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TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT
COUNCIL ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES MISSION
TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OAS)



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OSG/329-19

October 29, 2019

Her Excellency
Ambassador Rita Claverie Díaz de Sciolli
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Guatemala
to the Organization of American States
Chair of the Permanent Council
Washington, D.C.

Excellency:

I have the honor to address Your Excellency to request, through your good offices, that the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States arrange for the presentation of the XXVII Report of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP/OAS), pursuant to resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), in which the Organization of American States requests the Secretary General to report periodically to the Permanent Council on the work of the Mission.

Please find attached hereto the Spanish version of the report. The report is being translated into English and that version will be forwarded as soon as possible

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Luis Almagro
Secretary General

Twenty-seventh Report of the Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP/OAS): [Link](#)

**TWENTY-SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT
COUNCIL ON THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES MISSION
TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA (MAPP/OAS)**

The following report is submitted pursuant to resolution CP/RES. 859 (1597/04), in which the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) instructs the Secretary General to report periodically on the work of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia,^{1/} hereinafter “the MAPP/OAS” or “the Mission.”

This report covers the period from January 1 to June 30, 2019 and presents the findings of a total of 1,648 field missions conducted in 860 communities belonging to 205 municipalities in 22 departments of Colombia. These communities included municipal capitals, townships, villages, indigenous reserves [*resguardos*], and community councils. During this period, the Mission logged a total of 289,769 kilometers by land, and 6,032 kilometers by river.

The support of the international community is vital for the MAPP/OAS to be able to carry out the activities of its mandate. The GS/OAS therefore wishes to thank the donors and friends of the MAPP/OAS, in particular the Basket Funds countries—Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States—whose political and financial support make the Mission’s operations possible. The GS/OAS also wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Korea, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, as well as Argentina, Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany for supporting the Mission through the use of secondments.^{2/}

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The GS/OAS thanks the Government of Colombia for hosting the forty-ninth regular session of the OAS General Assembly in June, the slogan of which was: “Innovating to Strengthen Hemispheric Multilateralism.” It further wishes to recognize the General Assembly for its statement of support for the MAPP/OAS as part of the commemoration of the Mission’s 15th anniversary in Colombia.

Over the years, the MAPP/OAS has learned to adapt to the difficulties entailed in working in the midst of an internal armed conflict in Colombia’s most vulnerable and remote areas. It has established itself as an on-the-ground Mission that heeds the call of both the Colombian State and the country’s communities, thereby enabling it to effectively and objectively understand local phenomena and formulate respectful recommendations for connecting the needs of communities with the peace policies.

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, known as the “Convention of Belém do

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1. The mandate of the MAPP/OAS derives from the agreement entered into by the Government of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, hereinafter “the GS/OAS,” on January 23, 2004, as well as from Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), adopted on February 6, 2004. The mandate has been broadened and renewed seven times; it was most recently renewed until December 31, 2021.
 2. “Secondment” is a system whereby a country assigns one of its nationals to perform a job for a specific period of time.

Pará.” Given the persistence of violence against women, and in the specific case of Colombia, of violence associated with the dynamics of armed conflict and criminality, as well as increased political and gender-based violence against women who hold elected public office or who are political and social leaders, the commitment to the provisions of the Convention must be upheld, continuing with legislative progress and the implementation of specific actions to guarantee life and integrity, as well as women’s effective enjoyment of their civil and political rights.

The first year of Iván Duque’s administration has been marked by recognition and review of the various peace policies in an effort to make adjustments and determine what the main approaches and priorities will be. This has included a process of learning about the challenges and difficulties that lie in the territories, as well as risks and threats that might limit stability and the consolidation of peace. The GS/OAS acknowledges the efforts of the Colombian State and people to lay a strong foundation for peace and reiterates its support for Colombia, understanding the complexity and scope of an effort of this kind.

During the period covered by this report, some issues that are part of what makes the peace process so complex were addressed. In this connection, the objections raised in March by President Iván Duque to six articles of the Statutory Law of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) prompted political debate and institutional assessment that culminated in the endorsement and enactment of the Statutory Law, which ratified the JEP as a key tool for peace-building and victims’ effective enjoyment of their rights. The GS/OAS hails the constructive dialogue between the Colombian government and JEP authorities regarding the allocation of resources, which has moved past political differences and marshalled efforts to consolidate the JEP.

High expectations and a grueling debate also surrounded prolongation of the provisional territorial training and reintegration spaces (ETCRs), which were slated to end on August 15. Notwithstanding whatever pathway might be created for extending them, it is vital that these spaces continue to create opportunities for subsistence, reconciliation with communities, and improvements to local infrastructure in order to help former FARC-EP members effectively reintegrate socially, politically, and economically. It is likewise extremely important to ascertain the status of the more than 8,000 former combatants^{3/} who are not in the ETCRs so that alternatives can be devised and opportunities can be created for all persons willing to pursue peace.

Announcement of the implementation of different strategies to tackle the problems associated with the presence of illicit crops that combine all modalities possible, including forced eradication through aerial spraying of glyphosate, also prompted concern and uncertainty. The perceived adverse impact this could have raises concerns about the possibility of social movements in opposition to this strategy. Memories persist of the damage the spraying of this herbicide caused in the past, though at the same time families remain willing to transition to legal crops, even those who face major socioeconomic and security challenges when illegal crop substitution programs are being implemented. Against this backdrop, it is important to pay special attention to alternative eradication proposals and experiences happening in the territories.

Lengthy debates were held in Congress surrounding approval of the National Development Plan (PND 2018-2022). Specifically, the incorporation of the peace policies from the Final Agreement

3. Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization, “*ARN en cifras*” [ARN in Numbers], June 2019. See: <http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/agencia/Documentos%20de%20ARN%20en%20Cifras/ARN%20en%20cifras%20corte%20junio%202019.pdf>

divided the debate between those who perceived that there had not been direct inclusion of the agreements, appropriation of funds, or specific targets, and the government, which reaffirmed its commitment to inclusion of the “Pact for Peace” with its pillars of equity, legality, and coexistence. The GS/OAS underscores the importance of including actions and strategies that help pave the way to peace by upholding commitments to the communities in the territories and to victims; it also emphasizes the need for joint monitoring of implementation of what has been approved.

One of the PND’s strategies, which will be a national government priority, is consolidation of Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (ZEII), or Zonas Futuro [Future Zones]. The objective in the five zones established is to hasten implementation of components of the Rural Development Plans (PDETs), taking a comprehensive approach in the territories to mitigate violence, while simultaneously promoting local development. The MAPP/OAS will support and monitor this initiative as part of the efforts to secure peace in the territories, and will continue to emphasize the need to include other territories that also require the State to bring to bear all of its capacity.

The GS/OAS further commends the inclusion in the PND of the environment as a national asset, as well as other environmental protection actions adopted by the Colombian government as part of a strategy to reduce and prevent impacts on the environment, which have increased due to, among other things, crime and the activities of illegal armed groups. The GS/OAS hopes that implementation of the *Zonas Futuro* strategy will have a positive impact and help to reduce environmental degradation, which is another challenge associated with building territorial peace.

The GS/OAS also continues to observe how criminal activity and illegal armed groups’ presence and actions in the territories, namely, homicides, forced displacement, confinement, and imposition of “rules of coexistence,” are impacting communities. This situation particularly affects social leaders, human and communal rights defenders, and community representatives.

Despite the fact that as the present report was going to press, the Colombian government was reporting a drop in numbers,⁴ leaders’ and defenders’ exposure to such circumstances means their level of vulnerability remains the same. The potential for new deaths and attacks persists as indicated by the large number of threats reported against them. Additionally, there is alarming evidence of a growing number of attacks against and murders of women leaders.

The GS/OAS, through the MAPP/OAS, has supported the implementation of several different national and territory-specific policies, agencies, and mechanisms, like the Timely Action Plan (PAO), to address the issues affecting communities, and stresses the need to link, harmonize, and coordinate existing local and national entities and mechanisms effectively in order to secure decisive buy-in by department and municipal authorities and ensure the participation of affected communities.

The GS/OAS also draws attention to the increased peril for government employees in some regions of the country, one example being the threats received by agents of the municipal ombudsman’s office [*personeros municipales*] who carry out the functions of the Public Prosecution Ministry locally.

4. The “*Informe de Homicidios contra Líderes Sociales y Defensores de Derechos Humanos 2010-2019*” [Report on the Killings of Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders 2010-2019] prepared by the Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs indicates a 32% reduction “when comparing the 88 murders of social leaders between August 7, 2017 and May 25, 2018 during the previous administration, with the 60 homicides recorded between August 7, 2018 and May 25, 2019 under the administration of President Duque.”

This shows evidence of illegal armed groups' attempts to exercise social control by undermining government institutions and challenging the rule of law.

Over the past six months, different mobilizations, community efforts, and marches were organized as social, ethnic, and *campesino* organizations joined forces, particularly in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Their aim is to demand, through civic and regional movements, the right to life, protection of their territory, implementation of the Final Agreement, and security guarantees. The GS/OAS observes that the active and leading role taken on by civil society in a context of legitimate social protest serves as an opportunity to foster social dialogue and agreements. Focus on these and fulfillment thereof will unquestionably translate into strengthened democracy in Colombia.

The GS/OAS believes that truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition are key tools for building peace in Colombia and, specifically, for victims' effective enjoyment of their rights; this is why it has spent all of these years insisting on how key they are to the peace process. In this context, extending Law 1448/2011 is especially important for continuing to ensure, in accordance with its provisions, comprehensive reparations for victims.

Victims' effective access to the JEP as legal proceedings begin is also being hindered insofar as their participation is being limited to collective involvement and legal reports, with no access for individual victims. This presents a host of challenges when it comes to building trust and legitimacy in the transitional justice process. Moreover, the withdrawal of former leaders of the FARC-EP is undermining the ability to prosecute the senior leadership, which is adversely impacting victims' rights to truth and reparations.

As to the implementation of peace policies, the execution of more than 500 projects known as "small community infrastructure" (PICs) stands out. These are small- and medium-sized infrastructure projects that fall under the Rural Development Programs (PDETs) and which have brought in the leaders of Community Action Boards and territorial social organizations in an effort to reduce inequities in the territories hardest hit by the conflict. The communities have, however, expressed concern over the lack of greater socialization and dissemination of the Plans of Action for Regional Development (PATRs) and delays in identifying and formalizing lands in high-conflict zones. Additionally, the danger faced by government employees, contractors, and leaders who have spearheaded the participatory development of the PDETs is concerning.

Along these same lines, the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) continues to move forward after having tweaked its initial program so as to keep the commitment to the 99,097 families involved. In addition, a roadmap for stabilization has been created and includes different components, among them, the actions in the PNIS and the Strategic Steering Board as the highest decision-making level with regard to this topic. While the national government has engaged in efforts aimed at curbing increases in illicit crops, all indications are that new challenges will arise when the choice is made to use spraying methods strongly opposed by the communities. Both replanting and the use of anti-personnel mines (APMs) by illegal armed groups themselves pose major challenges to the State.

Communities' high expectations with respect to implementation of policies they consider important for the territories are clear. Some of the communities' demands call for effective communications strategies and fruitful dialogue with territorial actors as a common practice for reporting progress, achievements, and difficulties, and for providing consistent reports about their

scope. The GS/OAS encourages the Colombian State to explore all potential options for effective interaction between the communities and the State so as to not undermine trust or frustrate aspirations for transformation of the territories and their realities.

The second half of 2019 will be enlivened by the regional elections, a context that may exacerbate the current political polarization. In addition, persons who exercise leadership in zones formerly controlled by the FARC-EP and candidates in the areas most affected by violence or with little state presence could face greater risk.

The GS/OAS condemns and laments the murders of Karina García, candidate for mayor of Suárez (Cauca), and Bernardo Betancourt, candidate for mayor of Tibú (Norte de Santander) in September 2019. These grave events constitute a violation of democracy and the right to political participation in Colombia and pose a risk to the political and electoral process. Accordingly, there is a renewed call for state institutions to guarantee the safety of candidates and engage in timely prevention actions and prosecutions.

In this connection, national organizations have been denouncing the interests of illegal armed groups that threaten candidates, attempt to intimidate or constrain voters, or interfere in the election of representatives. Consequently, it will be necessary to implement prevention, monitoring, and support measures before, during, and after the elections in order to ensure elections that enjoy full participation by the opposition and free voting by the population.

The agreement by political parties on a “Pact for a political culture and non-violence in election campaigns” is key for respectful guarantee of the right to exercise democracy. Activation of all existing mechanisms, e.g., the Immediate Reception Unit for Electoral Transparency (URIEL), must be added to this in order to prevent risk and punish irregularities in the electoral process.

The GS/OAS believes it is important to encourage current local elected leaders to plan and execute the close-out and transition of their administrations and to submit reports on progress, achievements, and challenges to consolidating peace. The knowledge gained by outgoing administrations will serve as a valuable resource for continued peace building if it is transferred to and used by the administrations taking office next year.

The GS/OAS continues to hold that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army] (ELN) must provide clear and specific indications of its peaceful intentions, which necessarily involves, among other actions, the release of all those who have been kidnapped, as well as an end to the kidnappings and attacks against civilians and infrastructure, which have huge environmental impacts. It further believes that it is important to keep channels of dialogue open that might enable differences to be bridged and peace negotiations to be taken up again. The GS/OAS reiterates its willingness to help this process aimed at securing the full peace to which Colombia aspires.

Lastly, in the midst of the contingencies and challenges to consolidating peace in the country that arise on a daily basis, the GS/OAS calls on Colombia and the international community to continue to support peace building and to value what has been achieved, as well as, above all, the desire for peace still held by the majority of former combatants who have signed on to the process. Via the MAPP/OAS, we will continue to support the national government as it keeps advancing and deepening its efforts in those pending areas where different challenges remain.

2. ARMED CONFLICT AND CRIMINALITY

2.1. Presence and activities of illegal armed groups

During the period covered by this report, different dynamics associated with the presence and actions of illegal armed groups have been continuously identified. With respect to the Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army] (ELN), high-impact hostile actions aimed primarily at public security forces^{5/} and oil infrastructure^{6/} were observed. These actions were concentrated in areas where the ELN has historically been present and coincided with the break in talks and the conditions set by the government for the possibility of a new dialogue with the group.

As to the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia [Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] or Gulf Clan (AGC/Gulf Clan), and Los Pelusos or Ejército Popular de Liberación [People's Liberation Army] (Los Pelusos/EPL), increased disputes between each of these groups and the ELN have been observed in different territorial contexts, generally fueled by an interest in controlling territories with illegal economies (drug trafficking, mining, and smuggling), strategic corridors for smuggling persons, drugs, and weapons, and revenues from legal commerce by means of extortion.

The subregions of Bajo Atrato and the Pacific coast, and their municipalities of Riosucio and Juradó, respectively, in the department Chocó, are two areas that have seen the most armed conflict between the AGC/Gulf Clan and the ELN. This dynamic, which has existed since 2016 in Riosucio, and also involves Juradó, has given way to targeted murders, recruitment of children and adolescents, forced displacement, the containment of indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, social control, and targeting individuals.

In previous reports, the GS/OAS has called attention to the impacts the armed clashes between Los Pelusos/EPL and the ELN have had in the region of Catatumbo. Monitoring of the dynamics in this area has made it possible to see that, thus far in 2019, the ELN has positioned itself in zones that had once been controlled by Los Pelusos/EPL, such as El Tarra, Teorama, San Calixto, and Hacarí, thereby forcing Los Pelusos/EPL to retreat to Playa de Belén, Abrego, rural areas of Cúcuta, Puerto Santander, and Sardinata in Norte de Santander, as well as to areas in the department of Cesar.^{7/}

In the Bajo Cauca Antioquia subregion, armed clashes persist between two factions of the AGC/Gulf Clan that splintered off to form two groups—the AGC/Gulf Clan themselves and the “Frente Virgilio Peralta Arenas” [Virgilio Peralta Arenas Front], also known as “Los Caparrapos” or the “Caparros.” In this connection, the GS/OAS warns of the human impact these clashes have on civilians in rural areas of this region. Although the levels of conflict have varied, their impact has been ongoing in the form of targeted murders, social control, and mass displacement.

The residual organized armed groups [*grupos armados organizados residuales*] (GAORs)^{8/} continue to reshuffle in an effort to recover the territories abandoned by the FARC-EP in 2016 and 2017 after the signing of the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting

5. In the departments of Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Arauca, and Nariño.

6. In the departments of Norte de Santander, Nariño, and Arauca.

7. In January 2019, in the municipality of Pueblo Bello (Cesar), public security forces captured “a.k.a. Pepe,” who was considered the second in command of Los Pelusos/EPL.

8. Identified in the territories as FARC-EP dissidents.

Peace, hereinafter, the “Final Agreement.” The territories seeing most of this reshuffling are Norte de Antioquia, Arauca, Catatumbo, Sur de Córdoba, and the Cauca and Nariñense Pacific coast.

In some regions, this has meant clashes with other illegal armed groups that have impacted civilians. In March, in the south of the department of Córdoba armed confrontations between members of the AGC/Gulf Clan and members of the “Frente 18” GAOR prompted a mass displacement of the residents of the rural areas of Puerto Libertador (Córdoba) and Ituango (Antioquia) to the township of Juan José, in the municipality of Tierralta (Córdoba).

In the municipalities of Florida and Jamundí (Valle del Cauca), as well as Corinto (Cauca), there has been fighting between Los Pelusos/EPL and a FARC-EP GAOR calling itself “Columna Móvil Jaime Martínez” [Jaime Martínez Mobile Column]. This dissident group has also engaged in kidnappings and extortion.^{9/} In the municipality of Morales (Cauca) clashes have occurred with another FARC-EP GAOR calling itself the “Columna Móvil Carlos Patiño” [Carlos Patiño Mobile Column], in an apparent attempt to gain control of the territory and corridors of the western range of the Pacific side of Cauca.

Changes have been observed in the department of Nariño, particularly in its coastal and border areas. While the year began with a dip in the rates of crime and conflict in Tumaco^{10/} and in its rural areas thanks to agreements pushed by the communities, there has been fighting between the “Frente Oliver Sinisterra” [Oliver Sinisterra Front] (FOS) and a group led by “a.k.a. ‘Contador’”—known in the region exclusively as a drug trafficker—whose relations with the then FARC-EP were strictly commercial and functional for purposes of trafficking drugs.

In the areas that border Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela, especially those controlled by FARC-EP guerrillas, ELN and GAOR interests in controlling these zones has been noted. In the case of the border with Ecuador, in southern Nariño, increased ELN control of the territory for moving weapons, explosives, and controlling drug trafficking routes is being seen. On the border with Panama, particularly in the municipality of Juradó, there have been clashes between the ELN and the AGC/Gulf Clan surrounding control of drug trafficking routes. And on the border with Venezuela, the ELN appears to have greater control over the territory to charge for the passage of illicit transnational commerce.

On the Pacific coast, between the departments of Valle del Cauca and Cauca, there appear to be coexistence agreements between the ELN, the GAORs, and other groups present in the area regarding control of drug and weapons trafficking routes and of coastal areas where there is illegal mining.

The least belligerent and least active group, based on the monitoring done during this period, is the one known by the national government as Los Puntilleros, which has an area of influence in the Llanos Orientales (Eastern Plains). The Mission’s monitoring in the department of Vichada led to the conclusion that since multiple illegal armed groups are present, all of which share an interest in criminal activities associated with drug and weapons trafficking and fuel smuggling, it is possible there are agreements in place to avoid armed conflict between the ELN and the GAOR and between the ELN and Los Puntilleros.

9. It is worth noting that, according to National Defense Ministry figures, total kidnappings (both simple and extortive) fell by 40% nationwide between the first half of 2018 and the first half of 2019.

10. With respect to the high level of impact suffered in the zone.

2.2. Impact on the civilian population

The GS/OAS observes with concern the forced recruitment and conscription^{11/} of children and adolescents into illegal armed groups. ELN guerrillas appear to be continuing to build their ranks by recruiting children and adolescents in areas like Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, and in municipalities like Segovia in Antioquia, Santa Rosa del Sur and Simití in Bolívar, as well as Alto Baudó, Bajo Baudó, Bojayá, Riosucio, and Juradó in the department of Chocó. In the case of these latter two municipalities, the GS/OAS highlights the fact that there are children and adolescents from the Embera Dóbida and Wounaan indigenous communities who have been under ELN control since 2017, as well as others who had been recovered by the community and are waiting to have their rights restored by the government.

Forced recruitment and conscription also occur in the areas of influence of the GAORs, particularly in the municipalities of San Vicente del Caguán, Cartagena del Chairá, and Solano (Caquetá); La Macarena (Meta); San José del Guaviare and Miraflores (Guaviare); Suárez and Corinto (Cauca); and Arauca and Arauquita (Arauca).^{12/}

Whichever the illegal armed group, the strategies used to promote the conscription of children and adolescents into the armed conflict and criminal activity include: (i) offering them money, handguns, and luxury items; (ii) having other minors or young people lure them in or fall in love with them; (iii) convincing them by force, using psychological pressure or persistent invitations; and (iv) threatening their lives or their families'. It is important to note the roles these children and adolescents play within the armed structures, which range from acting as lookouts to collecting extortion payments to recruiting other children and adolescents as they rise to the armed ranks of these illegal armed groups.

Anti-personnel mines (APM), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) also continue to constitute an imminent risk to communities. APM/UXO/IEDs are proliferating in territories where more than two illegal armed groups are battling one another and in areas with extensive coca crops that might be the target of forced eradication.

Even though the efforts of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) and *Descontamina Colombia* have had a positive impact, and 75 municipalities were declared to be free of suspected APM/UXO/IEDs in April 2019,^{13/} the GS/OAS encourages continued demining actions in areas that remain critical like Hacarí, San Calixto, and Teorama (Norte de Santander); Arauquita

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11. Pursuant to the Presidential Council on Human Rights' public policy line of preventing the recruitment, utilization, and sexual use and abuse of children and adolescents by organized armed groups (GAO) and organized criminal groups (GDO), conscription shall be understood to mean: "Any engagement with, outreach to, or approach of children and adolescents aimed at compelling them to perform any type of role within or on behalf of a GAO or GDO."
 12. In particular, in this department there is evidence of conscription and forced recruitment of children, adolescents, and young people, primarily Venezuelan nationals, by both the ELN and the GAORs present in the area.
 13. *Descontamina Colombia* "Gobierno Nacional entrega 75 nuevas municipalidades libres de contaminación por Minas Antipersonal" [National government turns over 75 new municipalities free of anti-personnel mines], March 2019. Available at:
<http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/prensa/2019/Paginas/190404-Gobierno-Nacional-entrega-75-nuevos-municipalidades-libres-de-contaminacion-por-Minas-Antipersonal.aspx>

(Arauca); Riosucio, Carmen del Darién, Medio San Juan, Alto Baudó, Medio Baudó, and Juradó (Chocó); Puerto Libertador (Córdoba); and the Alto Mira and Frontera Community Council of the municipality of Tumaco (Nariño).

In addition to the above, the GS/OAS has been observing increased levels of collective risk for communities—especially indigenous and Afro-descendant communities—and social organizations owing to the presence and activities of illegal armed groups battling for control of both territories and profits from illegal economies, with mass impacts on the civilian population. This is also a consequence of these communities' efforts to demand their rights and the high profile they have in talks with the national government.

In the border zones with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, there is considerable collective risk. In particular, the situation in the Pacific coast of Nariño, the north of Cauca, the municipality of Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca), and the department of Chocó is noteworthy. These are all territories being disputed among illegal armed groups interested in securing control over the transportation corridors that lead to the Pacific Ocean for drug and weapons trafficking. Consequently, APMs are being planted, confinement and restrictions on movement are being imposed, and there have been mass displacements^{14/} and attacks against social leaders that impact the entire community.

Situations of collective risk have likewise been identified in Catatumbo, Sur de Córdoba, and the Bajo Cauca Antioquia; these are the result of clashes between illegal armed groups and the national army.

2.3. Impact on social leaders

The GS/OAS values the efforts of the Colombian State to protect social and community leaders and human rights defenders. In this connection, it highlights, *inter alia*: continuation of the Timely Action Plan for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Social and Community Leaders, and Journalists (PAO); extension to the territories of the Pact for Life; the creation of opportunities for convergence in developing public policies to prevent violence against and protect leaders; continuation of the National Working Group and National Commission on Security Guarantees (CNGS) and the Cross-sector Committee for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT); the start of the process for overhauling the National Protection Unit (UNP); and the strategy for strengthening community action organizations.

The GS/OAS specifically highlights the creation of the Interagency Coordination Group for Stabilization and Consolidation,^{15/} spearheaded by the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, the aim of which is to ensure effective coordination and timely institutional responses to threats or impacts on beneficiaries of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) and individuals in the process of reintegration, including communications

14. The GS/OAS has observed different responses by ethnically different communities to risk factors and scenarios. For example, Afro-descendant communities by and large tend to displace *en masse* when faced with latent or imminent risk, while indigenous peoples tend to engage in resistance in the territories where confinement is being imposed.

15. This group is comprised of the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of National Defense, National Police (UNIPPEP and Elite Corps), National Army (Strategic Transition Command – CCOET), the Office of the National Protection Unit, the Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN).

mechanisms with the territories. Also noted are actions to bring in individuals who serve as leaders in the context of the PNIS, like the target population of the PAO.

Additionally, the GS/OAS values the actions of the Office of the Attorney General, particularly its prioritization and development of investigative strategies for cases of killings of social leaders, capacity-building in the territories for investigating crimes committed against these individuals, and designation of specialized judges to prosecute these cases.

Despite state actions to prevent harm and protect community representatives and leaders, the GS/OAS reiterates its concern over persistent violence against such individuals in areas like Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Nariño. Renewed and effective actions are needed in terms of security and territorial control, as is the ongoing presence of public security forces and the full and effective presence of the State in the territories so as to improve security, social, and economic conditions, as well as conditions for integral development in areas with high rates of inequity and weak government presence, thus contributing to the transformation of the territories.

The GS/OAS likewise reiterates the need to effectively link, harmonize, and coordinate existing local and national entities and mechanisms in order to secure decisive buy-in by department and municipal authorities and ensure the participation of affected communities. Government and social efforts will ultimately be judged based on whether or not they achieve concrete results that translate into effective security guarantees for the population in those territories.

Through its ongoing monitoring and support in the territories, the Mission has observed that threats^{16/} and intimidation are what mainly affect the people who live there, and without effective protection, security, and investigation mechanisms, these could turn into new attacks against their life, liberty, and integrity. This is a complex phenomenon that cannot be simplified. In previous reports, the GS/OAS has indicated that the victims are mainly social leaders, human rights defenders, community leaders, victims, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, land claimants, and individuals who champion voluntary crop substitution. All of these individuals play an important role in reporting and calling attention to the harm being wrought on their communities.

As to the characteristics of this phenomenon, in the present context most incidents involving leaders have been perpetrated by unknown suspects or members of some illegal armed group. The risk is concentrated in areas where one or more illegal armed groups are present, whether these groups coexist or are embroiled in disputes over territorial control. Risk is also present in territories where strategies like forced eradication or PNIS are being implemented to reduce illicit crops. Demand for access to, as well as defense of, territories also constitute risk scenarios.^{17/}

The GS/OAS notes that the ordinary individual prevention and protection plans do not suffice for safeguarding the lives and physical integrity of social leaders. Such mechanisms must be adapted to the different realities of the individuals and the territories—which are, in most cases rural and remote— and include collective protection approaches. This also means that the justice system has to

16. Threats are generally made via pamphlets, harassment, calls, or text messages.

17. This includes opposition to damage to oil infrastructure in Norte de Santander; blockage of large projects that have a major impact on tributaries and biodiversity in Antioquia; opposition to activities associated with illegal mining and persistence in land restitution processes in Sur de Bolívar; resistance to illegal activity and single-crop planting on large expanses of land; and vigorous defense of the legitimacy of the ethnic authorities tied to the land in departments like Cauca and Nariño.

adapt its own investigation methods and strategies and incorporate the proposals and plans of communities, local authorities, and ethnic-territorial authorities.

In addition to the foregoing, both the fight against impunity and timely and effective administration of justice play a fundamental role in the issue at hand. Specifically, the investigation and punishment of perpetrators is essential. Other key elements include: the elimination of obstacles to access to justice; development of strategies to address the different types of harm committed against leaders, not just homicides; and investigation agencies' immediate and timely collection of material and physical evidence^{18/} at crime scenes.

The GS/OAS values the Office of the Attorney General's strategy of working with communities to solve cases, but also believes it is important to develop the necessary safeguards for community representatives who engage with prosecutors and investigators. Investigations and prosecutions should not be yet another source of vulnerability for communities and leaders.

2.4. Impact on former combatants

For this period, the GS/OAS underscores the continuing work of Technical Group on Security and Protection, under the leadership of the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, which is responsible for coordinating protection measures for former FARC-EP combatants and members of the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común [Common Alternative Revolutionary Force] (FARC) political party and their families. It also notes the efforts of the Office of the Attorney General's Special Investigation Unit (UEI) aimed at investigating attacks against this group.^{19/}

The GS/OAS likewise notes the efforts of the national government to ensure the safety of FARC candidates in the upcoming regional elections scheduled for October 2019. Such efforts are being spearheaded by the Ministry of the Interior and the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, in coordination with the National Protection Unit (UNP), Police Unit for Peace-building (UNIPEP), and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), under the National Electoral Guarantees Plan.

Despite this progress, the GS/OAS continues to observe incidents perpetrated against former members of the FARC-EP, particularly against former grassroots fighters, in the departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, Nariño, Putumayo, Cauca, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Meta, and Arauca. The incidents have included threats, forced displacement, and homicides, which affect individuals in the process of reintegration as well as their immediate families.

As far as impacts are concerned, different risk scenarios have been identified. First, in territories where one or more illegal armed groups are present, there is evidence that these groups are interested in recruiting former FARC-EP combatants into their ranks in order to capitalize on their past criminal experience or their military training. This, added to these individuals' economic and productive vulnerability, creates the risk of recidivism.

18. Evidence collection tends to be deficient in different parts of Colombia because of how difficult it is to access the territories.

19. Pursuant to information furnished to the GS/OAS by the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, as of June 2019, 115 homicides, 16 attempted murders, and 11 forced disappearances of former FARC-EP combatants had been recorded; and the Office of the Attorney General had made progress in investigating 69 incidents, corresponding to 48.59% of the cases recorded.

A second risk scenario plays out when former combatants hold leadership roles. In this context, they have been targeted by illegal armed groups opposed to the consolidation of the FARC as a political party, or are victimized by different illegal actors who continue to attack social leaders in Colombia. Because of this, many individuals have opted to keep a low profile as a way to avoid potential retaliation and stigmatization, while others have decided to move away to escape attacks against them.

The GS/OAS laments the death of former combatants^{20/} during this period, among them, Dimar Torres Arévalo, who was murdered in April 2019 in the municipality of Convención, Norte de Santander, and encourages the competent authorities to quickly investigate this incident, prosecute the perpetrators, and determine institutional responsibilities. In the current context, keeping up and enhancing opportunities for talks between the FARC and the national government are key to guaranteeing the agreed security measures and to streamlining the prevention and protection measures needed to safeguard former combatants and their families.

2.5. Law enforcement security actions

The Colombian government enacted the National Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity, which emphasizes the need to have a multidimensional approach to security in order to dismantle the illegal armed groups that threaten peacebuilding and stabilization of the territories. In this respect, the GS/OAS is pleased that this policy focuses state efforts on the structural development of the territories and not just their military control.

The GS/OAS likewise notes the delineation of five Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (ZEII)—known now as *Zonas Futuro*—in Catatumbo, Bajo Cauca, Sur de Córdoba, Arauca, Chiribiquete, and nearby national parks and the Pacific coast of Nariño. The strategy seeks to ensure sustained and comprehensive unified, coordinated, and interagency actions by the government in those territories most affected by the presence and activities of illegal armed groups by developing special plans to strengthen the social State under the rule of law, giving priority to social services and enhanced measures to protect the population and the environment. The *Zonas Futuro* are also expected to hasten implementation of the PDETs.

The GS/OAS also recognizes the efforts of public security forces to ensure a presence in the territories, among these, placement of Rapid Deployment Force 3 (FUDRA No. 3) in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander); this Force has secured important operational results in the territory. Despite their best efforts to avoid a humanitarian situation, clashes with the ELN resulted in mass displacements in the municipality of Teorama (Norte de Santander) and harassment at police stations in the region's municipal capitals.

The main success of Operation Orinoquía, which was part of the Zeus military campaign, was the takedown, in February 2019, of “a.k.a. Rodrigo Cadete,” one of the leaders of the GAOR in the department of Caquetá. It is, however, important to note that the impact of this outcome has not been felt in terms of security in the department inasmuch as the dissident group continues to engage in extortion, threats, conscription of new members, forced recruitment of children and adolescents, etc.

20. In various public statements, leaders of the FARC party have reported the murders of 139 demobilized former combatants since late 2016. See: <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/excomandante-de-las-farc-asesinado-era-el-mensajero-de-la-paz-articulo-860746>

Likewise, Operation Atalanta, conducted by public security forces for purposes of stopping the influx of inputs, destroying alkaloid-processing labs, and seizing marijuana and cocaine, led to the capture of members of the GAOR found in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the GAOR continues to up its game in the territory by conscripting and forcibly recruiting children and adolescents.

In light of the foregoing, in addition to military deployments, it is essential to focus efforts on strengthening the strategic transformation pillars contained in the National Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity, as well as the unified and comprehensive action conceived in the *Zonas Futuro* strategy. This would help to secure structural transformation in the territories and real and effective improvements to security conditions there.

3. ILLICIT CROP REDUCTION STRATEGY

In the first half of 2019, the GS/OAS learned that the national government had implemented different strategies to address the issues associated with illicit crops. In this connection, implementation of the Comprehensive Policy to Tackle the Drug Problem (*Ruta Futuro*), which includes illicit crop eradication actions and measures aimed at dealing with drug production and trafficking, domestic use, and transformation in the areas affected by this scourge, stands out.

The Colombian government has emphasized that reducing and eliminating illicit crops requires a combination of all possible strategies and modes, including forced eradication by means of aerial spraying with glyphosate. This position prompted a public hearing on March 7, 2019 before the Constitutional Court to follow up on Judgment T-236 of 2017, which had resulted in the suspension of aerial spraying with glyphosate under the principle of caution, given its potential effects on human health and the environment.

After some months of study and analysis, the Constitutional Court issued, in July 2019, an explanatory ruling upholding the six conditions established in 2017 for reactivation of the Program for Eradicating Illicit Crops via Aerial Spraying (PECIG), explaining that these should not be interpreted literally, especially with respect to demonstrating, with absolute certainty, the absence of harm to health and the environment from glyphosate. Accordingly, resumption of aerial spraying was left to the National Narcotics Council, the agency responsible for developing and issuing the necessary regulations and processes for effective implementation of this type of eradication.

In this context, the GS/OAS acknowledges that the challenge lies in prioritizing and pursuing strategies that enable sustainable reduction of the cultivated areas and, simultaneously, the economic reconversion of the territories, in addition to actions aimed at dismantling the criminal structures responsible for boosting drug production and trade, tracking chemical substances and production infrastructure, and fighting money laundering.

Regarding substitution, the Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) continues to be the primary strategy. In the first half of 2019, the Colombian government made institutional adjustments and upped the budget to keep its commitment to the 99,097 families

involved in the program as growers, non-growers, and pickers of coca leaves in 56 municipalities in 14 departments.^{21/}

The main adjustments include reactivation of the Strategic Steering Board, as the senior decision-making organization for the PNIS, and development of a roadmap for stabilization as an instrument for planning and coordination among the plans, programs, and strategies required for the ordered implementation of the Final Agreement throughout Colombia.

Likewise, the PNIS has been strengthened by the interagency strategies of the agriculture and environment sectors, such as “Formalize to Substitute” under the National Lands Agency (ANT), and the development of sustainable use systems for strategic environmental areas under the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and National Parks.

Another accomplishment the GS/OAS hails is the coordination and targeting of international cooperation resources toward programs to support families involved in the PNIS as one dimension of implementation of the Final Agreement. An example hereof is the review of the “Catatumbo Sostenible” [Sustainable Catatumbo] strategy^{22/} done by the Colombian Donor Coordination Group (GRUC) and the Colombian government in an effort to promote greater coordination between the support provided by donor countries and national, departmental, and municipal priorities when it comes to stabilizing the region of Catatumbo, where illicit crop substitution is one of the core items on the agenda.

At the level of the territories, despite all of the foregoing, and two years into the implementation of the PNIS, the GS/OAS has observed that challenges remain as far as discrepancies in the implementation of the different components contained in the family Immediate Response Plan (PAI) are concerned. The main challenge lies in how little synchronization there is between finalization of work income payments for families to support themselves and implementation of the food security program and productive projects for the grower and non-grower populations. To this, we can add other factors like disagreements with technical assistance operators and delays in assistance to the community of pickers or community managers.

The GS/OAS underscores the importance of clarifying the status of families that have been suspended from the program for different reasons.^{23/} Notification of decisions regarding the suspended families, development of a protocol for reactivating them in the PNIS system, and a purge of those who fail to meet the conditions for becoming program beneficiaries remain pending in the short term.

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21. UNDOC (15 February 2019). Consolidated Executive Report No.16. Monitoring and verification of illicit crop substitution commitments – Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS).
 22. “Catatumbo Sostenible” is an interagency coordination mechanism spearheaded by the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation that aims to link local governments with different national agencies and bring to them institutional services that can help to transform this region in the department of Norte de Santander.
 23. (i) Inconsistencies in terms of affiliation or in the official socioeconomic information databases; (ii) delays in or failure to attend visits to verify compliance with commitments; (iii) partial or no uprooting of crops; (iv) difficulties in proving ownership or obtaining land for the productive component.

The GS/OAS has also observed the impact of delays in attention to the picker population. In departments like Arauca, Caquetá, and Putumayo people have moved to areas with illicit crops to work picking coca leaves given there are no other sources of employment. Along these lines, it is important to move forward with attention to this group as a way to eliminate the availability of skilled labor for this type of work.

As noted in prior reports, the perceived displeasure of the PNIS beneficiary population has prompted social mobilizations and protests in an effort to demand the process move faster. In the first half of 2019, this was seen primarily in Sur de Córdoba, the municipality of Ituango (Antioquia), and in some of Caquetá's municipalities, like San José del Fragua, Puerto Rico, Florencia, and La Montañita. Unlike the mobilizations of previous years, this time around grassroots and second tier social organizations took the lead, with less of a role played by national-level platforms.

The GS/OAS underscores that the presence and activities of illegal armed groups in regions like Sur de Córdoba and Bajo Cauca, in departments like Guaviare, and municipalities like Tumaco (Nariño), etc. have contributed to delays in the PNIS roadmap. In these territories, the system for substitution continues to be perceived as risky for anyone involved in the process, including in areas where the program never managed to move past the collective agreements phase.

In this connection, the GS/OAS notes the continued impacts on individuals who promote illicit crop substitution, namely: extortion or thefts after days when mass family self-sufficiency payouts are made; constraints on participation in program activities or entry into territories of institutions associated with substitution; and killings of PNIS beneficiaries or leadership, which occurred in Tumaco (Nariño) in March and in San José de Uré (Córdoba) in May.

As a response strategy, the GS/OAS applauds the development and implementation of the Plan for Coordinating Security Actions for the Target Population of the PNIS, spearheaded by the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Coordination and coordinated via the Interagency Coordination Group for Stabilization and Consolidation, with the Police Unit for Peace-building (UNIPEP) and the National Police Elite Corps, the Strategic Joint Command for the Transition (CCOET) of the Armed Forces, the UNP, the Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, and the ARN.

To date, measures have been implemented under the plan in the municipality of Tumaco (Nariño) such as self-defense workshops, creation of support networks, improved territorial connectivity, changes in leadership roles in terms of operation of the PNIS, tweaks to the program's administrative procedures, low profile mechanisms for reporting and notification, and the establishment of channels for filing reports with and securing the attention of the authorities. Plans are being made to extend the strategy to the PNIS municipalities of Putumayo, Cauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, and Córdoba during the second half of 2019, with measures adapted to the particular characteristics of each territory.

Forced eradication, mainly of coca plants, is perceived by many communities as directly impacting their economy and is something that sows mistrust in national government institutions and creates risk because of opposition by illegal armed groups. In municipalities like Tumaco, for example, these risks have manifested in the use of landmines against members of public security forces and the civilian population.

In this regard, the GS/OAS values the development of a new version of the “differentiated attention path” for the community of illicit crop eradicators, led by the Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) agency, which falls under the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace and coordinates with the National Police Counter Narcotics Directorate. This, bearing in mind that eradication squads were among the groups most affected by landmines in the first half of 2019, with approximately 30 cases, most in Tumaco, Nariño.^{24/}

In this context, the GS/OAS learned of some social protest and mobilization actions to stop the advance of land spraying or eradication days in municipalities like San Miguel and Puerto Asís (Putumayo), Ituango (Antioquia), and Argelia (Cauca). It has been suggested that in Putumayo illegal armed groups or drug trafficking structures are forcing communities to clash with public security forces in order to put a stop to eradication efforts.

In addition to impacts on areas with coca crops, challenges exist in connection with tackling problems associated with marijuana. In territories in the department of Cauca, more marijuana is being grown because of pressure by illegal armed groups on communities. Given this situation, the GS/OAS is encouraging the Colombian government to coordinate actions with ethnic and territorial authorities and supplement these with initiatives to economically restructure the territories based on uses and customs.

Despite the execution of the PNIS and forced eradication work, coca growing continues to be the main economic engine and source of income in several municipalities in departments like Chocó, Cauca, and Putumayo, and in subregions like Catatumbo and the mountain range and Pacific coast of Nariño. While there are multiple reasons for this, illicit crops clearly continue to offer economic advantages in terms of sales and revenues to cover unmet socioeconomic needs that other products do not. Moreover, illegal armed groups continue to incentivize, or pressure, communities to keep their coca plantations, and since current reduction strategies have not yet reached those territories, planting and production carry on.

With that in mind, the GS/OAS is urging the Colombian government to make the most of the substitution proposals and dynamics coming from the heart of the affected territories, safeguarding them from possible interference by illegal armed groups and securing agreements to address the threat to national and hemispheric security represented by the illegal coca growing economy.

4. SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT

According to reports by the Center for Social Dialogue and Coexistence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), the first half of 2019 saw 264 events^{25/} associated with social conflict in Colombia. The three main mobilizations that took place between January and June 2019—the Indigenous *Minga* [Movement] to Defend Life, Territory, Justice, Democracy, and Peace; the Mass National Strike; and the Humanitarian Shelter for the Lives of Social Leaders—lie at the center of the rise in social conflict, given their important political role and demands.

These mobilizations brought together social, ethnic, and *campesino* organizations, ranging from grassroots to second-tier organizations that are engaged in political dialogue with the national government. The main items on their agenda include: opposition to the National Development

24. Descontamina Colombia “*Base Víctimas por Minas*” [Landmine victims database], 2019.

25. Data reported on June 4, 2019.

Plan (2018-2022); civic and regional groups' demands; and the demand that social leaders' right to life be guaranteed.

In this regard, the GS/OAS notes that these social protests and mobilizations have greatly raised the profiles of the social leaders who were engaging in dialogue with the national government among the illegal armed groups, which has led to collective risk that has taken a toll on individuals and spread to organizations such as in the case of the members of the Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the Association of Community Councils of Norte del Cauca (ACONC).

The “Indigenous *Minga* [Movement] to Defend Life, Territory, Justice, Democracy, and Peace” [the “*Minga*”] was the longest running mobilization in the recent past and was coordinated, at a political level, by different *campesino*, indigenous, and environmental sectors. The *Minga* began as a regional movement concentrated in the departments of Cauca and Huila, but subsequently became a national indigenous *Minga* after several of Colombia's regional indigenous organizations joined in, mainly from the departments of Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Caquetá, Córdoba, and Putumayo.

In this *Minga*, besides the list of demands from each participating organization and sector, a national agenda was drawn up that included both political issues and demands related to defense of the right to life, protection of territory,^{26/} implementation of the Final Agreement, security guarantees, fulfillment of previous agreements, objections to the National Development Plan (2018-2022), among others. For their part, the Mass National Strike of April 25 and the Humanitarian Shelter initiative took up a large part of the demands from the indigenous *Minga*.

As to security, during the *Minga* in the department of Cauca, members of public security forces were detained at points where roads or indigenous territories were being blocked by the Guardia Indígena [Indigenous Guard]. In some cases these were branded kidnappings by the national government, while the indigenous authorities claimed this was an exercise in territorial control against the threat of infiltration in the protest by law enforcement.^{27/} This difference in opinion prompted a temporary suspension in the dialogue between the national government and the indigenous communities.

In the municipalities of Miranda, Toribio, Suárez, Santander de Quilichao, and Caldono in the department of Cauca, the *Frente 6* GAOR engaged in attacks against police stations and harassed public security forces at the protests, roadblocks, and locations where dialogue was taking place.

Another security-related incident that affected the *Minga* was an explosion on Thursday, March 21, 2019 in a rural part of the municipality of Dagua,^{28/} department of Valle del Cauca, which left eight indigenous people dead, and four wounded^{29/} just days before talks were set to begin with the national government on the La Delfina reserve in the municipality of Buenaventura.

26. It includes topics like: consultations with communities regarding energy-related mining; indigenous authorities as environmental authorities; banning hydraulic fracking; prior consultations as a fundamental right; and *campesinos* as subjects of rights.

27. In all cases they were released after the MAPP/OAS and other national and international organizations interceded.

28. The Special Indigenous Jurisdiction is conducting investigations into this matter.

29. Although when the present report was being finished, notice was received that one of these individuals had died in the hospital they were taken to.

In spite of these challenges, the GS/OAS looks positively on the willingness of the national government to foster social dialogue as a response and path toward solution for the different groups that are demanding, in the framework of legitimate social protest, access to rights and fulfillment of agreements and historical debts.

The agreements reached in the *Mingas* in Valle and Norte del Cauca in April 2019 serve to reaffirm the path of dialogue and understanding. Fulfillment of the mutual commitments will complete the sense of effort and close the virtuous circle of this peaceful and democratic path.

In some cases, the MAPP/OAS was called in as a third party to bring the parties together by encouraging confidence-building actions, moderating dialogues, and managing exchanges in an open and purposeful environment. The GS/OAS, through the Mission, makes its human and technical resources available, convinced that democracy and economic and social development are interdependent and reinforce one another. It also believes that promoting and enforcing economic, social, and cultural rights is essential to integral development, economic growth with equity, and the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in the countries of the Hemisphere.

The GS/OAS is continuing to identify real and potential challenges in terms of social conflict associated with: (i) strategies for reducing illicit crops; (ii) the environment; (iii) the model for energy-related mining development; and (iv) ethnic and territorial conflicts in collective territories.

With regard to the environment, social conflict is becoming increasingly significant, especially when it comes to the absence of land use planning and the social impact of military strategies, which have raised the profile of socio-environmental conflicts primarily surrounding the growing problem of deforestation and the presence of campesino populations inside protected areas, forest preserves, or natural parks.

In the area of mining and energy, there is concern about increases in the illegal mining of ore, especially in the regions of Bajo Cauca Antioquia, Sur de Bolívar, and Amazonas. In this regard, difficulties in formalization processes, the activities of large companies, and resistance to State actions against illegal mining continue to cause tension in the territories, which then turns into ineffectively managed conflicts in areas where illegal armed groups interested in controlling the revenues of these economies are also present.

Regarding the oil and gas sector, communities are continuing to demand improved working conditions, the use of local labor, and protection of the environment, and in some places, they completely reject any type of intervention by these companies. Likewise, the environmental and public health-related impacts of extractive activities are striking, as is the rejection of dam and hydroelectric projects in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Putumayo.

In the collective territories of ethnically differentiated communities, potential social conflicts have been identified, including displays of xenophobia brought on by the arrival of Venezuelans in their territories, particularly in the border departments of La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Putumayo, Nariño, and Chocó. Social conflict dynamics have also been observed on the borders with Ecuador, Peru, and Panama in connection with the illegal exploitation of natural resources³⁰ and with issues of food security owing to increased fishing in border rivers.

30. Illegal mining, logging, environmental impacts caused by oil spills, etc.

5. COMPREHENSIVE TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION, AND NON-REPETITION SYSTEM

The GS/OAS believes that Colombia has a tremendous opportunity to make major advances in truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition with implementation of the Comprehensive Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition System (SIVJRN or “the System”). In this regard, it notes the opportunity afforded by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) as a tool for justice and fighting impunity in the face of serious violations of human rights and infringement of international humanitarian law in the framework of armed conflict, by helping to clarify facts and dismantle criminal structures and, as a result, contribute to guarantees of non-repetition.

The JEP has made significant progress in implementing the transitional justice system. There are cases in the territories that help make it possible to understand both the differentiated impacts the conflict had in different areas and different actors’ patterns of action. To date, seven cases have been opened. Of those, Case 006 “Victimization of members of the Unión Patriótica [Patriotic Union] by state agents”^{31/} and Case 007 “Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict”^{32/} were opened during the first half of the year. Furthermore, Case 005 was broadened to include municipalities from the south of Valle del Cauca in the cases of the municipalities from the north of Cauca.

Actions aimed at guaranteeing the incorporation of differential approaches into all of the JEP’s activities, including positive actions like the creation of commissions on ethnicity, gender, and most recently, participation, stand out. Also noteworthy is the implementation of a policy for bringing indigenous authorities in as special parties, with some of the prerogatives of procedural actors.

Despite these advances, the GS/OAS is concerned about the continued existence of barriers to access to justice that have historically impacted communities and persist in the context of the JEP in the form of difficulties State institutions are having in establishing a presence in the territories most affected by the armed conflict and criminal activity, excessive technicalities, *de facto* justice meted out by illegal armed groups, troubles with collecting evidence, etc. Likewise, misinformation and doubts persist in the territories about the work of the JEP, which is why it is important to insist upon dissemination and clear explanations of its achievements.

As to reports filed by civil society, the GS/OAS has observed that organizations in the territories most affected by the armed conflict and criminal activity are the ones least able to submit reports, especially because of limited access to technology, the difficulties and costs associated with collecting information in scattered areas, and the security risks they face.

In addition, in some cases it appears that the processes for preparing reports call for information that has already been collected via other processes, e.g. characterization of the harm in cases of land restitution and reestablishment of territorial rights, assessments of harm in the framework of comprehensive reparations processes, ordinary justice, and/or Justice and Peace. With this in mind, the GS/OAS believes it is urgent to move forward with establishing coordination between the JEP and entities like the Office of the Ombudsman, the justice system, the Victim Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation Unit (UARIV), and the Land Restitution Unit, so as to create expedited

31. Opened on February 26, 2019.

32. Opened on March 1, 2019.

channels for obtaining information, thereby mitigating the risks of revictimization and avoiding additional burdens on victims.^{33/}

These difficulties, added to the brief timelines established for filing reports,^{34/} can undermine effective access for victims. That being said, the efforts of the Office of the Ombudsman to offer support for the reports has been key, and competent agencies, particularly those that fall under the Public Prosecution Ministry, are encouraged to enhance support for the preparation and submission of these reports. It will likewise be important to strengthen both the Investigation and Indictment Unit (UIA) for cases that are difficult to document, e.g. environmental crimes, crimes against children and adolescents or within the ranks, and channels for protecting victims, emphasizing collective measures.

The GS/OAS has also identified challenges in connection with certifying [victims] under the JEP's legal proceedings, which, in turn, means limitations in terms of access to information from the voluntary statements and other proceedings. Such limitations are evidenced by the lack of understanding of processes and financial difficulties when it comes to obtaining and submitting documentation to the JEP. Added to this, the JEP is overwhelmed in its efforts to secure these certifications more quickly. In this context, the JEP is encouraged to make decisions aimed at overcoming the backlog and creating more accessible channels for victims in remote areas, with the appropriate government support.

The GS/OAS is calling for effective coordination between the JEP and Justice and Peace, since the latter has, via the Office of the Attorney General, created several frames of reference based on the Justice and Peace tribunals that could ultimately serve as the basis for building similar frames of reference in the JEP. At the same time, the GS/OAS believes the body of evidence amassed by Justice and Peace should be reviewed so it can be used in the proceedings before the JEP and can avoid duplication of efforts, which not only wears down victims, but can also lead to inconsistent opinions and frames of reference due to a lack of information.

In addition to the above, challenges persist with respect to the development, implementation, and monitoring of the alternative sentences [imposed by the JEP]. Accordingly, greater clarity is needed, particularly with respect to the repairing/restorative nature of these alternatives vis-à-vis victims and the need to coordinate with other agencies and programs, such as PNIS, PDETs, comprehensive reparation processes, etc.

The GS/OAS also believes it is necessary to better harmonize alternative sentencing, Reparation-related Jobs, Works, and Actions (TOAR), the conditions regime, and community service for peace of the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization (ARN). In this regard, the MAPP/OAS has provided the JEP with a document that compiles reflections, perceptions, regulations, and case law applicable to alternative sentencing that could help the JEP, and specifically the Sección de Reconocimiento [Acknowledgement Section], when it comes to imposing those sentences.

33. In this regard, the MAPP/OAS has developed a methodological guide that is helping several social organizations use those tools to submit reports to the JEP.

34. March 2020.

The GS/OAS also appreciates the opening of eleven (11) *Casas de la Verdad* [Truth Houses]^{35/} by the Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CEV), as well as the initial deployment of the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD) with its territorial teams.^{36/}

In working closely with the CEV, the MAPP/OAS has developed a knowledge transfer model based on reflections and lessons learned amassed over more than 15 years of work supporting and monitoring implementation of the different mechanisms of transitional justice, such as Law 975/2005 and Law 1448/2011.

In addition, the GS/OAS, through the MAPP/OAS, has developed a broad support strategy, both for the arrival of the CEV in the territories and for data collection days, for which different challenges have been identified, among them, the need to provide for differences and complementarity—primarily in the form of compensation—with respect to administrative reparations, and to create the appropriate conditions for collecting information that help to get to the bottom of what happened using a differential perspective.

For the GS/OAS the role documentation of coexistence initiatives plays in building democratic processes in the communities is key as is the creation of mechanisms and protocols aimed at ensuring security in the communities and for government employees as this work unfolds. As a result, it has made special reports available to the CEV with recommendations formulated during the work to support information collection on the so-called “trail of pain” in the department of Vichada.

5.1. Coordination with the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction

One of the challenges the JEP must address is how to work smoothly and in coordination with the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (JEI), not only because of the need to comply with the law governing the collective rights of ethnically different groups, but also because it serves as a unique opportunity to create new dynamics that help ensure integral justice, with respect for ancestral systems and fostering effective restoration of the social fabric and national reconciliation.

In light of the foregoing, the JEP-JEI coordination process is perceived as an initiative that could help to fine tune and streamline national-level coordination processes and help ensure that each one is carried out based on a vision that looks beyond a differential approach and moves toward intercultural and inter-jurisdictional dialogue. With this in mind, during the period of this report, the MAPP/OAS delivered a preliminary document on “Indigenous justice and restorative legal pluralism,” which aims to contribute to the debate and brainstorming surrounding harmonization between the JEI and the JEP, seeking as inputs the experiences of the jurisdictions themselves.

The GS/OAS acknowledges that in terms of the above, the Jurisdiction boasts two strengths: one is the presence of indigenous officials and magistrates who understand the JEI, its complexities, and how it works; and the second is the interest, both explicit and implicit, in avoiding the mistakes of previous coordination efforts and instead capitalizing on the successes thereof, which has taken the form of the Ethnic Commission, which meets in the framework of the Jurisdiction, and the development engagement protocols.

35. Ibagué, Sincelejo, Villavicencio, Cúcuta, Popayán, Barrancabermeja, Cali, Valledupar, San José del Guaviare, Apartadó, and Tumaco.

36. Barranquilla, Sincelejo, Rionegro, Apartado, Barrancabermeja, Cúcuta, Villavicencio, San José del Guaviare, Puerto Asís, and Cali.

The GS/OAS welcomes the fact that, during the period covered by this report, the JEP organized a number of opportunities for inter-jurisdictional dialogue in the context of Case 002 “Situation in Tumaco, Ricaurte, and Barbacoas” and Case 005 “Territorial situation in the Norte del Cauca and southern Valle del Cauca region.” The MAPP/OAS has supported six of these events with indigenous authorities from the Awá, Nasa, and Misak peoples in the municipalities of Ricaurte, Tumaco, and Pasto in the department of Nariño, and in Caloto and Pitayó in the department of Cauca.

However, with the understanding that the Jurisdiction’s work is just beginning, it is still possible to strengthen and improve some of its internal processes. Accordingly, continuation of the technical, legal, and cultural work that helps define the scope of the “ethnic relevance” to be managed in the steps and procedures is essential. Moreover, consensus must be reached among the different chambers, the tribunal, the units, and the working groups of the JEP as to the nature of their engagement with indigenous peoples. Ensuring that this engagement is not tied to the particular interest of any chamber or magistrate, but rather to an institutional policy will be key.

6. JUSTICE IN THE TERRITORIES

The GS/OAS reiterates its acknowledgement of the efforts of the Colombian State to enhance government presence when it comes to justice, the fight against impunity, and promotion of the culture of legality, through effective security and transparent justice.

In this connection, the GS/OAS notes the work of the Office of the Attorney General, which via its Strategic Plan (2016-2020), has focused its efforts on going after organized crime, helping to bring the armed conflict to an end without impunity, improving access to justice, and strengthening criminal justice in the territories via measures aimed at placing victims at the center and streamlining both investigative processes and channels for filing grievances.

The MAPP/OAS’ monitoring in the first half of 2019 revealed a justice-related government presence in both urban and rural areas in 65 municipalities where the Mission is represented. In this regard, there was a notable presence of prosecutors, magistrates, police inspectors, forensic medicine teams, judicial police, and, periodically, judicial brigades to enable communities to more easily access justice services. For example, in Tibú (Norte de Santander), a municipality experiencing high levels of conflict, a forensic medicine center was set up at the beginning of the year to help with investigation processes there.

Despite the above efforts, however, the GS/OAS still observes institutional weaknesses that limit the possibilities of consolidating a culture of legality and fighting against impunity. Such weaknesses are primarily related to a lack of sufficient staff in prosecutors’ offices, of a permanent team of judicial police to facilitate investigations, and of “conciliators in equity.” This dynamic is especially acute in municipalities located in the departments of Cauca, Chocó,^{37/} Nariño, Putumayo, and Bajo Cauca where the situation tends to be more critical in rural areas because of geographic challenges in accessing those territories and problematic security conditions.

Under these circumstances, different types of illegal activities are easier to carry out, especially when one or more illegal armed groups are present and operating in the territory. One of the most

37. Especially in the municipalities of Sipí and San José del Palmar.

evident is *de facto* justice, in other words, things like extortion, restrictions on mobility, the establishment of norms of coexistence, or resolution of community conflicts imposed by illegal armed groups in order to control the population.

6.1. Special Indigenous Jurisdiction

The GS/OAS acknowledges that the Colombian State as a whole has promoted not just practical, but also legal, actions for protecting the collective rights of ethnic peoples, especially indigenous peoples, and applauds the continuation of actions to guarantee the jurisdictional autonomy of these communities. The GS/OAS also underscores the efforts of the indigenous authorities of the 102 peoples recognized in Colombia to enhance their own systems of justice in accordance with their cosmovision and to create more spaces for dialogue with other national jurisdictions.

In this connection, the GS/OAS has observed the following: an increasing number of justice proceedings spearheaded by indigenous authorities; the development of life plans among the different peoples; formalization of internal regulations and coexistence manuals in the different indigenous *cabildos* [assemblies], councils, and reserves; and implementation of alternatives adjusted to the uses and customs of the communities, such as *Centros de Armonización Indígena* [Centers for Indigenous Harmonization] or *Casas de Reflexión* [Houses of Reflection], in cases warranting deprivation of liberty for community members.

The GS/OAS has also observed consistent participation by the peoples and the government in the inter-jurisdictional departmental working groups as well as national indigenous organizations working regularly in the framework of the National Inter-Jurisdictional Commission for Coordination between the National Justice System and the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (COCOIN). These serve as an opportunity for solving, in practice, the structural problems and particularities that have arisen out of the absence of a national coordination law.

The GS/OAS values the creation of spaces for coordination in the departments of Vaupés and La Guajira, as well as training on the JEI offered by the Office of the Attorney General and its field offices. The GS/OAS also applauds the COCOIN meeting held in the first half of 2019 for purposes of following up on issues related to violence against women and children and adolescents, as well as the agreement reached there to develop a work plan that includes discussion about and the feasibility of prior consultation on the Ten-year Plan for Justice, the draft law on Coordination, and the establishment of five departmental working groups throughout Colombia this year.

Progress in this regard is essential if we bear in mind that approximately 30% of Colombian territory is indigenous,^{38/} and that strengthening indigenous legal mechanisms is the ideal way not just to mitigate crime and fight against impunity in the territories, but also to prevent violation of and protect the rights of the indigenous population and prevent conflicts both within and outside the communities.

The GS/OAS is seeing a progressive strengthening of the JEI, but notes that major challenges remain in terms of indigenous justice processes and that making these visible and continuing to work on overcoming these challenges is important.

38. According to official DANE figures, as of 2005, titled [indigenous] reserves occupied approximately 34 million hectares, or 29.8%, of Colombian territory. DANE “*La visibilización estadística de los grupos étnicos colombianos*” [Statistical view of Colombia’s ethnic groups]. Available at: https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/etnia/sys/visibilidad_estadistica_etnicos.pdf

The first of these challenges is the persistence of factors in the territories that constrain the development of justice processes, for example, the presence of illegal armed groups. The ongoing presence of organized armed structures in indigenous communities hampers and limits both the actions of local authorities and the effective implementation of their justice system inasmuch it precludes the possibility of effectively prosecuting those who are harming the communities. This is not a trivial matter if one considers that there have been threats, intimidation, and deaths of indigenous leaders perpetrated by the organized armed groups present in ethnic territories.

The second challenge has to do with the uptick in illegal activities impacting the environment in indigenous reserves and national parks, as well as the serious difficulties indigenous authorities face in bringing these cases to justice. The GS/OAS is concerned about the increasingly visible proliferation of deforestation to make way for ranching, the illegal trafficking of species, expanding coca fields, water contamination, and illegal mining on the reserves. These territories are being targeted because of the wealth of natural resources and biodiversity they boast and because of how distant they are from population centers.

This situation poses challenges for the JEI, the ordinary jurisdiction, and the State when it comes to protecting natural resources. Accordingly, the GS/OAS hails both the recognition of the environment as a strategic national asset and the resulting environmental protection initiative known as “Artemisa,” spearheaded by the Colombian government with the support of the Office of the Attorney General, though it notes there is a glaring lack of coordination with the indigenous authorities present in a large swath of the territory where interventions are planned.

The GS/OAS believes it is important for the Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice to deepen their efforts in terms of regulations, investigations, and prosecutions of these types of crimes, while at the same time ensuring coordinated action with indigenous peoples.

7. PUBLIC POLICY FOR VICTIMS AND PEACE IN THE TERRITORIES

7.1. Restitution of lands and reestablishment of territorial rights

The public policy of land restitution and reestablishment of territorial rights is aimed at reversing the impact of the dispossession, forced abandonment, and other attacks on territories that occurred as part of the internal armed conflict in Colombia. For Colombia this is one of the core pillars of comprehensive reparation for victims and a tool for raising the profile on how violence was used to deal with age-old agrarian disputes over land use and tenure, especially in rural areas.

In this connection, the GS/OAS recognizes efforts made by the Colombian State that enabled it to organize a significant deployment to a good part of its territory and handle 74.66% of the requests approved by the Ministry of Defense because the necessary security conditions were in place, which accounted for 58.68% of all of the requests submitted.^{39/}

39. Land Restitution Unit, “*Estadísticas de Restitución de Tierras-Registro de Tierras Despojadas y Abandonadas Forzosamente*” [Land Restitution Statistics – Registry of Forcedly Dispossessed and Abandoned Lands], July 2019. Available at: <https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/estadisticas-de-restitucion-de-tierras>

Despite this progress, concerns remain that just two years out from the expiration of this public policy, no legislative initiatives have been presented to extend it, even while armed conflict persists in some regions of the country, thereby impeding the processing of 25,989 requests (21% of the total). This figure could rise bearing in mind that, according to government sources, up until April 2019 alone, 25 mass displacements had occurred in Catatumbo, Bajo Cauca Antioquia,^{40/} Arauca, Urabá Chocó, and the southwestern part of the country, resulting in 7,123 victims.^{41/}

The foregoing makes it possible to infer the number of cases of forced abandonment, as contrasted with the low number of requests for registration in the Registry of Forcibly Dispossessed and Abandoned Lands received during the same period—a mere 823^{42/}—which is the lowest figure since the policy was instituted.^{43/}

Preliminarily, the Land Restitution Unit appears to have refrained from implementing Decree 1167/2018, which contains measures that could be considered regressive when it comes to respecting the rights of victims. Instead, it has used a pro-victim approach as the framework for implementation. The GS/OAS believes this was a positive decision and reiterates the need to redouble efforts to massively socialize among the communities both the restitution process and the implications of the above Decree, which limits the ability to submit requests for restitution.

The GS/OAS also applauds the fact that Colombia has a robust administrative and judicial apparatus extending into the territories that has enabled the government to issue 5,045 individual judgments, 14 judgments in favor of indigenous communities, and 2 in favor of Afro-Colombian communities that were victims of impacts in the territories. Nevertheless, judicial backlog in terms of individual cases is striking—these account for 64.29% (17,978 cases) of all cases and include 52 claims by ethnic groups awaiting judgments and more than 100 precautionary measures that could turn into claims. These numbers are discouraging if we compare them to the progress made in eight out of the ten years the policy has been in force, and bearing in mind that, unlike the past two years, no agreement was reached in 2019 to address the backlog by creating temporary courts to take on some of the workload of the existing courts.

The GS/OAS looks positively on the fact that the URT and territorial agencies^{44/} are promoting the creation of technical monitoring groups and the holding of interagency meetings to follow up on

40. In the municipality of Cáceres (Antioquia), the high number of displacements caused by the presence of illegal actors in the urban center who seek to control the territory is creating a situation conducive to the dispossession and seizure of abandoned homes. In this regard, there is a need to create pathways for protecting urban goods that foster the material and legal protection of properties.

41. Office of the Ombudsman, *Boletín Informativo #2* [Newsletter #2], February 1–April 25, 2019. Available at: <http://www.defensoria.gov.co/public/pdf/Boletin-mayo-Desplazados-2019.pdf>

42. Figures, Victims Unit. 07/01/2019. Available at: <http://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/tierras?tema=40&subtema=41>

43. MinTic, Datos Solicitudes de restitución según mes de presentación. Available at: <https://www.datos.gov.co/Agricultura-y-Desarrollo-Rural/Solicitudes-de-restituci-n-seg-n-mes-de-presentaci/qsrc-b3k4>

44. This is the case of the interagency follow-up meeting on the judgment reestablishing the territorial rights of the Community Council of the Yurumanguí river basin in the municipality of Buenaventura issued under the leadership of the Secretariat of Peace of the Interior Department of the Valle del Cauca.

the orders issued in the restitution processes,^{45/} particularly those associated with the reestablishment of territorial rights for indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities whose territories have seen an increased presence of illegal armed groups. Such groups are involved primarily in drug trafficking and have been imposing territorial and social controls, thereby endangering the physical and cultural survival of communities, which are seeing their capacity for food sovereignty and to use their territory destroyed and their ability to develop life plans or pursue ethno-development quashed.

The above can be seen in the cases of the Embera de Urada-Jiguamiandó and Nukak indigenous communities, the Yaguara 2 multi-ethnic reserve, the Afro-descendant communities of Jiguamiandó, Curvaradó, Alto Mira, and Frontera, and the indigenous and Afro-descendant communities of the Baudó river basin, where, despite there being precautionary measures in place, “settlers” continue to engage in coca raising, illegal mining, deforestation, and land grabbing within the ethnic territories, as well as confinement, use of APM/UXO/IEDs, recruitment of children and adolescents, and threats and killings targeting traditional authorities. These authorities complain about the ineffectiveness of prevention measures and protection systems afforded by the Colombian government and are therefore demanding that self-protection measures and strategies, like indigenous guards, be strengthened.

Lastly, the GS/OAS reiterates the importance of linking land restitution to other public policies like illicit crop reduction, humanitarian demining, and community rural land planning programs that include the mass formalization of land titles, multi-purpose cadasters, and the standardization of environmental protection laws, as called for in some of the PDETs/PATRs. All of this for purposes of pursuing interventions in the territories that make it possible to work broadly, and with ample participation, in a secure environment on social conflicts related to land use and ownership. Such interventions will also aim to economically revive regions affected by the armed conflict and develop the infrastructure necessary for implementation of socially and environmentally sustainable productive rural structures that will enable rural areas in Colombia to transform and move toward peace and rule of law.

7.2. Comprehensive reparation for victims

The National Development Plan (2018-2022) (PND) has outlined guidelines to assist and compensate victims. The document confirms what was announced in the Twenty-sixth semiannual report—victims would be included in social programs designed to overcome conditions of vulnerability under the Social Protection System.^{46/} The rationale behind this was government efficiency.

Although victims agree with the government that social handout processes should not be maintained and the difficulties the state faces in implementing public policy must be overcome, they do not see a rights-based stance in the PND. For the individuals affected by the internal armed conflict, the differentiated approach afforded the victims is weakly reflected in the Plan; hence, their concern

45. Especially with respect to construction of homes, property appraisals, road infrastructure works, and job training for the judgments’ beneficiaries, as well as their effective enjoyment of rights like health and education.

46. Specifically, through the System to Identify Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programs. (SISBÉN)

about what they consider could be a rollback in victims' rights given a potential reduction in resources allocated,^{47/} aims,^{48/} and the absence of clear prioritized or targeted criteria.^{49/}

Furthermore, with two years left before Law 1448/2011 lapses, discussion on progress that has been achieved in comprehensive reparations is particularly important. The GS/OAS encourages revisiting as an input the report of the Commission to Follow-Up and Monitor the Victims Law.^{50/} In 2018 this report warned about defunding^{51/} and the need to take measures to overcome delays in the Law's implementation looking ahead to 2021. This situation shapes the debate on whether to extend or amend the Victims Law.

Guarantees of victims' rights must be protected in either situation. In the case of an amendment to Law 1448/2011, victims demand they be given opportunities to debate changes to the public policy affecting them, thus contributing to the realization of their rights.^{52/} In the case of an extension [of the Law], for the population affected by the conflict, it is essential that sufficient economic resources be ensured to go forward with the Law's implementation.^{53/}

7.2.1. Collective Reparation

The GS/OAS acknowledges the institutional efforts undertaken to achieve comprehensive reparation. In keeping with reports from the UARIV, from January 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019, 724 measures of the Comprehensive Collective Reparation Plans (PIRCs) were implemented, which provide for measures of satisfaction, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition, and compensation. The implementation of compensation measures has meant full compliance with six beneficiaries' PIRCs.^{54/} During this same period, 18 beneficiaries of collective reparation (SRC) formulated their PIRCs and an assessment or description of harm was prepared with 20 other collectives; this, of the approximately 600 beneficiaries recognized to date.

47. The National Development Plan redirects resources for assistance and reparations, reduces the amounts for administrative reparations, and fails to define either resources or specific goals for access to the right to health, housing, or education. The "*Pacto por la construcción de paz: cultura de la legalidad, convivencia, estabilización y víctimas*" [Pact for peace-building: culture of legality, coexistence, stabilization, and victims] has an earmark of COL\$10,431,000,000, and *Reparación: Colombia atiende y repara a las víctimas* [Reparations: Colombia assists and compensates victims] has COL\$1,213,600,000.

48. Victim assistance and compensation aims dropped with respect to the past four-year period.

49. They have become the responsibility of other entities of the Social Protection System.

50. Comprised of the Office of the Inspector General (*Procuraduría*), Office of the Comptroller, Office of the Ombudsman, and the National Working Group for Effective Participation of Victims.

51. The estimated resources required to implement the public policy on victims and land restitution 2018-2021 is approximately \$129.29 trillion constant [Colombian] pesos as of 2018. Taken from the Fifth Follow-Up Report of the Congress of the Republic, Commission to Follow-Up and Monitor Implementation of Law 1448 of 2011.

52. In this regard, in September 2018, the political party *Centro Democrático* introduced a proposal to amend the Law, which is on its legislative agenda.

53. There is pending legal action before the Constitutional Court to have the effects of Law 1448 extended to 2030, pursuant to judgement T-25 of 2004 of the Court, and in keeping with the provisions of the Peace Agreements.

54. In 2018, the following PIRCs were implemented: the Comunidad de Pita, the Comunidad Del Centro Poblado Guayabal de Toledo, the Comunidad de Santa Isabel, the Comunidad de la Cabecera Municipal de Mistrató, and the Association of *Campesino* and Indigenous Women of El Zulia; in 2019, the PIRC for El Tire was implemented.

Nevertheless, comprehensive reparation of victims still faces challenges, especially in cases of collective reparations. By early 2019, the GS/OAS saw evidence of the turnover of teams of officials responsible for interacting with the beneficiaries of collective reparation (SRC), which led to a review of procedures through stocktaking exercises, under the guidelines outlined in Resolution 03143 of July 23, 2018.^{55/}

Despite this being a parameter-setting exercise, some beneficiaries considered that the actions were repetitive and did not contribute to progress in reparations procedures. The GS/OAS continues to note challenges both in building trust between institutions and collectives and in providing logistic and financial resources when collective processes so require for specific measures. Beneficiaries are requesting effective progress in processes for their collective reparation, inasmuch as seven years have gone by since the law was implemented and there has been little progress given the total number of collectives that have pursued the procedures.

7.2.1.1 Beneficiary of Collective Reparation: Communal Action Organizations

Communal Action Organizations (OACs) are voluntary organizations created to lead and foster community processes. The OACs' creation and operation are an expression of participation and life in the community. Present throughout the country, the OACs are the organizations most closely linked to local dynamics, reflecting neighborhood or community rationales. The OACs' grassroots foundations are the Communal Action Councils (JACs), which are the organizations that ascertain firsthand the different phenomena, opportunities, and risks communities face on a local level.

Society is organically taking the lead with actions to promote conflict resolution and territorial organization, and even resource management. The appearance of different kinds of organizations to protect community interests is, however, unfortunately becoming a risk factor given the presence of local actors who have territorial, economic, political, and social interests.

The transition period subsequent to the signing of the Final Agreement, the pace of the Agreement's implementation, and the negotiation itself with the ELN created loopholes in local regulation. Given the prospect of change, different actors—both legal and illegal ones—took steps to consolidate their own positions and the OACs were one of the territorial actors impacted by this situation.

The GS/OAS recognizes the decisive support to the sector of President Iván Duque, who has expressed his backing of communal organizations as an important social force to revitalize the country. The implementation of specific measures by the Directorate for Democracy, Citizen Participation, and Communal Action of the Ministry of the Interior and the President's support through political pronouncements and in the Communal Action's very own forums demonstrate the interest that exists in prioritizing work with this sector of the Colombian population.

The signing of Document 3955 of the National Council on Economic and Social Policy (CONPES 3955) of December 31, 2018,^{56/} as well as the launching of the Communal Actions Bank,

55. Pursuant to which, the Victim Assistance and Comprehensive Reparations Unit's collective reparations operational model was adopted.

56. Entitled "*Estrategia para el fortalecimiento de la Acción Comunal*" [Strategy for strengthening communal action].

has encouraged approaches that seek to bring about social cohesion among members of communal organizations, through citizen participation and a sense of belonging in their surroundings and environment. These constitute important initiatives to rebuild the social fabric and contribute effectively to peace-building at a territorial level.

The GS/OAS highlights forums such as the Communal Security Working Group, created under Ministry of the Interior resolution 1129 of 2018, in which entities of the State analyze the security challenges faced by community residents from a territorial and national perspective. The GS/OAS nevertheless encourages the State to outline timely actions to investigate and punish the perpetrators of 145 cases of threats, 68 homicides, displacement, and stigmatization documented by the MAPP/OAS between October 2017 and October 2018, and urges it to provide prevention and protection measures to communal leaders regarding violations they are subject to in their communities.

During the first six months of 2019, the OACs have made headway in their collective reparation procedure, taking stock of the information compiled nationwide, reactivating its Action Committee, officially validating the decision-making model, and lastly, establishing the collective magnitude of the harm suffered, which led, by mutual agreement of the OAC and the Unit, to setting the goal of finalizing the harm assessment by the second half of 2019.

7.3. Participation in territorial peace

7.3.1. Effective participation of victims

From August to November 2019 elections will be held for members of the Working Groups on Effective Participation of Victims; these Working Groups were created under Law 1448/2011, regulated by Decree 4800 of 2011, and developed under different administrative provisions of the UARIV.^{57/} They therefore have a broad and structured regulatory framework. In this respect, the GS/OAS highlights the significance of these groups as the means by which victims may advocate, through their organizations, with regard to public policy concerning them, including representatives of victims who live abroad.

During the first half of 2019,^{58/} the MAPP/OAS monitored different information dissemination exercises implemented by the UARIV, Public Prosecution Ministry, Office of the Ombudsman, or the Pastoral Support Services. In these exercises, information was provided on the elections to the Working Groups on Effective Participation of Victims, victims' organizations, and victim's defense organizations. For the GS/OAS, these measures were very constructive as far as encouraging participation and disseminating the rights of victims, as well as the role of these different institutions in this process.

The GS/OAS noted the impact of informative exercises and training in 18 municipalities spread across 8 departments, namely: the departments of Arauca, Cauca, Cesar, Guaviare, and Meta, municipalities of Arauca, Piamonte, Palitas, San José del Guaviare and El Castillo, respectively, as well as the municipalities of Belén de los Andaquíes, Curillo, San José del Fragua, and San Vicente

57. UARIV resolutions 0388/13, 0588/13, 01448/13, 0828/14, 01281/16, 01282/16, 01336/16, 01392/16, 0677/17, and 00250 of 2019.

58. Current figures are based on monitoring from January 1 to May 30, 2019. For the final version, these data should be updated.

del Caguán in Caquetá; El Carmen, El Tarra, Ocaña, San Calixto, and Villa del Rosario in Norte de Santander; in Bolívar; and Buenaventura and Pradera in Valle del Cauca.

Of note are the training and updating workshops on elections and installation of municipal and departmental working groups for victims' participation aimed at municipal attorneys and staff from offices of the ombudsmen, implemented by the UARIV using a theoretical and practical model. In the opinion of the GS/OAS, these institutional efforts develop skills and bring clarity to the installation of the Working Groups on Participation for the 2019-2021 period, which boosts the legitimacy of the individuals elected and contributes to building trust in institutions.

The GS/OAS has warned of the risks victims face and the need for effective measures to prevent them from being impacted and discontinuing their participation, and in general, to ensure their rights. There have been reports of victims being threatened in the municipalities of Fortul and Arauca (Arauca), Cáceres (Antioquia), and Valle del Guamuez (Putumayo) to deter them from assuming their role as representatives in these forums.

La GS/OAS thanks the Victims' Unit for inviting the MAPP/OAS to support the process for electing the members of the Working Group on Effective Participation in the municipalities, departments, and at a national level. At the same time, the GS/OAS reiterates its commitment to join forces so these elections can be a democratic exercise and so that victims' advocacy forums have a positive impact on the challenges identified when Working Group members were apprised of their role, as well as on good relations with territorial institutions, processes of transparency in use of resources, and independence of victims' agenda vis-à-vis other political participation processes, among others.

7.3.2. Territorial Councils for Peace, Coexistence, and Reconciliation

In the first half of 2019 the GS/OAS noted progress in the design, creation, and installation of Territorial Councils for Peace, Coexistence, and Reconciliation, primarily at a municipal level. This underscores the determination of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) to foster, galvanize, and manage these arenas for participation.

In the municipality of Samaniego (Nariño), diverse sectors of civil society and the municipal administration consider the Municipal Council for Peace, Coexistence, and Reconciliation an arena for dialogue and exchange of views on matters of peace, reconciliation, and coexistence locally. Its operation during this period, however, was affected by the murder, in May 2019, of Paula Andrea Rosero Ordóñez, the municipal attorney who served as the Chair of its Executive Committee.

La GS/OAS highlights and celebrates the role of Paula Andrea, who was deeply involved in fostering participation and ensuring the rights of women and the community in Samaniego. Her reprehensible murder not only ended the life of this public servant, but has also impacted the community's social fabric, constrained access to community rights, and had a chilling effect, particularly on women's social and political leadership.

In the municipality of San Pablo, located in the south of the department of Bolívar, the creation of the Municipal Council for Peace, Reconciliation, and Coexistence was spearheaded by the Working Group for Effective Participation of Victims. Coordination among diverse sectors of civil society and the decisive support of the municipal administration have been key in its creation. In this respect, the

GS/OAS has noted that both civil society and institutions need training on the scope and potential of this Council.

At the same time the GAS/OAS considers that of the plethora of forums for participation that exist at a territorial level, the Territorial Councils for Peace, Reconciliation, and Coexistence have the potential to be a space that enables an exchange of views between sectors of civil society and institutions on matters that concern them in the territory.

7.3.3. Participation of women in territorial peace

Building a solid foundation for peace requires more and better spaces for democratic participation that is broad, plural, and inclusive and that considers and guarantees, *inter alia*, women's representation and participation in the exercise of power. Given this, the GS/OAS is pleased that the Colombian State, through its different branches of government, is demonstrating visible progress in diverse political representation of women in decision-making spheres, including some that are vital in implementing the Final Agreement.

With regard to the mechanisms of the Comprehensive Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition System (SIVJRGN), it is noteworthy that the selection system has contributed to reducing the gender gap from an intersectional and territorial perspective and is breaking the glass ceiling in decision-making positions in the institution. In this respect, the work of the JEP, where 53% of judges are women, is to be highlighted, as is that of the Truth Commission (CEV) where 5 of the 11 judges are women, and the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD), which has a woman heading up its management. These mechanisms have defined within their principles, policies, and implementation procedures, instruments to materialize the gender approach in their work, which is considered unprecedented in their transition processes.

Furthermore, the creation and role played by the Judicial Committee for Women's Equity of the Congress of the Republic stand out. Considering its importance and the entry into force of the Opposition Statute,^{59/} the GS/OAS welcomes the fact that female senators and congressional representatives from 10 political forces, including from government, independent, and opposition political parties and movements, are members of the Judicial Committee.

In addition to the foregoing, of note is the work of the Special Office on Gender of the Commission to Follow Up, Promote, and Verify the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI), as well as women's organizations, and the Network of Women Mayors for Democracy and Peace, who have been decisive in overseeing the government's response to commitments regarding women's rights and peace under the National Development Plan (2018-2022).

The GS/OAS observed that the scenarios for designing and approving the National Development Plan (2018-2022), and in particular the "Women's Equity Pact," were characterized by active and democratic deliberation. Indeed, some of the actors from government, congress, and civil society mentioned played a decisive role and took differing stances on governance, guarantees of women's rights, advancement of gender equity, and inclusion of a gender approach in the Final Agreement's implementation.

59. Law 1909 of July 9, 2018: "Pursuant to which the statute regarding political opposition and some rights of independent political organizations is adopted."

As a result of this deliberation and leaving aside significant challenges to be addressed through agreements and social dialogue on the issue, the Women's Equity Pact was approved, with an across-the-board allocation of COP\$5.4 billion under the Pluriannual Investment Plan.^{60/} Four of the Plan's articles^{61/} are directly related to gender equity policies and the inclusion of a gender approach in the Final Agreement's implementation. Additionally, 3 out of the 12 proposals that the Judicial Committee for Women's Equity and some women's platforms presented were provided for in these articles. These have to do with the National Women's System, the National Care System, and the Action Plan for the policy targeting rural women.

The GS/OAS highlights the technical guidelines and policies contained in the final document that laid the foundation for the National Development Plan. Specifically, the objectives associated with gender-related institutional strengthening in Colombia, women's participation in scenarios of power and decision making, the inclusion of rural women as agents for transformation in rural areas, and equity for women in peace-building.

At the same time, the GS/OAS notes that there are five challenges to the development of the Pact for Women's Equity and its link to the Pact for peace-building. The first is associated with the risks regarding mainstreaming the gender approach, for which it is necessary to combine political tools that include specific actions to mainstream the approach, such as creating gender-related institutions within national and territorial agencies and defining specific budget allocation floors and programs for women and local peace-building.

The second challenge is the result of embracing a macro vision of the Final Agreement's implementation contained in the framework plan for implementation and the development of the current Policy on Stabilization and Peace with Legality. For some women's organizations and congressional representatives who are members of the Judicial Committee for Women's Equity, the progress in affirmative action to include a gender approach and intersectional perspective could be constrained by the new political vision for stabilization. One example is the difference in perspectives held by the national government and women's sectors, including the special gender office of the CSIVI, regarding the concept of guarantees of non-repetition and security.

The third challenge corresponds to the need for collaboration with the territorial entities. The GS/OAS welcomes the dialogue the national government has undertaken with the Network of Women Mayors for Democracy and Peace, at the same time as it recognizes and draws attention to the challenges that women leaders face in exercising local governance with a gender and peace approach. Noteworthy are the efforts women in elected office undertake in order to overcome gender gaps in their political leadership and public administration. These women are allies for local transformations in favor of equity policies and require enormous support from the national government to make their development plans and commitments to creating municipal secretariats on gender viable.

60. The chamber plenary's final wording of Legislative Bill No. 311 of 2019 Chamber-227 of 2019 Senate "Pursuant to which the National Development Plan (2018-2022) 'Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity' is issued."

61. Article 122 related to special budget earmarks for peace; Article 123, special budget earmarks for women's equity; Article 124, National Women's System; and Article 281, Single Roadmap.

The fourth challenge is related to acknowledging gender gaps in women's leadership in communal action^{62/} and making them visible as a decisive sector in public policies on gender equity nationally, departmentally, and locally. In this respect, weaknesses have been identified not only in women's leadership and participation in communal action, but also as to their limited influence as political leaders with respect to the gender and peace agenda.

Finally, the fifth challenge has to do with the increase in political and gender-based violence associated with the armed conflict against women who hold elected office and exercise political and social leadership. The GS/OAS, through the MAPP/OAS, has reported an increase in the perception of threats, attacks, killings, and investigations and prosecutions of social protest that concern women who are communal action leaders, human rights defenders, local authorities—such as mayors, city council members, and municipal attorneys—and candidates in the local 2019-2022 elections in departments, such as Antioquia Arauca, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.

7.4. Rural Development Plans and Regional Transformation Action Plans

The GS/OAS agrees with the comprehensive vision of building a single roadmap for executing Rural Development Plans (PDETs), drawn up in 16 Regional Transformation Action Plans (PATRs). These are to be implemented in the coming 15 months in keeping with the Framework Implementation Plan.

The roadmap aims to coordinate planning instruments^{63/} and undertake technical and budget management, in keeping with the national government's strategic focus on setting out attainable goals in a limited amount of time and with the budget provided for under the PND. One of the important aspects of the single roadmap is that it will define an execution schedule and investment plan for each PDET subregion, which ratifies the national government's commitment to stabilizing the countryside and rural areas of 170 municipalities that the PDETs cover nationwide. The PND (2018-2022) underscores this priority, which is provided for under both Article 281 and in the foundation laid out therein in the Pact for Peace-Building: Culture of Legality, Coexistence, Stabilization, and Victims.

Nevertheless, while the single roadmap is being clarified and implemented, the GS/OAS notes four critical aspects that local communities and actors have expressed. First, there is the risk of failing to meet the expectations created by the participatory design of the PDETs; second, the failure to socialize^{64/} and disseminate the PATRs in the territories; third, the delay in other strategies and plans, such as in the case of identifying and formalizing land titles^{65/} based on land use and tenure in areas where there is social conflict; and finally, insecurity in PDET zones for leaders who have been heading

62. The GS/OAS through the MAPP/OAS has been supporting Communal Action Organizations (OAC) as national beneficiaries of collective reparations.

63. Planning instruments such as: National Development Plan (PND), National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS), the Framework Implementation Plan (PMI), Comprehensive Collective Reparation Plans (PIRC), and Territorial and Sector Plans.

64. According to data provided by the regional office of the MAPP/OAS, in regions such as Sur del Córdoba, Alto Patía, and Norte def Cauca, Catatumbo, the Nariño Pacific and border areas, Putumayo, the Caguán basin, Piedemonte Caqueteno, and Guaviare.

65. Examples of municipalities whose situation regarding property registries and titling is critical: Tumaco (Nariño), Vistahermosa (Meta), Calamar-El Retorno (Guaviare), Riosucio-Bajo Atrato (Chocó), Cáceres-El Bagre (Antioquia), Anorí (Antioquia), among others, where more than 63,000 initiatives under PATR have been approved. A determination was made that legitimate access to land must be resolved prior to executing these projects.

up the PDETs' participatory construction and for officials and contractors of the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART). Therefore, the GS/OAS calls attention to the urgent need to implement protection and security measures that ensure the mobility of officials and leaders responsible for the PATRs' management, implementation, and oversight.

Also of note is the execution of more than 500 projects known as "small community infrastructure," which are small and medium-sized infrastructure works which have involved leaders of the Communal Action Councils (JAC) and territorial social organizations, thus giving a vote of confidence to local capacity in municipalities. For example, in the region of Catatumbo more than 120 small community infrastructure works were planned. This boosted the credibility of the Presidential Council for Stabilization and the ART. The communities, however, hope that the government moves forward with the execution of these small infrastructure projects, given that it was the PATRs that had provided for structural solutions in the regions, such as infrastructure projects for tertiary roads and concrete proposals for substitution of illicit crops.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

In keeping with the findings described above, the GS/OAS would respectfully like to make the following recommendations to the institutions listed below:

1. National government

- 1.1.** Allocate sufficient budget resources for the public policy on victims and land restitution, in particular, the budget to be used for implementing urgent measures to resolve the backlog in the jurisdiction specialized in land restitution.

Furthermore, ensure that the entities that comprise the National Victim Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation System (SNARIV) have the financial and human resources required to comply in a timely manner with the orders issued pursuant to land restitution judgments, particularly those that order reestablishment of territorial rights to indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

- 1.2.** Pursuant to its regulatory authority, go forward with the design, budget resourcing, coordination, and implementation of the agrarian jurisdiction, as well as the multipurpose property registry, and plans for social legislation regarding rural property. These measures will have a positive impact on the transformation of Colombian rural areas, facilitating the advancement and sustainability of public policies for peace, as well as land restitution, and Rural Development Plans (PDETs).

2. Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

- 2.1.** Continue, together with the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Financial Information and Analysis Unit of the Ministry of Finance, to coordinate and enhance strategies to weaken illegal armed groups' funding sources and thus prevent revenues derived from legal and illegal economic activities from fueling these groups' growth and expansion, which directly affects the most vulnerable communities.

2.2. Continue to implement, in coordination with the Ministry of National Defense, land remediation strategies that include classes in “mine risk education” geared mainly towards communities, with the participation of children and youth. Furthermore, implement the strategy for the Ethnic Pact for Demining, coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior in the framework of the *Peace Policy with Legality* jointly with the program *Descontamina Colombia*; consider putting into place, together with public security forces and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Colombia, a demining strategy in border areas.

2.3. Bolster, in partnership with AICMA and the National Police Counter Narcotics Directorate, the Differential Assistance Procedure for the illicit crop eradicators community, in order to mitigate any risk personnel might face during this work.

3. **Presidential Council on Stabilization and Consolidation**

3.1. Implement complementary protection measures for PNIS communities and leadership in the nodes that this program covers and establish protocols for public officials and members of public security forces that support illicit crop eradication. This should take into account a territorial approach that can be adapted to the inherent dynamics of each of the zones prioritized in the program.

3.2. Continue the PNIS’ operational adjustments, especially those aimed at taking back administrative responsibilities that were taken on by leadership in the territories and to increase the program’s budget to mitigate gaps in the execution of its different components.

3.3. Create and develop arenas for dialogue and joint development of initiatives with communities and social leaders that provide for substitution frameworks other than the PNIS, including measures for rehabilitating the environment and using lessons learned during the implementation of other experiences of this kind.

4. **Ministry of National Defense**

4.1. Increase territorial deployment of the project “*Transformación de conflictos sociales y paz territorial*” [“Transformation of social conflicts and territorial peace”] by UNIPEP, in the framework of the National Police Model for Peace-Building, as an exercise in best practices for police interventions prior to violent escalation. Continue putting into operation the protocol for coordination of measures for respecting and guaranteeing the right to peaceful protest (resolution 1190/2018), which addresses these situations by means of a preventive, rights-based, differential, and territorial approach.

4.2. Supplement the strategy of forced eradication of illicit crops with social and productive programs that furnish effective support to coca-growing families in transforming their sources of income into legal ones. It is important that the intervention strategy provide for the particularities of each territory and that solutions address the technical flaws of previous programs (such as Plan Colombia) as well as mitigation strategies for security threats that the program participants may face.

- 4.3. National Security Council. Establish periodic assessments of the progress and difficulties in the *Zonas Futuro* [Future Zones], in order to expand and micro-target zones that require greater attention; or identify those areas that can be considered as *Zonas de Construcción de Legalidad* [Zones for Building Legality] or *Zonas de Legalidad, Emprendimiento y Equidad* [Zones for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity].
- 4.4. Public Security Forces, particularly the national army and navy. Redouble efforts to contain and then bring to justice actions taken by illegal armed structures that affect ethnic territories engaged in processes to reestablish territorial rights, in consultation with ethnic authorities about ongoing military control of sectors that are strategic for illegal armed groups. Ensure that the necessary military deployment and actions taken are in keeping with the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), internal guidelines on entry into ethnic territories, and especially, the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
5. **Ministry of the Interior**
 - 5.1. Prepare public policies regarding prevention and protection guarantees for social leaders and human rights defenders, including protection measures and training for public officials who operate in areas where there are illegal structures, such that they understand how to handle intimidating scenarios involving illegal armed groups and what the support procedures are in this respect. Along the same lines, move forward in a timely fashion with the process of reengineering the National Protection Unit (UNP) to coordinate implementation of collective protection measures under the national public prevention and comprehensive protection policy that entails a territorial, gender, and ethnic approach.
 - 5.2. Install, disseminate, and implement in a timely fashion, and in conjunction with the Presidential Council on Women's Equity, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, and the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, the Comprehensive Guarantees Program for Human Rights Leaders. Additionally, strengthen the Gender Sub-Group of the National Commission for Security Guarantees at a national, regional, and local level.
 - 5.3. In coordination with the National Planning Department, continue construction of the National System for Managing Social Conflict, with the involvement of departmental and municipal entities. Strengthen this technical instrument so it may assist in preventively managing social conflicts, their handling, and fulfillment of agreements. Involve, as a matter of importance, the development vision of communities and the proposals contained in the PDETs/PATRs.
 - 5.4. In collaboration with competent entities, make strides to comply with the agreement signed in the framework of the 2019 Indigenous *Minga*, as a demonstration of the effectiveness, quality, and proper orientation of state intervention for the sake of rebuilding trust among social sectors and the national government, and to reduce the state's social debt to indigenous peoples.

5.5. Include, in a decisive manner and with measurable and quantifiable affirmative actions, plans, programs, and projects aimed at strengthening women in communities under CONPES 3955 of 2018, associated with the Strategy for Strengthening Communal Action in Colombia.

5.6. The Directorate for Democracy, Citizen Participation, and Communal Action. Create mechanisms for recording updated information on risks and impairments to those engaged in communal action, differentiated by territory through the Communal Security Group, that enable development of timely and relevant measures for prevention, protection, and non-repetition guarantees for these individuals in the country.

6. Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development

6.1. Implement the interagency protocol to combat deforestation provided for in the National Development Plan Sustainability Pact as a roadmap that supports consolidation of the five regional centers for environmental dialogue that are to be created as arenas for facilitation, coordination, participation, cooperation, and reflection in order to identify, prioritize, and discuss socioenvironmental conflicts at a regional level and at the same time strengthen existing forums for dialogue.

6.2. Design a coordination strategy with the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction in the framework of defending biodiversity, water, and the environment.

7. Territorial Renewal Agency

7.1. Make headway in preparing a schedule for disseminating the PATRs in the territories and socializing the new mechanisms and processes for execution of community works.

7.2. Develop urgent measures that enable women, youth, and differentiated ethnic groups greater access to community works to economically empower and strengthen their organizations.

8. Land Restitution Unit

8.1. Jointly with the ANT, design and implement an assistance protocol for secondary occupants settled in ethnic territories where judicial orders provide for reestablishment of territorial rights to indigenous or Afro-Colombian communities. Ideally, said instrument would have a differentiated procedure for *campesino* settler communities who are very dependent on illegal economic activities, particularly illicit crops. To this end, conduct the design process in collaboration with the ART as the authority in charge of the PNIS.

9. Victim Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation Unit

9.1. Design and implement mechanisms for interface and complementarity between the administrative reparations set forth under Law 1448/2011 and the processes designed

in the SIVJRGNR for seeking the truth and searching for individuals reported as disappeared, in order to prevent potential revictimization in the access to rights.

- 9.2. Manage and secure financial and technical resources to implement collective reparation processes in a timely manner so victims may attain comprehensive reparation. Maintain seamless communication with the beneficiaries of collective reparation, bearing in mind resources available to comply with the procedures for more than 600 recognized cases.

10. National Government's High-Level Office on Gender

- 10.1. In the Office's bid to put into practice the 51 gender indicators of the Framework Implementation Plan for the Final Agreement, combine policy tools that, in addition to being cross-cutting, include creation of a gender-specific institutional framework in national and territorial entities and resourcing of a minimum specific budget allocation, as well as programs for women and local peace-building.
- 10.2. Strengthen dialogue and coordination with the Special Gender Office of the CSIVI in keeping with Articles 5(4) and 5(5) of Decree 1418 of 2018.

11. Intersectoral Commission to Prevent Recruitment and Use of Children (CIPRUNNA)

- 11.1. Reinforce the policy to prevent recruitment, especially through comprehensive prevention and protection for rural communities and families who run the greatest risk. As part of these actions, in conjunction with departmental and municipal governments, reinforce comprehensive policies for youth that prioritize the creation of academic, cultural, sports, and employment opportunities that help the children and youth in these municipalities consolidate a life plan in the framework of legality and peace-building.

12. Office of the Attorney General

- 12.1. Deepen the design of strategies to fight organized crime as part of the Strategic Plan (2016-2020).
- 12.2. Consolidate judicial police agencies in territories affected by organized crime, prioritizing departments like Chocó and Cauca.
- 12.3. Continue working with indigenous judicial authorities to forge better communication channels and interjurisdictional cooperation for combating organized crime.

13. Comprehensive Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition System

13.1. Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CEV)

- 13.1.1. Create standardized processes to disseminate the system, providing information on the institutional services offered in the territorial strategy's deployment.

- 13.1.2. Take actions to coordinate entities charged with implementing Law 1448/2011, especially with the UARIV, in order to reduce the risks of revictimization when victims' information is provided to competent institutions.

13.2. Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

- 13.2.1. Extend the deadline for civil society to file reports by a year and subsequently assess whether to extend it for two more years in those areas where there is greater likelihood of impunity.
- 13.2.2. Design a strategy so that in those places where it is more difficult to submit reports, greater awareness can be provided about the Jurisdiction. At the same time, establish alliances with institutions like the Office of the Ombudsman that can build and provide technical capacity to organizations on the ground.
- 13.2.3. Devise a strategy so that crimes committed "among the ranks of the FARC-EP" can be reported, providing security and safeguards to complainants.
- 13.2.4. Standardize amongst all courtrooms and divisions the forms and requirements for certifying victims in order to avoid confusion or the need for double certification.
- 13.2.5. Create a strategy for dialogue and coordination with the institutions of Justice and Peace, specifically with the Judiciary and the Transitional Justice Directorate of the Office of the Attorney General.
- 13.2.6. Devise a strategy for dialogue and cooperation with the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation in order to build bridges for communication with respect to the imposition of alternative punishments.
- 13.2.7. Continue generating intercultural dialogue and deepen strategies for ethnically-relevant notifications and processes.