THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (MAPP/OAS)

The following report is submitted pursuant to resolution CP/RES. 859 (1597/04), in which the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) instructs the Secretary General to report periodically on the work of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, hereinafter “the MAPP/OAS” or “the Mission.”

This report covers the findings for the period from January 1 to June 30, 2022. During this period, 1,217 field missions were carried out in 678 communities in 194 municipalities in 26 of the country’s departments. These communities included municipal capitals, districts (corregimientos), villages (veredas), Indigenous reserves (resguardos), and community councils. During this period, the Mission covered 142,737 kilometers by land and 2,202 kilometers by river.

Implementation of the MAPP/OAS mandate is possible thanks to the trust and steadfast support of the international community, which recognizes the Mission as a key player in peacebuilding in Colombia. The General Secretariat of the OAS (GS/OAS) is grateful to the member States and observers, especially to the members of the Basket Fund—Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States—whose political and financial support makes the Mission’s operations possible. The GS/OAS also recognizes the important contributions made by Norway and Switzerland, which strengthen the Mission’s work in fundamental areas, such as participation and dialogue. Finally, we thank the governments of Germany and Switzerland for the assignment of professionals in the form of secondments.2

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The General Secretariat presents its compliments to the elected President of the Republic of Colombia, Gustavo Petro Urrego, expressing the unwavering commitment of the OAS to the country and, especially, to continue to support peacebuilding through MAPP/OAS based on the experience, regional presence, and capabilities developed over more than 18 years of uninterrupted work. The General Secretariat also presents its compliments to Vice President Francia Márquez, a noted community leader and the first Afro-descendant woman in the history of the country to occupy this high office. Her election represents major progress in the political and decision-making structures, a key element for the exercise of democracy.

The aspiration for peace is closely held by the Colombian people, and the people of the Americas, and we must not resign ourselves to anything less. The journey thus far, the efforts and resources invested, the institutional architecture, the hope of the communities, the solidarity of the international community, the progress and achievements of peace, must be assessed to consolidate what has been accomplished, to newly energize and rekindle the conviction in every Colombian that constructing peace cannot be deferred.

The GS/OAS has publicly stated in its reports that Comprehensive Peace is with all stakeholders, in all territories, and on all issues; that dialogue is the mechanism for approaching and reaching agreements, and that engaging in dialogue is essential for transformation. It acknowledges the firm commitment of Gustavo Petro’s administration to “Total Peace,” and welcomes the steps taken with the delegation of the National Liberation Army (ELN) to reactivate the talks that have been suspended since 2019, and to explore scenarios in which other illegal armed groups may submit to the criminal or transitional justice systems.

1 The mandate of the MAPP/OAS derives from the agreement entered into by the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the OAS signed on January 23, 2004, and resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04) adopted by the Permanent Council on February 6, 2004. That mandate has been expanded and renewed seven times, most recently until January 24, 2025.

2 “Secondment” is a system whereby a country assigns one of its nationals to perform a job for a specific period of time.
Peace requires openness and the combined will to face the challenges encountered on the road to comprehensive or total peace. The Mission has accumulated a wealth of lessons learned from the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration/Reincorporation (DDR) processes that Colombia has undertaken since 2004 with various stakeholders such as the self-defense groups, the FARC-EP, and the Revolutionary Guevarist Army (ERG), including assisting individual and collective processes of submission to justice, and supporting dialogue with the ELN.

This knowledge is available to enrich and support the political commitment to achieve total peace. The GS/OAS takes this opportunity to call on the institutional framework to take ownership of the lessons learned from previous approaches and/or agreements with illegal armed groups in order to make definitive progress in the consolidation of peace.

In recent months, Colombia has undergone an intense period of democratic renewal resulting in the reconfiguration of different levels of authorities, from the local changeover of the Community Action Entities (OAC), the election of the Congress of the Republic, including for the first time the Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace (CTEP) representing the victims and the territories most affected by the internal armed conflict; as well as political alternation in the presidency of the Republic, which, for the first time in history, is headed by a person who was a signatory to a peace agreement reached in the early 1990s. This is an opportunity to call on all actors, at all levels, to join in a respectful dialogue and debate on the actions of the State. The GS/OAS believes that the Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace have great potential for democratic expansion, acknowledgment of the territories affected by the conflict, and addressing the need for greater inclusion of their communities.

The unfolding of the electoral campaigns, as well as the processing and presentation of the results, attest to the soundness of the institutions involved and the maturity of society. The GS/OAS acknowledges that Colombia has shown a democratic vitality that reflects internal socio-political changes with an impact on the region, highlighting peacebuilding as a pivotal factor in achieving social transformations.

This period also brought about a generational renewal and the empowerment of excluded sectors, with a decisive role for young people and women, which has encouraged people to want to play a critical and active role in decision-making. This new scenario requires stepping up efforts to strengthen citizen capacities for advocacy and proposal building by all social sectors and in keeping with their particular circumstances, as well as a call to strengthen the institutional mechanisms, spaces, and rules for citizen participation based on transparency and access to guarantees.

Peace is a listening process based on memory, solidarity, and cooperation. In many of the country’s territories and at the national level, social dialogue has become highly valued, opening new opportunities to combine wills, efforts, and results that strengthen integration in the defense of human rights and security. Dialogue is also the mechanism for bringing people together and reaching agreements, and carrying it out is essential for transforming the territories. The GS/OAS encourages prioritizing dialogue with communities, options for participatory conflict transformation, and the fulfillment of agreements.

While opportunities for transformation are emerging, there are still important challenges of concern to the GS/OAS that directly affect peacebuilding. The presence and actions of illegal armed groups in different regions of the country have a differentiated impact on the territories and on different social sectors, including the vulnerability of those who perform social leadership roles or duties, ethnic-territorial authorities, human and environmental rights defenders, State agents, women, children and adolescents, ethnic populations, peace signatories, and migrant populations.

The most vulnerable areas are those where illegal armed groups are involved in territorial disputes over sources of financing or battles with the security forces, where severe social controls restrict access to public services and goods and hinder relations between communities and institutions, including civil society actors and international organizations.
The main impacts identified as consequences of these dynamics are murders, threats, forced disappearances, forced displacements, confinement, restrictions on mobility, placement of anti-personnel mines, and the recruitment and exploitation of children and adolescents. In many of the territories, illegal armed groups have reinforced local models for imposing rules of conduct and social control (de facto justice) that shape coexistence, commerce, access to rights, and mobility, among other areas of community life, coupled with penalties ranging from murder, displacement, threats, physical harm or property damage, extortion charges, and stigmatizing punishments for those who violate or alter the rules.

On March 28, 2022, eleven people were killed and four others were wounded during one of the military operations carried out by the security forces in the Alto Remanso community in the municipality of Leguízamo, Putumayo. The Army maintains that lethal weapons were used during the operation due to the presence of illegal armed actors, and that a community bazaar attended by families, women, and children from the community was taking place at the same time. In view of these facts, the GS/OAS observes significant contradictions between the reports of the authorities involved and the local actors, including victims, residents, human rights organizations, and regional public servants. The Mission urges the State to expedite and intensify the investigation into these events, because of a possible violation of international humanitarian law, and to establish the respective penalties. In addition, it should provide psychosocial and humanitarian support to the victims, and protect the lives and physical integrity of the witnesses.

In May, the ACG/Clan del Golfo issued a communiqué announcing an armed strike between May 5 and 9, after their top leader was extradited to the United States. During this period, seven regions of the country were severely affected, with serious humanitarian impacts on access to food, health, and other goods and services. The GS/OAS notes with deep concern the capacity and operational coordination shown by this illegal group to shut down entire populations, including departmental capitals, creating, according to local actors, a “mass confinement.” This fact is aggravated by the murders of numerous members of the security forces, mainly members of the National Police in different regions of the country, which escalated in the following months and continues to this day.

Two deplorable cases have had a major impact due to their repercussions on security conditions and the social fabric in the territory. The first was the murder of José Miller Correa on March 15, 2022. Miller Correa was the coordinator of the Nasa project, a member of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN), and a key figure in the Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC). He was one of the authorities who opposed the presence of illicit crops and illegal armed groups in Indigenous territories, as well as the involvement and recruitment of children and adolescents. The second was the murder of community leader Jesusita Moreno, on June 7 in the city of Cali, an event that undermined the social fabric and political capacity of these communities of San Juan (Chocó), since she was well-known for her efforts to foster respect for the life and integrity of the civilian population in the face of actions by illegal armed groups.

Both historically and in the current situation, the diversity and complementarity of the mechanisms used to confront organized armed groups and dismantle all criminal organizations—although not without tensions—is striking. The persistence of this phenomenon has made it necessary to build a comprehensive policy that coordinates and reinforces multiple strategies, considering the distinctions and relationships between the political and the legal spheres. The GS/OAS notes that the approach to the dismantling of illegal armed groups should be based on the following principles: collective submission to justice takes precedence over individual submission, in the interest of creating guarantees; all proceedings should be victim-centered, including possible extradition; and resocialization should have a differential and restorative focus.

The MAPP/OAS will continue to embody the principles of the OAS, fostering respect for human rights, enhancing security, promoting peace, and strengthening democracy and the rule of law. It will continue to represent the values of the Organization, remaining close to the communities and institutions,
facilitating dialogue and gradual trust-building, building bridges, connecting local needs with State services, and encouraging the urgent joint presence of State institutions in these areas.

2. SECURITY CONDITIONS

The actions of illegal armed groups\(^3\) continue to be the main factor affecting the civilian population and public servants, despite the different outcomes obtained by the military, police, and judicial authorities against important leaders of these groups. The indiscriminate use of explosive devices is a common element in these dynamics, with serious social, physical, and psychological consequences, and it has also affected children and adolescents in urban and rural areas.

Both the ELN and the AGC/Clan del Golfo have declared armed strikes\(^4\) in some regions of the country, disrupting the security and the social and economic dynamics of the local population, with serious humanitarian impacts. The period was also marked by the legislative and presidential elections in March, May, and June, during which, independently and at different times, the ELN and the dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP announced unilateral cease-fires.

2.1. Presence and action of illegal armed groups

The ELN kept most of its actions in the Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander), Chocó, and Arauca, affecting mainly the civilian population but also State security forces, harassing and kidnapping some of their members.\(^5\) Illegal armed groups were highly influential during the armed strike in the southern part of Cesar, which included attacks on the security forces and damages to the road infrastructure in the municipalities of Curumani and Pailitas.

The ELN has ongoing disputes with the AGC/Clan del Golfo in the San Juan and Baudó rivers (Chocó) and, to a lesser extent, in southern Bolívar and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño. It maintains separate relations with the dissident or residual FARC-EP groups that suggest the existence of alliances and/or agreements with the “Segunda Marquetalia” in Arauca, Cauca, and Nariño. However, armed clashes continue with the “Frente Carlos Pájaro” in the Mucay River canyon (Cauca) and with the “Frente 10 Martín Villa” in Arauca, resulting in targeted killings.

Given the heterogeneous phenomenon of the dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP, at least two major trends can be identified. The first is related to a greater influence of the “Segunda Marquetalia” in Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo through organizations with prior presence and knowledge of these territories, such as the “Bloque Occidental Alfonso Cano,” the “Frente Oliver Sinisterra” in Nariño, and the “Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército Bolivariano” in Putumayo.

The second is the persistence of the offensive activity of the factions initially led by alias “Gentil Duarte”\(^6\) and “Iván Mordisco”\(^7\) against the security forces and the restrictions on the entry of State institutions and international organizations in the regions of northern Cauca, the Cordillera de Nariño region, and Catatumbo in Norte de Santander,\(^8\) and in Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta. However, on the Pacific coast of Nariño, in southern Cauca, on the border between Caquetá and Putumayo, and in Arauca,

\(^1\) This report will refer to illegal armed groups with the following denominations that combine governmental decisions and the way they are recognized in the territories: National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, People’s Liberation Army or “Los Pelusos” (EPL/Pelusos), Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia or Clan del Golfo (AGC/Clan del Golfo), Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas, or Los Caparros.

\(^2\) “Armed strike” is understood as the announcements and actions carried out by illegal armed groups, during a given period of time, that affect the security conditions of the communities and territories, with humanitarian consequences such as confinement, forced displacement, and restrictions on mobility.

\(^3\) In light of the events in Arauca and Norte de Santander, the security forces have reported the cases as kidnappings of police officers and soldiers, while the ELN has acknowledged the events and presented them as “prisoners of war.” Some of the kidnapped persons have been released.

\(^4\) On May 25, 2022, the Ministry of Defense stated the alleged death of alias “Gentil Duarte” in the state of Zulia, Venezuela amid clashes between illegal armed groups. On May 30, 2022, the Central High Command of the FARC-EP acknowledged that he died on May 4, 2022, and held the Colombian State responsible, without specifying the circumstances of how and where he died.

\(^5\) Who allegedly died in July 2022 in San Vicente del Caguán, in events that have yet to be clarified.

\(^6\) Particularly in this region, “Frente 33” has also tried to position itself in the media by recording and broadcasting videos in which some of its members are seen moving through the urban areas of municipalities such as Tibú.
they are engaged in armed confrontations with other illegal armed groups for control of drug trafficking corridors.9

A common element between these two factions is that they appear to be weakening due to the death of several of their main leaders, persecution by the security forces, and confrontations between them, which could have repercussions for their plans for consolidation or territorial expansion, at least in the short term.

The AGC/Clan del Golfo carried out criminal actions as part of an armed strike in several areas of the country, in retaliation for the extradition to the United States of their top leader alias “Otoniel.” This event particularly affected the civilian population living in towns, municipalities, and capitals of Antioquia, Bolivar, Chocó, Córdoba, Magdalena, and Sucre. In addition, they continued with their violent actions against the security forces through harassment and ambushes with explosives.

In terms of relations with other illegal armed groups, the AGC/Clan de Golfo have ongoing disputes with the ELN in Chocó, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, southern Bolívar, and Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca). However, the main new development is its dispute with the self-styled group Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada or Los Pachenca in Magdalena, mainly in the municipality of Ciénaga, whose ultimate goal is to control the beaches adjacent to the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. This would secure a strategic corridor for drug trafficking, with the resulting impact on security conditions for the civilian population.

With regard to the EPL/Los Pelusos and the Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas/Los Caparros, there are a few isolated groups that carry out sporadic actions, with an increasingly reduced capacity in Norte de Santander and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, respectively. The EPL/Los Pelusos has carried out kidnappings for ransom, illegal roadblocks, and targeted killings amid internal rearrangements in municipalities of Norte de Santander;10 for its part, the Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas/Los Caparros maintains its strongholds in rural areas of municipalities such as Caucasia and El Bagre, despite persecution by security forces and the AGC/Clan del Golfo.

The actions carried out by the Colombian State produced results to counteract the violent actions of illegal armed groups throughout the country. These included the neutralization11 of alias “Pirry,” a member of the National Directorate and commander of the Frente de Guerra Darío Ramírez Castro of the ELN; of alias “Jhonnier,” “Mayimbú,” and “Cabuyo,” commanders of different factions of dissident or residual FARC-EP groups; and of alias “Matamba,” a leader of one of the AGC/Clan del Golfo groups operating in Nariño.

On March 28, 2022, eleven people were killed and four others were wounded during one of the military operations carried out by the security forces in the Alto Remanso community in the municipality of Leguízamo, Putumayo. The population claimed that the operation took place during a community bazaar where illegal armed groups were not present. The authorities’ version of events indicated that members of the dissident or residual FARC-EP group known as the “Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército Bolivariano” were present in the town center and were buying and selling coca base paste.

Other sectors of the civilian population acknowledge that there were armed individuals at the community activity. However, they contend that at least six of the deceased were members of the community and that they did not belong to any illegal armed groups, although they do not know whether the other five individuals were linked to any such groups. Judicial authorities and oversight bodies are conducting investigations to establish the facts.

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9 In the regions of Sanquianga and Telembí, Nariño, “Frente 30,” allied with the ELN, confronts the illegal armed groups that represent the interests of the “Segunda Marquetalia.” In southern Cauca, these arrangements are reportedly being replicated to challenge the Frente Carlos Patiño for control of the Micay River canyon. Confrontations between “Frente 1 Carolina Ramírez” and the “CDF-EB” continue on the Caquetá-Putumayo borders.

10 The main actions by illegal armed groups during the period were concentrated in Abrego, Cúcuta, Ocaña, and Sardinata.

2.2. Impacts on the civilian population

The Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT) held 32 follow-up sessions on the recommendations issued by the Office of the Ombudsperson to mitigate potential risks to the physical safety of the civilian population. In addition, it held 140 regional follow-up workshops12 to address specific situations of violations of the rights to life, humane treatment, and liberty, among others.

The Ministry of the Interior supported the formulation of 11 comprehensive prevention and protection plans13 for the department of Valle del Cauca and the municipalities of Montería and Valencia (Córdoba), San Martín (Cesar), Neiva and Pitalito (Huila), Buenaventura and Jamundí (Valle del Cauca), Puerto Guzmán, Orión, and San Miguel (Putumayo).

In addition, on May 17, 2022, the Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs launched the Observa Platform as a technological tool for public consultation that allows access to quantitative data on violent phenomena such as the murder of social leaders, the recruitment, use, and exploitation of and sexual violence against children and adolescents, risk maps of human rights violations, and the status of public policies associated with these issues.

Violent actions against communities and their leaders, ethnic-territorial authorities, public servants, and the population advancing along the reincorporation route continue to plague the territories where there are illegal armed groups, illicit economies, and difficulties in the provision of public goods and services. The main impacts are murders, threats, forced disappearances, forced displacement, confinement, restrictions on mobility, the placement of anti-personnel mines, and the recruitment, use, and exploitation of children and adolescents.

Greater vulnerability is found in areas where illegal armed groups are engaged in territorial disputes or fighting with security forces, such as Arauca and Putumayo; and in regions such as San Juan and Baudó (Chocó); southern Bolivar; Sanquianga and Telembí (Nariño); El Tambo-Argelia corridor (Cauca); Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta; and the municipality of Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca).

In territories where several illegal armed groups operate and have arrangements regarding their sources of financing or territorial distribution, they exert strong social control to consolidate their presence, preventing the entry of other illegal armed groups and restricting the information and interaction of communities with the institutional framework—particularly in the regions of Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Urabá,14 southern Córdoba, in the Cordillera de Nariño region, and the department of Guaviare.

In Arauca, Catatumbo, Cauca, Chocó, and Putumayo, organized social sectors have highlighted the need to mitigate risk scenarios and the impact on the physical safety of communities by respecting the principle of distinction and establishing what they have called “humanitarian minimums.” These proposals are at different stages of evolution, but agree on the importance of creating conditions for the protection of the civilian population where armed conflict and criminality remain an ongoing issue.

2.2.1. Forced displacement and confinement

Forced displacement persists and is causally linked to other impacts. First, armed confrontations between illegal armed groups or clashes with security forces gave rise to mass displacement events.15 These dynamics were concentrated in the Pacific region, mainly in the San Juan and Baudó rivers.

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12 They are part of a strategy adopted by the Ministry of the Interior to activate communication channels at the territorial level, coordinate actions between national and territorial entities, and provide technical assistance to institutions. Taken from Ministry of the Interior, “Oficio de Respuesta a sobre los avances, logros y resultados que ha obtenido el Ministerio del Interior en el proceso de construcción de paz” [Official response to the progress, achievements, and results obtained by the Ministry of the Interior in the peacebuilding process.], pp. 40-41.
13 Ministry of the Interior, “Oficio de Respuesta a sobre los avances, logros y resultados que ha obtenido el Ministerio del Interior en el proceso de construcción de paz,” pp. 36-37.
14 In the municipalities of Urabá Antioquia, the AGC/Clan del Golfo have threatened people who contribute to the work of the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD).
15 Article 2.2.2.5.1 of Decree 1084 of 2015 defines mass forced displacements as those events involving 10 or more family nuclei or 50 or more persons.
(Chocó), Telembí and Sanquianga (Nariño) and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, as well as in the municipalities of Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca), Argelia, and Guapi (Cauca), and the department of Arauca.

Other causes include prior impacts such as threats; accusations of collaboration with security forces; extortion; killings; de facto justice; risk of recruitment, use, and exploitation of children and adolescents; and the possible effects of harassment against military bases or police stations. In these contexts, forced displacements were both mass and individual, with a strong tendency toward the latter. This is the case of the municipalities of La Montañita (Caquetá), Pueblo Bello (Cesar), Remedios (Antioquia), Simití (Bolívar), Tumaco (Nariño), Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo), La Macarena (Meta), and in the Catatumbo region.

In both scenarios, some of the forced displacement events were of short duration and people were able to return almost immediately. This dynamic reflects a self-protection strategy, which, since it is not understood as a violation, is not declared a “victimizing event” (crime) before the competent entities. This has occurred in the department of Arauca, the municipalities of Argelia (Cauca), Carmen del Darién (Chocó), and the Catatumbo region.

The limited financial resources and capacity of municipal governments to respond to forced displacement events, as well as the complex humanitarian situation in shelters or places of refuge, led communities to return even when security was not guaranteed. In other cases, forced displacement persists due to the lack of adequate conditions for safe return. An example of this is the situation of the riparian communities of the Calima River who have been living in the urban area of Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca) since April 2022.

During the armed strike decreed by the AGC/Clan del Golfo in May, vehicles were burned, roads were blocked, and private and public property was damaged by graffiti alluding to illegal armed groups. Communities and institutions in Bajo Cauca, Urabá, and Nordeste (Antioquia); Darién and Bajo Atrato (Chocó); and southern Córdoba regarded this event as a mass confinement that brought social and economic activity to a standstill. It also created serious humanitarian impacts such as food shortages and restrictions on health services and the search for shelter for those who could not reach their homes before the announcement made by the AGC/Clan del Golfo.

The differentiating factor of this armed strike was the immediacy of the order, which limited civilians’ ability to prepare and stock up on supplies in order to comply with the order. As a result, statements on this victimizing event were given to the Public Prosecution Service [Ministerio Público], an action uncommon in previous armed strikes decreed by this and other illegal armed groups.

2.2.2. Involvement, forced recruitment, use, and exploitation of and sexual violence against children and adolescents

The Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment, Use of, and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups (CIPRUNNA) provided technical assistance to 387 territorial entities that are developing Comprehensive Protection and Prevention Plans, and facilitated the updating and formation of immediate action teams in 13 departments. 16

Despite the institutional efforts made at the territorial level, support for the implementation of immediate action teams is not sufficient. In some cases, local institutions continue to be confused when it comes to identifying the functionality and activation of early prevention, emergency, and protection routes. Regarding the care of demobilized children and adolescents, not all municipalities have adequate foster homes for their protection. As a result, they are sometimes housed in police stations or military

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bases to provide them with physical security, which does not necessarily mean a safe environment for minors.

Sexual exploitation of girls and adolescents as young as 12 years old persists in areas where illegal armed groups and illicit economies are present. This form of age- and gender-based violence is perpetrated by illegal armed groups in territories where illegal mining is taking place, such as Antioquia, Chocó, and Nariño. Gender roles and stereotypes, coupled with the economic need of families or caregivers, create a situation of permissiveness in which minors become romantically involved with members of illegal armed groups, leave home, and end up being affiliated with an armed group.\(^\text{17}\) In other cases, heads of household encourage the sexual exploitation of girls and adolescents to improve the family economy.

Residual or dissident groups of the FARC-EP and the ELN continue to engage in forced recruitment to a greater extent in rural areas, especially of minors involved in the illicit harvesting of coca leaves. Sometimes they pressure families to hand over at least one of their minor children. In urban centers, the AGC/Clan del Golfo uses young people predominantly for surveillance activities, the sale and transport of illicit drugs, and the sexual exploitation of adolescent girls.

In the Indigenous communities of Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Guaviare, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, the forced recruitment of children and adolescents by dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP persists under the threat of forced displacement if they refuse to join the group. As a result, ethnic-territorial authorities that seek to protect children and adolescents are the targets of threats and murders. Children and adolescents forcibly recruited in Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño are taken to camps run by these groups where they receive ideological indoctrination and training in the use of long guns, combat positions, and the construction of camp areas.

Regarding the ELN, in Chocó, the Frente Ernesto Che Guevara has stepped up its recruitment of children and adolescents to counter the expansion of the AGC/Clan del Golfo; while in Arauca, minors are threatened for being related to members of dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP; and in Antioquia, they are used to handle anti-personnel mines and place explosives.

In Antioquia, Bolívar, Córdoba, Chocó, and Valle del Cauca, the AGC/Clan del Golfo entice children and adolescents with alcohol and illicit drugs to later turn them into dealers, use them as lookouts, and use them in criminal activities such as extortion and contract killings. Minors are approached outside schools, recreational areas, and through social media. In these cases, it is difficult to identify when children and adolescents have joined the illegal armed groups, since they continue to live in their communities. At times, membership in such a group is understood by the family nucleus as a source of income.

Other actions by illegal armed groups have violated the right to life of children and adolescents. In March, in Bogotá, two minors died in an explosive attack on National Police Immediate Response Command (CAI), which was attributed to the dissident or residual group of Frente 33; and in Arauca, two other minors were killed when the ELN shot at a family in a vehicle, which the illegal armed groups later described as “collateral damage.”

Beyond offering technical assistance to local authorities for the creation of prevention routes, the challenge lies in reaching families and school environments, as well as children, adolescents, and young adults, with prevention education and assistance routes. Added to this is the challenge of changing

\(^{17}\) Situation evidenced by the death of alias “Gentil Duarte,” leader of the dissident or residual group of the FARC-EP, along with a 13-year-old minor, who was said to be his “girlfriend.” This has been documented in national media such as: https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/gentil-duarte-así-quedo-su-campamento-luego-de-ataque-en-que-habria-muerto-675062
collective perceptions within state and ethnic authorities and communities in general, since the idea that children and adolescents go to illegal armed groups of their own free will is still normalized.  

2.2.3. Impacts on social leaders and community representatives

The persistence of illegal armed groups in the territories is one of the main risk factors to the physical safety of social leaders. The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OHCP), as technical secretariat of the National Commission on Security Guarantees, adopted Agreement Number 1 of 2022, which contains the regulatory provisions on the sessions and functioning of this interagency body. It is also developing the Action Plan to formulate the public policy for dismantling criminal organizations.

The Human Rights Office of the Ministry of the Interior provided technical assistance to social leaders on the activation of inter-institutional routes to ensure the defense of human rights in Arauca, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. In addition, the National Protection Unit made progress in implementing Decree 1139 of 2021 through actions such as reducing processing times for individual risk level assessments from 61 to 30 working days, which seeks to expedite the institutional response to requests for protection in order to safeguard the life and humane treatment of this population group.

On April 28, 2022, the Constitutional Court held a public hearing on protection measures for community leaders and human rights advocates. The proceeding arose from the tutela [petition for the protection of constitutional rights] actions requesting a declaration of an “unconstitutional state of affairs” (ECI). The session covered four main topics: (i) situation of risk to the life and integrity of social leaders; (ii) legislative, administrative, and budgetary measures adopted by the State; (iii) the effectiveness of implementing protection routes and measures; and (iv) security guarantees in line with the Final Peace Agreement. At present, the Court is evaluating the situation in order to issue the respective decision.

The personal safety of social leaders continues to be undermined, with murder being the most salient threat. Although the Inter-Institutional Monitoring Committee on the Killings of Human Rights Defenders While the quantification process is advancing, the debate on methodologies remains a challenge for the institutions in charge of prevention and protection strategies.

Social leaders in the territories are subject to coercion by illegal armed groups. As a strategy for consolidating their social control, illegal armed groups demand the payment of “taxes” from communities, issue identity cards to the civilian population, require permits for the entry of foreigners, and impose rules of behavior.

Early in the year, Arauca was heavily affected by the clash between the ELN and dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP, which gave rise to threats, murders, and forced displacements of social leaders. The actions of these illegal armed groups were aimed at weakening the political and social bases by stigmatizing them as being aligned with their adversary, with peasant, community, youth, women, and trade union leaders being the main targets. This is why some leaders of Community Action Councils (JAC) chose not to assume their positions in February, when opportunities for participation were limited by the forced displacement of their members or their desire to keep a low profile as a self-protection mechanism.

2.2.4. Impacts on ethnic authorities

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18 In Order 251 of 2008, the Constitutional Court held that all recruitment is an act of coercion, of which children and adolescents are victims. Article 162 of the Criminal Code defines this conduct as the crime of unlawful recruitment. For this reason, “voluntariness” cannot be considered in an act of forced recruitment by an illegal armed group.

19 To carry out one of its pending tasks and comply with the orders issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).

20 Response to request for institutional achievements made by the UNP - Internal Filing EXT22-00069110.

21 Created by Decree No. 1138 of 2021.

22 In municipalities of Guaviare, Meta, and in the Cordillera de Nariño region, factions of the dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP force leaders to collect money from their communities to support collective activities such as some community works.

23 In Guaviare, dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP are distributing coexistence manuals among leaders of the JACs, to be read at meetings and assemblies so that the entire community fully complies with them.
Illegal armed groups continue to violate the rights to life, liberty, and humane treatment of ethnic authorities, which undermines the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction and the exercise of self-government by Afro-descendant communities. These acts are intended to prevent action by those communities’ justice systems, prevent the rescue of forcibly recruited children and adolescents, and hinder relations between communities and the State, as well as to rupture the social fabric and reinforce control over illegal economies.

In northern Cauca, the dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP grouped in the Comando Coordinador de Occidente issue threats; commit murder; impose de facto justice; and forcibly displace and constrain Indigenous and ancestral authorities, members of the Indigenous guards, and political representatives as a strategy to maintain their territorial control. This strategy also safeguards the production and commercialization of marijuana and coca leaf derivatives.

One of the most notable cases was the murder of José Miller Correa, a member of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN), on March 15, 2022. He was one of the authorities who opposed the presence of illicit crops and illegal armed groups in Indigenous territories, as well as the recruitment of Indigenous children and adolescents.

In the Pacific region of Nariño, particularly in the municipalities of Barbacoas and Tumaco (Nariño), the authorities of the Awá people have been the target of threats, forced displacements, harassment, and murder24 for calling attention to the impacts of dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP in their collective territories. They are also accused of collaborating with security forces in carrying out forced eradication activities.

In Putumayo, dissident or residual FARC-EP groups threatened and forcibly displaced authorities of the Awá and Siona people for administering their own justice and participating in processes to restore territorial rights. In Valle del Cauca, the Indigenous guard was declared a military target by illegal armed groups after the arrest of smugglers and the confiscation and burning of illicit drugs. Meanwhile, in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, sacred sites of the Wiwa, Kankuamo, and Kogui communities were attacked in retaliation for their authorities’ complaints about illegal mining operations.

In the San Juan region (Chocó), the territorial dispute between the ELN and the AGC/Clan del Golfo has created security risks for Indigenous authorities and Afro-descendant community leaders. The murder of leader Jesusita Moreno on June 7 in the city of Cali weakened the social fabric and political capacity of these communities since she was well-known for her efforts to foster respect for the life and integrity of the civilian population in the face of actions by illegal armed groups.

2.2.5. De facto justice

Illegal armed groups continue to exercise territorial dominance through the imposition and enforcement of rules of behavior in the communities. Extortion, the regulation of coexistence, and restrictions on mobility continue to be the most common actions, with some differences in the way they are carried out. Residual or dissident FARC-EP groups, the AGC/Clan del Golfo, and the ELN are the main perpetrators.

Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Meta, Norte de Santander, Nariño, and Putumayo are the departments with the highest incidence of extortion through telephone calls, pamphlets, or in person. “Taxes” are collected, especially from merchants, transporters, infrastructure operators, mining companies, and public officials. The beneficiaries of housing construction projects are also frequently extorted, as in Córdoba, where the AGC/Clan del Golfo demands between 3% and 20% of the subsidies provided to the population for low-income housing.

24 On July 3, Juan Orlando Moriano, alternate governor and councilor of the Indigenous Unity of the Awá People, and the members of his security detail, were killed in the Inda Sabaleta Indigenous Reserve (Tumaco). The incident occurred in front of the reserve’s community and its authorities, who were in an internal meeting.
In Chocó, illegal armed groups demand extortion payments from merchants in money or merchandise, which is why many choose to increase the price of products to compensate for the financial loss, directly affecting the population’s cost of living. They also demand items for their own needs, such as rubber boots, medicines, or food, as in Putumayo and Norte de Santander.

In Antioquia, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca, illegal armed groups enforce rules of conduct and coexistence, the most frequent being curfews; they also force establishments to close, make it compulsory to carry identification when traveling, and prohibit the wearing of face-coverings. So-called “social cleansing” operations against drug users or those who disrupt the social order imposed by illegal armed groups also continue.

In Nariño, new forms of control have emerged, such as requiring men and women to undergo clinical tests for hepatitis B and HIV to enter the communities. In Tibú (Norte de Santander), illegal armed groups banned the use of bodyguards and armored vehicles, especially in rural areas, so people with security details have limited their mobility even more; In Chocó, the illegal armed groups take photographs of every local resident, apparently to keep a record of who lives in the territory. Finally, night-time restrictions on mobility continue to be in effect between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

2.2.6. Impacts due to the suspected presence of, and accidents involving, anti-personnel mines (APM), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Anti-personnel mines continue to be used mainly by the ELN, the AGC/Clan del Golfo, and residual or dissident groups of the FARC-EP in their territorial control strategies. In Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and the regions of Catatumbo, southern Cesar, San Juan (Chocó), Sanquinga (Nariño), and southern Caquetá, these devices are used to prevent the entry of security forces or other illegal armed groups. In southern Córdoba and Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), they are placed in rural areas to prevent the forced eradication of illicit crops.

IEDs are also used by illegal armed groups during armed strikes, on public roads and in public places, to carry out actions against security forces, especially in high-traffic urban and rural areas in Antioquia, Arauca, Cesar, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca. This means that the areas near police stations, national army installations, city halls, parks, and schools are the highest risk areas for UXO events.25

In the regions of Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), San Juan and Baudó (Chocó), and Telembí (Nariño), as well as in the municipality of Tumaco, the suspected existence of APM/UXO/IEDs continues to provoke fear among the population, leading to confinements, restrictions on mobility, and mass forced displacements, and hindering the arrival of government institutions. In rural areas of La Macarena (Meta), Argelia (Cauca), Istmina,26 and the region of Atrato (Chocó), part of the population did not participate in the elections due to the risk of being victims of APM on their way to the polling stations.

In territories where APM are not suspected to be present, such as in the municipality of Valencia (Córdoba), El Dovio (Valle del Cauca), and in areas where it is still impossible to undertake humanitarian demining operations, such as La Macarena (Meta) and Novita (Chocó), illegal armed groups have placed new APM. In El Doncello (Caquetá), the risk of APM persists because threats from illegal armed groups have kept local residents from providing all the information about dangerous areas to the technicians.

In areas slated for humanitarian demining operations such as Caquetá, Meta, and Valle del Cauca, organizations continue to face security-related difficulties in gaining access to the territory. Generally,

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25 This situation creates challenges for security forces, which have neither the technical capacity to deal with the events nor the security conditions to deactivate explosive devices, given the risk that the explosives specialists may be harassed while performing their work. For this reason, and because these devices have remained in the territories for so long, the communities engage in unsafe behaviors that include the handling of explosive devices by civilians or the use of the affected roads.

26 The community of Doidó, which is supposed to vote in the Negría district, was unable to do so during the presidential elections due to the risk of APM-related accidents on the roads surrounding the district, as well as to the sedimentation of the river. In this case, out of almost 200 voters that usually register in the district of Negría, only 53 managed to vote.
the confluence of drug trafficking interdiction operations and the forced eradication of illicit crops in the areas where humanitarian demining has been carried out have led to these strategies being mistaken for each other, prompting threats or accusations leading to the withdrawal of demining organizations.

In areas to be prioritized for humanitarian demining actions in Antioquia, Bolívar and Norte de Santander, civilians continue to engage in unsafe behavior, such as returning to APM-contaminated areas or deactivating devices themselves because they need to use public or cultivated areas. Illegal armed groups make it difficult for Mine Risk Education (MRE) workshops to reach Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca.

As of August 1, 2022, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), 299 municipalities in Colombia have been declared free of suspected APM, well beyond the 180 municipalities designated as a goal of President Duque’s administration for 2022, and progress has been made with prevention activities that have included an ethnic approach to MRE, outreach to promote safe behaviors, and the creation and implementation of 181 comprehensive victim assistance pathways.

2.2.7. Impacts on persons in the process of reincorporation (PPR) and their families

The Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation is advancing the regulation of the Comprehensive Protection Program to formalize and coordinate the actions, institutions, and agencies in charge of security measures for PPR and their families. In addition, as part of the Strategic Security and Protection Plan, it made progress in building the Departmental Comprehensive Security Strategies in Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. It also coordinated prevention actions in the National Plan for Electoral Guarantees, aimed at bolstering the security and effective participation of PPR in congressional and presidential elections.

In this context, the Colombian State assigned security details to 98% of the candidates for their protection; in some cases, it reinforced the measures already granted and, in others, it implemented new security arrangements. Broadly speaking, the PPR candidates carried out their political activities at the national level without major security incidents, except for threats against a candidate in Guaviare, as well as an attack on another candidate in Tuluá (Valle del Cauca) and the murder of his bodyguard.

In January 2022, the Constitutional Court declared an ECI on the grounds that the security guarantees for the signatories of the Final Peace Agreement had been poorly implemented. The decision is a milestone in the positioning of this issue at the political and technical-legal level, which may strengthen the institutional capacity to mitigate the security risks that the ex-combatant population continues to face throughout the country.

The Elite Corps of the National Police reported that 25 PPR and five of their family members were victims of one of these three crimes: murder, attempted murder, and enforced disappearance. Although these violent acts are under judicial investigation, in the territories where signatories of the Final Peace Agreement are involved in the reincorporation process, the PPR and their families also experienced forced displacement, stigmatization, and threats.

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27 This includes activities such as the control and seizure of chemical substances, dismantling of laboratories for the processing of illicit drugs, and air, sea, river, and land traffic control.

28 This is the case of the Embera Eyábida Indigenous communities in Murindó (Antioquia), and the communities of Cantagallo (Bolívar) and Las Mercedes in the municipality of Sardinata (Norte de Santander).

29 This is one of the elements of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP).

30 Structured along eight strategic lines: (i) prevention; (ii) nonmaterial prevention actions; (iii) protection; (iv) coordination for investigation and prosecution; (v) comprehensive human security; (vi) gender-differentiated approach; (vii) inter-institutional coordination; and (viii) security guarantees for electoral participation.

31 According to data from the National Registry of Civil Status, 40 candidates for the Congress of the Republic were put forward by the Comunes party for the 2022 elections. Likewise, three people representing former combatants ran as candidates with the endorsement of other political parties.


The security violations against this population group were concentrated in Caquetá, Guaviare, Meta, and Putumayo, affecting the families of PPR, public servants, and international cooperation agencies. The dissident or residual groups of the FARC-EP are mainly responsible for the violence perpetrated against PPR in these areas, because they consider PPR to be “traitors” for participating in the reincorporation process, or because they see them as collaborators of an opposing illegal armed group, or because of their refusal to join the group.

In the case of their family members, the most common impact is retaliation when the PPR takes an action that the illegal armed group disagrees with, or when the person is linked to another illegal armed group. In other cases, the violation is the indirect result of an attack aimed at the PPR.

A leader of the reincorporation process was killed in Puerto Guzmán (Putumayo) in late February, an incident that also resulted in the wounding of four people from the community who were nearby; in Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo), PPR and their families have been forcibly displaced; and in the Former Territorial Training and Reincorporation Areas (AETCR) of Colinas in San José de Guaviare (Guaviare), a group of bodyguards was threatened and forcibly displaced by the dissident or residual FARC-EP group, Columna Jhon Linares.

With respect to the recidivism of the people active in the reincorporation process, in regions such as Urabá Antioqueño, the communities and institutions believe that members of this population are members of the AGC/Clan del Golfo, and even play commanding roles. To a certain extent, the existence of a prior relationship between those who remain committed to the process and those PPR presumed to be recidivists would allow for the establishment of non-aggression agreements.

3. BORDER DYNAMICS AND MIGRATION FLOWS

As part of the implementation of Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelan migrants, the national government issued one million Temporary Protection Permits (PPT), and some 700,000 Venezuelan nationals are now receiving them. It also developed different strategies and actions to facilitate transportation at the borders, address unmet basic needs, raise awareness about temporary protected status, and update the humanitarian assistance and protection routes. It also published document CONPES 4100, which details the gradual strategy to be implemented between 2022 and 2032 for the integration of the Venezuelan migrant population as a development factor for Colombia.

However, the Venezuelan population still faces obstacles in accessing PPT. These include the misinformation of the migrant population and local officials about temporary protected status; difficulties in transportation and access to areas where biometric records are taken or where the PPT is picked up; and mistrust of government outreach events. In addition, local authorities expressed uncertainty about budgetary impacts, obligations, and available resources resulting from the implementation of temporary protected status.

Venezuelan migrants are also arriving more frequently to areas along the Venezuelan border and other areas such as Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Valle del Cauca, and southern Bolívar, often for short stays and with informal employment. In these places, they receive low wages and have to work very demanding hours compared to the Colombian population.

In the municipalities of Sardinata and Puerto Santander (Norte de Santander), Jamundí (Valle del Cauca), Samaniego and Cumbitara (Nariño), Argelia and El Tambo (Cauca), illegal armed groups register

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34 Jorge Santofimio, who was leading the reincorporation process in the municipality of Puerto Guzmán, was killed during a meeting with the community and the bodyguards of the individual and collective security details for the PPR.

35 This refers to the linking of persons in the process of reincorporation to any criminal activity, especially those related to illegal armed groups.

36 According to Migración Colombia, 53% of these one million cards were issued to women and 29% to children and adolescents. https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/colombia-alcanzo-un-millon-de-tarjetas-de-proteccion-entregadas-a-migrantes-venezolanos-informo-el-presidente-duque

37 Available at: https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econt%2C?%2C%2Bmicos%2C4100.pdf

38 However, in Arauca, between January and March, many Venezuelans returned to their country of origin for fear of being victims of murder or forced disappearance because of the clashes between illegal armed groups.
the Venezuelans who come to work in the rural areas of these municipalities and require them to provide a letter of recommendation. Social conflict also persists because of the establishment of informal human settlements. In host communities, the arrival of migrants is associated with the misuse of public space, the occupation of land, and the exploitation of the Venezuelan population.39

On the Venezuelan, Panamanian, and Ecuadorian borders and in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Guaviare, and Valle del Cauca, the forced recruitment, use, and involvement of Venezuelan children and adolescents and young people continue, as do the imposition of de facto justice, 40 forced disappearance, forced displacement, human trafficking, and violence against Venezuelan women. These phenomena occur in isolated rural areas. They tend not to attract much attention and there are no institutional records because of the affected population’s fear of reporting them.

Finally, the failure to open the borders has encouraged the continued transit of migrants through unauthorized crossings or “illegal trails” that are controlled by illegal armed groups, who impose various rules of behavior. When any of these rules are violated, punishments can include torture, cruel treatment, and murder.

4. JUSTICE IN THE TERRITORIES

The Ministry of Justice and Law designed and adopted the Territory-Based Strategy against Organized Crime, which seeks to “strengthen the capacities of justice sector entities in the investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and punishment of crime in targeted territories (…)”.41 It also signed an agreement with the Inter-American Judicial Facilitators Program of the OAS to include conciliation in equity within the framework of local justice systems, 42 considering the long history of conciliation in Colombia and the need to consolidate the practice, especially in the territories most affected by the armed conflict.

This ministerial portfolio also provided training for family police stations on the detection and prevention of gender-based violence, with the participation of both institutions and social leaders, and on Law 2126 of 2021, which introduced changes to how police stations operate.

Despite these efforts, the population still faces difficulties in accessing the justice system, especially those entities that handle criminal proceedings, such as prosecutors’ offices and courts, mainly due to the firm territorial control exerted by illegal armed groups. Nor do they allow justice authorities to travel to rural areas, which means that basic judicial needs, such as the removal of corpses, are neglected. This is seen especially in Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, and Norte de Santander.

In Valdivia (Antioquia), illegal armed groups allowed municipal firefighters to enter to remove and recover bodies; however, with the increase in armed confrontations and their interest in tightening their control over the population, they have barred the entry of any government representative since March. The situation is the same in Cañón del Micay, in the municipality of Argelia (Cauca). There, bodies are left on the roads, with some identification, so funeral homes or JAC authorities can collect them and transfer them to the morgue. Similarly, in Tibú (Norte de Santander) and in the department of Arauca, funeral homes—with the authorization of the illegal armed groups—must take care of removing bodies without, in most cases, a judicial investigation. In other cases, the bodies are abandoned on rural roads, where they are left to decompose.

39 In El Tarra, Norte de Santander, the Venezuelan population residing in informal human settlements near installations of the security forces was coerced by illegal armed groups to stage protests and occupy those installations.

40 For example, in Sardinata (Norte de Santander), both the ELN and Frente 33 have been responsible for targeted killings, forced labor, and forced displacement of the Venezuelan population, especially of people accused of being drug dealers, consumers of illicit drugs, or collaborators of other illegal armed groups.


It is also difficult for the population to file complaints with public prosecutors, even through technological means, due to the fear of being identified as informants and targeted by illegal armed groups for reprisals. This situation hampers investigations and, therefore, prosecutions, especially of crimes related to murder, threats, and forced disappearance, since citizens prefer not to testify as witnesses.

The Office of the Attorney General [Fiscalía General de la Nación] (FGN) adopted virtual complaint mechanisms, which have not worked in the territories due to fear, unfamiliarity, and lack of connectivity. Likewise, while the ongoing use of virtual technology in the courts helps to expedite pending cases, it also limits the entry of new ones, given the population’s lack of knowledge of how to follow up on them. This heightens distrust and widens the gaps in access to formal justice, which is exploited by illegal armed groups to strengthen their territorial presence.

In Tibú (Norte de Santander), the presence of State actors has dwindled. After the murder of the special prosecutor in 2021, the virtual court measures adopted during the pandemic, and the actions of illegal armed groups against government institutions, judicial authorities have not reestablished their presence. This has increased public distrust of the justice sector and diminished the State’s capacity for territorial control.

In this context, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms help communities to resolve their problems out of court and prevent the illegal armed groups from always being the one to settle the matter, since in many cases the JACs and/or the conciliators in equity are the only ones allowed to conduct the mediation process.

However, in Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Norte de Santander, and the Pacific regions of Nariño and southern Bolívar, these community practices have been weakening for two main reasons. The first is the turnover of the JAC members, since many still lack the knowledge, legitimacy, or experience to mediate in their communities. Second, the people trained as conciliators in equity have given up this work due to constraints imposed by illegal armed groups, forced displacements, and a lack of resources; and because they often spend a large part of their time on conciliation—a free service—it does not allow them to earn a livelihood.

With the signing of the agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Inter-American Judicial Facilitators Program of the OAS, it is hoped that the legal concept of conciliation in equity will be reinforced, since for many communities it is the only way to access and obtain justice.

4.1. Autonomy, community justice systems (derecho propio), and interjurisdictional cooperation

The guarantee of individual and collective rights is being affected by difficulties in registering Indigenous authorities with local authorities and the Ministry of the Interior. This creates conflicts in the communities that weaken their governance, particularly among the Arhuaco, Wayúu, Sikuani, and Wounaan peoples. The Constitutional Court has noted that the government’s task is one of processing and registration, which is not a requirement for the recognition of ethnic status. An example of this can be found in Sardinata (Norte de Santander) where the Yukpa population from Venezuela is not being recognized by Colombian entities because they are not registered as an Indigenous population in the country.

Eight years after the issuance of the Decree on the Autonomy of Indigenous Peoples, its provisions for the exercise of judicial, cultural, political, and administrative functions contained in their life plans have not been implemented. Indigenous peoples are not fully aware of its contents and consider that the requirements for the direct transfer of resources are too strict, and few can meet them. This means that

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43 In June, Law 2213 of 2022 was enacted, “Permanently enacting Legislative Decree 806 of 2020 and adopting measures to implement information and communication technologies in judicial proceedings, expedite judicial cases, make assistance to users of the justice service more flexible, and enacting other provisions.”

44 Decree 1953 of 2014, establishing the special system for the Indigenous Territories to enable the autonomous functioning of their own systems.
only communities and organizations that continuously implement projects and have the financial and technical capacity are able to access them, which leaves grassroots communities at a disadvantage.

In addition, in Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Guaviare, La Guajira, and Putumayo, several Indigenous communities did not receive funds from the General Participation System in the last year. In other cases, there are communities that have not received funds for more than five years and others, such as the Nukak people, who have never received them, despite being a people at risk of extinction.

The Indigenous communities have drafted an increasing number of internal regulations and written coexistence manuals. Most implemented a punitive approach to violent actions, assuming the harmfulness of some behaviors, such as those related to gender-based violence (intrafamily violence and sexual violence, in particular). Some communities in Cauca, Cesar, and Norte de Santander have even begun to consider aggravating circumstances such as femicides, imposing greater penalties on those who commit such acts.

Security conditions in Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca have led communities to regulate matters such as the prohibition against the forced recruitment of children and adolescents, participation in illegal armed groups, and “territorial discord,” understood as any violent impact on their communities. However, in Amazonas, Arauca, Chocó, Guaviare, and La Guajira, some serious cases not sufficiently addressed by the JEI remain unpunished due to the weak internal organization for the exercise of its autonomy.

There has been successful interjurisdictional coordination between the FGN and the National Institute of Forensic Medicine with the Wayúu, Zenú, and Nasa peoples to solve cases of femicides, murders, sexual violence, and threats. In particular, the Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office and the Wayúu Board of Mediators [Junta Mayor de Palabreros Wayúu] made progress in three cases of sexual violence, and in jointly solving, between Indigenous authorities and national entities, crimes against Indigenous people.

The National Commission for the Coordination of the National Judicial System and the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (COCOIN), along with the Indigenous commissioners and representatives from the justice sector, also pushed for the drafting of the Interjurisdictional Coordination Law. However, coordination with other sectors and issues should be broadened to include, for example, defense sector entities, considering the expanded view of autonomous community justice in Indigenous worldviews and the reality faced in the ethnic territories.

4.2. Submission of illegal armed groups to the justice system

The Humanitarian Assistance Group for Demobilized Persons and Support for Individual Submission to Justice of the Ministry of National Defense completed 20 years of work, with over 35,000 people demobilized or individually brought before the justice system. The main route for members of organized armed groups to lay down their weapons is individual submission to justice, which involves providing security guarantees, the possibility of negotiating with the FGN, and educating society and local authorities about the process.

Beyond the attempts to develop individual demobilization and submission to justice programs, the organized armed groups have not been completely dismantled. There is a need to explore collective ways of having greater control over the effective dismantling of such groups, through a process of comprehensive differential assistance, and the pursuit of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition in judicial settings.

Individuals and family members of those who leave the criminal life face serious security risks, especially in Apartadó (Antioquia), Tumaco (Nariño), northern Cauca and the Bajo Cauca Antioqueño region, due to the presence of illegal armed groups. In the latter region, several people who participated

45 These are the resources that the national government transfers by constitutional mandate to the territorial entities and Indigenous reserves to finance the functions of their own government, such as education, health, sanitation, justice, and others.
in the process for individual submission to justice were killed because they were accused of being linked to security forces.

In judicial matters, the FGN has made an effort to investigate the acts of the organized armed groups as a macro-criminal phenomenon. However, the limited alternatives for negotiation with the members of the organized armed groups make it difficult to obtain information for their effective dismantling. Moreover, the submission to justice route only allows for the application of the benefits provided for under the criminal law,⁴⁶ which are not sufficient incentives for the person to leave the criminal life and cooperate with the justice system.

Finally, when individuals go before the authorities, and during the entire process, they must be informed of the free and voluntary nature of the submission, the socioeconomic benefits available to them or their family, and the consequences of committing new crimes or abandoning the process.

4.3. Prison and jail conditions for members of illegal armed groups

In 18 national detention centers (ERON), where persons deprived of liberty (PPL) from illegal armed groups—mainly from the ELN—are held, several factors that led to the declaration of an “unconstitutional state of affairs” (ECI) in prison matters persist and have resulted in mass violations of the rights of PPL.

The main difficulties are related to access to health care, food, prison infrastructure, and failures in the provision of essential public services such as water and sanitation. This situation is aggravated in the prisons of Arauca (Arauca), Jamundí (Valle del Cauca), Valledupar (Cesar), and Tierralta (Córdoba) due to hot weather in these territories.

As mentioned in the Thirty-Second Semiannual Report, in 2021, the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (INPEC) established regulations for people who pose a special security risk or are held in high-security wings of ERONs.⁴⁷ As a result, several PPL linked to illegal armed groups, among them members of the ELN, were relocated to other areas. This has had a negative impact on access to academic opportunities and job opportunities outside the prisons, even for those who are about to be released, and it has made contact with their families more difficult.

In terms of health care, there are delays in transferring prisoners to medical centers, especially those with a high security profile, such as those linked to the ELN. In these cases, protocols that require special monitoring must be applied, which creates delays, even in emergency cases. In particular, women belonging to the ELN who are being held in the Jamundí (Valle del Cauca) and Cúcuta (Norte de Santander) prisons have limited access to specialized medical services and sexual and reproductive health care.

Considering that in March the Constitutional Court extended the ECI to temporary detention centers, INPEC should analyze, with military and police authorities, the possibility of prioritizing the allocation of prison quotas in ERON to members of illegal armed groups who pose the greatest security risk—especially in Arauca (Arauca); Montelíbano (Córdoba); San José del Guaviare (Guaviare), Tumaco (Nariño) and Puerto Asís (Putumayo), where prison conditions reflect the need for immediate humanitarian attention.

Against the backdrop of possible peace talks between the national government and the ELN guerrillas, trust-building measures should be implemented, such as providing prison conditions respectful of human dignity and opportunities for the re-socialization of the PPL belonging to this group, to support their training in human rights, democracy, and peaceful conflict resolution, fostering positive leadership for building a Comprehensive Peace.

5. SOCIAL MOBILIZATIONS

⁴⁶ For example, benefits are prohibited in complex crimes related to organized armed groups such as kidnapping, extortion, or terrorism.
⁴⁷ Resolution 3972 of 2021 issued by the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (INPEC).
Calls for mobilizations to resume the national strike were a constant during the first months of the year, especially for the 28th of each month. Although this time they did not have the anticipated national scope, there were clashes between demonstrators and the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) in the country’s major cities. The National Strike Committee called for a mobilization on March 3, reiterating the list of demands it has been making since 2020. However, it decided to cancel the call and invite citizens to participate in the March 13 elections.

Various social sectors also reiterated their demands for the respect of human rights and security guarantees, including the signatories of the Final Peace Agreement and the Comunes Party, who carried out a “Pilgrimage for Life and Peace” on March 7 and 8 in Bogotá to demand the updating of risk maps.

In April, the Minga Indígena [organized protest for Indigenous rights] led by CRIC traveled through Cali, Ibagué, and Bogotá in solidarity with the Emberá people who have been forcibly displaced to Bogotá. The Bari people in Norte de Santander mobilized in May to demand accountability for the murder of one of their members and the right to live in peace in their territory.

The humanitarian situation in some regions led to social mobilizations such as the S.O.S. Caravan in Arauca and the Humanitarian Caravan for Life, Liberty, and Permanence in the Territories, which brought together leaders and social organizations from Arauca, Barrancabermeja (Santander), Buenaventura and Tuluá (Valle del Cauca), Cajamarca (Tolima), Pasto (Nariño), and Quibdó (Chocó) in Bogotá.

Although the mobilizations de-escalated during election season, the social demands made since the end of 2019 during the national strike remain relevant. Therefore, fulfilling existing agreements between civil society and the national government, strengthening dialogue spaces, and guaranteeing rights are urgent tasks for the management and transformation of social conflicts.

6. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE

Territorial demands for a broad and inclusive dialogue, which is needed to address the conflict and its impact on the most remote communities in the center of the country, have increased. More and more people are speaking out about the situation of the civilian population and how essential it is to seek a dialogue-based solution to the violence. An example of this was the call put out by over 500 organizations and leaders in February 2022, demanding a ceasefire from all armed actors in Colombia.

In this way, humanitarian initiatives and messages of peace emerge from the territories most affected by the internal armed conflict and inequality, demonstrating the determination, expertise, and perseverance of grassroots social groups when it comes to drawing attention to their concerns and proposing solutions tailored to the realities of their territories. These include the National, Social, Popular and Community Minga and the Espacio Regional de Paz in Cauca; and the Acuerdo Humanitario Ya initiative in Chocó.

In Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, on November 25, 2021, the Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres led the mobilization of over 3,000 women from different regions of the country to Caucasia (Antioquia), as part of the initiative “A journey of joy and celebration for life,” as part of a strategy to protect the lives of women and their territories, demanding the eradication of all gender-based violence. As a result of women’s demands for non-stigmatization and respect for life, collective risks for women leaders and advocates have been repositioned on the department’s public agenda.

The Mission, pursuant to its mandate, has been supporting these initiatives and the social organizations behind them and stresses the need to consider them when exploring and designing territorial dialogue processes that meet specific needs, address the particular contexts, and guarantee participation, without putting the population at risk.

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48 Related to guaranteeing the right to life, compliance with and implementation of the Peace Agreement, resumption of peace talks with the ELN, protection of social leaders and the environment, as well as the right to social protest without stigmatization and the dissemination and implementation of Decree 003 of 2021.
Despite the clear intention of civil society to advance processes and engage in dialogue with the State, effective participation continues to face significant challenges in Colombia. The Territorial Councils for Peace, Reconciliation, and Coexistence; the Roundtables for Effective Victim Participation; the Territorial Roundtables on Guarantees; and the Municipal Youth Councils, among others, are still unable to develop their potential. Rather than being cohesive settings for collective construction, they lack clarity about their scope and purpose and tend to be informative spaces for the institutional framework, particularly for accountability.

Some communities feel that the call to participate in different scenarios, from local and national institutions, is considered a requirement rather than an indispensable and useful instrument to ensure the construction of a State from the grassroots, respecting territorial realities. They call for grassroots leadership to be taken into account from the diagnostic assessment and design to the implementation, oversight, and evaluation of public policies, plans, programs, and projects.

The need to seek new forms of representation and legitimacy in leadership was clear in the elections of the Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace (CTEP) that mobilized 16 regions of the country to elect their representatives to the lower house of Congress, in an unprecedented election that took place peacefully and with no major security issues on election day.

The electoral process and the campaigns of the grassroots organizations were affected in terms of financing and access to timely regional campaign resources; only some candidates were able to obtain the disbursement of the advance requested before the elections, and even then, it was not made in a timely manner. Similarly, the voting population expressed dissatisfaction with the voter registration process, particularly with respect to the online biometric procedures, which prevented some people from exercising their right to vote for the CTEP.

Although these elections were intended to increase women’s political participation through parity lists, this aim was not achieved, and only three women were elected out of the 16 seats to be filled. However, most of the non-winning candidates now recognize themselves as the elected representative’s counterparts, consider that the 100 gender measures of the Final Peace Agreement should constitute the national and local agenda for the CTEP’s advocacy, and demand greater involvement in parliamentary proceedings.49

In some electoral districts, communities have questioned different campaigns’ legitimacy to represent the victims in these regions. The difficulties and allegations of co-optation by the traditional political machines led some districts to file legal appeals with the electoral courts and even with the FGN to disqualify the elected representatives. Several of these appeals are still pending.

In this context, there is a risk that this political-electoral exercise, aimed at broadening democracy and recognizing the leadership of victims as a form of reparation, instead of uniting and reconciling, could widen the gaps in political representation of victim communities. Therefore, the authorities are encouraged to review the electoral process and take the necessary measures to strengthen the trust and democratic openness sought by the CTEP.

7. IMPACT OF STRATEGIES AND POLICIES FOR TERRITORIAL TRANSFORMATION

7.1. Reincorporation process

Under the mandate established in the Eighth Additional Protocol to the agreement signed between the GS/OAS and the Colombian Government, the MAPP/OAS has been visiting the Former Territorial Training and Reincorporation Areas (AETCR), the so-called New Reincorporation Areas (NAR) or

49 Taken from the advocacy document prepared by the CTEP teams in June and presented at the Congressional Summit for Equality on July 5 and 6 in Bogotá, titled “Pasos para construir la Agenda de Género en las Curules de Paz.”
collective spaces, and those territories where PPR are participating in the reintegration process on an individual and dispersed basis.

Since the signing of the Final Peace Agreement, the Mission has monitored the effects on the lives, humane treatment, freedom, and physical safety of the signatories and their families, as well as their economic reintegration process. Despite the investment in productive projects, few have achieved economic stability. Some are inactive or are facing difficulties due to the lack of resources for their maintenance, the precarious road infrastructure for reaching the territories, and the actions of the illegal armed groups.

The situation of the dispersed population is more complex since these are people who typically do not have consolidated support networks or a strong investment that can support their life plan. It is also more difficult for them to make their needs known, to make progress in their productive projects, and to achieve meaningful participation in decision-making arenas. Many of the people in cities such as Cali (Valle del Cauca), Medellín (Antioquia), and Villavicencio (Meta) state that, despite having their own individual productive initiatives such as stores or garment workshops, they still depend on basic income and must resort to informal jobs to cover their expenses.

The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) and local authorities have worked together to strengthen the municipal and departmental reincorporation roundtables. Their aim is to include some of the productive projects being developed in the territories in the development plans and other existing planning mechanisms. In recent months, the MAPP/OAS has been supporting the creation, adoption of the work plan, and operation of the Tierralta and Córdoba reincorporation roundtables, through which PPR hope that some of the productive projects will be prioritized.

Faced with stigmatization, some signatories of the Final Peace Agreement find that it comes mainly from members of security forces or communities that hold the perception that PPR pose a risk to them, are outsiders, or are related to the actions of illegal armed groups. For example, in Tuluá (Valle del Cauca), these groups distribute pamphlets associated with persons in the process of reincorporation. In Palmira (Valle del Cauca), the community has expressed its disapproval and fear of the arrival of signatories from Cauca.

In Puerto Concordia (Meta), San José del Guaviare (Guaviare), Caucasia (Antioquia), Tumaco (Nariño), and Florida (Valle del Cauca), PPR report feeling fear when identified as such or when participating in the Territorial Peace Councils; spaces that make them visible and could increase the risk of attacks on their lives and integrity. They also say that at checkpoints or when they report victimizing acts at police stations, they are detained for hours or days until the authorities verify their legal status.

In response to these events, the Technical Roundtable on Early Prevention and Overcoming Stigmatization has developed workshops with members of security forces and communities for early prevention and the updating of the municipal plans adopted as part of Decree 1581 of 2017. It is also vital to promote reconciliation and community reincorporation processes that seek to improve relations between victims, communities, persons in the process of reincorporation, and State institutions and authorities.

7.2. Rural Development Programs (PDETs)

The objective of the PDETs is to progressively guarantee the exercise of fundamental rights and the strengthening of the social rule of law in the territories most affected by the armed conflict. Its adoption as a medium and long-term public policy by mayors’ and governors’ offices, coupled with the experience of nation-territory coordination, represent notable strengths that, with the political and financial commitment of the national government and the legislative branch in the regulatory and institutional design, will allow for progress in peacebuilding.

50 Adopting the public policy for the prevention of violations of the rights to life, humane treatment, freedom, and security of persons, groups, and communities, and issuing other provisions.
State efforts to secure funding for the initiatives\textsuperscript{51} achieved differentiated progress in the 16 subregions. Peasant and ethnic communities, as well as local authorities, perceive PDETs as a legitimate strategy for reducing inequality gaps that contributes to the well-being and dignity of rural communities. However, they note the limited implementation of initiatives and works, insufficient community participation in their design, and the absence of criteria for equitable allocation and fiscal oversight of PDET resources in infrastructure for the development and productive integration of the regions.

The Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) adopted informed public policy criteria;\textsuperscript{52} implemented the digital tool Central PDET,\textsuperscript{53} which guarantees public access to data on program implementation; and made progress on the “Information Circles” outreach and follow-up strategy, with the participation of leaders from PDET, PNIS, victims, and Youth Councils, among others. This adds deliberative elements that qualify participation and increase social ownership of the programs, while strengthening State mechanisms for fiscal control and citizen oversight.

The structuring teams in the PDET municipalities with less experience and skill for project design, financing, and execution continue to have limited capacities. Difficulties in meeting technical requirements have led to delays in the implementation of the initiatives, raising questions about the transparency and fairness with which resources are allocated. The ART has supported the municipalities that face the greatest difficulties by providing support for team training, meeting requirements, and approaching various sources of financing.

Although local authorities in 168 municipalities and ten departments created PDET project management bodies for the progressive strengthening of local capacities, the lack of ongoing monitoring by entities such as the National Planning Department, ministries, and the Comptroller General of the Republic, which participate in the approval and financing process, has led to reprocessing and cost overruns.

The Special Consultation Mechanisms (MEC) for ethnic communities and the ART strategy, which seeks to strengthen the citizen participation capacities of Impetus Group (GM) and MEC delegates, provide an opportunity to regulate the methodology, follow-up, and scope of participation in the PDETs, in partnership with the rural communities. They will also make it possible to steer expectations of participation toward different local and national planning scenarios, with different scopes and competencies in rural development.\textsuperscript{54}

In Arauca, Chocó, La Guajira, and Putumayo, political and administrative instability has had a negative impact on PDET implementation, due to the turnover of public servants and the failure to transfer information. To this extent, there is concern that conflicts outside the PDETs may hinder the actions of local institutions to ensure their implementation.\textsuperscript{55}

The PDETs are being developed in a complex setting where violence by illegal armed groups continues. This violence has disrupted the presence of government institutions and personnel, as well as the development of citizen engagement activities. In 10 of the 16 subregions,\textsuperscript{56} PDET contractors have been extorted and social leaders have been intimidated, having been held responsible for the obstacles to implementation and their role as supporters of the programs, which has heightened their vulnerability.

\textsuperscript{51} According to official information, the resources earmarked for PDET financing amount to 13.5 billion for 3,356 projects, mainly in road infrastructure.

\textsuperscript{52} Aimed at the collection, systematization, and analysis of territorial information previously unknown to government institutions, which is indispensable for the design of PDET initiatives and objectives and for overcoming barriers to their implementation.

\textsuperscript{53} Available at: https://centralpdet.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/

\textsuperscript{54} The ART has made efforts to establish linkages between PDET leaders and the Municipal Youth Councils in the subregions of Putumayo and Alto Patía and northern Cauca; and with the Territorial Planning Councils in Bolívar, Chocó, Nariño, Putumayo, Córdoba, Cesar, La Guajira, and Magdalena.

\textsuperscript{55} In subregions such as Arauca, Macarena - Guaviare, Pacifico Medio and Alto Patía, and northern Cauca. Tensions have been identified in the joint work for the execution of initiatives between public officials and community leaders due to political and electoral issues.

\textsuperscript{56} Sierra Nevada Perijá, the Pacific and border regions of Nariño, Uribá Antioqueño, Bajo Cauca and northeastern Antioqueño, Alto Patía and northern Cauca, the southern part of Bolívar, Macarena-Guaviare, Chocó, Catatumbo, and Putumayo.
The financial challenge of peacebuilding in Colombia requires, among other things, the decentralization of public investment and a greater economic effort by the State in the areas most affected by the armed conflict. It is essential to promptly clarify the alleged diverting of resources intended for PDET implementation and to establish effective controls to guarantee the transparent use of resources.

Finally, progress needs to be made in the participatory implementation of other public policies, to guarantee access to individual or collective land ownership for landless or land-scarce peasant and ethnic communities, and, in conjunction with the PDET, to ensure the structural transformation of rural areas. The lack of synchronization in the implementation of key elements of the comprehensive rural reform is a missed opportunity to create sustainable actions for overcoming the structural causes of the armed conflict associated with land use and land tenure.

7.3. Strategies for reducing illicit crop cultivation

Drug activity continues to be one of the factors driving the presence and actions of illegal armed groups and involves some population groups, directly and indirectly, under coercion or for reasons of economic survival. The increase in the density of illicit crops in Antioquia, Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca reveals the existence of new varieties of coca leaf and a more technologically advanced process for transforming it into coca base paste and its derivatives, and with it, higher yields and production of illicit drugs on a smaller number of hectares. In some cases, this is supported by illegal armed groups and mafias in the service of drug traffickers.

This has had an impact on local economies. In Catatumbo, the interdiction of security forces and new territorial arrangements between the ELN and the residual or dissident FARC-EP group Frente 33 led to an accumulation of coca base paste and a decrease in the circulation of money. A similar scene played out on the Pacific Coast of Nariño, where the dispute between illegal armed groups kept buyers out of rural areas, so growers had to go out to sell their coca crops and their derivatives in the municipalities, risking capture in urban areas.

According to official figures, the Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) continues to be implemented in the 14 departments and 56 prioritized municipalities, where 46,008 hectares of coca leaf have been voluntarily replaced. In addition, of the 99,097 beneficiary families, 76,283 received full payments under the Immediate Assistance Plan; 75,825 have received comprehensive technical assistance; 67,907 have established food security projects, and 49,089 are implementing their productive projects.

Despite the actions carried out by the Bureau for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (DSCI), there have been delays and instances of noncompliance in the implementation of the PNIS, due to mismanagement by program operators; reluctance to accept the idea of right of use contracts (CDU), especially in Córdoba, Guaviare, Putumayo, and Tumaco (Nariño); and difficulties marketing lawful products.

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57 Such as (i) the creation and implementation of the agrarian courts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with a rural focus; (ii) progress in the multipurpose cadastre, incorporating state-of-the-art technology and ensuring the participation of rural and ethnic communities; (iii) ensuring opportunities for citizen participation in the design and implementation of the National Plans for Mass Property Formalization and Environmental Zoning, the Social Management Plans for Rural Property, and the strategy of natural conservation contracts in environmental protection zones.

58 The Mission defines drug activity as the phenomenon related to the planting of illicit crops, the processing and production of illicit drugs and, subsequently, elements related to their transportation, sale, and the involvement of illegal armed groups and mafias.


60 Cost overruns on inputs for productive projects, inconsistency in the delivery of materials requested in the investment plans, contracting of foreign suppliers, and pressure to sign documents.

61 They are part of the strategy of Natural Conservation Contracts and may be granted to the beneficiary population of the PNIS located in Forest Reserve Zones of the Second Law of 1989, for families to make use of them for a maximum period of 10 years, through activities consistent with environmental laws and regulations.
In Córdoba, the delays led to mobilizations and social protests in which the communities expressed their legal uncertainty and lack of knowledge about the scope of the CDU. However, the national government began to set up territorial technical roundtables for dialogue and conflict management, as occurred in the department of Guaviare, where the National Land Agency (ANT) held workshops with the communities as part of its social dialogue strategy to agree on the terms of the contract for granting use rights over vacant land not subject to adjudication.

Difficulties in the implementation of the PNIS, coupled with the presence of illegal armed groups, led to the replanting of coca leaf crops in Antioquia, Caquetá, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca, causing environmental damage such as deforestation, contamination of water sources, planting of illicit crops inside protected areas of the National Parks System (PNN),62 the illegal extraction of crude oil, and fuel smuggling.

This also affects the collective territories with the installation of basic infrastructure for drug processing by illegal armed groups, which hinders State interdiction actions.63 The PNIS beneficiary population in Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Guaviare, Meta, and Norte de Santander have also moved to other municipalities or departments to continue cultivating and harvesting coca leaves to obtain new sources of income.

In relation to other types of voluntary crop substitution, the DSCI made progress in the design of “tailor-made” models64 for families not participating in the PNIS in Puerto Asís (Putumayo); Valdivia and Campamento (Antioquia); and Jamundí (Valle del Cauca). In addition, coca-growing communities have high expectations for engaging in voluntary coca substitution activities under the governmental strategies of the new presidential administration.

The Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation, under the “Plan for the coordination of actions to improve security for PNIS leaders and in substitution models,” held territorialization meetings in Cauca and Meta, and coordinated with the territorial entities in Antioquia, Guaviare, Valle del Cauca, and the municipalities of Montelíbano (Córdoba) and Tumaco (Nariño) to include actions to provide security for crop substitution leaders in the comprehensive prevention and protection plans.

Between January and June 2022, security forces forcibly eradicated 40,373 hectares of coca leaf crops in 81 municipalities in 14 departments, concentrated in Putumayo, southern Bolívar, and Guaviare.65 The eradication campaigns were less intense than in the second half of 2021 due to factors including: (i) the desire to avoid tensions and confrontations with the communities that grow coca crops; (ii) the installation of APM to counter the advance of Mobile Eradication Groups; and (iii) the ruling of the Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Pasto that halted eradication activities in 10 municipalities in the Pacific region of Nariño.

In Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Córdoba, and the Catatumbo region, instances of social conflict and their violent escalation have led to the loss of human lives, actions by the communities toward the Army and the National Police, and alleged procedural irregularities by security forces. In the municipality

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62 Especially in the Nudo de Paramillo National Park (Antioquia), Tinigua and Sierra de La Macarena in Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta.
63 In particular, it has led to the involvement of the Indigenous population, especially children and adolescents, in the drug trafficking chain in municipalities in the northern part of Valle del Cauca. It has also led to the arrival of foreigners who rent land and plant coca within the Indigenous territories of the Awá people in Nariño and Putumayo; Cauca, Antioquia and Guaviare.
64 This model is based on community and local initiative. The objective is to implement integrated projects prioritized between the community, the territorial entity, the national government, and the contributor. The main components of the strategy are manual and voluntary removal of illicit crops, rapid response, productive activities, marketing, social and productive infrastructure, verification, and monitoring.
65 Although forced eradication efforts have decreased, interdiction actions have been maintained primarily in Cauca, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo.
66 On May 22, the Anti-Narcotics Division of the National Police carried out a forced eradication operation in the Yurayaco district of the municipality of San José del Fragua. The communities were able to enter into a dialogue with security forces agreeing to partial eradication to mitigate the impact on coca-growing communities. However, one of the demonstrators allegedly rejected this agreement and reacted violently against one of the members of the Antinarcotics Police, attacking him with a sharp weapon; the officer fired his weapon at the farmer, resulting in his death.
of Tibú (Norte de Santander) violent incidents resulted in the detention of members of the security forces and personal injuries to civilians.67

The communities maintain their opposition in the face of these scenarios, arguing that the persistence of this illegal economy in the territories is linked, among other factors, to the economic dependence on coca leaf cultivation, the high vulnerability indexes, the weak State presence, and the failure to follow through with the implementation of voluntary substitution programs. Government institutions have also reinforced the position that this State action cannot be suspended because that would favor the illegal markets and violence fomented by illegal armed groups.

7.4. Law on Victims and Land Restitution

Land restitution has had a favorable impact on the transformation of the territories by contributing to land identification and bringing institutional support to the victims who have received restitution. Proof of this is that the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute (IGAC) authorized the Land Restitution Unit (URT) in April 2022 to manage the land registry. This means that, for properties with a final judgment of land restitution, the URT’s land survey work will facilitate the identification of properties for multipurpose cadastre purposes. Similarly, restitution has favored the comprehensive reparation of victims and access to other rights related to return, such as health, education, and livelihood.

However, the enforcement of orders derived from judgments and precautionary measures presents challenges for institutional coordination, with an impact on the effective realization of the right to restitution. The individuals and communities that have received restitution reported that they are required by different entities to make similar requests, which leads to community attrition and higher operating costs. Local institutions noted that the timely exchange of information to move the process forward is sometimes difficult.

The URT has also held various outreach and dissemination workshops68 on public policy, and has engaged in social dialogue as a mechanism to prevent conflicts arising from the implementation of the public policy. However, the communities and some local institutions are still unaware of the URT’s mandate, the conditions that give a person standing to claim restitution, and the means to do so. This situation is exacerbated in places where the URT has no permanent institutional presence or where micro-targeting has failed to include most of the territory, as in Arauca and Guaviare, and in the Pacific region of Nariño, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, and Catatumbo.

Regarding the ethnic restitution route, the need to strengthen the ethnic teams in the URT’s territorial offices, referred to in the Thirtieth Semiannual Report of the SG/OAS, has been addressed with the reinforcement of personnel in areas with a higher density of land restitution proceedings. Despite the above, effective restitution and the advancement of the judicial stage of the process raise different challenges, due to the particularities involved in this type of claim, such as the size of the territories, the community census, the identification of third parties, and the challenges involved in satisfying the rights of the ethnic communities, among others. As a result, the judicial chambers in charge of these proceedings have a backlog of cases and, of the 169 lawsuits filed on behalf of ethnic communities, only 24 have been adjudicated.

With respect to collective reparation, the Mission’s seven-year follow-up on the construction of the Comprehensive Collective Reparation Plan (PIRC) of the Community Action Entities views positively the approval of the PIRC by the Community Action Entities’ Steering Committee. The document contributes to the recognition by State entities of the acts perpetrated against groups, the continuation of

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67 In the Caño Indio sector, in May 2022, approximately 120 National Army and 16 National Police officers were detained while carrying out forced eradication activities.

68 As of June 30, 2022, the entity reported 19 community outreach workshops in Bolivar, Sucre, Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Cordoba, Tolima, Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Casanare, and Caldas. Support was also provided to the Medellin Metropolitan Technological Institute’s diploma course “Land Restitution, Communication, and Peace,” which included workshops on the restitution process geared toward social leaders, victims’ representatives, public servants, and others. Likewise, since 2021, the URT has been supporting outreach activities with Community Action Entities; 15 workshops have been held since then. URT’s response to the Mission’s request for accomplishments, dated July 18, 2022.
the community project within the framework of the conflict, and the territorialization of public policies, particularly peace policies.

Nevertheless, several challenges have yet to be overcome. They include securing the budget for the effective and timely implementation of the PIRC, as well as the coordinating with other national institutions that complement the reparation measures established in the Plan, such as preventing safety risks for dignitaries; promoting human rights and environmental protection; and directly including community action leaders in the various peace policy strategies in the communities.

7.5. **Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (ZEII) or “Future Zones”**

Decree 2278 of 2019, which established the ZEII, entered its third year of implementation. The PDET acceleration component is the one that shows the greatest progress in the installation, upgrading, or provision of essential infrastructure for the reduction of inequality gaps and access to public resources. However, weaknesses persist mainly in the components of enhanced protection measures for the population and the strengthening of the social rule of law in Antioquia, Arauca, Chocó, Nariño, and Norte de Santander.

The national government maintained the lines of investment for providing basic health and education services and small road infrastructure works in municipalities such as Anorí, Cáceres, El Bagre and Remedios (Antioquia), and the Guayacana-Llorente corridor in Tumaco (Nariño). In Bojayá, Carmen del Darién, and Riosucio (Chocó), boats were also delivered to provide access to medical services and student transportation. Despite this, in other priority areas such as Catatumbo and in Caquetá, Guaviare and Meta, many are still unaware of the policy. Meanwhile, in Arauca, the perception remains that it is a strategy to militarize the territory, with no evidence of major changes in social investment and economic development.

The preservation of water, biodiversity, and the environment is a crosscutting line of the strategy. According to figures from the Ministry of Defense, 27,044 hectares have been recovered and 208,000 hectares of forest have been restored through the Artemis Strategy. However, the perception remains that the operations carried out in Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta have not been able to have an impact on those mainly responsible for deforestation and are only focused on the first link in the chain, the civilian population. This continues to be exploited by illegal armed groups to pressure the communities with threats and push them to reject the State’s action.

Several operations were carried out to address illegal mining, with a focus on taking over illegal mines, seizing heavy machinery, and arresting people associated with this activity. However, the ZEII strategy lacks a roadmap that includes sustainable actions to mitigate the impact on natural resources in the NNP and in the collective territories.

8. **GENDER AND PEACE AGENDA**

The Vice Presidency of the Republic and the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Women’s Equity designed the digital tool “Así avanzan las mujeres en la paz” (“This is how women advance in peace”). The report states that 65% of the 51 gender indicators of the Framework Implementation Plan (PMI) have already been met or have been significantly mainstreamed. Although this tool focuses on the level of progress of these indicators and does not have territory-specific information, it is an important step toward

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69 In Arauca, Bajo Cauca, and southern Córdoba, Catatumbo, Chiribiquete National Natural Park and surrounding parks, and Pacific region of Nariño and Chocó.
70 Each of the Comprehensive Strategic Intervention Plans is made up of the following components: Plan to accelerate the PDETs to prioritize the provision of social services; Plan for enhanced measures to protect the population, under the constitutional jurisdiction of the Armed Forces and the National Police; Plan to strengthen the social rule of law in keeping with the constitutional norms governing public order and the administration of justice.
71 Permanent Directive No. 008 of March 23, 2022, establishes that the Artemis Strategy will be a permanent, comprehensive, and sustained function of the security forces.
the data openness and open government required by the country under the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.

The MAPP/OAS, by virtue of its mandate and the institutional arrangements entered into with the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation, monitors progress and challenges in the implementation of the gender measures of the Final Peace Agreement, in relation to the following: the Special Women’s Authority of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI); political participation; women and gender in the SISEP; the Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders (PIG-Mujeres); security guarantees; and gender mainstreaming in the PDET. women’s political participation and security guarantees for the exercise of politics with a gender perspective in the SISEP; gender mainstreaming in the PDET; the Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders (PIG-Mujeres); and gender mainstreaming in security guarantees, the alert system, and the dismantling policy of the National Commission on Security Guarantees (CNGS).

The representatives of the Special Women’s Authority of the CSIVI were selected nine months after the end of the territorial screening assemblies. Its importance as an autonomous, technical, and political civil society mechanism for the monitoring of the Final Peace Agreement demands that the new members receive urgent support; they must be provided with enhanced guarantees for their effective participation and decisive support for the territorialization strategy.

In terms of women’s political representation, the fact that the new Congress of the Republic is 30% women is an achievement. Similarly, in the 16 CTEPs, women candidates’ political trajectories were more dynamic and visible due to a combination of several factors, including the election of a greater number of women presidents of JACs and the influx of young women into the Municipal Youth Councils. In this context, it is expected that more women from conflict-affected areas interested in political power will participate in local elections in 2023 and will require effective and comprehensive gender-sensitive guarantees to counteract violence against women in politics.

In the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics, no concrete progress has been made with respect to gender mainstreaming since technical deliberations continue to be centralized. Progress has been made in the PIG-Mujeres in Cauca, Chocó, and Putumayo in terms of the participation of women’s organizations and institutional dialogue. On the other hand, it was not possible to start the enrollment phase in Antioquia, and in Norte de Santander there are still no plans to implement the program in the short or medium term.

Comprehensive security and dismantling policies with a gender focus, which are the responsibility of the National Commission on Security Guarantees (CNGS), are still lacking. The gender risks and macro-criminality patterns brought about by the internal armed conflict continue to lack a gender-based, intersectional, timely, and comprehensive institutional response to ensure effective access to prevention, protection, and guarantees of non-repetition.

9. COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION, AND NON-REPETITION (SIVJRNR)

9.1. Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repentition (CEV)

On June 28, the CEV released a section of the Final Report made up of the documents “Call for a Great Peace,” “Findings and Recommendations,” and “Stories of the Armed Conflict in Colombia (Testimonial Volume).” The Final Report is the result of listening to more than 30,000 people, including victims, perpetrators, businesspeople, politicians, leaders, members of the security forces, journalists, women, young people, ethnic peoples and communities, and others. The Commission examined cases and reports on acts of violence and promoted opportunities for dialogue, recognition, and contributions
to the truth, with a national presence through 28 “Truth Houses” (Casas de la Verdad) and actions in 23 countries.

The document describes the magnitude of the armed conflict and its impact on Colombian society. It notes, among the most relevant figures, that 90% of the victims are from civil society; between 26,900 and 35,641 children and adolescents were recruited between 1986 and 2017; 8 million hectares have been the object of violent land grabs; and that events during the period between 1996 and 2008 produced approximately 75% of the victims of the armed conflict, according to official records.

The recommendations included by the CEV in the report are organized for implementation in the short, medium, and long term and focus on the permanent cessation of armed confrontations, progress in peacebuilding and comprehensive reparation, the strengthening of democracy, and actions for the knowledge, dissemination, and continuity of the Legacy.73

The Commission has also developed a stakeholder “ownership” strategy, including a digital platform that includes the Report and audio, video, and text tools for public consultation; the network of partners made up of civil society and the international community committed to adopting the findings and recommendations; and the Follow-Up and Monitoring Committee.74 The Committee, composed of seven people appointed based on criteria of plurality, inclusion, and gender equity, serves mainly to ensure that the recommendations contained in the Final Report are implemented.

The victims’ demand for the truth has been constant, and recounting past events is a challenging process. The contributions to the Final Report were not without competing positions and tensions over its underlying assumptions, coming from various sectors of society and even from among the commissioners. Having a State entity acknowledge and name what happened was profoundly significant for the victims; but it starkly contrasted with the situation of those who did not see themselves represented and included in the process. Likewise, despite the CEV’s efforts to include all voices, some sectors have questioned the veracity of the statistics provided in the Report, even though they come from multiple sources, including official data.

The Final Report is a broad tool for public knowledge and reflection. This, coupled with the acknowledgment of the various truths of the armed conflict, should lead to dialogues that make it possible to deal with differences and move towards coexistence and non-repetition, helping to meet the challenge of building peace.

**9.2. Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD)**

The UBPD has built a support network that seeks to consolidate its legitimacy and credibility with civil society organizations. It has done so through trust-based environments and educational spaces for relatives and loved ones to participate in regional plans, as well as through the exchange of experiences and methodologies with organizations in the search process.

In the districts of La Gabarra in Tibú and La Paz in El Tarra (Norte de Santander), the UBPD partnered with civil society organizations to enter the search areas,75 as well as with the Territorial Councils for Participation, Reconciliation, and Coexistence, to explore avenues of coordination in the municipalities. In Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, bilateral meetings were held with community organizations to carry out diagnostic assessments and promote awareness of the mandate; and in Bajo Atrato, Darién, and Urabá, three search plans were drawn up with the goal of establishing humanitarian corridors and encouraging coordination among local actors.

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73 The Legacy is a strategy consisting of three components: the network of partners from organizations of civil society entities, institutions, sectors, and international organizations; the Final Report, which is the narrative document relating the conflict and the persistence factors in terms of non-repetition and coexistence; and transmedia storytelling, which are digital initiatives that will support and maximize knowledge and appropriation of the Final Report.

74 Its financing is guaranteed through resources from the General Budget of the Nation under the auspices of the JEP.

75 Territories in which there is information on the possible burial of bodies.
In Putumayo and in the regions of Catatumbo and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, the UBPD made progress in developing the Regional Search Plans, which included providing forums for dialogue and information analysis, approaching the families, identifying the places of disappearance to determine contexts, and stakeholder mapping for territorial coordination.

The UBPD and the JEP also coordinated actions that led to the adoption of the “Search and restorative process of transitional justice” route. This involves receiving input from participants, in compliance with the “conditionality regime” [régimen de condicionalidad] or a court order; the exchange and flow of information; and the involvement of participants in implementing the Regional Search Plans, in coordination with special sanctions and the restorative process. This led to the receipt of information from people from different sectors participating before the JEP, and allowed the Unit to contact appearing parties and their legal representatives to gather confidential information leading to the location of individuals.

Bilateral roundtables were also held between the JEP and the UBPD to address actions in the territories under the Jurisdiction’s protection. This provided opportunities to work jointly, such as the participation of the UBPD in public hearings to share the progress and outcomes of its interventions.

9.3. Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)

The deadline set by the JEP for the submission of reports on crimes committed during the internal armed conflict was extended until March 2022. However, many organizations and victims were left without the opportunity to submit reports. Another limiting factor in this process, as well as in the accreditation of victims, was the reconfiguration of violent scenarios in the territories, especially in those with a greater presence of residual or dissident FARC-EP groups. This is because many of the people belonging to this illegal armed groups may face charges, which poses a greater risk to the victims.

The Investigation and Indictment Unit of the JEP has set up a conflict observatory which, alongside compliance with precautionary measures, constitutes a significant effort to prevent the occurrence of risks to victims and communities participating in the Jurisdiction. The actions of illegal armed groups have heightened the risk for accredited and non-accredited victims in Catatumbo, the Pacific region of Nariño, and in the departments of Cauca, Chocó, and Valle del Cauca.

Participants have also been threatened because of their involvement in the JEP, in an attempt to prevent them from contributing to the right to the truth, which has also affected their continued participation in the Jurisdiction. In some cases, because of these circumstances, their contributions are limited to the minimum necessary or, in other cases, their accounts point to deceased former combatants as the main perpetrators. It is vitally important to coordinate the preventive and protective actions established in the precautionary measures and in the ECI, to ensure participants’ effective appearance before the Jurisdiction.

The JEP made progress in the dignified return of remains exhumed in the Dabeiba cemetery, in cases 03 and 04, which are investigating the murders and forced disappearances wrongfully presented as combat casualties and the territorial situation in Urabá, respectively. These transfers were carried out with the solemnity of judicial proceedings, and included elements of reparation and dignity for the victims. The coordination between the chambers and the National Institute of Forensic Medicine and the UBPD, especially in Antioquia, has served in many cases to bring decades of impunity to a close.

The voluntary statements made by those appearing before the JEP, particularly in the framework of the dialogic truth-building hearings, have led to the discovery of mass graves and minefields in Case

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76 It envisages three facets of coordination: (i) Receipt of input from those appearing in compliance with the “conditionality regime” or a court order; (ii) Exchange and flow of information; (iii) Participation in the implementation of actions of the Regional Search Plans in coordination with their special sanctions (sanciones propias) and the restorative process.

77 Civilians, former combatants, and security forces.

78 The initial deadline was March 15, 2021. The last extension was granted through Order 134 of 2021.
02 in Barbacoas, Tumaco, and Ricaurte (Nariño). However, there are risks of impunity and the recurrence of criminal acts if the parties involved in this case are subject to extradition proceedings.

The Chamber for Acknowledgment [Sala de Reconocimiento] developed the new lines of investigation on the commission of crimes not subject to amnesty committed by the FARC-EP, security forces, or other State agents, or in association with paramilitary groups and civilian third parties; on crimes committed against ethnic communities and their territories; and those related to gender-based violence in the context of the armed conflict. However, these pose a challenge, considering the Chamber’s deadline to complete its investigations and ensure the continuity of the other proceedings of the JEP. This is particularly so when, after five years of operation of the Jurisdiction, five orders of determination of facts and conduct have been issued for two of the seven prioritized macro-cases.

In April, this Chamber also held the first public hearing for the acknowledgment of truth and responsibility within its sphere of competence, in macro case 03 on “Killings and forced disappearances presented by State agents as combat casualties.” The victims were summoned to this hearing, as well as ten members of the National Army and a civilian recruiter who admitted responsibility for more than 100 murders and forced disappearances committed in the region of Catatumbo, Norte de Santander, between 2007 and 2008.

The lessons learned in the transitional justice context were evident in this hearing, due to its restorative nature. It helped to redefine direct victims, constituted an act of satisfaction, and is a historic milestone that represents an opportunity to promote social and institutional changes for Colombia to move forward on the road to peace.

Finally, as part of the judicial proceedings conducted by Justice and Peace against the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, testimony has been received and investigations have been carried out in relation to the FARC-EP over the last 15 years. Its decisions and judgments must be harmonized with those handed down by the JEP, respecting jurisdictional autonomy and ensuring that the decisions are not contradictory, in order to avoid having several versions of the same dynamics and victimizing events.

**10. RECOMMENDATIONS**

10.1 To the Ministry of the Interior

10.1.1 Within the framework of the CIPRAT, formalize the regional follow-up workshops and strategies with a differential approach, as tools for strengthening the rapid response prevention and alert system, detailing the differences between the rapid response procedures for early warnings of imminent risk and structural risk.

10.1.2 In coordination with the National Registry of Civil Status, establish a dialogue with the communities, to evaluate the CTEP electoral process and lessons learned. The purpose of this is to adapt the regulations to the specific circumstances of the territories, broaden the educational component, and focus efforts on building citizen capacities—including effective oversight—for the next political and electoral cycles, considering the difficult physical and virtual access to rural territories. This exercise should involve civil society actors.

10.2 To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In coordination with Migración Colombia, the Venezuelan Border Management and territorial authorities, continue to grant PPT and coordinate institutional capacities and procedures aimed at assisting the migrant population.

10.3 To the Ministry of Justice and Law

In coordination with the Ministry of National Defense, harmonize the different governmental and international methodologies for the collection of figures and statistics related to the density of illicit crops.

10.4. To the Ministry of National Defense
Strengthen decision-making processes within the framework of military operations against illegal armed groups in order to prevent harm to the civilian population and breaches of international humanitarian law. Likewise, expedite the investigations to clarify what happened in the town of Alto Remanso in the municipality of Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo.

10.5 To the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

Strengthen the follow-up and monitoring strategies of the competent authorities and the demining experts designated in the territories, in case of new suspicion of APM or UXO in the areas declared free of suspected explosive ordnance contamination.

10.6 To the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Stabilization and Consolidation

10.6.1 Finalize the regulatory process of the Comprehensive Protection Program for those in the process of reincorporation, its political leadership, headquarters, and activities, ensuring that it is widely publicized in the territories.

10.6.2 Ensure the equitable and transparent allocation of resources for PDET initiatives, in line with the commitments established in the Final Peace Agreement, the Framework Implementation Plan, and other related fiscal policy instruments. Likewise, expand and strengthen the exclusive sources of financing for the PDET in order to prioritize the subregions with the greatest deficits.

10.7 To the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights and International Affairs

Within the framework of CIPRUNNA, ensure the permanence and sustainability of strategies to prevent the recruitment, use, and exploitation of and sexual violence against children and adolescents by illegal armed groups, through the formulation of a public policy that allocates an ample budget for the execution of strengthening and coordination actions between territorial entities and civil society for the guarantee of children’s rights.

10.8 To the Office of the Presidential Advisor for National Security

Assess the actions implemented within the framework of the ZEII strategy, in order to evaluate, with a multidimensional approach, the impact on security conditions and social investment in the prioritized territories during the three years this policy has been in effect. In this way, determine its effectiveness in terms of nation-territory coordination in the unified, inter-agency, and comprehensive intervention of the State.

10.9. To the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Superior Council of the Judiciary

Strengthen initiatives to guarantee the autonomous rights of Indigenous peoples through the promotion of existing legal instruments, capacity building of Indigenous peoples in the autonomous exercise of the JEI, and the further development of scenarios for the recognition of their own community justice proceedings and interjurisdictional coordination. This should be done within a framework of mutual respect, allowing for coordinated work between ethnic legal systems, the national legal system, and transitional justice mechanisms.

10.10 To the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights and International Affairs, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and the Office of the Attorney General and the National Protection Unit

Design a comprehensive State policy to mitigate the extermination and security risks that continue to threaten Indigenous peoples, with appropriate public policy and judicial measures that include components to strengthen governance, justice, and protection.

10.11 To the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Office of the Attorney General and the Superior Council of the Judiciary
Establish linkages between the Strategy against Organized Crime and the strengthening of the Ministry’s Local Justice Systems; the Strategic Orientation of the FGN and the Strategic Plan of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, including coordinated actions with common objectives that help improve access and responsiveness in the justice system, especially in the territories most affected by the armed conflict, to reach the territories in an orderly manner and respond to the needs of each one.

**10.12 To the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Ministry of National Defense, the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Office of the Ombudsperson**

Work jointly with local and national authorities to continue with training on the process and strengthen linkage and coordination efforts through inter-institutional spaces in order to overcome difficulties in implementing the individual submission to justice route.

**10.13 To the Land Restitution Unit**

As part of the legal claims, include a request for the judicial chambers to designate an entity responsible for managing the different orders, which will facilitate coordinated actions to ensure their enforcement. In addition, create opportunities with municipal authorities to include training on the policy and access to information for basic assistance and advice in areas where the URT does not maintain a permanent presence.

**10.13 To the Unit for Comprehensive Victim Assistance and Reparation**

Guarantee the budget for the implementation of the Comprehensive Collective Reparation Plan (PIRC) of the Community Action Entities, adapted to each reparation measure signed.

**10.14 To the National Commission on Security Guarantees**

Expedite the conclusion of the process for developing and implementing the Action Plan, which is the road map that will coordinate and guide strategies at the national, departmental, and municipal levels to dismantle criminal organizations and conduct.

**10.15 To the High-Level Authority on Gender of the National Government**

Accelerate the creation of a National Action Plan under Resolution 1325/00 for Colombia, harmonized with the gender measures of the Final Peace Agreement, which will allow the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda to be grounded in the country’s current reality. At the same time, reposition the Special Women’s Authority of the CSIVI within this process, regulating its role and scope as an autonomous, technical, and political mechanism for women in peace, expanding and effectively realizing its guarantees of participation and territorial coordination.

**10.16 To the National Planning Department**

In coordination with the ministries and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Nation, provide ongoing support for the implementation of the training and technical assistance strategy led by ART for structuring, resource management, and accountability in the PDET municipalities with the greatest lags in the process of designing, approving, and financing initiatives.

**10.17 To the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute**

Work toward defining the main components of a prison treatment program and determine actions based on the need for resocialization and guarantees of non-repetition rather than containment based on the inmate’s security threat profile.

**10.18 To the Constitutional Court**

Under the framework of the ruling finding an “unconstitutional state of affairs” regarding the security situation of signatories to the Peace Agreement, develop a follow-up mechanism that ensures the collection of national and territorial inputs with a focus on sustainability and interdisciplinarity. This is
aimed at creating greater opportunities for coordination with other justice authorities, such as the JEP and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and overcoming the challenges and difficulties identified.

10.19 To the Special Jurisdiction for Peace

Strengthen the capacities of the Investigation and Indictment Unit (UIA), the Chamber for Acknowledgment (SRVR) and other bodies responsible for studying and issuing precautionary and protection measures, to ensure the appropriate participation of victims and appearing parties, preventing risk scenarios.

10.20 To the Disappeared Persons Search Unit

Strengthen the working groups with the JEP to massively expand the identification of areas and territories for the location of bodies. Likewise, accelerate the implementation of regional search plans, with budgetary allocations to support search teams and satisfy the rights of victims whose search processes have not advanced.

10.21 To the Territorial Renewal Agency

Based on consultation and dialogue with delegates from the Impetus Group and the Special Consultation Mechanism, design a citizen participation protocol for monitoring PDET initiatives. This process will allow the entity and the communities to agree on competencies and on how the right to citizen participation can be exercised within the framework of the PDETs.
## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AETCR</td>
<td>Former Territorial Training and Reincorporation Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICMA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>National Land Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>anti-personnel mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Territorial Renewal Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARN</td>
<td>Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACIN</td>
<td>Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>right of use contracts</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEV</td>
<td>Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPRAT</td>
<td>Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPRUNNA</td>
<td>Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment, Use of, and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTEP</td>
<td>Temporary Special Electoral Districts for Peace</td>
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<td>CNGS</td>
<td>National Commission on Security Guarantees</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPES</td>
<td>National Council on Economic and Social Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIC</td>
<td>Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIVI</td>
<td>Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCI</td>
<td>Bureau for the Substitution of Illicit Crops</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECI</td>
<td>Unconstitutional state of affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESMAD</td>
<td>Mobile Anti-Riot Squad</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army or “Los Pelusos”</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>education on antipersonnel mine risks</td>
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<td>ERON</td>
<td>National Detention Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army</td>
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<td>FGN</td>
<td>Office of the Attorney General</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>Impetus Group</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>gender-based violence</td>
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<td>IEDs</td>
<td>improvised explosive devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAC</td>
<td>Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute</td>
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<td>INPEC</td>
<td>National Penitentiary and Prison Institute</td>
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<td>JAC</td>
<td>Community Action Councils</td>
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<td>JEI</td>
<td>Special Indigenous Jurisdiction</td>
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<td>JEP</td>
<td>Special Jurisdiction for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPP/OAS</td>
<td>Mission to Support of the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Special Consultation Mechanisms</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
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<td>NAR</td>
<td>New Reincorporation Areas</td>
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<td>OAC</td>
<td>Community Action Entities</td>
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<td>OACP</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Peace</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>PDET</td>
<td>Rural Development Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIG-Mujeres</td>
<td>Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIRC</td>
<td>Comprehensive Collective Reparation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPL</td>
<td>persons deprived of liberty</td>
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</table>
PNIS - Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops
PNN - national parks
PPR - persons in the process of reincorporation
PPT - Temporary Protection Permits
SIVJRNR - Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition
UIA - Investigation and Indictment Unit
UARIV - Unit for Comprehensive Victim Assistance and Reparation
UBPD - Disappeared Persons Search Unit
UNP - National Protection Unit
URT - Land Restitution Unit
ZEII- Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention