of the AUC. As a result, there was a proposal for the creation of a permanent follow-up mechanism, with representatives from the highest level of government, state institutions, and the Mission. It is expected that in this way it will be possible to provide an effective response to all those former AUC groups that, following their demobilization, attempt to once again begin armed action, illegal activities, or both.
V. VERIFICATION OF REINTEGRATION

In the process of verifying reintegration, the Mission found that the Program for Return to Civilian Life [Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil, PRVC] has made progress in its coverage of the demobilized population. Existing information indicates that 79.6% of the individuals in the process have been relocated and 77.1% are being served. An additional effort is necessary, however, to reach the 23% whose needs have yet to be addressed by the Government Program.

In this context it is important to note that although important progress has been made, the Program still faces problems in reaching all the demobilized combatants, in coordinating institutional efforts, monitoring the former combatants and their families, and offering basic services in the most critical period of reintegration.

According to reports, less than half of the beneficiaries (41.4%) have been linked to the Social Security System. This can be explained by the lack of coordination between territorial entities charged with this area at the municipal level, as well as by the lack of need on the part of former combatants to access this service. It is important to note that, although the spots for these demobilized combatants and their families to become affiliated to the service have been obtained, they have not yet been fully utilized.

Psychosocial services continue to one of the weak spots of the PRVC. In some cases they are limited to the intake of the demobilized combatants in the temporary relocation zones, or the assistance given to them by the personnel working in the Centros de Referencia y Oportunidades (CRO) [Reference and Opportunity Centers]. During this period, the coordination between this support and the contracting of organizations specialized in this area was begun; in this way 5,189 beneficiaries have been served, a small number if it is compared with the entire demobilized population.

There is low coverage in education, despite the fact that over the last period complementary and co-management policies and strategies had been implemented jointly with territorial entities, in order to guarantee the quality of education and its full coverage. Only half of the demobilized combatants have graduated from the “Initial Module,” that all demobilized combatants must take during the first six months of their reintegration. Another matter of concern is the low attendance of demobilized individuals to training and academic courses (22.8% and 17.6% respectively), as well as the high numbers of drop-outs.

According to the MAPP/OEA’s observations, low educational coverage and high drop-out rates are related to the following: 1) long periods of time transpired between registration and course initiation; 2) in the case of the “Initial Module,” the courses are designed to begin with a minimum enrollment of 35 persons; in some municipalities the number of demobilized combatants is lower than that, and they must travel to other municipalities to take the module; 3) there is a lack of coordination with other CRO activities, and there is occasional schedule overlap; 4) there is a lack of CRO management to standardize and publicize the “Formal Education” offerings, and 5) lack of information on the part of local and departmental institutions.

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5. This figure was provided by the quarterly technical report, Program for Reintegration into Civilian Life, Ministry of the Interior and Justice, updated to August 2006.
Regarding economic reintegration, there has been a lack of correspondence between the training offered and the labor supply, as well as of an adequate adjustment of the demobilized combatants’ profiles to allow them to find jobs. Up until the month of August,\(^6\) 86.7% of the demobilized individuals had been receiving humanitarian aid, which compensated for the poor results obtained in the generation of jobs. According to information received from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, over these last few months an extension of assistance was granted to 1,904 beneficiaries whose 18-month period had run out.\(^2\) It should be underscored that during the first months of reintegration, humanitarian assistance is the main economic alternative; however, it is transitory. By December 2006 most units had gone beyond 18 months of demobilization, and if the Colombian Government does not adjust and reinforce the job placement component, the reinsertion of this population and its social context/surroundings may be affected – in no more than five months, 10,879 members of 19 units will have gone beyond 18 months of demobilization. The MAPP/OEA especially points to the cases of Norte de Santander, Barrancabermeja and Córdoba.

Only an estimated 24% of the demobilized combatants have some type of job placement, including the 1,350 who are carrying out servicio social reparatorio \(\text{[community service as reparations]}\).\(^8\) Fifty-six per cent (56%) of those who are employed do so in the informal sector; those who are productive comprise a small number of former combatants (898). It is noteworthy that among the jobs held, most are in security services. According to information received by the MAPP/OEA, many security cooperatives and training schools have been created with former combatant participation, in cities such as Medellín and Cúcuta, as well as in zones such as Sur de Bolívar and Magdalena Medio.

In this context, the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for the Social and Economic Reintegration of Armed People and Irregular Groups, by Decree 3043 of 2006, should be highlighted. The mission of this office is to design, execute and evaluate reintegration policy. One of the most important functions the decree establishes is that of harmonizing and evaluating the National Plan of Action, so that state entities can develop required programs and strategies, joining the initiatives of territorial and local entities.

It is necessary to note that the processes of reintegration and the experience obtained from them have proven that there is no single formula applicable to all cases. It is a given that there are tasks that cannot be delegated, and which the state must carry out in the most critical stage of demobilization, from the surrendering of weapons to the next two or three years. The strengthening of the role of institutions at the departmental and municipal levels, as well as of the private sector is a high priority.

Adequate inter-institutional coordination among entities dealing with reintegration does not currently exist. However, there are efforts that should be highlighted: in Bogotá with the Programa de Atención Complementaria a la Población Reintegrada \(\text{[Program of Supplementary Services for the Reintegrated Population]}\) and in Medellín with the Programa de Paz y Reconciliación \(\text{[Program for Peace and Reconciliation]}\).

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\(^6\) Quarterly technical report, Program for Reintegration into Civilian Life, August 2006.

\(^7\) Approvals of extensions have been granted to those who have effectively made use of the benefits institutionally provided.

\(^8\) The Community Service as Reparations constitutes an initiative to place reintegrated AUC combatants in social service work for the community, under the orientation of the National Police. After a 400 hour training period, the beneficiary shall be compensated for 6 months. The National Police (PONAL) made the program official by Executive Decision 031196 of September 1, 2005.
Peace and Reconciliation]. These two programs have been executed as supplements to the institutional services offered by the national government, providing direct services with the private sector, thus guaranteeing more training and better job placement conditions for the beneficiaries. Likewise, these administrative efforts have supported the extension of humanitarian assistance beyond the 24 months established by the program at the national level.

There is no doubt that during the process, both for the demobilized combatants and for the community itself, the mindset of violence and of its environment change. Consequently, necessary training and education should be provided, in order that demobilized combatants may enjoy conditions similar to any Colombian youth in his or her community or job market. Every effort is necessary to strengthen this stage, because there is the risk that the peace process in its entirety may fail.

In addition, progress made in the restructuring of reintegration policy should have a differentiated focus. Treatment of the demobilized population should tend to respond to the particular circumstances of the beneficiaries, considering the role these persons have played within their armed units, and adjusting institutional services offered case by case. Likewise, it is necessary that this policy restructuring especially serve women, minors, and ethnic groups.

VI. MONITORING LAW 975/2005 (JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW)

During this report’s quarter, the government issued Decree 3391 of 2006 that, along with Decree 4760, provide regulations for the Justice and Peace Law. This law establishes that there must be compliance with some requirements for all those aspiring to become beneficiaries, including the return of any property illegally obtained, the liberation of all persons kidnapped, and the handing over of all minors in their ranks. The law also establishes that those whose principal activity has been narcotrafficking or other activities related to illegal enrichment. It should be noted that the law, complemented by the decrees, establishes procedures for providing reparations to the victims and the clarification of the truth.

The law creates the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation (CNRR), with the task, inter alia, of establishing and coordinating regional committees for restitution of property and of designing the road map for a Colombian model of reparations and reconciliation. The Commission has decided to submit its Action Plan to a process of national deliberation. To this end, it has called for a Social Consultation with the participation of civil society in discussions on different public policy alternatives to carry out its mandate effectively.

Within this normative framework, and in application of the provisions of the decree, the Office of the Attorney General has issued citations by publication calling all persons who believe are entitled to truth, justice, and reparations, and who have been victims of criminal conduct by the paramilitaries (those who have opted for the application of the benefits of Law 975). The citation was made with the purpose of obtaining, from the persons responding, information regarding the facts of their victimization, their personal information and address so that they could participate in the process and claim their rights.

9. Commanders, middle-ranking officers, patrolmen and support networks require differential treatment, responding to the needs and particular circumstances of each one of these levels.
The IACHR has expressed its concern regarding the deficiencies of the way in which the citations were issued, since they have only been done so in the zones where illegal armed groups are operating, without stating the aliases by which they were identified. A great number of victims have moved to other departments of the country, and therefore there is an urgent need to issue citations at the national level. As the IACHR pointed out, the participation of victims is crucial in judicial proceedings.

In addition, it is important to note that currently, at the government’s request, 57 former commanders and middle-ranking officers have been temporarily gathered in one place, waiting for the initiation of the process of investigation and trial pursuant to the Justice and Peace Law.

It is also necessary to note that other demobilized commanders have not heeded the government’s petition to temporarily relocate to certain places, including José Vicente Castaño Gil, representative and member of the General Staff of the Self-Defense Forces; Ever Veloza García (alias Hernán Hernández, Commander of the Bananero Bloc; Pedro Oliverio Guerrero Castillo (alias Cuchillo), commander of the Héroes del Guaviare Front; Luis Arnulfo Tuberculosis (alias Memín), commander of the Noroccidente de Antioquia Front; Eder Pedraza Peña (alias Ramón Mojana), commander of the Mojana Front, and Miguel Ángel Mejía Munera (alias El Mellizo), commander of the Vencedores de Arauca front. The National Government revoked the suspension of the arrest warrants against these officers of the demobilized self defense forces and called upon the Security Forces to apprehend them.

Another noteworthy event – part of the work of the CNRR – that took place during the quarter covered by this report, was the opening of the first Regional Office of the CNRR in Medellín and the initiation of the work of the Comisión histórica para esclarecer la verdad del conflicto en Colombia [Historic Commission to Clarify the Truth Regarding the Colombian Conflict]. The MAPP/OEA has been following the Commission’s progress in fulfillment of its mandate; the Commission also receives support from the United Nations, through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as from countries such as Holland, Sweden, Canada, and Spain.

It should be highlighted that the Mission, through the legal team in its Analysis Unit, and with the IACHR as an advisor, will obtain information from the different organs responsible for its application and, especially, on the tasks of verification of dismantling, cease-fire, ceasing of illicit activities, and return of property, related to the application of the individual and collective benefits provided for by the law. In August 2006, the IACHR identified the challenges faced by the application of the Justice and Peace Law, and will continue to follow up in this respect.

The MAPP/OEA expects that the effective implementation of the Justice and Peace Law will contribute to the clarification of the investigations regarding the existence of alleged links between politicians and the self-defense forces, as well as other matters related to the negative influence of these irregular groups over Colombian political and institutional life.
VII. PARTICIPATORY COMMUNITY PROCESSES

During this quarter, the Mission has solidified the Unidad de Iniciativas con las Comunidades [Unit of Community Initiatives], whose main task is to plan and manage support for local initiatives in conflict zones. As part of its work, and after the definition of its adopted methodologies, a selection was made of initiatives to implement in the different areas where the Mission has regional offices; more than 20 initiatives were selected for implementation over the course of a year.

In those places where the Mission has a permanent presence, different participatory processes have been followed. These processes are geared toward supporting communities that have been victims of violence, as well as those communities that have received the demobilized population that is being reintegrated into civilian life. The greatest progress in this respect has taken place, inter alia, in Medellín (Antioquia), Tierralta (Córdoba), Barrancabermeja (Santander), and Valledupar (César).

In Medellín, the inter-administrative contract signed with Metroseguridad has allowed the Mission to carry out broad community work in the city’s metropolitan area. Within this framework, several initiatives have been carried forward, from the generation of alternative teaching models to the establishment of an inter-institutional dialogue on reintegration, thus making a contribution to the coordination of activities and the supporting this process in the city of Medellín in an integral fashion.

The construction of the process of reintegration and support in the Medellín neighborhoods is of great importance. One of the greatest cycles of violence ever known in Colombia originated in these neighborhoods in the 1980s. In these same places, the mayor’s Program for Peace and Reconciliation has carried out effective actions that have visibly lowered the rates of violence.

In Tierralta, in carrying out the Proyecto de Justicia Comunitaria “Conciliemos” [Community Justice Project “Let’s Reconcile”], the Mission has supported the community, offering technical assistance to social workers, and finalizing the strategy of dissemination of the “conciliador en equidad” [conciliator in equity] in the communities that will use this service.

In Urabá, work has been done to locally strengthen the Personerías, by creating spaces for dialogue. In a first meeting which took place on August 30 and 31, attended by 9 personeros and other institutions, the necessary inputs were obtained to learn about the situation of the demobilized combatants in the municipalities, and to have an exchange on the demands of the demobilized combatants, made to the personeros, and the corresponding institutional offerings.

There has also been important work carried out in Urabá with demobilized women, in order to support this population and share their concerns and problems encountered during the process of reintegration. In a series of workshops with the demobilized women of the region, the situation of these women was analyzed in the light of the benefits conferred on them by the law. The main result was the identification of the needs of demobilized women by the local institutions and organizations present, the recognition of their needs, and the presentation of institutional offerings as well as the

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10. The personería [government representation] is a position belonging to the Office of the Attorney General that has as some of its, protection of the public interest, as well as the monitoring the behavior of other public officials. At the municipal level, personeros [government representatives] are among the different offices and persons directly involved in municipal dynamics; they are aware of the problems of the corregimientos and veredas in which they work, and continuously hear the complaints and concerns of their inhabitants regarding the process of reintegration.
assistance options that the women have in the municipalities. Finally, a long term commitment towards work in this area was made, with the support of the MAPP/OEA.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Mission is optimistic regarding the efforts towards the construction of a peace dialog between the Colombian Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) [National Liberation Army], as well as regarding the possibility of resuming actions leading towards a humanitarian agreement with the FARC.

2. The General Secretariat reiterates the importance of the demobilization and reintegration of the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia, essential components of the peace process in the country, and reaffirms its commitment to continue solidifying its work in this respect, as well as to support Colombia’s people and institutions in all peace initiatives they decide to move forward.

3. The disarmament and demobilization of the AUC and their attempt to become reintegrated into civilian life, although imperfect and with foreseeable and considerable difficulty constitute the possibility of building, step by step, new peace scenarios for Colombia; central and unavoidable issues exist in processes of this nature, especially reparations for the victims, truth and justice. Colombians face these challenges today and also have the tools that they built themselves to make progress meeting them.

4. The decision to destroy each and every weapon surrendered in the AUC demobilizations is an important step, as the Mission has reiterated. To this end, the Organization’s technical support and resources have been advanced, as well as full verification of the procedure employed.

5. The Mission expresses its concern regarding the results of the verification of the dismantling of some armed units of the AUC and the danger entailed. Said verification has established a serious presumption regarding the intention of maintaining armed units linked to extortion, threats, and social control in some territories that were supposed to have been freed of the influence of AUC blocs.

6. The Government’s decision to thwart these attempts to rearm has been verified especially in Córdoba, Caquetá, Casanare, and Alta Guajira. However, it is expected that similar effective actions be carried out in other points of the territory where the potential danger is significant.

7. The greatest possible support for communities affected by violence, the strengthening of state institutions in demobilized territories and the need to take urgent measures related to reintegration, are all central themes in this stage of the Colombian process.

8. The Mission is pleased to note the naming of the High Commissioner for Reintegration and reiterates its full disposition to support him in the present and future of the peace process. However, it also notes the need to make progress with urgent measures in territories where the concentration of demobilized combatants is high. The success of reintegration of the
irregular groups to civilian life is crucial to guarantee the sustainability of the peace process as a whole.

9. With respect to the Justice and Peace Law, the Mission is readying itself to follow up and monitor its effective enforcement. This is a substantial phase of the process towards compliance with justice, reparations, and the truth.
Annex A
Numbers demobilized, by sex, number of weapons surrendered and men/weapons ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TOTAL DEMOB.</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>RATIO</th>
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<td>860</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ORTEGA SELF-DEFENSE FORCES</td>
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<td>168</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>29,740</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>18,002</td>
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### Annex B
Number of Weapons Surrendered

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<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>12,862</td>
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<td>Shotguns</td>
<td>706</td>
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<td>Carbines</td>
<td>166</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>SUPPORT WEAPONS</strong></td>
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<td>Machine Guns</td>
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<td>Grenade Launchers M203</td>
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<td>Single Shot Grenade Launchers</td>
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<td>Multiple Grenade Launchers (M.G.L.)</td>
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<td>Mortar Tubes</td>
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<td>Rocket Launchers</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIDE ARMS</strong></td>
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<td>Submachine Guns</td>
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<td>Pistols</td>
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<td>Revolvers</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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Verification of the dismantling of AUC armed units

Processed by the MAPP/OEA Analysis Unit
Cartographic Base of the Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institute
15. Pueblo Bello
16. Chivolo, Ariguari, Sabanas de San Angel
17. Sincelbo, San Orotre
18. Caucasia y El Bagre
19. San Vicente de Chucurí
20. Modigliani
21. Mosquera, Pizarro y Nariño
22. La Herriga, Orin, Puerto Asís, San Miguel y Puerto Durán

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