

THIRTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (MAPP/OAS)

The following report is submitted pursuant to resolution CP/RES. 859 (1597/04), in which the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) instructs the Secretary General to report periodically on the work of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States,¹ hereinafter “the MAPP/OAS” or “the Mission.”

This report covers the findings for the period from July 1 to December 31, 2021. Due to travel restrictions imposed by government authorities to contain the COVID-19 public health crisis, the Mission adapted its monitoring and support arrangement during this period, combining remote means² with in-person activities whenever possible.

During this period, owing to the trust that has been built with actors in Colombia, 5,197 monitoring and support tasks were carried out (2,370 virtually and 2,467 in person) in 696 population centers located in 188 municipalities across 29 departments. The population centers in which this work was done included municipal seats, districts (*corregimientos*), villages (*veredas*), indigenous reserves (*resguardos*), and community councils.

Due to their nature and breadth, in this report the OAS General Secretariat (GS/OAS) condenses the principal dynamics identified by the Mission during the six months covered. In addition to this report, the MAPP/OAS regularly, and in coordination with state agencies, generates and delivers in-depth analyses on matters within its mandate and/or concerning the territories covered, including specific recommendations to address the situations identified and to contribute to peace building.

Implementation of the MAPP/OAS mandate is possible thanks to the trust and steadfast support of the international community, which recognizes the Mission as a key player in peace building in Colombia. The GS/OAS wishes to thank the member states and observers, in particular the Basket Funds countries—Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the political and financial support of which make the Mission’s operations possible. The GS/OAS also recognizes the important contributions made by Norway and Switzerland, which strengthen the Mission’s work in fundamental areas, such as participation and dialogue. Lastly, we mention the support in the form of secondments³ from Germany, with the assignment of four professionals, and Switzerland, with two specialists, an enormous contribution to the Mission in terms of human talent.

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

On October 13, 2021, the Colombian government and the OAS General Secretariat entered into an agreement to extend the MAPP/OAS mandate for another three years, through the Eighth Additional Protocol to the original Agreement. This protocol reaffirms the functions of the

¹ The mandate of the MAPP/OAS derives from the agreement entered into by the Government of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on January 23, 2004, and from Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), adopted on February 6, 2004. The mandate has been expanded and renewed eight times, the most recent renewal extending until January 24, 2025.

² Conducted through videoconferences, telephone calls, and e-mail, among other means, to maintain smooth communication with community leaders, civil society representatives, and local institutions. This provided timely real-time information on topics related to the MAPP/OAS mandate.

³ “Secondment” is a system whereby a country assigns one of its nationals to perform a job for a specific period of time.

MAPP/OAS and, expands them to include support for implementation of the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (hereinafter “the Final Agreement”).⁴

The extension of the mandate until January 25, 2025, reaffirms the trust built between the Mission, state authorities, the donor countries, and the communities in the areas most affected by the dynamics of the armed conflict, crime, and inequity. This trust is expressed in the ongoing requests for the monitoring of initiatives and support in highly complex scenarios, so that challenges and progress are highlighted and for rapprochement between communities and authorities of competent jurisdiction.

The Mission assumes this responsibility with respect and solidarity, and with steadfast intent to support Colombia’s efforts to find a comprehensive peace, with renewed commitment, convinced of a useful mandate, and with capacity for impact, as concluded in the 2021 external evaluation requested by the Basket Fund members.⁵ Even at times of crisis and uncertainty in the context of the pandemic, the Mission has assumed its duty to remain in the territories, respecting the biosecurity measures adopted by the national and the local governments. The MAPP/OAS personnel have remained close to the communities and institutions, demonstrating their capacity to adapt and offering important lessons learned for the implementation of the mandate in times of adversity.

In this report, the GS/OAS points to different challenges and threats on the peace agenda, among them: the serious impacts of the action of illegal armed groups on the civilian population and State agents, especially on ethnic authorities and communities, women, children and adolescents, social leaders, persons in the process of reincorporation, and the migrant population, as well as the persistent dynamics of drug crime and social conflict.

The GS/OAS also recognizes the experience and efforts made to seek and consolidate peace witnessed by the Mission over the last 18 years. It is imperative to continue to fulfill the terms of the agreement if transformations are to be made. Therefore, implementation of the Final Agreement as broad and specific support in this area constitutes an opportunity to address the structural factors of violence and armed conflict based on the principles of comprehensiveness, progress, and good faith.

Now in the fifth year of implementation of the Final Agreement, marked in the second half of 2021, the GS/OAS points to the creation of the Rural Development Programs (PDETs). This instrument for consensus-building, planning, and sustainable implementation for the 16 regions most impacted by the armed conflict is recognized by local authorities and actors as the means to improve, in the short, medium, and long term, access to goods and services for the effective enjoyment of rights. PDET implementation is also contributing best practices the use of which may strengthen the implementation of other policies and offer responses to existing challenges and obstacles. The GS/OAS invites the parties to profit from the successes and actions that have positively impacted the well-being of communities.

The current government has charted new courses under the Peace with Legality policy and strategies such as Future Zones, the aim of which is to further the implementation of the Final

⁴ Available for consultation on the MAPP/OAS web page:

<https://www.mapp-oea.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Digitalizacion2021-10-28-075836.pdf>

⁵ In its final report on the results of the external evaluation of the Mission, the Just Governance Group indicates that “The value added by the MAPP/OAS to the peace process in Colombia is something that no other multilateral organization is able to contribute in the country. Based on its institutional mandate and presence in the country, the Mission monitors the social and conflict dynamics in different locales. By these means, it generates confidence and credibility among all actors. This enables the MAPP/OAS to promote and/or support the protection of at-risk individuals and communities as well as citizen participation in dialogues and peace-building processes, taking differentiated approaches into account.”

Agreement. In this case, for example, focusing interinstitutional intervention and resource allocation on Future Zones has made it possible to step up PDET implementation, thus generating changes that reduce inequality gaps. Likewise, since the launch of implementation of the Comprehensive National Program for Illicit Crop Substitution (PNIS), 45,810 hectares of coca leaf⁶ have been voluntarily replaced with other crops, while, at the same time, progress has been made with the design and implementation of new voluntary substitution models.⁷ As for demining, as of November 2021, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), 194 municipalities had been declared free of suspected anti-personnel mines, constituting progress in the 200-municipality target set for August 2022.

In the context of the functions recently incorporated in the MAPP/OAS mandate, the monitoring of and support for the reincorporation component in the framework of the Final Agreement, efforts have been made to achieve the socioeconomic stabilization of persons in the process of reincorporation, as well as progress in the design of the Security and Protection Strategic Plan and the coordination of mechanisms to guarantee the security of persons who have laid down arms. Nonetheless, the GS/OAS notes complex challenges in rendering effective the security guarantees for persons who have signed the Agreement and their families, especially those who left sometime later in order to promote their reincorporation in different parts of the country. They are facing different forms of violence, such as murder, threats, and stigmatization.

The second half of 2021 was of high relevance for democracy in Colombia. The process of creating the 16 Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace (CTEP) was reactivated; for the first time, Municipal Youth Council elections were held, as were independent democratic election exercises for civil society, such as for the reactivation of the Community Action Councils (JAC), the Special Women's Authority of the Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI), and the Committees for Effective Victim Participation.

In the GS/OAS, there is absolute commitment to the youth of the Hemisphere. In that regard, it expresses appreciation to President Iván Duque for the invitation extended to the Organization to monitor the unprecedented exercise of the Municipal Youth Council elections, held in December 2021, which demonstrated the citizen and political aspirations of this group. During this monitoring, the GS/OAS established that this exercise adds to the strengthening of democracy, generates confidence and openness in the institutional and social structure, and has become a referent for the Hemisphere that must be systematized and made available to the other member states.

In this context, the GS/OAS, through the MAPP/OAS, also monitored the processes of reactivation of the Victim Participation Committees, the JAC, and the Special Women's Authority of the CSIVI, as key forums for citizen participation in peace-building; and, in coordination with a network of civil society partners known as "Colaborianza," a strategy was promoted for supporting the candidacies for the CTEP regarding aspects such as political impact, instruction and communication, the provision of training for candidates, and security guarantees. Notable among the various actions is a scheme for providing training for candidates in partnership with the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM/OAS).

For the March 13 legislative elections, the Mission promoted monitoring actions in the CTEP rural areas, where new polling stations were installed. It also continued to further the identification of

⁶ Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation: "Informe de Resultados de Paz con Legalidad. Enero 2022." Available at: <https://www.portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/1112/informes-de-resultados/>

⁷ Such as: Formalize for Substitution, Territories for Conservation, Substitution with Legality, and Made to Measure.

monitoring findings, underscoring concerns that continued to arise in this unprecedented electoral process and that may call for future revision of the legislation, and its regulations and implementation for complete fulfillment of the CTEP purposes. Bearing in mind the coming electoral calendar, the GS/OAS urges the authorities with competent jurisdiction to step up efforts to ensure conditions conducive to citizen participation and to call firmly on all actors and sectors involved to avoid stigmatization, promote a respectful exchange of ideas, and respect the existing rules of play.

Although progress has been made with the peace-building agenda in Colombia, different challenges and threats persist, especially those related to security conditions in the territories. In that regard, the GS/OAS has identified a high level of armed activity by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), as well as the internal reconfiguration of other illegal armed groups as a result of the death or prosecution of important leaders.⁸ This increased activity is having serious impacts on the civilian population in territories such as Bajo Cauca, Catatumbo, Sur de Bolívar, Sur de Córdoba, along the Atrato, Baudó, and San Juan Rivers in Chocó; and departments such as Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, Guaviare, Nariño, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.

It has been observed that acts of violence persist in these territories, such as threats, displacements, physical attacks, extortion, murders—both selective and collective—of community members, leaders, and authorities, as well as the social control imposed through coercive measures, such as the use of explosive devices that impact travel, social coexistence, and the environment. The involvement and forced recruitment of children, adolescents, and youth continues especially to impact members of ethnic peoples and migrant population.

The GS/OAS notes with concern an increase in these territories in acts interpreted as *de facto* justice by illegal armed groups, along with serious actions that hinder the functions of formal justice workers and other state agents, as well as the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction's own justice mechanisms.

The GS/OAS reiterates its position that the ELN guerrillas need to signal clearly and specifically their peace intentions, which necessarily involves the release of all those kidnapped and the cessation of kidnapping, the impacts on the civilian population, and attacks on infrastructure, which have enormous environmental impact, among other things. It also considers it important to keep open avenues for dialogue that may gradually lead to the rapprochement of positions and restoration of the peace talks. The GS/OAS reaffirms its intent to contribute to ensuring that this process assists in achieving the much longed for comprehensive peace in the country.

The exercise of peaceful and legitimate social protest represents an opportunity for all actors because it strengthens the path of dialogue, understanding, and consensus-building. Although large-scale social protests have become less intense, expressions of discontent continue, aimed at the fulfillment of agreements reached, as do exigencies for the fulfillment of other demands. In that regard, the national government points to greater institutional receptivity, which led to the presentation of reforms to the National Police to strengthen its civilian character, as well as the opening of forums for participation by the youth population, as described above.

In view of efforts to reactivate the Program for Illicit Crop Eradication Using the Herbicide Glyphosate (PECIG), in January 2022, the Constitutional Court handed down a judgment ordering the authorities responsible for the procedure for modifying the Environmental Management Plan (PMA) of the PECIG to promote prior consultation with the ethnic communities present in each of the six areas of operation defined for PMA modification, covering a total of 104 municipalities in 14 departments.

⁸ Such as the man known as “Romaña” for the dissidents, and as “Otoniel” for the AGC/Clan of the Gulf.

This judgment creates relevant short-term challenges for authorities and indicates the imperative of according precedence to dialogue with all actors involved in the quest for solutions.

The institutions of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition Guarantees (SIVJRNR) have strengthened complementary actions regarding strategic matters that facilitate the expansion of coordinated work in the territories. The Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD) has achieved major territorial deployment that has enabled it to deepen its relationships with and recognition and comprehension of families searching for disappeared persons and civil society entities, with the aim of establishing search guidelines in the territories. For its part, the Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CEV) has promoted noteworthy efforts for the consolidation of its final report in order to generate dynamics in the context of democratic debate that promote transformative actions aimed at reconciliation and coexistence, without the report becoming an instrument for polarization in the midst of the political electoral panorama, and that promote the dignity of the victims.

The GS/OAS, through the Mission, reaffirms its willingness to support the actions of the SIVJRNR and of different community actors in accessing this transitional justice mechanism, which, in this period took shape as the eight reports presented to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) by different groups and associations of victims in the context of a strategy to build this population's capacities for accessing the various justice mechanisms, with support from the Government of Germany.

The GS/OAS also reiterates the Mission's commitment to continue supporting Colombian institutions through analysis and recommendations key to peace-building; as well as its monitoring in the territories, promoting forums for inclusion, active listening, participation, and dialogue for progress towards peace and strengthened democracy. It also finds it relevant to caution those elected to public office to give priority to the peace-building agenda and gain knowledge of the different actions under way so as to take ownership of achievements and cumulative lessons learned.

2. SECURITY CONDITIONS

Trends in the modus operandi, relations, and profiles of illicit armed groups⁹ are hard to identify owing to the different dynamics of security conditions in the territories. Despite Colombian State efforts to transform them, in some areas, negative perceptions of the security situation are present. Serious attacks on the civilian population persist in areas such as Catatumbo, the border with Venezuela in Norte de Santander and Arauca, southern Bolívar, southern Córdoba, Antioquian Lower Cauca, along the Atrato, Baudó, and San Juan Rivers in Chocó, and departments such as Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.

The ELN and dissident or residual FARC-EP groups are those most involved in bellicose activity, especially in those territories advantageous for maximizing the proceeds of legal and illegal economies. Although this would appear to be their main interest, for the most part, they seek to sustain a political and ideological platform to legitimize their existence and action.

The clashes among illegal armed groups for territorial control, intensified social control actions, and bellicose actions against security forces have spread from rural population centers to

⁹ This report will refer to illegal armed groups designated as follows, which combine government decisions with how they are recognized in the territories: National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, People's Liberation Army or Los Pelusos (EPL/Pelusos), Gaitan Self-Defense forces of Colombia or Clan del Golfo (AGC/Clan del Golfo), and Virgilio Peralta Arenas Bloc, or Los Caparros.

municipality seats, and even to departmental capitals, as has occurred in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander.¹⁰ Moreover, in some regions where drug crime is present, illegal armed groups coerce communities to hamper the action of the security forces or the courts by impeding arrests of their members, seizing war materiel and inputs for alkaloid processing, and obstructing the presence of state institutions.

The security forces have developed strategies to strengthen or reorganize themselves in territories such as Cauca, Nariño, and Norte de Santander. However, these efforts are perceived as insufficient by some sectors of the civilian population, who consider that their presence does not always assist in improving security conditions, or that troops do not have the necessary tools and capacities to carry out actions for permanent territorial control and to disband illegal armed groups.

Major leaders of illegal armed groups have been neutralized by the security forces or impacted by disputes within or against other illegal armed groups. Such is the case of the ELN in Chocó, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups in Meta and Guaviare, and of the AGC/Clan del Golfo, whose highest leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga, known as “Otoniel,” is now in the custody of the judicial authorities. We have also learned of the death in Venezuela of the man known as “El Paisa” and the man known as “Romaña,” important figures in the group known as “Segunda Marquetalia.”

2.1 Presence and action of illegal armed groups

The ELN has concentrated much of its actions in Arauca and the Catatumbo area in the form of threats, murders, harassment, and attacks on the security forces, imposition of entry restrictions, the exercise of functions of State institutions and international cooperation organizations¹¹ and profile-raising actions.¹² Although it does not have hegemonic influence in these areas owing to the presence of other illegal armed groups, it has achieved control of some territories and population sectors, and intervention in legal and illegal economies.

After the FARC-EP laid down their arms, the ELN advanced its expansion into some territories, but has recently found this to be limited. For example, in regions such as el Atrato in Chocó or the Micay River canyon in Cauca, following armed clashes with the AGC/Clan del Golfo and dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, all seriously impacting the civilian population, the ELN has lost areas¹³ where, since 2018, it had succeeded in increasing its influence.

Nonetheless, the ELN still has an important presence in territories where it is still in conflict or where tensions are increasing with the AGC/Clan del Golfo, as is occurring along the Baudó and San Juan Rivers in Chocó, the Cúcuta metropolitan area in Norte de Santander, and Bajo Cauca in Antioquia. Similar dynamics of armed disputes have been identified in connection with dissident or residual FARC-EP groups in Arauca Department¹⁴ and in some Valle del Cauca and southern Bolívar municipalities; as have growing tensions in the Catatumbo area.

¹⁰ On December 14, 2021, two explosive devices detonated in the area around Cúcuta city airport. This led to the death of two National Police force members and of one of the alleged perpetrators of the act.

¹¹ Detentions, interrogations, and theft of vehicles providing service or the property of State institutions, international cooperation, private companies, and private transport companies have continued to occur.

¹² Installation of parades, posters, and flags in rural population centers and, in some cases, in municipal seats, such as in El Tarra, Norte de Santander. In the Convención urban area, a group of some 15 armed uniformed men appeared and took selfies, which they later displayed on a 2022 calendar.

¹³ Such as the southern Bolívar area and the San Juan River in Chocó.

¹⁴ In the first few days of January 2022, a series of murders occurred in different rural areas of the department, perpetrated by the ELN against persons who, in their view, were members of or were cooperating with the FARC's organized crime group R 10.

Dissident or residual FARC-EP groups are viewed as a heterogeneous phenomenon that, as a group, have higher levels of hostility towards the civilian population and the security forces. Some factions are grouped under coordination bodies without a single line of command having been consolidated. The most relevant case is the Western Coordinating Command, which improved its positioning in the Sanquianga and Cordillera areas, in Nariño¹⁵; while in the Cañón del Micay area in Cauca, it was linked with the “Columnas Móviles Dagoberto Ramos” and “Jaime Martínez” for military and operational support for the “Frente Carlos Patiño” in its clash with the ELN.

The clashes among own factions have led to murders, forced displacements, and confinements, especially in Nariño and Putumayo. In Nariño,¹⁶ the disputes on the Pacific Coast seem to focus on the intent of the “Frente Óliver Sinisterra” and the “Bloque Occidental Alfonso Cano” to halt the advance of the “Frente 30” from the Sanquianga area towards Telembí. In Putumayo, they appear to be related to the attempt by the “Frente 1º Carolina Ramírez” to position itself in areas of influence of the “Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército Bolivariano” to control routes of illegal activity towards Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador.

The “Segunda Marquetalia” has established agreements with illegal armed groups with a consolidated presence in the territories, such as in Putumayo with the “Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército Bolivariano” or on the Pacific Coast of El Nariño with the “Bloque Occidental Alfonso Cano,” without this implying the complete subordination of these factions to that group. However, it continues to be perceived as an illegal armed group whose command center is not in Colombian territory, and that, in addition, was weakened by the deaths of the man known as “Romaña” and the man known as “El Paisa” in December 2021.

In areas such as Catatumbo, where there are tensions but not direct armed clashes with other illegal armed groups, and in departments such as Meta, Guaviare and northern Caquetá, where the presence of other actors disputing their influence has not been identified, these dissident groups have maintained high levels of hostility towards the security forces through attacks on and harassment of their members and installations. In addition, the presence of State institutions in the territories is being restricted and the civilian population victimized by threats, murders, and regulations and sanctions established against young illicit drug users or non-binary persons.¹⁷

The AGC/Clan del Golfo has managed to position itself against the ELN in the Baudó River area and dispute its control over the San Juan River in Chocó, and has continued to clash with the same group in the Cúcuta metropolitan area. It also appeared to be positioning itself on the Nariño Pacific Coast and in northern Antioquia against a faction of dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, and in the lower Valle del Cauca, profiting from the weakening of “Los Caparros.” However, given that since October 2021, its highest leader, known as “Otoniel,” was being prosecuted, readjustments to the leadership have been made, which, in turn, is causing fear among the civilian population owing to the social control exercises, threats, and murders being perpetrated, especially in southern Córdoba.

Although the People’s Liberation Army (EPL) or “Los Pelusos” and the “Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas” or “Los Caparros” continue to weaken, their bastions have impacted the civilian population. The EPL/Los Pelusos in Catatumbo¹⁸ have perpetrated extortionist kidnappings, installed illegal checkpoints, and carried out profile-raising actions, the latter directly related to the anniversary of their founding in December. As for Los Caparros, they have been persecuted in rural areas of the

¹⁵ Through the “Frente 30” and the “Columna Móvil Urias Rondón.”

¹⁶ Roberto Payán and Magüí Payán municipalities.

¹⁷ As is occurring in El Tarra, Hacarí, and Teorama municipalities in Norte de Santander.

¹⁸ Municipalities of Cúcuta, El Zulia, Hacarí, La Playa de Belén, and Ocaña, Norte de Santander.

lower Valle del Cauca,¹⁹ not only by the security forces, but also the AGC/Clan del Golfo, so that the civilian population fears possible clashes.

In areas such as Catatumbo and the Cauca Pacific Coast, movements of nationals of other countries have been noted, who appear to be acting as emissaries for criminal cartels or organizations involved in the drug trafficking chain, primarily in the cocaine marketing and export phases.

2.2 Impacts on the civilian population²⁰

In the second half of 2021, under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT) held 27 meetings to follow up²¹ on the recommendations issued by the Office of the Public Defender to mitigate potential scenarios of risk to the security of the civilian population and address the attacks that had taken place.

In areas of the Nariño Pacific Coast, southern Bolívar, and San Juan in the Chocó, and in the municipalities of Ituango, Antioquia; Argelia, Cauca, and Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, one of the main trends has involved mass forced displacements of communities stemming from the armed clashes among different illegal armed groups or from clashes with the security forces. In some of these areas, the civilian population has returned to their homes despite the absence of full conditions of security and dignity, and the absence of coercion, as provided in Colombian law.

Now when the mass forced displacement resulted in high visibility,²² illegal armed groups opted to confine the communities not displaced to limit rapid response by the State and prevent its entry into areas where they hold financial resources or that contain routes they travel.

In the departments of Arauca, Meta, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca and in the Catatumbo area, illegal armed groups have attacked security forces, causing collateral damage to private property such as houses or vehicles of those living near police stations or military bases. Commercial activities have also been impacted as a result of this dynamic and, at the same time, persons involved in them have been subjected to extortion by different illegal armed groups in areas where territorial disputes exist or are merging.

Differentiated risk exists for indigenous and Afro-descendent communities stemming from the violation by illegal armed groups of their right to defend and protect their collective territories. In that regard, restrictions on travel, threats against and murders of their authorities, and violence perpetrated against indigenous leaders and guards undermine their capacity to prevent and contain situations or acts that threaten their well-being, development, and access to resources.

In the dynamics of armed conflict and crime, patterns of gender-based violence persist, as do contexts of coercion against women,²³ which add to the extraordinary risk of gender-based violence,²⁴

¹⁹ Specifically, Cuturú village, Cauca municipality, Antioquia.

²⁰ The MAPP/OAS defines impacts as violent or irregular actions, facts, or conduct perpetrated in the context of and during the Colombian armed conflict and the dynamics of crime.

²¹ Ministry of the Interior, “Informe CIPRAT 2021 (Segundo Semestre) del 1 de julio al 31 de diciembre de 2021.” Given to the MAPP/OAS on December 21, 2021, p.1

²² An example of this occurred in August 2021, owing to the clashes between factions of residual or dissident FARC-EP groups in the Telembí area in Nariño Department, primarily impacting the Afro-descendent population.

²³ Meaning coercion and/or lawful duress reinforced through family and interpersonal relations, public and private, applied as gender stereotypes that strengthen subordination, discrimination, and gender-based violence.

²⁴ According to Act 098/2013 ff, special gender-based risk should be presumed in cases of threats to women leaders and women defenders. It should be presumed “in connection with women leaders since in events where they approach authorities to request protection, the authority of competent jurisdiction should take as starting

especially for women leaders. This is reflected in the threats, forced displacements, sexual violence, suspected femicide, and trafficking in persons in municipalities such as Tibú, Norte de Santander; Cáceres, and Tarazá, Antioquia, and Argelia and Corinto, Cauca, among others.

Armed clashes in Tibú have resulted in increased violence against women, deepening the crisis of the social fabric with the perpetration of 10 suspected femicides in 2021, representing a 500% increase in gender-based violence over the year prior,²⁵ in addition to the forced displacement of 36 women of which the Public Prosecutor's Office has knowledge. This betokens the undermining of the right to a life free of violence and collective impact on the area's women and communities. The grave security conditions for women and women leaders of this municipality are exacerbated by the influence of transnational crime organizations, weak institutional pathways for addressing it, and the absence of a differentiated gender response in the department, such as the Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders (PIG-Mujeres).

2.2.1 Impacts on social leaders and community representatives

The adoption of the document 2021 CONPES [National Council on Economic and Social Policy] 4063, on public policy on guarantees and respect for human rights protection efforts and social leaders is the culmination of a national and territorial exercise for analysis and joint construction between the national government at all levels and social leaders, with contributions by international cooperation. It is also an opportunity to consolidate the unified State response in the next five years to address and mitigate the violence that is undermining the life, well-being, and security of social leaders.

In 2021, the Elite National Police Corps ordered the permanent appointment of 14 investigation personnel in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Córdoba, Chocó, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca, and in the southern Bolívar area. As for prevention, the Public Prosecutor's Office, through CIPRAT, held 69 training workshops for Community Action Councils (JAC) and, since December 2021, has made progress with the diploma course for social leaders and human rights defenders on the prevention and early warning system. These actions are promoting the exercise of citizen monitoring of the recommendations issued by the Office of the Public Defender, building the management capacities of women leaders in the territories, and, at the same time, contributing to the fulfillment of the Final Agreement.

Despite institutional efforts, aggression against social leaders continues and official quantification of the phenomenon remains a challenge owing to the different methodologies, approaches, and criteria used to measure it.

Now four years since the enactment of Decree, 660 of 2018, which established the Public Policy for the Prevention and Protection of Leaders, Organizations, and Communities, embodied in the Final Agreement and conceived of as a tool for establishing comprehensive protection measures in the most impacted territories, its implementation is still pending in the 24 priority communities, despite the simultaneous progress of different institutional efforts, such as the enactment of Decree 1138, of 2021, strengthening the Timely Action Plan (PAO) with the creation of two specialized committees – the Social Committee and Operations Committee and the Interinstitutional Committee to Follow Up on Murders of Human Rights Defenders.

point that the requester is, in fact, at extraordinary risk to her life, security, and personal well-being and that such risks would take the form of acts of gender-based violence.”

²⁵ In-house, according to official statistics of the National Police Statistical, Crime, and Operations Information System (SIEDCO).

<https://www.policia.gov.co/grupo-informacion-criminalidad/estadistica-delictiva>

The dynamics of attacks on the lives of social leaders have many explanations. However, the territorial contexts in which most of the identified cases have occurred have a common risk factor: territorial disputes among illegal armed groups for control of areas of strategic economic or logistical value. This is occurring in the departments of Arauca, Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca, in areas of southern Bolívar and Catatumbo, and in the Cúcuta metropolitan area. The ELN, the AGC/Clan del Golfo, and dissident or residual FARC-EP groups are cited as those with primary responsibility for the murders in these areas.

Illegal armed groups are also threatening and coercing leaders in order to strengthen their social control. In municipalities of Antioquia, Cauca, Guaviare, Nariño, and Putumayo, one tactic of dissident or residual FARC-EP groups is to require the civilian population to carry identity cards.²⁶ Social leaders even need authorization from illegal armed to leave their territories to carry out personal errands or attend institutional forums. When they return, in some cases, members of illegal armed groups seize their cell phones to check what they did and with whom they communicated.

This type of violence has two other impacts on social leaders. On the one hand, the undermining of their autonomy, which sometimes forces them to avoid appearing in participation forums or to limit their contact with institutions or persons from outside their territories for their own protection; on the other, normalization of the role of illegal armed groups as “authorities” in the territories. This situation is notable in Tibú municipality, Norte de Santander, where dissident or residual FARC-EP groups have funded the purchase of food for some rural families and the performance of community works.

Municipal authorities, representatives of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and political leaders have also been subjected to recurrent threats and, to a lesser extent, extortion and attacks. In the departments of Arauca, Chocó,²⁷ and Valle del Cauca, and the Catatumbo, Nariño Pacific, and Ariari areas in Meta, illegal armed groups have attacked these groups for calling attention to the attacks on the security of communities; refusal to pay extortions; stigmatization of illegal armed groups as responsible for the entry of new illegal armed groups into the territory, pointing to their negligence in territorial control or assuming that they have allowed it; and their monitoring of judicial steps taken to disrupt criminal conduct.

2.2.2 Imposition of de facto justice by illegal armed groups

Illegal armed groups continue to extort primarily the business, manufacturing, and livestock-raising sectors, dissident FARC-EP and ELN being the groups most responsible for these types of action.²⁸ Especially in Guaviare, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups summon residents and NGO contractors executing community projects and take them to rural areas to obtain information on plans and execution costs in order to assess how much they will extort, which ranges from 5% to 10% of the total project investment.

The second most frequent dynamic is the illegal imposition of coexistence norms, this being most prevalent in Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo. In these places, illegal armed groups regulate and sanction criminal activities such as theft and illicit drug consumption, imposing punishments reaching the level of murder and exerting

²⁶ The identity cards do not bear logos associated with any illegal armed group, but they must be carried and include the person’s name and the signature of the JAC official who is forced to implement this control.

²⁷ The crime group “Los Mexicanos” is primarily responsible for the violence perpetrated against labor union and political leaders, municipal and departmental authorities, former municipal and departmental authorities, and directors of education centers in the Quibdó urban area. In the other municipalities, it was the AGC/Clan del Golfo and the ELN who threatened or extorted municipal government personnel in the Baudó and San Juan areas.

²⁸ Common criminals are also carrying out this practice through extortion calls from prisons and jails.

greater pressure on the migrant population, which, in Putumayo, has been victimized by forced displacement,²⁹ with no clarification of the facts.

In the Cordillera area of Nariño, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups have forced the population in rural areas to carry identity cards, restricting entry by outside persons as a form of territorial control. In that department, they have stepped up restrictions on travel, especially in rural areas of Olaya Herrera, where constant clashes among various illegal armed groups have occurred.

2.2.3 Impacts on persons in the process of reincorporation and their families

The Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation is leading the coordination of security measures for the 12,843 persons in the process of reincorporation,³⁰ and their families. The Strategic Security and Protection Plan is the roadmap in this area and is also a differentiating element that focuses the State response on addressing and mitigating differentiated risk for this group.

The national government has furthered the development of the security strategy for former women combatants, which implements the eight components of the Strategic Plan, with the aim of building institutional capacity for addressing, coordinating, and managing the particularities and differentiated risks of the signatories of the Final Agreement. Among actions carried out by the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation, and the National Protection Unit (UNP) is the inclusion of the gender approach in the risk analyses being prepared by the Specialized Subdivision for Security and Protection, and the implementation of gender training for guards.³¹

In the second half of 2021,³² the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT) also promoted the holding of six meetings to follow up on the recommendations of the Public Defender's Office, with emphasis on persons in the process of reincorporation in the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, Huila, Nariño, and Valle de Cauca, and the Llanos del Yarí area (between Caquetá and Meta).

However, this institutional progress is insufficient to address the security risks faced by the former combatant population in the national territory. In 2021, according to the Elite National Police Corps,³³ 64 persons in the process of reincorporation were victims of murder, attempted murder, and forced disappearance. Former combatants continue to be reincorporated in the midst of a heterogeneous violence phenomena. In departments such as Antioquia, Cauca, Cesar, Chocó, Guaviare, Nariño, Putumayo, and the southern Bolívar region, this population has been subjected to murder, threats, and forced displacements.

²⁹ Forced disappearance is used as defined in the Colombian Code of Penal Procedure, Article 165, which indicates: "Anyone belonging to an illegal armed group who deprives another person of his/her liberty, whatever the form, and then hides him/her and refuses to acknowledge that deprivation or to provide information on his/her whereabouts, removing him/her from the protection of the law (...)"

³⁰ Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation, "Informe de gestión Avanza la reincorporación, agosto 7 de 2018-diciembre 31 de 2021" (CPEC, 2022), <https://www.portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/990/informes-de-seguimiento/>

³¹ Information given by the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation to the MAPP/OAS at a working meeting held on October 29, 2021.

³² Public Prosecutor's Office, "Informe CIPRAT 2021. (Segundo Semestre) del 1 de julio al 31 de diciembre de 2021," given to the MAPP/OAS on December 21, 2021, pp. 4-6.

³³ National Police, "Boletín semanal 07 de 2022: Hechos de afectación contra líderes defensores de DDHH, personas en reincorporación FARC y familiares" (National Police, 2022).

One of the main insecurity factors is the persistence of the action of illegal armed groups in territories where persons in the process of reincorporation and their families live. Although risk is greater for those who have decided to continue their reincorporation process outside the former Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (AETCR), individually or collectively, the population concentrated in those Areas is also subjected to violations of their security. In November, alleged members of the Jorge Briceño dissident or residual FARC-EP group set fire to vehicles of the Yará de La Macarena, Meta AETCR's individual and collective protection schemes. This looming risk was managed by the national government, in coordination with leaders of persons in the process of reincorporation, with support from the Public Defender's Office, the MAPP/OAS, and the United Nations, by stepping up the population's transfer to El Doncello municipality, Caquetá.³⁴

Dissident or residual FARC-EP groups allegedly are responsible for most of the assaults on lives and well-being that occurred in Cauca, Guaviare, Meta, and Putumayo; while in Antioquia, Chocó, and southern Bolívar, the ELN and the AGC/Clan del Golfo are involved. Victim profiles range from leaders of the reincorporation process to participants in the roadmap without any political role or who are not representative of that process.

In analyzing the dynamics of violations against women former combatants, official figures³⁵ suggest that they are not the primary victims of lethal violence perpetrated against persons in the process of reincorporation. However, acts of non-lethal violence have been perpetrated that impact them in particular. In Cauca, when the partner of a woman former combatant is murdered, related impacts such as threats or forced displacement are perpetrated. This also undermines their economic security. As a result, security for persons in the process of reincorporation is considered to be a means to guarantee their physical protection and that of their family, community, and economic life.³⁶

There are also risks to the security of women in the process of reincorporation in contexts of territorial disputes among illegal armed groups. In Putumayo, for example, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups are interested in involving them in criminal activities owing to their possible military, logistical, or medical knowledge or strategic information regarding routes or property, in view of their possible relationships with former ringleaders of extinct guerrilla forces. Additionally, in contrast to the impact on men in the process of reincorporation who reject offers by illegal armed groups, women responding similarly are subject to reprisals that extend to their families.

In regions of southern Bolívar and southern Meta and in the departments of Guaviare, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca, security forces have carried out raids in which they captured or neutralized persons involved in activities related to illegal armed groups who turned out to be in active

³⁴ The caravan was attacked during the trip. There were no fatalities or injuries, but property damage was sustained and those in the process of reincorporation and their families were further terrorized. Nonetheless, the population did reach El Doncello municipality, where their reincorporation process continued until December 2021.

³⁵ According to the Elite National Police Corps, of the 354 persons in the process of reincorporation who were murdered or the object of attempted murder or forced disappearance from 2017 to 2021, 12 were women undergoing reincorporation. Elite National Police Corps, "Boletín Semanal 01: Hechos de Afectación Líderes Defensores de DDHH, Personas en Reincorporación FARC y sus Familias." (Elite National Police Corps, 2022), pp. 3 and 4.

³⁶ For example, in the Colinas AETCR located in Guaviare, women former combatants identify the offer of part-time early childhood care as a factor dissuading them from participating in any activities. Likewise, in Quibdó, Chocó, the collection of extorted money from a restaurant created by a group of women former combatants resulted in the closure of this productive initiative, undermining their economic reincorporation. Such situations thwart the promotion of opportunities for their access to public goods, financial resources, and political participation, factors with multidimensional impact on their security.

process of reincorporation. Although it is difficult to identify with precision the occurrence of recidivism among former FARC-EP combatants, examples such as the above give some indication that it has occurred.

2.2.4 Involvement, forced recruitment, utilization, and sexual use of and sexual violence against children and adolescents

The Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment, Use of, and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups (CIPRUNNA) has launched the Manual for the Territorial Installation of Early and Emergency Protective Pathways³⁷ for the management by territorial entities of imminent threats against children and adolescents. This entity and the implementing partners of the “Join for Me: Protective environments for children and adolescents” strategy have also furthered the formation of 229 immediate action teams for the protection of children in 479 municipalities of the 32 departments.³⁸ The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization is continuing to implement the sixth version of the “Mambrú, that’s another story” strategy for strengthening protective environments, which will benefit population in 29 municipalities by July 2022.

Illegal armed groups continue to violate the rights of children and adolescents through their use and involvement in intelligence work, transporting illicit drugs or arms, perpetrating criminal activities related to kidnapping, and their contemptible use as shields in case of combat with military forces or in clashes with other illegal armed groups.

As noted in the 30th and 31st Reports, the closure of some rural education centers owing to the COVID-10 emergency health crisis has led to higher drop-out rates among students aged 12 to 17, and, with that, their risk of involvement with illegal armed groups. Illegal armed groups are also promoting the involvement of minors in crime and illicit drug consumption contexts, discouraging their eventual return to school.

In the case of indigenous communities, forced recruitment and the use of children and adolescents also implies cultural uprooting and obstruction of self-governance and justice, since indigenous authorities and teachers are threatened and sometimes subjected to forced displacement from their territories for having interceded to protect children and adolescents.

Dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, owing to their heterogeneity, implement different modalities of involvement. In Norte de Santander, they coerce children and adolescents with behavioral problems as a disciplinary method. They also use children and adolescents skilled in the use of technological tools and social media to support the dissemination of information regarding the dissident factions. In Arauca, mention is made of the introduction of youth to illicit drug consumption, then forcing them to become members of illegal armed groups in exchange for not threatening their lives. In that department, since 2018, the forced recruitment of adolescents of Hitnü ethnicity has been ongoing for them to carry out cooking and camp maintenance activities, the group also subjecting them to sexual violence.

In northern Cauca, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups are forcibly recruiting children and adolescents to assist in allowing the entry of dissident factions into Nariño Department. On the Cauca Pacific Coast, there was a training camp for children and adolescents from Cauca, Nariño, and Chocó,

³⁷ Such as the Intersectoral Policy for Prevention of the Recruitment and Utilization, and Sexual Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents.

³⁸ Office of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights and International Affairs, “Reporte Informe MAPP/OEA” (Reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Given to the MAPP/OAS on January 14, 2022.

which was destroyed in a security forces operation. Another risk situation exists in Antioquia, where they are seeking to involve children and adolescents living in the AETCR because of their familiarity with armed confrontation contexts.

In Guaviare, Meta, Putumayo, and Caquetá, peasant and indigenous children and adolescents are being recruited and used as shields to protect ringleaders of dissident or residual FARC-EP groups. In San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá, during operations against this illegal armed group, military forces have even recovered children and adolescents, whose rights they have restored. In other military actions, adolescents have been injured in combat or died following offensive actions with bombings of Segunda Marquetalia camps.

The ELN uses minors aged 10 and up for surveillance action in Norte de Santander. In Arauca, Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, and Valle del Cauca, indigenous communities are persistently impacted by this illegal armed group. Sometimes indigenous guard members organize to keep watch over the territory 24 hours a day, thus impeding the violation of rights of children and adolescents, while other communities opt to be forcibly displaced. As a result of security force raids on ELN camps in the Litoral de San Juan, Chocó, minors aged 13 to 17 died, who allegedly were providing security for the man known as “Fabián,” who was mortally wounded.

As regards the dynamics of involvement by the AGC/Clan del Golfo, the use of children and adolescents for surveillance activities, to collect extorted money, and to sell and transport illicit drugs in urban areas of Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, and Chocó are the predominant modalities. Organized criminal groups in the service of drug traffickers also make use of minors in border areas such as Maicao, in La Guajira, and Buenaventura, in Valle del Cauca.

In short, there is an urgent need to generate, adapt, and strengthen effective measures for the comprehensive protection of children and adolescents in the context of the armed conflict and dynamics of crime, according priority to their best interest. The GS/OAS reiterates that children and adolescents must be left out of all dynamics of conflict and violence that violate their rights, especially the rights to life, well-being, liberty, and security. There is also an urgent need to strengthen their protection with full respect for the norms of the Colombian State and its constitutional precepts that give precedence to the rights of children and adolescents, and to the standards of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

In the prevention area, the Colombian State has the challenge of expanding all reporting mechanisms to more territories, specifically rural ones; activating protection pathways for children and adolescents; and ensuring the security of officials carrying out their prevention and protection duties.

2.2.5 Impacts owing to the suspected presence of and accidents with antipersonnel mines, unexploded munitions, and explosive devices³⁹

According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), as of November 2021, 194 municipalities had been declared free of suspected antipersonnel mines, representing major progress with the 200-municipality target set for the end of the government of President Iván Duque. In total, the country has 871 municipalities free of suspected mines.⁴⁰ For its part, Colombia, for its Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) intervention efforts, was recognized at

³⁹ The term unexploded munitions is used since in the monitoring carried out by the MAPP/OAS, information was obtained on contamination in the territories with unexploded used munitions (explosive devices launched, shot, thrown, or released that did not detonate) as well as abandoned munitions (stored or abandoned munitions).

⁴⁰ “Resultados Paz con Legalidad” (Office of the Presidential Advisor for Stabilization and Consolidation, 2021) Available at: <https://www.portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/1896/avanza-la-paz-con-legalidad-los-logros-del-2021/>

the international level with its election to Chair of the 20th Meeting of the States Parties to the convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, to be held in Geneva (Switzerland), in 2022.

Also recognized is the progress made by the national government in developing prevention programs, with activities for education on antipersonnel mine risks, military and humanitarian demining, systematic follow-up of the phenomenon,⁴¹ and the OACP's AICMA response activities. Also to be noted is the progress made in the territories with institutional coordination for activation of the roadmap in cases of antipersonnel mine-related events and the inclusion of differentiated approaches in education on antipersonnel landmines risks.

Despite governmental efforts, in Colombia it has become difficult to identify dangerous areas and how to intervene. Illegal armed groups continue to use antipersonnel landmine contamination to control territories and explosive devices to attack security force members or enemy illegal armed groups.⁴² This dynamic has been exacerbated especially in Arauca and Guaviare, and in Murindó and Dabeiba municipalities, Antioquia; Argelia, Cauca; Puerto Concordia, and La Macarena, Meta, and in the Alto, Medio and Bajo San Juan in Chocó, Catatumbo areas of Norte de Santander, and Telembí, Pacific Coast, and Cordillera in Nariño.⁴³ Primary impacts include forced displacements or confinements, loss of property such as animals, land devaluation, and migration of agricultural workers to other economic sectors.

In addition, humanitarian demining operations and other AICMA intervention strategies have been suspended or limited owing to the ongoing military clashes and threats by illegal armed groups, who prefer for there to be no foreigners or external interventions in those territories because they consider them to be possible government intelligence elements. The most impacted areas are the indigenous reserves and community councils in Antioquia, Chocó, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.

Lastly, some communities have adopted unsafe conduct in their territories owing to a need to return to or prevent more accidents in their communities. This unsafe conduct is related to the return by indigenous communities in Antioquia and Chocó to contaminated areas without regard to safety, uncontrolled explosive deactivation by communities in Sardinata and Hacarí in Norte de Santander, and the renewal of travel in Nariño and Chocó through areas of suspected antipersonnel mine contamination.

Regarding strategies for prevention, care, and reparation, communities in Antioquia and Chocó have reiterated the importance of appointments for ongoing physical and emotional rehabilitation therapy and/or follow-up for family members of victims who have died. Lastly, the lack of connectivity and road connections in rural areas continues to impact the implementation of strategies for education on antipersonnel mine risk in Chocó, Antioquia, Nariño, Meta, Guaviare, and Putumayo.

3. TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS IN BORDER AREAS

⁴¹ In December, former FARC-EP combatants presented to the OACP information on 84 possibly mined areas, with support from the United Nations Mine Action Service and the MAPP/OAS.

⁴² Still present are the reasons mentioned in the 31st half-yearly report of antipersonnel mine contamination by illegal armed groups, who usually use it to: delimit the territory they seek to control, prevent security forces from moving into areas where they exercise greater control, and fence off areas where illicit crops are grown to prevent forced eradication.

⁴³ As mentioned in the 31st half-yearly report, the areas most at risk from antipersonnel mine contamination are schools, bridges, water sources, roads, police stations, and areas where illicit crops are grown. Therefore, most of the victims of events related to antipersonnel mines/unexploded munitions/explosive devices are civilians, with children and adolescents and indigenous communities being those most impacted.

In August, the National Civil Status Registry issued resolution 8617, of 2021, extending the “Children First” measure, the aim of which is to ensure access to Colombian nationality by children born in Colombia of Venezuelan parents and to prevent cases of statelessness.⁴⁴ Institutions also continue to promote the delivery of health and education services, and strategies for coordinating institutional services with international cooperation to address the population of irregular migration status.⁴⁵ Through the “visible” campaign, the national government has also promoted the regularization of the migrant population’s status, enabling this population to obtain an identity document in the country; and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) has designed an initiative that facilitates access by migrant children under the age of five to the temporary residency permit for which the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants provides.

The national government, with the gradual resumption of the authorized steps, has also carried out migration control actions. Throughout 2021, on the border with Panama, efforts were coordinated with institutions and international cooperation to address irregular migration flows; on the border with Venezuela, humanitarian corridors were maintained for control of peak foot traffic with an identity document; and on the border with Ecuador, on December 14, vehicle and foot traffic was authorized.

In September, the second phase of implementation of the Statute began. According to institutional figures, as of December 15, there were approximately 1,842,390 Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and of these, over 1,571,000 had begun the procedure to be covered by the Statute.⁴⁶ However, in its implementation, difficulties remain for access to the registration system. There have been cases of swindling, possible confusion among entities regarding their roles, poor management of territorial entities, and disinformation regarding the scopes of the Statute. Concerns of the receiving communities have also arisen, with fear of a possible collapse of public services as a result of the regularization of the migrant population’s status.

In Putumayo,⁴⁷ Chocó,⁴⁸ La Guajira, and Nariño, both the Colombian population resident in border areas and the population of irregular migration status travel through unauthorized areas where they must come into contact with illegal armed groups and criminal groups that control those areas. Both groups have used new remote migration routes with little institutional presence.

Some inhabitants of border and migrant reception areas have left their jobs and slowly become involved in activities to facilitate the travel and stay of the migrant population or the storage of goods arriving in Colombia through unauthorized crossing points.⁴⁹ This situation has had various impacts

⁴⁴ According to information provided by the National Civil Status Registry, as of January 16, 2022, 70,692 children and adolescents had benefited from the introduction of the “Valid for demonstration of nationality” note, meaning that they are no longer at risk of statelessness, and whose parents know that with this recognition, they may access health, education, and nationality services.

⁴⁵ Among notable achievements in this period is the enactment of Law 2136, of August 4, 2021 establishing Colombia’s comprehensive migration policy. According to institutional statistics, as of December 2021, 426,763 Venezuelan migrants had been accepted into the General Social Security System. Border Management Office of the Presidency of the Republic: Reply to the MAPP/OAS email. Received on February 6, 2022.

⁴⁶ “Migración Colombia, Gestión para la atención a población migrante. Respuesta a solicitud de avances, logros y resultados,” given to the MAPP/OAS on February 8, 2022, pp. 5-8.

⁴⁷ In the area around the San Miguel International Bridge, several unauthorized crossing points were created for Haitian migrants. In October, this flow decreased as a result of the step taken to direct them to Ipiales, Nariño.

⁴⁸ Such as the maritime route from Buenaventura to Jamundí, in Acandí to reach the border with Panama.

⁴⁹ Especially owing to payment in dollars for these services and their high demand in border or migration flow areas.

on Colombian communities⁵⁰ which also makes difficult the institutional management of the migration phenomenon and facilitates the dynamics of smuggling, smuggling of migrants, and human trafficking for sexual or labor exploitation purposes.

In addition, in selecting a place to live in Colombia, the Venezuelan migrant population gives priority to family relationships and job availability. However, where job opportunities are scarce, in some cases, migrants go to rural areas of Antioquia, Guajira, Cauca, Chocó, Norte de Santander, Nariño, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca and the southern Bolívar area to carry out work related to illegal exploitation of ore deposits or to harvest coca leaf.

Arauca and Norte de Santander Departments continue to be receivers of Venezuelan nationals forcibly displaced owing to acts of violence. Despite national government actions, local authorities sometimes do not have clear knowledge of existing pathways for emergency care for the migrant population.

Institutions remain concerned over the forced recruitment, use, or involvement of migrant children and adolescents;⁵¹ and violence against and the sexual exploitation of girls, adolescents, and young women of Venezuelan nationality. These impacts usually occur in brothels, human settlements, and unauthorized crossing points in communities located on the borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, and in rural areas of Valle del Cauca, Cesar, Bolívar, and Antioquia.

The migrant population continues to be victimized by physical aggression, murder, disappearances, and expulsions by illegal armed groups after having been accused of theft, extortion, selling illicit drugs, disregarding travel restrictions, or of being members of enemy illegal armed groups on the border with Venezuela and Ecuador, and in Antioquia, Guaviare, and Cauca. In most cases, these are groundless accusations or xenophobic perceptions.

4. JUSTICE IN THE TERRITORIES

The Ministry of Justice and Law has endorsed 749 peacemakers in equity in Guaviare, Meta, Nariño, and Norte de Santander; imparted training for justice workers to strengthen attention to the different forms of violence⁵² in accordance with norms in force; and promoted the formation of 112 local and five departmental justice committees in the framework of the Local Justice Systems strategy⁵³ as a mechanism for differentiated attention to territorial needs. All these actions constituted major progress in strengthening dispute resolution and communities' opportunities for access to justice.

Despite the reactivation of the local justice systems strategy, it has been hard to implement, yet more so, to make sustainable. Although the strategy has been formally defined in most municipalities, it remains a challenge to bring local prosecutors' offices and municipal courts into the system. In addition, the closing of the USAID program in 54 municipalities of Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Nariño, and Putumayo, where it had been supporting the strategy, highlights the difficulties of keeping it in operation. This because its ownership by local authorities has not been achieved, nor are sufficient resources available to carry out actions that enhance access to justice and justice response, especially

⁵⁰ As referenced in the 31st report, the impacts are: dispersal of the migration flow, increased migrant traffic, contraband, dollarization of the local economy, child labor, swindling, less work in tourism and/or business or agricultural work, and higher crime rates.

⁵¹ The situation of socioeconomic vulnerability in which most migrants arrive in areas of influence of illegal armed groups increases the risk of recruitment into and involvement in criminal groups or illegal armed groups.

⁵² Gender-based violence, intrafamily violence, and violence against LGBTI people, among others.

⁵³ Strategy in which, through a local process providing linkage among justice and community institutions, the territory's judicial needs are identified and actions proposed to ensure a timely and effective response. It has had technical and economic support from USAID, the European Union, and UNDP, among others.

in rural areas, where, in the absence of a coordination process, it is difficult for the population to access judicial services.

Justice administration and response have been impacted by different threats from illegal armed groups against justice workers in the departments of Antioquia and Guaviare and in areas of the Nariño Pacific Coast and Catatumbo. These threats have been made primarily against officials of the family police stations, police stations, municipal attorney's offices, and local prosecutors' offices. These threats are made when cases or prosecutions they are pursuing are related to the illegal armed groups, such as involving forced recruitment, land use and ownership, arrests of members of those groups, and, in general, the promotion and restoration of human rights. In the context of these security conditions, it has been difficult to achieve protection measures for justice workers, so that the population ceases using judicial services and leaves their jobs, since many choose to leave the municipalities as a self-protection measure.

Difficulties remain in accessing judicial services virtually, especially in rural areas, owing to the lack of knowledge by residents of the use of technological tools, the existing digital divide, and lack of financial resources. Although a revolving pool model has been implemented in prosecutors' offices and courts, access to them remains very limited. Therefore, the municipal attorney's offices, police stations, and family police stations are the entities that receive complaints and provide guidance for citizens, and have become efficient mechanisms to that end, but with considerable increase in their workloads.

4.1 Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (JEI)

The Ministry of Justice and Law has supported, in Chocó, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, the strengthening of justice in 45 indigenous communities and of their own dispute resolution mechanisms in 21 community councils. It has also supported the strengthening of training plans on the differentiated ethnic approach, judicial pluralism, and the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (JEI), with over 2,000 persons benefited. The Office of the Presidential Advisor on Human Rights and International Affairs has also provided training on governance and own protection systems for 114 authorities and guards of 32 communities of the Awá People Indigenous Units.⁵⁴

These efforts stand in contrast with the ongoing coercion and attacks on the JEI by illegal armed groups, who undermine the organization of and exercise of self-government by the ethnic communities, as well as their social cohesion, which, as noted in the 31st Report, ultimately could lead to the disappearance of the people's traditional forms of organization, development, and own justice.

The Embera Katío, Embera Dobida, Embera Eyábida, and Wounaan Peoples in Chocó and Antioquia have been the victims of confinement,⁵⁵ forced displacement, forced recruitment, installation of antipersonnel mines,⁵⁶ crossfire scenarios, and imposition of de facto measures, in violation of the regulations of these Peoples. Their authorities have been subjected to physical aggression, stigmatization, threats, and murders,⁵⁷ allegedly by the AGC/Clan del Golfo.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Justice and Law. Reply to the entity's request for progress, achievements, and results. Received on February 3, 2022.

⁵⁵ Some 23 Chocó communities.

⁵⁶ With special impact on Murindó and Chageradó River groups.

⁵⁷ Murder of the spiritual authority of the Barro Blanco community and of a guard of the Santa María de Catrú community in Alto Baudó.

The self-government and justice system of the Awá People in Nariño and Putumayo has been restricted by direct attacks, extortion, threats, and murders of their authorities.⁵⁸ Entire communities have been subjected to forced displacement,⁵⁹ installation of antipersonnel mines/used unexploded munitions in their territories, confinement,⁶⁰ and the disappearance, ever more frequent, of youths who later were found with signs of torture for failing to follow rules imposed by illegal armed groups.

The guard and council authorities of the Nasa, Yanacona, and Siona Peoples in Cauca and Putumayo have been threatened by illegal armed groups⁶¹ through pamphleteering. These threats have materialized as the kidnapping of family members,⁶² the murder of a former governor of the Yanacona of Santa Bárbara Council and eight indigenous guards, including a 14-year-old minor.⁶³ Forced recruitment⁶⁴ by illegal armed groups has also increased, in violation of indigenous norms.

Authorities of the Barí Nation in Norte de Santander have been attacked, threatened, and stigmatized⁶⁵ and their travel restricted by illegal armed groups. In particular, the protection system of the Guardianes del Isthana People has been accused of associating with paramilitary groups, with the aim of legitimizing violent actions against it. Threats have been made of the recruitment of children of governors of the Murui People in Putumayo, and the deputy Governor was prohibited from applying the People's norms, forcing him to follow rules of the illegal armed groups operating in the territory.

Authorities of the Macaguán People in Arauca were induced to take action in connection with thefts occurring in the area which, according to the illegal armed groups, involved indigenous community members, giving them 48 hours to vacate under threat of renewing the "executions." Threats have been made against authorities of the Cubeo People in Guaviare, Zenú People in Córdoba,⁶⁶ and Kankuamo People in Cesar. In the latter case, fire was set to two of its sacred places.

All of the above-described violations allegedly were perpetrated by the AGC/Clan del Golfo in Chocó, Córdoba, and Antioquia; the ELN in Norte de Santander, Nariño, Chocó, Arauca, and Antioquia; residual or dissident FARC-EP groups in Putumayo, Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Arauca; and the Los Pachencas organized crime groups in César and Los Contadores, in Nariño.

These violations by illegal armed groups are perpetrated to undermine organizational processes and strengthen their control over ethnic territories; silence reports of human rights violations, and attack self-government decisions. They are also perpetrated as a mechanism of retaliation against indigenous

⁵⁸ Threats against to Governor of the Nunalbí Alto Ulbí Indigenous Reserve, the Governor of the Gran Rosario Indigenous Reserve, the Economic Advisor of the Awá People Indigenous Unit (UNIPA), and education coordinators of the El Verde Indigenous Reserve. Mention should also be made of the murders of 80 UNIPA community members in the last five years.

⁵⁹ Alto Guelmambí, La Brava, Piguambí Palangana, Pulgande, Campoalegre, Gran Rosario, Gran Sábalo, Chinguirito Mira, Inda Zabaleta, Inda Guacaray, Kejuambi Feliciano, and Peña la Alegría Indigenous Reserves.

⁶⁰ La Brava, Piguambí Palangana, Pulgande, Campoalegre, Gran Rosario, Gran Sábalo, Chinguirito Mira, Inda Zabaleta, Inda Guacaray, Kejuambi Feliciano, and Peña la Alegría Indigenous Reserves.

⁶¹ Governor Siona of the Santa Cruz de Piñuña Blanco Indigenous Reserve, the Governor of the reserve and advisor of the association of the Regional Council of the Nasa del Putumayo Kwe'sx Ksa'w People, and authorities of the Valle del Cauca Regional Indigenous Organization (ORIVAC) and of the Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC).

⁶² The father of the CRIC Advisor.

⁶³ Breiner Cuncuñame, member of the Youth Indigenous Guard. The act took place on January 17, 2022.

⁶⁴ According to MAPP/OAS monitoring, in 2021, about 80 children and adolescents in Cauca, of whom the Indigenous Guard has rescued a dozen.

⁶⁵ Direct threat against the chief of the Saphadana community and the ASOCBARI human rights coordinator.

⁶⁶ Governor of the Zenú Vende Agujas Council, Governor of the Santa Fe Las Claras Council, former Governor of the Santa Fe Alto San Jorge Council, and captain of the Nueva Victoria Council indigenous community.

authorities for exercising territorial control, such as seizing narcotics and war materiel; eliminating the propaganda of illegal armed groups; refusing to accept their presence on councils; the consequent arrest of some of their members in the framework of the JEI;⁶⁷ prohibiting illicit crops and the illegal exploitation of ore deposits in collective territories; recovering forcibly recruited children and adolescents; and identifying minefields.

4.2 Bringing illegal armed groups to justice

In 2019, the national government designed the Defense and Security Policy for Lawfulness, Enterprise, and Equity. This policy provides for the adoption of models for the delivery and individual surrender to justice of members of organized armed groups, such as the AGC/Clan del Golfo, EPL/Los Pelusos, Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas/Los Caparros and residual or dissident FARC-EP groups. In implementation of this policy, Decree 965, of 2020 was issued, which establishes alternatives for individual return to lawfulness by members of organized armed groups who come voluntarily before any military, police, administrative, or judicial authority with the aim of surrendering.

The Humanitarian Demining Group of the Ministry of National Defense has furthered the coordination of the roadmap. The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) has also been developing the Differentiated Care Process (PAD), which has enabled 306 persons (36 women and 270 men) who were members of different organized crime groups to be handled through the Territorial Groups across the country.⁶⁸

Before signing the surrender document, organized crime group members must be assisted and advised by an attorney. However, the low numbers of public defenders in some territories, such as southern Córdoba, Bajo Cauca antioqueño, Guaviare, and Norte de Santander, have prevented those who decide to surrender to justice from obtaining adequate legal advice prior to surrender, unaware of the consequence and in some cases considering that they are accessing transitional justice mechanisms.

When the individual is not involved in a criminal prosecution, there is no outstanding arrest warrant for him/her, and when he/she claims membership of an organized crime group and his/her intent to leave it, some authorities, to prevent violations of due process owing to the lack of public defenders, have chosen to let them go free. This has led some organized crime group members to choose to rejoin the groups or flee from the territory out of fear of reprisal. In particular, some authorities avoid undertaking these proceedings out of fear of retaliation by the illegal armed group, as is occurring in Norte de Santander, where, in addition to the limited institutional presence, de facto justice is being imposed.

If the roadmap does not operate expeditiously, surrender to justice may lead to situations of risk to life and personal well-being of those who decide to leave the groups. For example, in December 2020, four former AGC/Clan del Golfo members came before military authorities of Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, but only by September 2021, was one of them certified by the Interinstitutional Committee for Individual Surrender to the Law. This situation increased their risk from the organized crime groups present in the territory, in some cases leading to displacements owing to threats and intimidation.

⁶⁷ This phenomenon is visible in northern Cauca, where at least a dozen members of residual groups have been arrested, and in Morales, Suárez, and Buenos Aires, where illegal armed groups opposed the JEI's investigation and prosecution of cases related to sexual violence, femicide, and intrafamily violence perpetrated by persons close to the illegal armed groups.

⁶⁸ Of the 212 persons who have entered the PAD, 204 (95%) are active in the process, two are recorded as dead, and six are inactive. Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Given to the MAPP/OAS on January 19, 2022.

According to institutional sources, 72 persons participating in the PAD are at risk: 52 of threat, a woman of assault, and 11 of persecution.⁶⁹

The MAPP/OAS invited local authorities of Bajo Cauca Antioqueño⁷⁰ and national authorities to a conversation in which each entity shared its experience, in order to strengthen interinstitutional relationships. This forum enabled the Ministry of Defense, the OACP, and the ARN to explain the operation of the roadmap for individual surrender to justice to the representatives of National Police units, the National Army, the Attorney General's Office (FGN), the Public Defender's Office, and the municipal attorneys' offices, who also expressed doubts regarding its implementation.

Specifically, cases were identified that still have not been resolved or had unsatisfactory response owing to exceptional situations in which the person was not fully identified, did not meet the requirements, or even was not certified owing to delays related to the Decree's implementation stage. The FGN also needs to study the cases of foreign national former organized crime group members who have collaborated with justice, but who cannot access the roadmap because it is exclusively for Colombian nationals.

Decree 965, of 2020, entails challenges for institutions and the civilian population as regards security and differentiated attention. For that reason, it is important for institutions to work harmoniously and in coordination in the context of the shared responsibility principle so as to overcome the lacunae and close the impunity and legal and physical insecurity gaps that have arisen during its implementation.

4.3 Jail Conditions in Transitional Justice Contexts

Since 2006, the MAPP/OAS has been visiting different national and municipal detention centers where persons deprived of liberty are being held owing to their relationship with or membership of illegal armed groups, this with the aim of making visible situations constituting violations of rights in the areas of liveability, access to health and food, security conditions, education, and vocational training, among others.

In this context, the Mission monitored jail conditions in 10 national detention centers where persons deprived of liberty are held owing to their relationship with or membership of the ELN, the AGC/Clan del Golfo, and dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, who have perpetrated crimes of high political and social impact that require differentiated criminal treatment.

Recently, the General Department of the National Prison and Jail Institute (INPEC) issued Resolution 3972, of 2021, regulating the high security sections of the national detention centers. This resolution establishes the regulations for persons held in these sections or who pose a special security risk,⁷¹ as was the case with several persons deprived of liberty related to the aforesaid illegal armed groups. Since the implementation of this resolution, several persons deprived of liberty were relocated with new security measures which, in some cases, have made it difficult to carry out resocialization

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Work was focused in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño owing to the dynamics of the conflict and the challenges faced by institutions in prosecuting many acts in the context of the fight against crime organizations, but especially owing to the reconfiguration taking place in the territory as a result of the arrest of the man known as Otoniel, the presence of Los Caparros, the arrival of FARC dissident groups, and the dynamics of the legal economy.

⁷¹ These are: "*negative leaders; provocateurs, and those who incite persons deprived of liberty to disobedience, riots, serious acts of violence against custodial or surveillance personnel, administrative personnel, and persons deprived of liberty themselves, or who perpetrate acts that disrupt or seriously or imminently threaten the security of prisons and jails.*" Resolution 3972, of 2021.

activities (productive and training), since the custodial and surveillance personnel is insufficient to perform the corresponding monitoring and comply with the provisions of the resolution.

Some persons deprived of liberty in medium and minimum-security prison treatment stages have also been impacted by the relocation. It should be noted that at these stages, these persons can participate in education and work programs with fewer security restrictions, with the aim of restructuring family and work dynamics in preparation for life after release. However, with the implementation of the resolution, these security restrictions have also limited the implementation of these activities.

A security risk also exists in that enemy illegal armed group members and populations involved in the internal armed conflict have been placed in the same section. These cases need to be reviewed to prevent classification without regard to the specific situations and conditions of each person deprived of liberty and to avoid impact on his/her resocialization process.

5. MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL PROTEST

The second half of 2021 began with a call for a national strike by the National Strike Committee (CNP) and the “Primeras Líneas,” [first lines of defense by representatives of the most invisible groups against government repression of the strike] and the holding of a National Indigenous Minga [gathering], which traveled through Santa Marta, Bucaramanga, and Bogotá. Reasons for continuing the monthly convocation of mobilizations included a demand for the creation of a mechanism to monitor implementation of the recommendations issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) subsequent to its June 2021 visit; demand for security guarantees for university leaders and teachers threatened by illegal armed groups owing to their participation in the mobilizations, and a demand for enactment of the bills⁷² that the CNP had submitted to the Congress of the Republic.

Although there was violence and confrontation between National Police and demonstrators during the strikes called for the 28th day of each month, these were not the equal of the events in the first half of 2021. In addition, as the economic recovery following the COVID-19 crisis proceeded, mobilizations in the capital seats were not as massive. The progress made with the investigations and arrest of alleged perpetrators of crimes in Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Popayán, and Arauca were also factors impacting the ability to convene the protests.

Civil society organizations requested a hearing to follow up on the observations and recommendations made by the IACHR to the Colombian State. At that forum, held on October 26, 2021, these organizations indicated that account was not being taken of the recommendations and that both the social mobilization exercise and the Indigenous Minga were still being accused of receiving illegal funding. For its part, the national government indicated that major progress had been made with the recommendations, such as the policy for guarantees and respect for human rights protection work,⁷³ the implementation of Decree 003, of 2021, containing the guidelines for conducting peaceful public demonstrations in Colombia, and the creation of the Police Disciplinary Statute,⁷⁴ modifying procedures for and sanctions on police force members who have incurred in human rights violations.

⁷² Related to basic income, education, job creation, economic recovery, guarantees of youth’s fundamental right to peaceful protest and political participation, social protection, price-setting policy for agricultural products and inputs on the national market, National Police reform, and actions against gender-based violence.

⁷³ National Planning Department, CONPES 4063 document, Public Policy on Guarantees and Respect for Human Rights Protection Efforts and Leaders, issued 11/28/2021

⁷⁴ Subsequently issued under Law 2196, of January 18, 2021.

In addition to the national strike, territorial social mobilizations were also held regarding illegal exploitation of ore deposits in Bolívar, Antioquia, and Chocó. Demands included the cessation of security force operations against informal miners and non-stigmatization of those carrying out this activity, as well as formalization for small and medium-scale miners.

Demonstrations were also held to demand respect for human rights. In Cali, a ceremony was held in commemoration of the youths who died during the national strike; in Arauca, to repudiate murders of civilians; in Tumaco, to demand guarantee of the right to life of social leaders; and in Popayán, another Indigenous Minga to the city of Cali was held to lend visibility to the humanitarian crisis in ethnic territories resulting from the presence and action of illegal armed groups.

6. CITIZEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The second half of 2021 was historic in terms of the expansion of democracy owing to the renewal of the process to create 16 temporary special peace districts (CTEP), the first ever elections of the Municipal Youth Councils (CMJ), and autonomous democratic election exercises of civil society, such as the Communal Action Boards, the Special Women's Authority of the Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI), and the Committees for Effective Victim Participation.

6.1 Municipal Youth Councils (CMJ)

The CMJs, created in the framework of Statutory Law 1622, of 2013,⁷⁵ are autonomous forums in which youth can interact and engage in dialogue with institutions in order to achieve participation, consultation, oversight, and monitoring of government and public policy. For the first time in Colombia, and after two delays resulting from the COVID-19 health crisis, the CMJ electoral process was held. In these, youth demonstrated their citizen aspirations following the social mobilizations of May and June.

In an unprecedented process, 41,684 youth candidates were registered on 7,789 parity lists,⁷⁶ figures demonstrating youth's broad interest in participating. These elections are of historical importance since they generate openness, strengthen democracy, and attach value to youth participation of equal importance to that of other elections, through a State electoral organization.

The Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Youth, the National Civil Status Registry, and the National Electoral Council (CNE) made wide-ranging efforts to provide training and disseminate information nationwide. Nonetheless, a need was evident to deepen and expand instruction for future electoral exercises.⁷⁷ The process was conducted in an organized manner and aimed to facilitate and expand youth participation in elections. The Registry automatically registered this group on the electoral rolls, installed 6,058 polling stations (1,284 in rural areas), and sought mechanisms to facilitate the polling station change for minors. Lastly, on December 5, 2021,

⁷⁵ Issuing the youth citizenship statute and other provisions.

⁷⁶ Office of the Deputy Electoral Registrar, "Reporte Informe MAPP-OAS" (reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Given to the MAPP/OAS on January 7, 2022.

⁷⁷ Requirement emphasized given the high percentage of null votes (22.8%), which was attributed in part to the design of the ballot and the limited instruction given regarding it, which may have led to the error.

1,266,857 youth (10.3% of the total electoral roll) went to the polls and elected 10,929 youth advisors across all of the country's municipalities.⁷⁸

The elections were notable for their diversity, breadth, and inclusivity. For the first time, the lists were parity, alternating women and men, and special youth victim, peasant, and ethnic seats were assigned. The CNE validated the lists formed in alteration by women and men, with affirmative action. The parity lists and the election process for special seats for victims, ethnic populations, and peasants contributed to the formation of diverse councils, with 5,365 women (49%),⁷⁹ 5,564 men (51%), 268 peasant youths, 904 youth victims, 400 Afro-descendent, Raizal and Palenquero youth, 335 indigenous youth, and four Rom youth.⁸⁰

Now that the electoral process has concluded, it is key to continue to disseminate the scope and functions of the CMJs, form and install the Departmental Councils and the National Council, ensure adequate monitoring thereof by the institutions with responsibility, and strengthen respectively the council members so that they can realize their potential, thereby inspiring more youth to participate. It is also important to coordinate the different initiatives for youth, such as the Pact of Colombia with Youth and the CONPES for Youth,⁸¹ and to incorporate them in the framework of the National System for Youth,⁸² with a view to joining forces.

OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, at the invitation of the national government, was present at the observation of the elections, and the MAPP/OAS also supported and monitored the electoral exercise and its results in the territories. This established that it was an important experience in the Hemisphere for democratic participation by youth that will need to be systematized and made available to the other member states. This exercise will continue to be supported by the GS/OAS. In view of the express request by the national government to monitor the operation of the CMJs, the GS/OAS and the MAPP/OAS reiterate their intent, commitment, and willingness to promote the necessary actions in the framework of their mandate and to continue strengthening the youth sector as a democratic actor.

6.2 Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace (CTEP)

The Constitutional Court gave the green light for the creation of the 16 CTEPs by Legislative Act 02, of August 25, 2021. This political participation mechanism for victims of the armed conflict and the inclusion of rural communities and territories is an opportunity for the expansion of democracy necessary for the consolidation of peace.

⁷⁸ Office of the Deputy Electoral Registrar, "Reporte Informe MAPP-OAS" (reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Give to the MAPP/OAS on January 7, 2022.

⁷⁹ The figures show that to reduce the gender gaps, it was a success for the elections to be organized using parity and "zipper" [alternation of candidates by gender on the] lists, allowing for nearly equal representation of female youth.

⁸⁰ It is noteworthy that while alternation of relatively large numbers of youth victims was achieved (primarily with the impetus of the municipal Committees for Effective Victim Participation), the occupation of ethnic seats and especially peasant seats was not effectively achieved, implying a need for instructional efforts with these sectors and local administrations for future exercises.

⁸¹ For several months, the national government led a wide-ranging participatory effort with youth through the Pacto Colombia in 236 municipalities of 32 departments, in which (as of August 13, 2021) 15,145 youth had participated on 502 committees, concluding with the signature of the Pact, consisting of 12 action lines, between the national government and youth representatives. The Pact of Colombia with Youth will have an investment of COP25.9 billion for its implementation. At the same time, for the CONPES for Youth, in force until 2030, COP33.5 billion was allocated for the implementation of programs benefiting 13 million youths.

⁸² Law 1622, of 2013, Youth Citizenship Statute, Article 22.

The entities with responsibility, headed by the Ministry of the Interior, the Registry, and the CNE, were faced with the challenge of regulating this novel and complex electoral process, under time pressure, since it was to begin on September 10. These circumstances led to numerous points of disagreement in communities, civil society organizations, and victims' organizations, which are pointing to a need for more instruction and training, and for the flexibilization of certain rules that they consider barriers or obstacles for civil society.⁸³

The Unit for the Care and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims (UARIV) and the Registry have carried out important instructional actions through in-person and virtual workshops in the territories. However, the processes were insufficient given the complexity of the regulations, remoteness, and connectivity difficulty in rural areas.⁸⁴

Despite the challenges and disagreements with the process' regulations, 403 candidacies (202 women and 201 men) were registered. Of these, 201 were presented by civil society organizations, 76 by victims' organizations, 46 by community councils, 42 by peasant organizations, 24 by indigenous authorities, 10 by women's organizations, two by the Kumpaño, and two by an important citizen group.⁸⁵

The Registry created 177 new polling stations in rural areas of the 167 municipalities involved and implemented an identity card campaign at these stations that processed 1,029 new identity card applications.⁸⁶ Although the creation of new polling stations is an essential contribution to democracy, major differences arose among the CTEPs and among municipalities of the same district stemming from the individual performance and management of the decentralized entities and the dialogue they maintain with communities and civil society organizations.⁸⁷

The institutional efforts for effective inclusion of rural communities in political-electoral exercises represent a democratic gain. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that these new polling stations are permanent, and do not serve only for these elections. And to expand substantially and on an ongoing basis the identity card effort in the rural communities, since a major deficit persists in this area, especially in the CTEP regions.⁸⁸

The electoral body⁸⁹ has adopted the protocol to promote greater political participation by women, guarantee the right to vote on equal terms, and prevent and address cases of violence against women in politics.⁹⁰ In the last two years, parity and non-violence against women in politics have been

⁸³ One of the main disagreements found in the territories stems from the exclusion of urban polling stations, since this is viewed as an obstacle for a large group of forced displacement victims now settled in municipal seats.

⁸⁴ The MAPP/OAS has organized six in-person and three virtual workshops to expand the dissemination of information regarding the electoral process, reaching eight CTEP communities, and has been able to establish a marked need in the communities for information and concrete responses.

⁸⁵ Office of the Delegate Electoral Registrar, "Reporte Informe MAPP-OAS" (reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Give to the MAPP/OAS on January 7, 2022.

⁸⁶ Statement by the Registry during the virtual meeting "Victims in the Context of Peace Seats," organized by CODHES, USAID, and Colombia+20, on January 21, 2022.

⁸⁷ While the number of new polling stations per district averaged 11 (and in Caquetá, 40 new polling stations were created), in four districts (CTEP 3, 4, 15, and 16), only one new polling station was created. In Córdoba (District 14), seven new polling stations were created in only one of the five municipalities comprising the district (Tierralta).

⁸⁸ Report of the Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) "Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz para Cámara de Representantes 2022-2026 and 2026-2030," November 2021, pp. 21-23.

⁸⁹ Composed of the Registry and the CNE.

⁹⁰ National Electoral Council Resolution No. 8947, of December 15, 2021.

placed on the public agenda, and, in the current context, they are being put to the test in different electoral contests, especially those of the CMJs, CTEPs, and the Congress of the Republic.

Despite the adoption of parity in 2020, only 39.85% (1,122) of the candidacies registered for Congress are of women,⁹¹ meaning that the gender gap in political representation persists. It is also necessary to see parity as one of several strategies to be guaranteed in order to achieve gender equality in politics. That is how the gap is to be closed, by taking steps for internal democratization by political parties and movements, and comprehensive guarantees for women candidates at all stages of the electoral contest.

The CTEPs have great reconciliation, coexistence, and peace-building potential. Nonetheless, considering the critical security conditions in these areas, the candidacies, the organizations promoting them, and the communities that will vote are at high risk, primarily from the actions of illegal armed groups. It is essential for the institutions with jurisdiction to adopt and implement the measures necessary to ensure a wide-ranging, safe, and transparent democratic exercise, the proper operation of the National Commission for the Coordination and Monitoring of Electoral Processes and of the Special Electoral Courts,⁹² and the timely materialization of public funding through the disbursement of the advances for the campaign.

6.3 Participatory process of the Community Action Entity (OAC)

On November 28, 2021, elections were held for the officials of 62% of the Community Action Councils (JAC),⁹³ promoting the reactivation of the country's largest autonomous organizational base. Attrition of community leaders stemming from lengthy tenure in office and vacancies arising from resignation, death, or displacement led to the OACs' perception of the process as an opportunity to formalize changes or early unreported appointments.

The Department for Democracy, Citizen Participation, and Community Action of the Ministry of the Interior has furthered the implementation of the Community Electoral Guarantees Boards as forums to promote institutional knowledge of elections, promote analysis of risks of violation of community rights, and coordinate local institutional responses. It has also installed Unified Command Posts (PMU),⁹⁴ where territorial entities contributed comprehensively to election day. One success was the institutional support provided by the Ministry through a permanent virtual information channel,⁹⁵ with data on the elections, normative and institutional provisions, and pathways for processing alleged irregularities in the electoral process.

However, restrictions by illegal armed groups on JAC autonomy during election periods persist through the update of books of associated persons⁹⁶ and the implementation of the community

⁹¹ According to the base of 2819 candidacies registered published by the Registry.

<https://wapp.registraduria.gov.co/electoral/Elecciones-2022/candidatos-inscritos.html>

⁹² It is of concern that, despite clear regulations in this regard, on December 13, none of the Temporary Electoral Peace Courts had been put in operation by the electoral authority.

⁹³ There are an estimated 63,000 JAC and JVC. Ministry of the Interior "Elecciones comunales 2021" (Mininterior, 2021),

<http://comunal.mininterior.gov.co/documentos/Bot%C3%B3n%20Elecciones%20Comunales/ELECCIONES%20COMUNALES.pdf>

⁹⁴ National and departmental, with presence of institutions such as the Public Defender's Office, Public Prosecutor's Office, Registry, Police, Army, Attorney General's Office, National Protection Unit, UN Verification Mission, and MAPP/OAS.

⁹⁵ Available at: <http://comunal.mininterior.gov.co/Elecciones-Electorales.html>

⁹⁶ Requiring affiliated persons to be identified with cards or identity cards that must be carried to enable citizens to travel in rural and urban areas.

collective for the exercise of territorial control through population identification and traceability or extortion. These actions by illegal armed groups against community leaders and organizations increase the risk of delegitimizing their work, stigmatization, and accusations; negatively impact citizen participation in the OAC, and have consequences for matters of vital importance for the group and generational changes of leadership.

6.4 Victim participation, Law 1448, of 2011⁹⁷

The national government has adopted CONPES 4031, of June 11, 2021, with an estimated budget of COP142 billion, which is expected to optimize victim access to safeguards of their rights and promote Law 1448, of 2011 as extended. During the 10 additional years of implementation, the challenges made evident in the first period it was in force must be overcome, especially those related to security conditions that ensure the cessation of victimization, return and effective restitution, and non-repetition by those accessing the reparation and restitution pathway.

There was fear and mistrust regarding the process to elect the municipal Committees for Effective Victim Participation (MPEVs).⁹⁸ Risks in the form of threats and stigmatization by illegal armed groups led to the withdrawal of candidacies. The Committees, as forums for impact, have been questioned in view of their operational defects,⁹⁹ few meetings convened, scant recognition of victims' contributions to the initiatives of territorial entities, and lack of knowledge of their scope and contribution to concrete results. All this discouraged participation in this democratic exercise.

By contrast, the UARIV and the Attorney General's Office have carried out actions to promote knowledge of the existing Protocol for Effective Participation,¹⁰⁰ with training for civilian, military, and ethnic authorities and victims' organizations, and implemented simulations and forums for clarification of doubts and answering questions as means to promote informed processes that stimulate active interest in joining the forums. In coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they also promoted the representation of overseas victims on the National Committee, through a clear process using virtual tools.

The Protocol for Victim Participation¹⁰¹ introduced changes that the MPEVs view as positive because more inclusive and representative forums are advocated.¹⁰² One proposal is for the vote for MPEV members not to be cast by legal representatives of victims' organizations, but rather by candidates for Committee membership, reducing the possibility of impact on the composition of the forum by inactive organizations. Another advance is the representation, for the first time, of those eligible for collective reparation, expanding their participation and possibility for impact on public policy. The immediate institutional challenge is to contribute to the legitimacy of these forums by promptly addressing challenges and allegations of irregularities reported during the electoral process.

7. IMPACT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND POLICIES

7.1 Rural Development Program (PDET)

⁹⁷ Extended by Law 2078, of January 8, 2021.

⁹⁸ Although this only became evident in the first election process specifically for the municipalities, the characteristic of participation impact on the representativeness and legitimacy of the process during subsequent balloting.

⁹⁹ Such as payment of travel expenses and scant convocation of meetings.

¹⁰⁰ Victim Unit Resolution 01668, of December 30, 2020.

¹⁰¹ Resolution 01668, of December 30, 2020.

¹⁰² A change viewed as positive that will be implemented in 2023 is the lengthier term of representatives from two to four years.

The PDETs have stepped up the implementation of essential comprehensive public rural development policies. Their progress and coordinating experience at the rural level have become an opportunity for implementation of the National Sectoral Plans for Comprehensive Rural Reform, of which the nationwide recognition and impact need to be strengthened.¹⁰³

The leadership of the Office of the Advisor for Stabilization and Consolidation and of the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) have ensured that, among other things, that the institutional meetings to promote PDETs are the most important and diverse tool for short, medium, and long-term strategic planning in the territories affected by the armed conflict, ensuring the launch of implementation of 10,331 of the 32,808 PDET initiatives (31%).

The process of validation and territorial preparation of the Single Roadmap (HRU)¹⁰⁴ culminated in participation by over 3,500 actors essential for peace-building. In addition, government reports underscore the historic increase in public, private, and international cooperation investment resources by over COP\$11.52 billion, which has meant that over 60% of approved PDET projects are now completed and/or delivered.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, according to official Comprehensive Rural Reform Land Fund figures,^{106 107} 798,993 hectares in 140 PDET municipalities have been made available and 2.5 million more will be activated through the use of the Natural Conservation Contract (CCN), which promotes the usage rights of peasant populations in conservation and restoration areas for strategic ecosystems. In that regard, dissemination processes should continue and diverse and effective participation by rural communities promoted in the incorporation of adjustments to the CCNs that strengthen their sustainability and impact.

The formation of 168 of the 170 PDET project management teams constitutes progress in meeting local initiative management needs. It is essential to continue to build technical capacities and incorporate gender and ethnic approaches in these processes, and for nationwide entities to apply differentiated criteria that facilitate the overcoming of local technical deficits of municipalities not proficient in the structuring and financial management of PDET initiatives.¹⁰⁸

By contrast, the rate of refusal or rejection of structured projects generates cost overruns stemming from the need for rectification, as well as perceived gaps in national-territory coordination and disagreement among local authorities. In addition, the announcement in November 2021 of the exhaustion of the resources of the Collegiate Entity for Administration and Decision (OCAD-Paz) discouraged town hall and governor office interest and underscored the need to strengthen resource management through other means of financing.

Despite the progress represented by the capacity-building strategies for participation by Impetus Group (GM) delegates and the formation of the Special Consultation Mechanisms for Ethnic

¹⁰³ The National Sectoral Plans for Comprehensive Rural Reform will not only be implemented in 170 PDET municipalities, but also in the country's 1,122 municipalities.

¹⁰⁴ According to the methodology for its construction, of the 16 PDET subregions, the only territorial validation missing is the HRU of Middle Pacific.

¹⁰⁵ Includes important road and productive infrastructure works, electrification, aqueducts, health centers, and rural schools that make it possible to bridge inequality divides between rural and urban areas.

¹⁰⁶ Territorial Renewal Agency, "Respuesta OEA/MAPP" (reply to request for information as input for the report of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States). Given to the MAPP/OAS on January 28, 2022.

¹⁰⁷ Final Agreement, paragraph 1.1.1.

¹⁰⁸ Situation that has been arising in PDET subregions such as Pacífico Medio, Catatumbo, Chocó, Urabá Antioqueño, and Pacífico and Frontera Nariñense.

Communities, community perceptions persist of a deficit in citizen participation, and of delays in the timely execution of infrastructure and productive initiatives and in access to land.

The perception also persists of giving precedence to infrastructure initiatives over those included in pillar 8 for comprehensive reparation, rebuilding the social fabric, and promotion of peaceful coexistence. In addition, PDET social oversight processes are absent or weak in the territories, and ethnic-territorial authorities indicate that there is resistance in town halls and governors' offices to giving precedence to ethnic initiatives.

These factors, in addition to the actions of illegal armed groups,¹⁰⁹ limit the acknowledgement of progress, and of social ownership of the process and its sustainability. They also make it difficult to position the PDETs on the territorial and national agendas, and facilitate their use as a means of social polarization in the upcoming electoral processes, especially those related to the CTEPs that coincide territorially with the PDET subregions.

For rural communities, participatory implementation of the PDETs represents an opportunity to build a future with comprehensive rural development and bridge inequality divides. The PDET initiatives completed or in execution are the realization of conditions of well-being and dignity as guiding principles of the exercise of fundamental rights that have also driven the demands of the social demonstrations of the last two years.¹¹⁰

7.2 Comprehensive Strategic Intervention Areas (ZEIIs) or “Future Zones”

The implementation of the ZEIIs or Future Zones has furthered the implementation of the Immediate Response Plans (PRI) in the six priority regions.¹¹¹ In 2021, the national government reported the execution of COP\$390,438,569,232 million in social and security investment, which includes projects for the prevention of forced recruitment of children and adolescents, citizen participation, public interest in urban land use planning [*ordenamiento social de la propiedad*], multipurpose registry, improvement of roads, health, and education infrastructure, and building the operational capacity of the security forces.

The components of strengthening of the State where the law guarantees the well-being of society [*Estado social de derecho**] and PDET acceleration¹¹² are those showing most progress with the installation, improvement, and/or provision of infrastructure essential to bridging inequality divides and divides in access to public resources. In that regard, the Offices of the Presidential Advisors and

¹⁰⁹ In the Chocó PDET subregion, illegal armed groups have expressed their opposition to the implementation of PDET initiatives, especially those related to social management of rural property and access to land. In areas such as Chocó and Bajo Cauca, extortion of PDET works contractors has also been occurring.

¹¹⁰ Some key elements on the environmental and social agendas of Alto Patía and Norte de Cauca, Cuenca del Caguán and Piedemonte Caqueteño, Meta and Guaviare are present in PDET initiatives of these subregions.

¹¹¹ In the Chocó PDET subregion, illegal armed groups have expressed their opposition to the implementation of PDET initiatives, especially those related to social management of rural property and access to land. In areas such as Chocó, Bajo Cauca, and Catatumbo, extortion of PDET works contractors has also been occurring. In addition, in September in Catatumbo, the ELN stole an ART pick-up truck .

[* The “Estado Social de Derecho” was progressively implemented in Colombia through social security programs, progressive tax systems for the financing of public works, tax and monetary policies, among other things, and was based on a broad political, economic, social and legal concept differing from the welfare state, which was a response by a State to the crisis of the 1930s, which was limited to funding a political, economic and social policy. The “Estado Social de Derecho” therefore became a new proposal that ultimately replaced the liberal state [with laws governing the conduct of all members of society, and with separation of powers and equal rights]].

¹¹² Decree 2278, of 2019.

the OACP have played an important part in expediting coordinated and comprehensive entry by State institutions.

The national government maintains the line of protection of water, biodiversity, and the environment through the implementation of the 13 phases of the Artemisa Campaign, and has reclaimed some 22,000 hectares and made 104 arrests in connection with environmental crimes, primarily in the National Parks composing the Chiribiquete and Parques Aledaños ZEII. Despite the dissemination efforts of the security forces, some peasant communities living in the national parks continue to view Artemisa as a strategy that violates their rights, and the security forces have not succeeded in impeding the major deforesters. This view has been used by illegal armed groups to pressure the population through threats and to create bias among those communities towards rejection of State action, as has occurred in Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta.

Despite the security force operations, in the departments of Arauca, Chocó, Meta, and Norte de Santander, and the Bajo Cauca, Pacífico Nariñense, and southern Córdoba areas, the plan's component of strengthened measures for the protection of the civilian population has not made it possible to strengthen security guarantees for these communities, which are still impacted by crime and violence.

In the Pacifico Nariñense ZEII, in Tumaco, the SIJINs¹¹³ have been strengthened through the arrival of 10 judicial police, for a total of 40. Nonetheless, public prosecutors remain concerned over the low numbers of Technical Investigation Corps (CTI) officials, in view of the high level of violence and crime persisting in the area, a situation that thwarts optimal levels of clarification.

Neither has it been possible to strengthen with sufficient personnel the ZEII's sectional prosecutor's offices, with one of its objectives being to dismantle crime organizations, as is the case in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Pacífico Nariñense, and the Chiribiquete National Park, despite the operations and arrests being made against those groups. Although most of these processes are investigated and prosecuted at the national level, depending on the crime involved, some are transferred to the sections, meaning that those prosecutor's offices have been overwhelmed, and few changes deriving from the Future Zones strategy have been noted.

7.3 Illicit crop reduction strategies

Coca leaf crops, in increased volumes, continue to be found in departments such as Antioquia,¹¹⁴ Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca and southern Bolívar, owing in part to the community perception of the inefficacy of voluntary crop substitution and the pandemic's impact on the economy in rural areas. These factors are used by illegal armed groups to promote replanting actions and or actions for the transfer of illicit crops to other areas. The new coca leaf varieties and mechanization of the coca paste and derivatives production process have led to higher yields and increased illicit drug production.

In Cauca, in municipalities such as Corinto, Toribío, and Miranda, residual or dissident FARC-EP groups have imposed a tax on coca leaf sales and controls on marijuana production, especially in collective territories of indigenous and Afro-descendent communities.¹¹⁵ In Norte de Santander, the environment has been impacted by the production of illicit coca crops. For example, in rural Cúcuta, coca leaf production has increased in areas near water bodies supplying the Cúcuta aqueduct, which

¹¹³ Sections of the Crime Investigation Department and Interpol.

¹¹⁴ In Briceño municipality, some PNIS beneficiaries are replanting coca and have sold inputs they are given for short and long cycle production projects and used this money to buy coca seed for planting.

¹¹⁵ This is also occurring within the Nükak People Indigenous Reserves in Guaviare.

has led to the dumping of chemical inputs used to fumigate these crops into these bodies of water, as is the captured liquid from coca processing, with the ensuing water scarcity, while in municipalities such as Teorama, there has been deforestation to make room for illicit crops, even within the Catatumbo-Barí National Park.

Official data show that, through implementation of the Comprehensive National Illicit Crop Substitution Program (PNIS), alternative crops have been voluntarily planted on 45,761 hectares of coca leaf in 14 departments and 56 municipalities. In addition, of the 99,097 beneficiary families, 70,665 have received all Immediate Assistance Plan payments; 75,139 have received comprehensive technical assistance; 66,029 have established food security projects, and 26,083 are implementing their productive projects.¹¹⁶ However, the PNIS beneficiary population in Antioquia, Bolívar, Córdoba, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo has indicated that irregularities have occurred by operators' deliveries of inputs for productive projects, in particular, cost overruns.

To address this situation, the Illicit Crop Substitution Department (DSCI) has convened and implemented participatory forums – with support from control entities – where factors accounting for the variation in the prices of the inputs supplied were disseminated. Among determining aspects, they noted (i) difficulties in the availability of inputs at the local, regional, and national levels; (ii) cost overruns associated with the low availability of raw material for their manufacture; (iii) logistical distribution difficulties at the global level; and (iv) exchange rate variations.

The DSCI, in coordination with the National Land Agency (ANT), has also furthered the dissemination of the usage rights contract¹¹⁷ for land for the PNIS beneficiary population living in forest reserve areas, with the aim of enabling the families to use it for up to ten years, with possible indefinite extension, through activities consistent with environmental management and regulations. In departments such as Guaviare, where this initiative was disseminated, the communities involved in the PNIS describe it as a State attempt at dispossession and coercion by making it a condition for remaining in the program, for which reason they have openly indicated their rejection. The situation is similar in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and southern Bolívar. However, the DSCI and the ANT have proposed various strategies for social dialogue and building capacities among beneficiary communities so that they understand the strategy and erroneous perceptions are countered.

The Department has also promoted the participatory preparation of the document “Guidelines for implementation of illicit crop substitution modalities with a differentiated ethnic and environmental approach, and a women’s, gender, family, and generational perspective,” which included the community contributions. This has promoted better relations between the Department and the beneficiary population, especially in Tumaco, Nariño, and Cúcuta, Norte de Santander.

As for the “Plan for coordination of actions to strengthen the security of PNIS leaders and of substitution models,” on 22 occasions, the Office of the Advisor for Stabilization and Consolidation has activated the protocol for addressing cases that require immediate attention. It has also deployed the territorial coverage strategy, which has disseminated the Plan to the territorial entities, and decided to include lines on matters related to citizen security and citizen coexistence for the population involved in illicit crop substitution, and to give precedence to the PNIS communities and leaders for their involvement in territorial entity plans, programs, and projects. In the prevention area, the Office of the Advisor has held eight self-protection workshops, in Meta, Caquetá, Cauca, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca,

¹¹⁶ Department of Illicit Crop Substitution, “Respuesta Solicitud Logros Institucionales Informe Semestral XXXII MAPP-OEA.” Given to the MAPP/OAS on December 24, 2021.

¹¹⁷ Regulated by National Land Agency Agreement 058, of 2018.

Antioquia, Guaviare, and Arauca, where training was provided for over 170 leaders on illicit crop substitution.¹¹⁸

Despite the institutional actions, implementation of the voluntary substitution models in areas where drug crime is present remains a risk to the security of communities and social leaders, who have been subjected to forced displacement, threats, and murders by illegal armed groups in Antioquia, Cauca, Córdoba, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Meta, and Putumayo.

The security forces, for their part, report the forced eradication of 65,053 hectares of coca leaf crop from July to December 2021, in 117 municipalities of 16 departments, with most eliminated fields concentrated in Putumayo, Bolívar, and Caquetá. This figure indicates that the intensity of eradication days has declined, and that the set target of 130,000 hectares eradicated by the end of 2021¹¹⁹ was not met. In departments such as Cauca and in the Catatumbo area, security forces reduced forced eradication efforts to avoid tension with the population, instead focusing their efforts on actions to seize cocaine hydrochloride and destroy illicit drug processing infrastructure.¹²⁰

In municipalities such as La Montañita, Caquetá, and El Retorno, Guaviare, and in the Bajo Putumayo and southern Córdoba areas, altercations arose between communities and security forces, which led to the suspension of forced eradication and rapid response operations in order to deescalate social tensions. Here, interference has not been neglected by illegal armed groups that are interested in safeguarding illicit crops through the coercion of communities so that they hinder State intervention, as has occurred in Anorí, Antioquia; Montelíbano, Córdoba; Santa Bárbara de Iscuandé, Nariño,¹²¹ and Tibú, Norte de Santander.¹²²

Reactivation of the Program for Eradication of Illicit Crops Using the Herbicide Glyphosate (PECIG) has been one of the anti-drug policy challenges facing the Colombian government. In January 2022, the Constitutional Court, by judgment T-413, of 2021, decided to review the judgments in response to four stewardship actions brought by different citizens and civil society organizations against the National Environmental Permits Agency (ANLA) and the National Police with a view to safeguarding the rights to participation, prior consultation, and due process in the context of a process for modification of the PECIG's Environmental Management Plan (PMA).

In this judgment, the Court ordered ANLA, the Ministry of the Interior, and the National Police to promote, within one year, that may be extended for up to six months, a prior consultation process with the ethnic communities present in any of the six operation areas defined for modification of the PMA of the PECIG, covering a total of 104 municipalities in 14 departments. This poses a challenge

¹¹⁸ Office of the Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation, "Respuesta Solicitud Logros Institucionales Informe Semestral XXXII MAPP-OEA." Sent to the MAPP/OAS by email of February 7, 2022.

¹¹⁹ In 2021, a total of 103,257 hectares were eradicated. Drug Observatory of Colombia of the Ministry of Justice and Law, "Cifras erradicación de cultivos de hoja de coca año 2021" (ODC, 2022). Consulted at: <http://www.odc.gov.co/sidco/oferta/erradicacion>

¹²⁰ From January to December 2021, in Cauca 875 hectares were eradicated, 81% less than in the same period in 2020, while 18.401 kg of cocaine hydrochloride was seized, 110% more compared to the year prior. At the national level, in 2021, 391,441 kg was seized, the highest anti-drug trafficking operations figure. Drug Observatory of Colombia of the Ministry of Justice and Law. Consulted at: <http://www.odc.gov.co/sidco/>

¹²¹ A seven-day protest during October in which 2,000 peasants participated who opposed the forced eradication efforts of the security forces within community councils, which, from their perspective, constituted failure to implement the stewardship judgment of the Higher Court of Pasto Judicial District, which ordered the national government to carry out and guarantee prior consultation with the region's indigenous reserves population and community councils.

¹²² In October, 180 soldiers were impounded by the peasant population in the village of Oru 7.

for the Colombian State for a variety of reasons, among them: institutional deployment, cost, security conditions, and attendant risk scenarios in the collective territories of ethnic communities.

7.4 Reincorporation process

On the occasion of the signature of the Eighth Additional Protocol to the Agreement, on October 13, 2021, the national government requested the MAPP/OAS to provide support for the process of reincorporating the signatories to the Final Agreement.¹²³ In that connection, the Mission has stepped up its visits to the Former Territorial Training and Reincorporation Areas (AETCR), the new reincorporation areas, and the territories where the signatories are proceeding with their reincorporation process in order to identify the main achievements and difficulties they face in the context of this process and in their appearance in judicial scenarios such as those of the JEP.

The national government and the ARN have furthered the strengthening and execution of the productive projects being promoted by the AETCR signatories and in the country's different territories as investment in 3,720 productive projects, benefiting 7,575 persons (5,692 men and 1,883 women). Mention should also be made of the decision to continue the AETCRs, originally agreed to exist until May 2019,¹²⁴ and to allocate resources for their operation. This commitment also included the direct purchase of 13 lots for 11 Areas, corresponding to 678 hectares, and the transfer of those which, owing to the presence of illegal armed groups, have had major security difficulties. An example is the transfer in December of the Yará, Meta AECTR to Doncello municipality, in Caquetá.

Achieving the economic stability of persons in the process of reincorporation takes time and requires the support of society as a whole, as well as commitment from municipalities and departments to the execution of their productive projects and their inclusion in public policies and municipal and departmental development plans. This support is still more important in the case of persons who, owing to security situations, have decided to leave the AETCRs and the collective reincorporation process in order to promote their process individually. Such persons encounter additional difficulties when seeking to make their needs visible, promoting the implementation of their productive projects, and achieving effective participation in decision-making scenarios.

This situation is evident in Córdoba and Antioquia, where the closure of the El Gallo, Tierralta and Vidr , Vig a del Fuerte AETCRs has led to the dispersal of population in these departments and in others, such as Choc . This has led to difficulties when seeking to further the development and strengthening of processes coordinated with local authorities, and to achieve effective participation in the various scenarios, such as municipal and departmental reincorporation committees.

Another challenge of highest importance is the security of persons in the process of reincorporation stemming from their participation in transitional justice scenarios that require them to appear to make contributions to the truth. This may compromise or involve persons who have decided not to appear before these mechanisms, who often are part of illegal armed groups such as dissident or residual FARC-EP groups. Risks to signatories are heightened when illegal armed groups are present in territories where they are undergoing their reincorporation process.

In view of the stigmatization of many signatories, especially in Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Meta, the JEP's Lack of Recognition Section with its proceedings for precautionary measures and the Constitutional Court with its review of stewardships have had impact on the adoption by State

¹²³ Article 2.1.5.2 of the Eighth Additional Protocol to the agreement between the General Secretariat and the Government of Colombia. Available at:

<https://www.mapp-oea.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Digitalizacion2021-10-28-075836.pdf>

¹²⁴ The AETCR derive from the definition of the Temporary Village Normalization Area, which were established following the signature of the Final Agreement and during the demobilization of the FARC-EP.

authorities and institutions of plans and programs to mitigate this dynamic. The JEP's dissemination sessions, the reconciliation ceremonies, and the ARN's progress with strategies such as community reincorporation have also similarly contributed.

Lastly, some signatories also lack knowledge of the conditions and obligations regime that they signed with the JEP to enable them to access and maintain the benefits of this special justice regime. These obligations are to contribute to the full truth,¹²⁵ non-repetition, to refrain from perpetrating new premeditated crimes, and to contribute to victim reparation.¹²⁶ In the case of the former FARC-EP combatants, the regime also establishes additional obligations,¹²⁷ such as laying down arms, contributing to the success of the reincorporation process, and the release of children and adolescents.

8. WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND GENDER-RELATED POLICIES FOR PEACE

The Special Women's Authority of the Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI) held successful elections for its reactivation. Owing to the challenge of implementing the Project Management Institute (PMI)'s gender indicators,¹²⁸ this participation mechanism is a fundamental item on the agenda. To that end, the process had nearly 545 registered organizations in 240 municipalities, 652 women participants, 141 candidates, and 94 pre-selected candidates in the framework of 100 assemblies carried out in the 32 departments, and four at the national level.¹²⁹ The CSIVI has yet to make the final selection of the composition, with effective guarantees for its operation and territorial coverage.

Despite the progress, women's groups in Cauca, Antioquia, Caquetá, Chocó, and Nariño expressed skepticism and questioned both the lack of territorial instruction regarding the Authority and the perceived delay in fulfilling the Final Agreement's commitments on gender mainstreaming and women's leadership.

¹²⁵ According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, this obligation entails: (i) recognition before the JEP of truth and responsibility when the person is the perpetrator of the crimes; (ii) contributing to the truth by declaring to the JEP any facts of which he/she has knowledge as a witness when his/she is not the perpetrator; (iii) contributing to the truth when so requested by the Truth Commission; and (iii) giving information to the UBPD for the fulfillment of its mission. Additionally, the Constitutional Court, in its judgment C-080, of 2018, clarified that recognition of collective responsibility does not replace or exhaust the individual duty to acknowledge truth and responsibility.

¹²⁶ Lack of awareness persists among persons in the process of reincorporation regarding the reparative-restorative efforts, works, and activities for victims that have been implemented, as well as their certification with the JEP Executive Secretariat.

¹²⁷ Statutory Law on Justice Administration of the JEP, Law 1957, of 2019, Article 20, and Article 5.8 of Legislative Act 01, of 2017.

¹²⁸ According to the national government, as of September 2021, nine commitments with the PMI indicators had been finalized, five of which were achieved during the current administration. It also indicated that there is a definite plan for the 42 remaining commitments, which have advanced substantially. "Avances en la implementación de la Política de Paz con Legalidad: Mujer y Género" document. Office of the Presidential Advisor for Stabilization and Consolidation (CPEC), September 30, 2021, p.3, <https://portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/1590/enfoque-de-genero-en-la-paz/>

¹²⁹ Document "Evaluación de las hojas de vida de preseleccionadas en las asambleas territoriales." Special Women's Authority of the CSIVI, December 2021, p. 6, <https://www.instanciagenero.org/2021/12/21/resultado-evaluacion-de-las-hojas-de-vida-de-preseleccionadas-en-las-asambleas-territoriales/> (consulted January 31, 2022).

The ART has furthered the implementation of the roadmap in 37% (1,704) of the currently active PDET gender initiatives,¹³⁰ and encouraged the involvement of local authorities in promoting them in territories such as Tibú and Hacarí, in Norte de Santander; Istmina, and Nóvita in Chocó, and Saravena in Arauca. However, participation by women’s organizations in the process remains scant, as does their connection with the Impetus Groups, this negatively impacting gender governance in rural transformation for peace.

The Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders (PIG-Mujeres) remains the State’s gender-approach policy for the comprehensive security of women leaders in the territories. In Cauca and Chocó, territorial coverage exercises maintain communication with the array of organizations, with a view to consensus regarding schemes conducive to the implementation of, among other things, the Impetus Committee. However, more expeditious steps must be taken if, by the end of 2022, significant gains are to be made with women leaders’ effective access to the Program and its implementation in other areas, such as Catatumbo.

Lastly, through the Gender Subcommittee of the National Committee for Security Guarantees and the Women and Gender Operations Committee of the Comprehensive System for Policy Exercise, the multisectoral work forums were reopened to introduce the gender perspective. Nonetheless, the centralized dynamic and current design phases have meant that the purposes of these forums lack strategic implementation, are unknown in the different territories, and it has not been possible to promote urgent actions to mitigate violence against women in politics in the scenario of the 2022 elections.

9. COMPREHENSIVE TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION, AND NON-REPETITION SYSTEM (SIVJNR)

The entities of the SIVJNR have strengthened complementary actions regarding strategic matters that allow for work in bloc in the territories. However, the specificities of time, methodology, site prioritization, victim participation formulas, and each entity’s scope have meant that comprehensiveness remains a challenge. It has also been difficult to coordinate with regular Colombian State institutions, which has led to challenges of harmonization between them and the transitional institutions.

On November 30, the Unified Mechanism for Monitoring Risks to the System¹³¹ was introduced. This is a timely measure that contributes to security guarantees for individuals and groups that interact with the SIVJNR entities and gives notification of violations of the rights to life, physical well-being, and liberty of these individuals and groups.

9.1 Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD)

The UBPD has furthered the dissemination of and feedback for the National Search Plan with the FGN and the Office of the Deputy Public Prosecutor for the Peace Agreement, as well as civil society entities¹³² and platforms located in the national territory and abroad, with a view to validating

¹³⁰ Territorial Renewal Agency, “Principales logros implementación PDET II – Semestre 2021,” given to the MAPP/OAS on January 12, 2022.

¹³¹ Launched in San Jacinto, Bolívar in the framework of the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the signature of the Final Peace Agreement.

¹³² Advisory Council with representatives of the CEV, OACP, UARIV, Institute for Legal Medicine, Office of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights and International Affairs, and Ministries of the Interior, Health, and Justice. For the civil society organizations, six representatives of victims’ collectives or groups are designated for the acts of forced disappearance and kidnapping, one organization with technical-forensic experience, and one victims’ participation committee representative.

and enriching the strategic and territorial priorities identified. The entity has achieved the territorial deployment of 17 teams, with which it has deepened relations, and recognition and comprehension of institutional actors, families searching for disappeared persons, and local civil society entities; and gained greater knowledge of the specificities of the disappearances in the realities of each territory. This model has strengthened 22 regional search plans that provide blueprints and guidelines for the search for persons in each area.

Access to information is a decisive factor for progress with the statistical analysis that assists in locating disappeared persons. The main challenge is to build confidence and relations enabling cooperation models to be established with multiple and diverse actors to expedite the process, maintaining the confidentiality of the data given to territorial entities and bodies.

Instructional efforts that amplify the humanitarian and extrajudicial scope of the search are fundamental, as is the formalization of channels for interaction through agreements with regular institutions.¹³³ This formalization implies the existence of the political will and intent of various actors to contribute to locating disappeared persons and determining their universe, and to strengthening the National Registry of Graves, Illegal Cemeteries, and Tombs.

In Catatumbo, the UBPD has implemented the participatory preparation of the Regional Search Plan, ensuring participation and ownership by families. It has also made arrangements with victims' liaisons and municipal ombudsmen's offices as to how cases will be referred. In Boyayá municipality, Chocó, the entity's arrangement actions with indigenous authorities of the Indigenous Reserve of the Opogadó-Dogwadó of the Embera Dóvida People are focused on locating areas with signs of interments, recognizing the rectification and spiritual harmonization of the collective territory and contributing to the guarantee of the right to the truth of the victims of the armed conflict.

During the implementation of the Regional Search Plans, one evident challenge is to build capacities among institutional teams for handling forensic matters, location, search, recovery, identification, custody, and preservation of bodies located, and how to approach persons found alive.

9.2 Commission on Truth (CEV)

The Constitutional Court has extended the mandate of the Commission on Truth until August 27, 2022, underscoring the centrality of the victims and the creation of opportunities to hear those whose access to the right to the truth was restricted in the context of the COVID-19 health crisis. The Court's decision is enabling the CEV to implement ownership processes and generate reflection on the findings, the recommendations contained in the Final Report, the methodology, and lessons learned in the peace-building process.

The extension entailed a higher challenge for the entity, and, in general, for the Colombian State, since the CEV's conception and planning had to be completed by end November 2021, which involved expedited administrative procedures that will ensure its implementation and financial flow for an additional nine months. This challenge was fully met, and, at the same time, the Commission made headway with key processes for clarification of the truth, such as recognition ceremonies, the coexistence and reconciliation agreement, the consultation with youth, and, in general, greater occasion for hearing the victims.

As a result, territorial conversations have continued regarding factors contributing to the persistence of the armed conflict, as has input for the transformation of societal mindsets that are

¹³³ As was the case of the inter-administration agreement with the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences and memoranda of intent with the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, National Civil Status Registry, and the Office of the Superintendent of Notaries and Registry.

contributing actively to the non-repetition of situations of violence. Now that the Final Report has been submitted, an additional challenge also arises of assigning to the Partners Network¹³⁴ a clear role regarding ownership of its content, and of the efforts to follow up on the recommendations. This with the aim of generating dynamics with impact on democratic debate and promoting transformative actions for reconciliation and coexistence without the Report becoming an instrument for polarization in the midst of the political electoral panorama, but one that promotes the dignity of the victims.

In the context of cooperation with the CEV, the MAPP/OAS has made available for consultation its audiovisual and photographic fund, with the aim of contributing unpublished images and interviews from the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These materials will contribute to the investigation of the paramilitary phenomenon in Colombia, and will form part of the digital platform or transmedia narrative of the Final Report presented by the Commission.

9.3 Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

In December, the MAPP/OAS provided support for the presentation of eight reports to the Jurisdiction by three indigenous communities,¹³⁵ four victims' organizations,¹³⁶ and one meeting of Afro-Colombian women.¹³⁷ These reports were presented as part of the "Communities Road to Justice" project,¹³⁸ through which the Mission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany provided technical and logistical support for the compilation and analysis of information on the gross human rights violations and infractions of international humanitarian law to which these communities were subjected prior to January 1, 2016.

The aim of these reports is to contribute to the work of the JEP's Recognition Room in the seven macro cases thus far accorded priority¹³⁹ and for the identification of those with highest responsibility and those who participated most decisively in the grossest and most representative events. This information may also contribute new elements for identifying the facts and conduct that these cases will address.

There are still ethnic communities and victims' organizations in departments such as Antioquia, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Córdoba, and Norte de Santander and in the Amazon region that have difficulties in compiling testimony to further the preparation of their reports, either owing to lack of economic and professional resources or to the inherent risk of their preparation. In another vein, the possible opening of new macro cases¹⁴⁰ would be an opportunity for the JEP to continue

¹³⁴ Actors from international cooperation, the academic community, victims, former combatants, political actors, and the security forces, who have contributed by interpreting factors that explain the persistence of the conflict, as well as truth-building exercises.

¹³⁵ Korebaju Nation in Caquetá, Hitnü Nation in Arauca, and Barí Nation in Norte de Santander.

¹³⁶ Association of Women Victims of Forced Disappearance in Guaviare (ASOVIG), Victims Committee of Montelíbano in Córdoba, Victory in Peace Association in Nariño, Victims Committee of Anorí, Antioquia.

¹³⁷ Composed of: the Association of Displaced Afro Women Builders of the Equity Network (ASOMADERE), the Women's Foundation and We Can Live and Women in Chocó.

¹³⁸ The project, whose first stage ended in December, makes progress with the implementation of leadership schools that build capacities in these communities and organizations for access to various justice mechanisms.

¹³⁹ Case 01: Illegal retention of persons by the FARC-EP; Case 002: Gives priority to the situation in Ricaurte, Tumaco, and Barbacoas (Nariño); Case 003: Unlawful deaths presented as fallen in combat by State agents; Case 004: Gives priority to the territorial situation in the Urabá region; Case 005: Gives priority to the territorial situation in the northern Cauca and southern Valle del Cauca regions; Case 006: Victimization of members of the Unión Patriótica; and Case 007: Recruitment and use of children in the armed conflict.

¹⁴⁰ National concentration of crimes perpetrated by the extinct FARC-EP; Crimes perpetrated by members of security forces, other State agents, or in association with paramilitary groups and civilian third parties; and

strengthening its presence in territories where, owing to conditions of access and the action of illegal armed groups, it is faced with additional challenges for effective and pluralistic victim participation.

The JEP has made progress in obtaining culturally appropriate precautionary measures for the following ethnic organizations: Unidad Indígena del Pueblo Awá, Asociación de Autoridades Tradicionales Indígenas del Pueblo Awá-Cabildo Mayor Awá de Ricaurte, Red de Consejos Comunitarios del Pacífico Sur, Asociación de Comunidades Indígenas Eperara Siapidara de Nariño, Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca, and the Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca; and in developing patterns of environmental impacts and sexual violence. Both initiatives have had positive impact for the reduction of the risk of impunity in cases 002 and 005. The Jurisdiction has also reopened the mirror rooms,¹⁴¹ which enable ethnic victims in Cauca and Valle del Cauca to participate so that they can take part in the voluntary versions of the hearings.

The JEP's Unit for Investigation and Prosecution, the Wounaan and Wayúu Peoples, and the San Bernardo Patía Norte Community Council, with support from the MAPP/OAS, have implemented the "Best Practices" project for the generation of own-justice documents for the strengthening of their justice systems and facilitating involvement and coordination.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 For the Ministry of the Interior

10.1.1 Further the implementation of the Public Policy Action Plan on guarantees and respect for human rights protection work and social leaders, in its information management component to improve evidence-based decision-making.

10.1.2 In the framework of the Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT), continue to promote the strengthening of the entities' rapid, comprehensive, and timely response to the recommendations arising from the early warnings issued by the Public Defender's Office as a best practice for generating institutional commitments and nation-territory coordination. In addition, continue to hold follow-up meetings focused on the population in the process of reincorporation. This strengthens institutional protection and prevention actions at the departmental level.

10.1.3 Ensure the technical and financial strengthening of the interinstitutional, electoral, and community committees to ensure the autonomy of the community movement and broad dissemination of the participatory peace-building exercise.

10.2 For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In coordination with Migration Colombia, Management of the Border with Venezuela, and the territorial authorities, continue to strengthen the granting of temporary protection permits and the coordination of institutional capacities and procedures for addressing the migrant population, especially for women and children, and its economic and social integration. This with the aim of preventing scenarios of risk to this population arising from the actions of illegal armed groups and from the gradual reopening of the borders.

10.3 For the Ministry of Justice and Law

Concentration of crimes perpetrated against ethnic peoples and territories in some illustrative territories. Available at: <https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/La-JEP-convoca-a-organizaciones-de-v%C3%ADctimas-a-participar-en-audiencias-de-observaciones-sobre-apertura-de-nuevos-macrocasos.aspx>

¹⁴¹ Adjoining rooms, where the victims of the proceeding are located. This is rebroadcast in real or differed time.

10.3.1 In local justice systems policy, include an ownership strategy so that local authorities continue to implement local justice committees, and with action plans. To that end, promote at the departmental level the formulation of a public justice policy that includes resource allocations for the operation of local systems in the municipalities.

10.3.2 In coordination with the Ministry of National Defense, further the coordination of the various government and international methodologies for compiling data and statistics on illicit crop density.

10.4 For the Ministry of National Defense

Continue to carry out actions to prevent the emergence, reconfiguration, regrouping, and territorial consolidation of illegal armed groups. Also assess the impacts of recent operations on security conditions and identify new modus operandi of the illegal armed groups so as to be able to adapt strategies, taking as central tenet the protection of the civilian population, consistent with the particularities of each territory.

10.5 For the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation

Further the territorial coverage of the Strategic Security and Protection Plan, and the measures included in the strategies for women former combatants and in the Plan for Coordination of Security Actions for Leaders of the Comprehensive National Program for Illicit Crop Substitution (PNIS), building institutional capacities for preventing, protecting against, and addressing imminent risks. This will contribute to the political, economic, and social stability of the reincorporation process and the illicit crop substitution process.

10.6 For the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART)

10.6.1 Continue building institutional capacities for participation by Impetus Groups and Special Consultation Mechanisms, and for citizen oversight by rural communities of the Rural Development Program (PDET) subregions. Once these processes have been strengthened, together with the Ministry of the Interior, promote effective and safe participation by rural communities in other existing citizen planning and citizen participation mechanisms for rural areas of Colombia, such as participatory and territorial planning budgets, among others.

10.6.2 In coordination with the National Planning Department (DNP), design and apply differentiated training and monitoring criteria to overcome local technical deficits of PDET municipalities with weaknesses in the structuring and financial management of PDET initiatives (e.g., Pacifico Medio).

10.7 For the Department for Illicit Crop Substitution

Strengthen the dissemination and dialogue process with the PNIS beneficiary population located in forest reserve areas in order to further the implementation of usage rights contracts.

10.8 For the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP)

10.8.1 Focus Education on Antipersonnel Mine Risks (ERM) actions on areas such as Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca; Cúcuta metropolitan area, Norte de Santander; Quibdó, Chocó, and the departments of Arauca and Nariño reached by displaced populations and on areas contested by illegal armed groups in order to further the adoption of safe practices in the communities most at risk.

10.8.2 In coordination with the Ministry of Defense, strengthen efforts to implement military demining actions in areas where security conditions for humanitarian demining are not present, upon arrival in collective territories, establishing due coordination with ethnic authorities.

10.9 For the Office of the Presidential Advisor on National Security

Expedite the implementation of the Immediate Response Plans (PRI) in order to ensure the component on the strengthening of the state in which the law guarantees societal well-being [*Estado social de derecho*] in the six priority areas. Additionally, promote mechanisms for dissemination and broad citizen participation, in contexts of security, to enable rural communities to learn of progress with the civic elements of the strategy.

10.10 For the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Human Rights and International Affairs and the Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups (CIPRUNNA)

As part of the “Join for Me” strategy, strengthen self-government of indigenous communities in the areas of measures to prevent and protect against the forced recruitment of children and adolescents; as well as informative actions in rural areas on access to prevention and protection pathways for the prevention of action injurious to the population receiving the information and for municipal officials.

10.11 For the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Youth

Provide close support for local authorities to ensure the proper operation of the Municipal and Departmental Youth Councils, and strengthen the councilors. Guarantee comprehensive coordination of the various initiatives for youth (Pact of Colombia with Youth, the National Council on Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) for Youth, and local youth policies) in the framework of the National System for Youth.

10.12 For the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation (FGN)

With judicial investigators and public prosecutors, strengthen the FGN’s sectional units, since the limited institutional capacity hinders progress with investigations, with consequent delays in judicial proceedings. Also provide security guarantees for officials who are prosecuting cases related to threats to justice workers.

10.13 For the Ministry of the Interior, the National Electoral Council, and the National Civil Status Registry

Organize a lessons learned exercise, seeking wide-ranging dialogue with communities, candidates, promoting organizations, and elected representatives in order to adjust regulations and expand instruction in preparation for the second electoral exercise, to take place in four years.

10.14. For the Constitutional Court and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

Make progress with new territorial hearings or technical meetings to enable these courts to gain awareness of the risks and difficulties faced by those testifying and by former FARC-EP members in each territory where they are in process of reincorporation. This in keeping with the varying conditions in each territory, such as access to it, the presence and action of illegal armed groups, and the response by municipal and departmental authorities and institutions, so that the risks and difficulties faced by those testifying are analyzed on a differentiated basis.

10.15 For the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

10.15.1 Further, in the context of prioritizing new macro cases, the design of strategies that lend credence to the victims, for their participation at the different procedural stages, and for the presentation of oral or written reports after March 2022. Include especially those communities and

organizations that have been compiling information and testimony for the preparation of their reports and those communities in which, despite their intent, progress could not be made with the preparation of these documents owing to situations of insecurity or lack of resources.

10.15.2 Ensure that the new macro case of crimes against ethnic peoples and territories is sufficiently broad and inclusive to ensure that the victims in different territories feel represented and heard and find justice. This, bearing in mind that ethnic peoples in particular have been populations historically subjected to attack and injury, with little access to justice in the context of the armed conflict.

10.16 For the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD)

Strengthen strategies for awareness and coordination with regular national and local institutions and entities of the Comprehensive Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repitition System (SIVJRNR) in order to strengthen means of information-sharing, thereby contributing to effective access by victims to their rights.

10.17 For the Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repitition (CEV)

10.17.1 Generate clear communication with the Partners Network regarding the process of ownership and dissemination of the Final Report, and transmedia as a contribution to social, political, and cultural transformations aimed at non-repetition and coexistence.

10.17.2. Strengthen partnerships and coordinated actions with the Municipal Youth Councils and the Territorial Peace Councils to leverage territorialized ownership of the Report and follow-up of the recommendations it contains.

10.18 For the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice and Law, the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Human Rights and International Affairs, the Higher Judiciary Council, the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, and the National Protection Unit

Design a comprehensive State policy to mitigate the risk of annihilation and of [in]security that persists in connection with indigenous peoples, with appropriate public policy and judicial measures that include the government, justice, and protection strengthening components.

10.19 For the Ministries of Justice and Law and of National Defense, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, and the Office of the Public Defender

10.19.1 Strengthen the pathway for individual surrender to justice through linkage and coordination of interinstitutional forums, with the aim of building the capacities of authorities regarding the specificities of the process.

10.19.2 Design strategies to ensure the security, life, and well-being of members of organized crime groups in the process of surrendering to justice in order to prevent impacts on them and their families.

10.20 For the High Governmental Authority on Gender and the Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI)

Support the proposals for its strengthening presented by the new Special Women's Authority of the CSIVI in its autonomy, especially those aimed at obtaining a structure, coordination system, and municipal and departmental presence that make feasible the territorial coverage of its mandate and

provide it with guarantees based on the principle of equality with other participation mechanisms of the Colombian transitional process.

10.21 For the National Commission on Security Guarantees (CNGS) and the Comprehensive System for Security in Policy Implementation (SISEP)

Strengthen the autonomy and impact capacity of the Gender Subcommittee of the CNGS and the Women and Gender Operations Committee of the SISEP to promote required adaptations to policy for the effective incorporation of the gender approach in the dismantlement of illegal armed groups and the identification of gender-based violence patterns of macro crime; and promote urgent actions to safeguard women's rights to political participation and representation, especially in the context of the 2022 and 2023 electoral contests in high conflict areas.

10.22 For the National Prison and Jail Institute (INPEC)

Take the steps necessary to seek participation in training programs and productive projects by persons deprived of liberty placed in the high security section or classified as security level one. Also promote activities for their resocialization, studying the possibility of lending flexibility to their prison treatment.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT

AETCR – Former Territorial Training and Reincorporation Areas
AICMA – Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines
ANLA – National Environmental Permits Agency
ART - Territorial Renewal Agency
ARN – Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization
ASOCBARI – Motilón Barí Community Association of Colombia
ASOMADERE – Association of Displaced Afro Women Equity Network Builders
ASOVIG – Association of Women Victims of Forced Disappearance in Guaviare Department
AUC – United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
CEV – Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition
CIM – Inter-American Commission of Women
CMJ – Municipal Youth Councils
CNP – National Strike Council
CIPRAT – Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings
CIPRUNNA – Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups
CTEP – Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace
CPEC – Office of the Presidential Advisor for Stabilization and Consolidation
CNE – National Electoral Council
CNGS – National Commission on Security Guarantees
CONPES – National Council on Economic and Social Policy
CRIC – Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca
CSIVI – Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation
CTI – Technical Investigation Corps
DNP – National Planning Department
ELN – National Liberation Army
EPL - People’s Liberation Army or the “Pelusos”
ERM – Education on Antipersonnel Mine Risks
FARC-EP – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
FGN – Attorney General’s Office
FOS - Oliver Sinisterra Front
GM – Motor Groups
HRU – Single Roadmap
IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
INPEC – National Penitentiary and Prison Institute
JAC – Community Action Councils
JEI – Special Indigenous Jurisdiction
JEP – Special Jurisdiction for Peace
LGBTI – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Intersexual Persons
MAPP/OAS – Mission to Support of the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States
MPEV – Committees for Effective Victim Participation
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
OAC - Community Action Entities
OACP - Office of the High Commissioner for Peace
OAS – Organization of American States
ODC – Drug Observatory of Colombia of the Ministry of Justice and Law

ORIVAC – Valle del Cauca Regional Indigenous Organization
PDET – Rural Development Programs
PECIG – Program for Illicit Crop Eradication Using the Herbicide Glyphosate
PIG-Mujeres – Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders
PMA – Environmental Management Plan
PMU – United Command Post
PNIS – Comprehensive National Illicit Crops Substitution Program
PRI – Immediate Response Plan
SIJIN – Sections of the Crime Investigation Department and Interpol
SIVJRN – Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repitition Guarantees
SIEDCO – National Police Statistical, Crime, and Operations Information System
SISEP - Comprehensive System for Security in Policy Implementation
UARIV – Unit for the Care and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims
UBPD - Disappeared Persons Search Unit
UNIPA - Awá People Indigenous Unit
UNP – National Protection Unit
UN – United Nations
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
ZEII – Comprehensive Strategic Intervention Areas